

The Aristotelian Conception of δύναμις in Arendt's Understanding of Power*

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Hannah Arendt, one of the most significant political and philosophical intellectuals of the 20th century, frequently brought up the issue of power. In *The Human Condition*, to distinguish power from force, strength, and, particularly, violence, she pointed out that the word 'power' had been derived from the Aristotelian conception of δύναμις. Since Arendt had written about power as the capacity to act together in the political realm, her understanding of the term δύναμις was credited to Aristotle. In order to make the distinction between power and its extremity, that is, violence, in Arendt's theory more comprehensible, it is crucial to examine the Aristotelian conception of the term δύναμις and its original definitions, which are mostly found in *Metaphysics*. This paper aims to provide a philosophical analysis of δύναμις in Aristotle to clarify Arendt's notion of power as well as her theory of action. In the first part of the article, the author discusses the word δύναμις which had a variety of meanings in antiquity including power, potentiality, potency, capacity, possibility, and force. Unlike common meanings, Aristotle used the word δύναμις in its relation to the term ἐνέργεια, which were usually translated as 'potentiality' and 'actuality'. Aristotle defined δύναμις as the principle of change, that is, the power or capacity to act and be affected, which reveals itself when it achieves its fulfilment, or ἐνέργεια. In the second part, the author demonstrates that Arendt's concept of power is based on the Aristotelian δύναμις as the power to act together, which cannot be stored up and exists only in its actualization. The author concludes by saying that power in the Aristotelian sense cannot be substituted for violence but instead manifests itself in the ability to be a political human being.

Keywords: power, δύναμις, Aristotle, Hannah Arendt, capacity.

Hannah Arendt, an outstanding twentieth-century political philosopher, was known to be passionate about antiquity and its high political realm under the name of πόλις. In contrast to the modern society of apolitical human beings, πόλις was seen by Arendt as an organization where people could exercise their freedom by acting together. "To be political, to live in a πόλις meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence" (Arendt 1998, 26). The capacity to act in a political realm like πόλις was distinguished by Arendt as power which she derives from the Aristotelian conception of δύναμις. To realize the importance of the distinction between power, force, strength, and violence made by Arendt, it is necessary to trace the Aristotelian the-

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ory of δύναμις and its original meanings. In this article, I propose that the Aristotelian revision of δύναμις could help clarify Arendt's sense of power as well as her theory of action.

I want to start by mentioning the role of power in Arendt's theory. In *On Violence*, the political theorist raised the question on the nature of violence in the political realm. According to her theory, power had come to be interpreted in terms of violence, since it had been viewed as an instrument of rule with its instinct of domination (Arendt 1970, 36). The result of such power is effectiveness of commands (ib. 37) and bureaucracy, the most tragic aspect of the command-obedience model, which is currently the most formidable manifestation of such dominance. Bureaucracy is defined as the 'rule by Nobody' (ib. 38). Arendt developed the following idea as a result of her longing for the past: "When the Athenian city-state called its constitution an isonomy, or the Romans spoke of the *civitas* as the form of government, they had in mind a concept of power, and law whose essence did not rely on the command-obedience relationship and which did not identify power and rule or law and command" (ib. 40). As stated by the political thinker, the command-obedient model arose when two aspects of action — on the one hand, beginning, understood by Arendt as ἀρχεῖν, and, on the other hand, achieving (πράττειν) — were separated. The leader or beginner becomes the ruler, who gives commands to someone who executes those commands. The separation of the original unity of action into giving commands and obeying represented an escape from politics (Arendt 1998, 189). The Arendtian point was to recover the *original* understanding of action as the beginning of something new. This beginning was bound up with human natality, which made the newcomer capable of action.

Every human being has the initiative to begin something new, that is, to act (Arendt 1998, 177), to be the ruler and executor of his actions. The important conclusion is in the simple fact that the capacity for action — the fact that man is capable of action — is inherent to every human being. For Arendt, the political realm not only arises directly out of acting together, where men reveal themselves by sharing words and deeds, but is also the only activity that constitutes it (Arendt 1998, 198). Furthermore, such a capacity to act is concerned with power to act and, as Arendt indicates, has a Greek equivalent: δύναμις. Thus, the consideration of power in Arendt requires focusing on the concept of power conceptualized by Aristotle.

1. The Aristotelian concept of δύναμις

The word δύναμις derives from δύναμαι and in general denotes 'power' or 'force'. Pierre Chantraine points out that this force has nothing in common with ἰσχύς (strength) or ῥώμη (bodily strength), but in the plural it could be used in a political sense and indicates military forces (Chantraine 1968, 301). Aristotle uses this term in the sense of potentiality in opposition to actuality (ἐνέργεια). However, there are different translations of δύναμις in Aristotle, like 'power, capacity, potentiality, ability, potency, and possibility'. These difficulties in translation display the various senses of the word that Aristotle mostly demonstrates in his *Metaphysics*. Moreover, in Aristotle's terminology, δύναμις has its cognates in the two adjectives δυνατός (capable) and ἀδύνατος (impossible), and the verb δύνασθαι (to be able). In *Metaphysics* Δ 12, Aristotle gives a short investigation trying to sort out the different meanings of δύναμις. In that chapter, it is possible to trace the two main meanings of δύναμις for Aristotle as 'power' and 'capacity' (Arist. *Metaph.*

1019a15–32), but it also has the meaning of possibility or possible in opposition to impossible (Arist. *Metaph.* 1019b22–33). The latter is not considered in the current article.

In *Metaphysics* Θ Aristotle deals with the main sense or the strict usage (μάλιστα κυρίως) of δύναμις (*Met.* 1045b35), which discusses δύναμις as a principle of change (κατὰ κίνησιν 1046a1). W.D. Ross interprets δύναμις in respect of movement as a power¹, that is ‘a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other’ or ‘Power is a capacity in A of producing a change in B (Ross 1975, cxxiv). Let me cite Aristotle himself when he defines δύναμις in *Metaphysics* Δ 12:

δύναμις λέγεται ἢ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἑτερον, οἶον ἢ οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμις ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὐσα ὑπάρχει ἂν ἐν τῷ ἰατρουμένῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἢ ἰατρουόμενος. ἢ μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἢ κινήσεως λέγεται δύναμις ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἑτερον, ἢ δ’ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου ἢ ἢ ἑτερον (Arist. *Metaph.* 1019a15–20)².

Power means (1) a source of movement or change, which is in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing qua other; e. g. the art of building is a power which is not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which is a power, may be in the man healed, but not in him qua healed. Power then means the source, in general, of change or movement in another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also (2) the source of a thing’s being moved by another thing or by itself qua other. (W.D. Ross’ translation, modified.)

According to this passage, δύναμις is a kind of beginning, but it is not a movement at all. It is something that could be labeled as an *initiative* if it is the starting point of something that can change. W.D. Ross gives a good translation of δύναμις as a principle enabling a thing to be changed (Ross 1975, 312). Consequently, δύναμις has an active meaning. Δύναμις can be exemplified as an art, as an instrument someone can use. The art of building is the potentiality of the thing being built. At the same time, δύναμις is in the man being healed, who has the power to be healed *qua* the art of healing, that is, the active capacity. Further, Aristotle designates δύναμις in two different meanings. First, δύναμις can be used as a change of something and has the meaning of the word ποιεῖν (make, do, act), as has been demonstrated earlier. Second, δύναμις is in something that could be changed and this thing — even an animal, or a man — has the capacity to be changed, this capacity could be determined as πάσχειν (suffer, to be affected).

The passage is connected to Θ of *Metaphysics*, where the philosopher speaks about δύναμις more clearly:

φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς μία δύναμις [20] τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (δυνατὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν καὶ τῷ ἄλλο ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς ἄλλη. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι (διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀρχήν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀρχήν τινα, πάσχει τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἄλλο ὑπ’ ἄλλου: τὸ λιπαρὸν μὲν [25] γὰρ καυστὸν τὸ δ’ ὑπεῖκον ὡδὶ θλαστὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ δ’ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οἶον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἢ οἰκοδομικὴ, ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαντικῷ ἢ δ’ ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ: διὸ ἢ συμπεφυκεν, οὐθὲν πάσχει αὐτὸ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ: ἐν γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο (*Metaph.* 1046a19–29).

It is plain then that there is in a way one capacity of acting and being affected (for something is capable both in that it has a capacity of being acted upon and in that something else can be acted on by it), but in another way they are different. For the one is in the thing affected

¹ J. Beere also understands and translates δύναμις as power. See Beere 2009, 33–152.

² Here and further, the edition cited is Ross 1975.

(for it is because it has a certain origin, and because the matter also is a certain origin, that what is affected is affected, and one thing by another; for what is oily can be burnt while what yields in a certain way can be crushed, and similarly as regards other cases); the other in contrast is in what acts, such as heat and the building craft — the one in what can heat and the other in what can build. That is why, qua naturally unified, nothing is affected by itself; for it is one, and not something else. (S. Makin's translation.)

Aristotle notes two types of δύναμις to act and be affected or the active power (capacity) and passive power:

1. The active and the passive powers (capacities) are the one power (1046a20–22);
2. The active and passive powers (capacities) are distinct (1046a22–29).

The first type can be explained with the help of the earlier passage, where δύναμις is ἡ ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο (is an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other (Ross' translation) (Arist. *Metaph.* 1046a11). This ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ can be opposed to ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου (the originative source of change by another thing) (Ross' translation, modified) (Ross 1975, 241). According to this interpretation, the active and passive δύναμις are complementary aspects of a single fact, i. e., if one thing can change another, like, for example, A can change B. A has an active power, and B has a passive power (Ross 1975, 241). Thus, a single fact, fire that heats water ensures that fire manifests its active power, and water passive one.

The unity of active and passive aspects in δύναμις can be also treated otherwise, in the sense that the active power of an agent affects the object which responds according to its own power and they together produce the effect which unifies them but is posterior to their powers — 'the single rise in temperature which is the exercise of fire's active capacity to heat water and water's passive capacity to be heated by fire', as S. Makin proposes. Stephen Makin prefers the second explanation because it allows 'that something could have an active capacity without anything having the correlative passive capacity; for example, that craftsman could have the capacity to build houses in the absence of any materials with the passive capacity to be built into houses' (Makin 2006, 30). According to Makin, this second option is preferable because although we always have capacities to do something or to suffer something, Aristotle inclines to indicate that we have capacities or powers to change something only when there is something that can be changed or affected.

To defend Ross' position and mine, I want to demonstrate the principle that could be named the ποιεῖν/πάσχειν principle in Aristotle. W. D. Ross cites *De Anima* (425b25–426a30) when he explains the single unifying fact of active and passive powers. The second chapter of *De Anima* investigates the sense perception, or αἴσθησις, which is scrutinized in Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. Aristotle examines ἡ ὄψις (vision) and ἡ ὄρασις (seeing or the act of seeing). These two words of seeing explain the Aristotelian division on possibility and actuality, where ἡ ὄψις is a possibility of seeing something or ἡ ὄρασις. When we see something, our vision is acting, but at the same moment, it is also affected by something. For example, we can see an apple; when we see an apple, we act, but the image of an apple is our affection. As Aristotle notes: ἡ ὄψις πάσχει, οὕτω καὶ ποιεῖ τι (the vision is affected, but also it acts on something) (Arist. *Parv. nat.* 459b27). Thus, we can perceive the power to act or to be affected as the one power or capacity.

Aristotle further adduces the second type of δύναμις, where the passive and active powers are not the same (*Metaph.* 1046a22–29). The explanation seems simple because it concerns different locations of the active and passive capacities. The passive capacity is

in the patient (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι) and the active capacity is in the agent (ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι). The passive capacity, for example, could be in something capable of being burnt like oily things that are flammable. However, the source of their burning must be something else, like fire, which could be considered the agent. The active capacity is in the agent; for example, it is fire or the building craft. Thus, the active and passive capacities belong to different things because nothing affects itself or could be affected by itself.³

Aristotle terms this state of alienation or change that could be caused by the power (δύναμις) to change or to be changed πάθος, which can be translated as affect or affection. He examines this word in its different meanings, but some of these are important for the current consideration: 1) πάθος as a quality (ποιότης) in respect of which a thing can be changed (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται) and 2) πάθος as the actualization of the qualities and their changes (αἱ τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη) (*Metaph.* 1022b15–20). The most significant definition of πάθος is given in the treatise *De Anima*:

σωτηρία μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχίᾳ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν (*De An.* 417b3–4).

The other way is rather preservation of the being in potentiality by the being in actuality and thus being like, as potentiality is with respect to actuality. (R. Polansky's translation.)

According to Aristotle, everything that exists has two modes of being: actually and potentially. If something has the capacity to build, it has a realization of this capacity respectively. In Θ of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle criticizes the Megarians, who vindicate the concept of potentiality by saying that something can act when it is acting. On the contrary, Aristotle points out that someone has a capacity to build when he is not building. If the Megarians were right, people would become blind and deaf many times a day (*Metaph.* 1046b29–1047a10). Thus, it is important that δύναμις as power or capacity to change be in correlation with its actualization, that is, ἡ ἐνέργεια (actuality).

Unlike the word δύναμις, which is an ordinary Greek word, 'ἐνέργεια' was invented by Aristotle. It is usually translated as 'actuality' or 'actualization' and used in relation to δύναμις. Also, Aristotle applies another word for actuality, ἐντελέχεια. The latter is rare in *Metaphysics* Θ (six occurrences: Θ1, 1045b33–4, 1045b35; Θ3, 1047a 30, 1047b2; Θ7, 1049a 5–6; Θ8, 1050a23). W.D. Ross supposes that ἐνέργεια means activity or actualization, while ἐντελέχεια 'means the resulting actuality or perfection' (Ross 1975, 245). S. Makin offers another translation of ἐντελέχεια; he understands it as a fulfillment (Makin 2006, xxviii). Both words are neologisms, and there are disagreements about their etymologies.

As for the word ἐντελέχεια, Aristotle mentions at *Metaph.* Θ 8, 1050a 21–3, that the word is derived from the τέλος (goal, aim, or end). The alternative to the Aristotelian explanation is that ἐντελέχεια has its origin in the adjective ἐντελής (perfect, full, and complete) (Makin 2006, xxix; Ross, 1975, 245). Both words are mostly used as synonyms. As far as the term ἐνέργεια is primarily associated with ἡ κίνησις (movement), S. Makin inclines to understand such a kind of movement as change due to the fact that it is not always a movement like from A to B:

ἐλήλυθε δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦνομα, ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι, διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὴ οὔσιν οὐκ ἀποδιδόασι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄλλας δὲ τινὰς κατηγορίας, οἷον διανοητὰ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὰ εἶναι

³ Some problems of active and passive capacities are discussed by S. Makin. See Makin 2006, 32–36.

τὰ μὴ ὄντα, κινούμενα δὲ οὐ, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ὄντα ἐνεργεῖα ἔσσονται ἐνεργεῖα. τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ἓν ἰα δυνάμει ἔστιν: οὐκ ἔστι δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελεχεία ἔστιν (*Metaph.* 1047a30–1047b2).

The term ‘actuality’, the term connected with fulfilment, has also been extended to other cases from applying most of all to change. For it seems that actuality most of all has its being qua change which is why in addition people do not assign change to non-beings, though some other predicates, such as being thought about and being desired, are predicated of non-beings, but not being changed, and this is because while not being actually they will be actually. For some of the things which are not are potentially; but they are not because they are not in fulfilment. (S. Makin’s translation.)

The term ἡ ἐνέργεια is used to designate not only movements. We can say that I have the capacity to walk, and when I am walking, I actualize my capacity to walk. Nevertheless, there are a lot of things that do not exist because they are not actualized. Some not-beings Aristotle shows as διανοητὰ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὰ (thoughts and desires) that can be actualized and their actualization is ἐνέργεια. Further, Aristotle gives an example of ‘Hermes’, who being in the wood (τῷ ξύλῳ) has the power or potentiality to be a statue, but when he becomes the statue of Hermes, his existence will be in actuality (*Metaph.* 1048a30–33). At the time as things actualize their potentiality they achieve their fulfilment, or ἐντελέχεια.

Moreover, Aristotle distinguishes movements from actualities in their relation to the end or completion, τὸ τέλος. He demonstrates in *Metaph.* 1048b20–35 that some actions, like seeing, have an end in themselves, but others, like being healed, are incomplete and have their completion or end in something else:

οἷον ὄρᾳ ἄμα καὶ ἐώρακε, καὶ φρονεῖ καὶ πεφρόνηκε, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν (*Metaph.* 1048b23–24).

For example, at the same time one is seeing [and has seen], and is understanding [and has understood] and is thinking and has thought, but it is not that one is learning and has learned. (S. Makin’s translation.)

That is why some of them are called changes or, in some cases, movements, but other actualities:

τούτων δὴ δεῖ τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ’ ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχυρασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις: [30] αὐτὰ δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε (*Metaph.* 1048b28–30).

Of these then [it is necessary] to call some changes, and others actualities. For all change is incomplete, thinning, learning, walking, house building; these are changes and surely incomplete. (S. Makin’s translation.)

Though the power to act seems to have a priority over actuality, the Philosopher insists on the fact that actuality is prior to power or potentiality: πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἔστιν (*Metaph.* 1049b5). He provides three instances of such priority. First, the actuality is prior in definition (λόγῳ) (*Metaph.* 1049b11), because if someone is going to act or be able to act, it is necessary that he primarily should have the power to act. For example, to be able to build houses, it is necessary to have the capacity to build, just as it is necessary to have the capacity to see (*Metaph.* 1049b13–16). In this sense, someone or something possesses powers or capacities, but this possession appears only in its actualization. Second, the priority is in time, when someone or something is actualized by another individual, like man by man or musician by musician (*Metaph.* 1049b25–26). No one is capable of building if

he has not built anything. Third, the actuality is primarily in substance (οὐσία) (*Metaph.* 1050a4). The explanation of this statement goes with the following assertion:

καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἔνεκα ἢ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἢ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἢ δύναμις [10] λαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἴνα ὄψιν ἔχωσιν ὀρώσι τὰ ζῶα ἀλλ' ὅπως ὀρώσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδομικὴν ἴνα [12] οἰκοδομῶσι καὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν ἴνα θεωρῶσιν: ἀλλ' οὐ θεωροῦσιν ἴνα θεωρητικὴν ἔχωσιν (1050a7–12).

... and because everything that comes to be proceeds to an origin and an end (for that for the sake of which is an origin, and the coming to be is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is an end, and the potentiality is acquired for the sake of this. For it is not that animals see in order that they may have sight but they have sight so that they may see, and likewise too they possess the building craft in order that they may build and the contemplative ability in order that they may contemplate; but it is not that they contemplate in order that they may have the contemplative ability. (S. Makin's translation.)

The most essential statement from the passage is that ἡ ἐνέργεια or actuality is the end, so the power has its end in its actuality. The Aristotelian teleology achieves its crucial meaning in these lines. On the one hand, Aristotle talks about the ends in the movements, or rather, changes like seeing. On the other hand, the end is not always in changing but in something else, as if the act of building is in the thing built. Some ends are in the activities or actions; others are in the products those actions make (*Metaph.* 1050a16–1050b1). If the end is in the action, the activity is called ἐντελέχεια.

τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἢ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διὸ καὶ τοῦνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν (*Metaph.* 1050a21–23).

For the action is the end, and the actuality is the action. And so even the word 'actuality' is derived from 'action', and points to the complete reality (W.D. Ross' translation).

For this reason, in *Politics*, Aristotle declares that the city-state, πόλις, is the end, a kind of partnership that exists for some good (*Pol.* 1252a1–2; 1252b31). If πόλις is the end, it is at the same time the actuality. A political organization like πόλις exists for good living only when the power to be τὸ πολιτικὸν ζῆλον is actualized. It is the only way for πόλις to exercise its true being.

2. Arendt's adaptation of the Aristotelian δύναμις

It is noteworthy that Arendt primarily examines action in the political realm. Her concept of action is closely connected with the possibility or capacity to act. This possibility of action is considered the power to act. As Arendt notes: "Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert" (Arendt 1970, 44). On the one hand, every human being has the power to act, which in Aristotle's terminology is δύναμις. This δύναμις as a power has a meaning of ἀρχή or the principle of any movement or change. That is why every human being has power but never possesses it: "...power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies; like the instruments of violence, but exists only in its actualization. Where it is not actualized, it passes away" (Arendt 1998, 200). As well as the Aristotelian δύναμις it is always in relation to ἡ ἐνέργεια because it is the τέλος of a power. When we stop acting, our power becomes a possibility again, but it is never 'the

property of an individual' (Arendt 1970, 44). On the other hand, the fact that people act 'in concert' means that a man has the power or possibility to act only *inter homines* or in the public space that Arendt calls the space of appearances (Arendt 1998, 199). This space of appearances reveals itself when people speak and act 'in-between'. This space 'precedes all formal constitutions of the public realm and the various forms of government' (Arendt 1998, 199). When people are acting and speaking, the space is actualized, when people stop acting, the space disappears. Its peculiar character is the mere possibility, and the space of appearances in Aristotle's terms can be called τὸ δυνατόν. Thus, people gather, having the power to act; at the moment they actualize their power through speeches and deeds, the public realm is also actualized and 'never loses its potential character' (Arendt 1998, 200).

Arendt always regards power in terms of potentiality or capacity. Therefore, power cannot be measured and cannot be a reliable entity like force or strength. The only way power could be materialized is through the living together of people, for example, in cities. The plurality is the condition of δύναμις or power. Although everyone has the possibility or power to act, it cannot be necessarily realized: "And whoever, for whatever reasons, isolates himself and does not partake in such being together, forfeits power and becomes impotent" (Arendt 1998, 201). Unlike strength, power is never the property of an individual (Arendt 1998, 44). It vanishes with its actualization; it cannot be seen, felt, or have any appearances. It is hidden, like the capacity of a builder to build when he is not building. Although Aristotle never distinguishes capacities or powers in the strict sense, for Arendt, this distinction is crucial. The matter is that any craft deals with the creation of things, and, speaking of a builder or a craftsman, when he is acting, that is, creating something, he violates material. In Aristotelian terms, this violent character of the creative capacity or power fulfills its realization of passive and active power, or the ποιεῖν/πάσχειν principle. As Arendt notes, the work of *homo faber* consists in reification. "This element of violation is present in all fabrication, and *homo faber*, the creator of human artifice, has always been a destroyer of nature" (Arendt 1998, 139). Thus, the extreme opposite of power is violence, with its instrumental character and its "implements <...> are used for the purpose of multiplying natural strength until <...> they can substitute for it" (Arendt 1970, 46). The equation of power with violence comes from the understanding of government as the domination of men over men by means of violence (Arendt 1970, 52). When we understand power as the Aristotelian δύναμις with its potential character, we never substitute power for violence because when violence is present no one has the power to act, and no political realm is possible.

The traces of passive and active δύναμις in the Aristotelian sense can be found not only in the fabricating capacity but also in the action itself. The agent discloses himself through speech and action in the public realm; his revelation brings up the web of human relationships: "The actor always moves among and in relation to other acting beings, he is never merely a 'doer' but always at the same time a sufferer" (Arendt 1998, 190). Here we see how the passive and active δύναμις realize their twofold character, being the one actualized power. When someone acts, he always takes the risk because the consequences of action change not only the constellation of human relationships but also the agents. However, Arendt is mostly preoccupied with the space or the web which appears in those actions as a kind of τὸ δυνατόν, composed of the consequent deeds and sufferings (Arendt 1998, 190). Every new action inserts something new into the chain of reactions; the space

of τὸ δυνατόν is capable of being changed, of suffering, and at the same time, of doing or bringing up something new, of becoming something new. As a result of this active-affective exercise of power in the web of human relations, the action has both the characteristics of boundlessness and unpredictability.

At last, the most important Aristotelian sense of δύναμις as a power lies in the concept of ἐντελέχεια or performativity of action. Arendt writes that the process of acting and speaking can leave behind no results or end products (Arendt 1998, 183). In other words, the action never deals with ends outside itself and never springs up as a means to an end. The end of every actualized power is its actualization. Arendt refers to Aristotle speaking of action as ἡ ἐνέργεια (actuality) with which ‘he designated all activities that do not pursue an end (are ateleis) and leave no work behind <...>, but exhaust their full meaning in the performance itself’ (Arendt 1998, 206). The τέλος (end) in such action like actualized power lies in the activity itself, thus such activity becomes ἐντελέχεια. Nevertheless, Pavel Kontos disapproves of such performativity of action in Aristotle and calls it a myth. He argues that performances cannot take place everywhere because they need ‘a specific kind of stage that only the *homo faber* can create’ (Kontos 2017, 241). He adheres to the notion that there is an objective end and that it consists in the ‘preservation’ of the public realm, and the capacity to accomplish it is called ‘power’ (Kontos 2017, 244). According to Kontos, “Political performers should promote the objective political end which lies in the fact that the stage on which performances occur needs to be preserved after the performances are over, preserved for the sake of new future performances by ourselves and others” (Kontos 2017, 244). I suppose that Kontos designates here the political realm as the space of τὸ δυνατόν. The fact is that Arendt speaks about the political space that precedes all performances or actions (Arendt 1998, 199), but it is preserved only potentially, and it should be actualized to actually be. As for the end seen in the preservation of the political stage, it is already in the action itself, as I have mentioned earlier.

In conclusion, there were two reasons why combining the ideas of two disparate intellectuals from separate eras was justified. First, Aristotle discusses power (δύναμις) in relation to actuality (ἐνέργεια), as does Arendt who combines these to describe modes of being not only of just living but of living together, ‘in-between’ other human beings. Second, if we ignore Aristotle’s definition of δύναμις, we are unable to comprehend Arendt’s opposition of ‘power’ to ‘strength, force, and violence.’ Aristotle examines δύναμις as a power to do something, to reveal what is concealed in the realm of appearances to its actual function, or ἐνέργεια. Power is not ἀρχή as a sovereignty; it is the beginning of change. If power is fundamentally about rule, violence is the only form of exercising power. If power is concerned as capacity to act, it is implemented in every man, not only in sovereignty. Arendt’s theory of action may have problems with being understood and interpreted in some way or another. The key point is that Arendt elicits the concept of power and action to demonstrate that every human being can be political.

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Понимание власти у Ханны Арендт в свете учения Аристотеля о δύναμις*

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Ханна Арендт, один из самых значительных политических теоретиков и философов XX в., не раз поднимала вопрос о власти. В своей книге *Vita Activa, или О деятельной жизни* она определяет власть, четко отличая ее от силы, мощи и насилия, и привлекает аристотелевскую концепцию δύναμις в качестве обоснования. Поскольку власть для Арендт — это способность действовать сообща в политическом пространстве, ее понимание этого феномена напрямую соотносится с δύναμις у Аристотеля. Для того чтобы пролить свет на идеи Арендт и отделить власть от насилия как ее крайнего проявления, необходимо рассмотреть аристотелевский термин δύναμις в его оригинальных значениях, встречающихся по преимуществу в *Метафизике*. Цель данной статьи — представить философский анализ δύναμις Аристотеля для прояснения арендтовского понятия власти, которое исследовательница кладет в основу своей теории действия. В первой части статьи обсуждаются античные смыслы слова δύναμις: власть, возможность, мощь, способность и сила. В отличие от такого словоупотребления Аристотель использовал δύναμις в паре с термином ἐνέργεια, поэтому они часто переводятся на русский язык как «возможность» и «действительность». Аристотель считал δύναμις началом изменения, т. е. способностью действовать и претерпевать, каковая достигает своей цели в действительности, или в ἐνέργεια. Во второй части статьи демонстрируется, что концепция власти Арендт восходит к аристотелевскому понятию δύναμις, истолкованному в качестве силы действовать в общих интересах, лишенной накопительного свойства и проявляющейся только в момент своего осуществления. В заключении делается вывод, что власть, понятая в аристотелевском смысле, не может сводиться к насилию, напротив, она представляет собой способность человека действовать вместе с другими, а значит, быть существом политическим.

Ключевые слова: власть, δύναμις, Аристотель, Ханна Арендт, способность, возможность.

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