

The Description of Tyche in Galen's Treatise "Protrepticus"*

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This article discusses the extract from Galen's treatise "Protrepticus" which contains a description of the goddess Tyche. In the extract, Galen contrasts Hermes (a male master of the arts) and Tyche (a capricious and irrational woman). The fragment is considered in the context of the entire treatise ("Protrepticus" was intended as a polemical statement against the empirical school and their method) and its purpose (exhortation to the study of arts). G. Kaibel has previously shown that many details in the description of Tyche coincide with similar descriptions in the treatise "Tabula Ceбетis". As a result, the scholar came to the conclusion that Galen and the author of "Tabula" relied on the same source. The fragment from the poem by Pacuvius provides additional evidence. However, in addition to the similarities in the description, it is worth considering the differences that appear in Galen's treatise. For example, Galen replaces the term *μανία* (*μαινόμενη* in "Tabula Ceбетis") with the term *ἄνοια*, depriving it of medical connotations. The translators, apparently, did not attach any importance to this replacement, and therefore we have different translations of the term *ἄνοια*: folie, manzanza di senno, inanity. Since the replacement of the term *μανία* is not commented on in the editions and the existing translations demonstrate different interpretations, the author of the article provides an additional commentary, including a comparison of "Protrepticus" with other texts of Galen and the works of Plato, and also draws attention to the parallel passage from Pacuvius.

Keywords: Galen, Protrepticus, Tabula Ceбетis, Pacuvius, Tyche, mania, anoia.

The treatise "Protrepticus" was written by Galen to illustrate the benefits of practising the intellectual arts (primarily medicine). To this end, the physician demonstrated a contrast: rational men (*λογικοί*) vs irrational creatures (*τὰ ἄλογα*). In the first part of the treatise, Galen examined the role of the Chance in human life: he contrasted the personified goddess of Chance, fickle and reckless Tyche, with Hermes who was presented as the master of *logos* and all art. As V. Boudon notes, Galen connected the concepts of *λόγος* and *τέχνη*.¹ Thus, Hermes is the patron of rational art (art as a rational activity), and according to Galen, this is exactly how medicine should be perceived. Tyche, on the other hand, personifies everything that should not have a place in any worthy art.

The treatise "Protrepticus" is included in the section of writings against the representatives of the empirical school. Although there is no explicit polemics against the empiricists in the surviving part of the treatise, the traces of it can be found in the treatise.² Galen's attempts to show that the methods of the dogmatic school are more adequate to meet medicine needs than the findings of the empirical school, can be taken as an example of such implicit po-

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¹ Boudon 2000, 11.

² On implicit polemics with sports trainers and their methods, see Koryuk 2022.

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lemics. The opposition of rationality and lack of it thus goes through the whole surviving part of the text. In this article, we will discuss the part devoted to the opposition of Tyche and Hermes in order to demonstrate how this fragment works for the general idea of the treatise — the opposition of the rational and the irrational approach in life and art.

1. The representation of Tyche

In the first part of the treatise “Protrepticus” Galen insists that it is shameful to neglect the arts and entrust oneself to Tyche (*Protr.* II. 1 Boudon). Further he includes an ekphrasis to give a vivid description of the appearance and the deeds of Tyche and Hermes. Tyche is described as a source of all kinds of trouble (*Protr.* II–VI Boudon), and Hermes as a fair mentor and the master of logos and art: τὸν δ’ Ἑρμῆν ἄτε λόγου μὲν ὄντα δεσπότην, ἐργάτην δὲ τέχνης ἀπάσης θέασαι πάλιν (*Protr.* III. 1 Boudon).³ As for the latter, it is possible that such interpretation of the image of Hermes was already widespread in the time of Galen.⁴ As for the former, when showing the appearance of Tyche, Galen claims that he was inspired by the images created by ancient writers and sculptors, and endowed her with traditional attributes — a rudder, a ball under her feet, and terrible character.

Tyche is mentioned in many literary sources. Sometimes the word “tyche” appears as a common noun, in other examples it is personified, and sometimes fluctuates between these two meanings.⁵ The first mention of Tyche is found in the Homeric hymns: in the hymn to Demeter the author calls her the daughter of the Ocean (*Hom. Hymn. Dem.* 420); in the hymn to Athena, she is not personified and means “happiness, good luck” (*Hom. Hymn. Ath.* 5). In “Theogony” Hesiod calls her an Oceanid (*Hes. Theog.* 360). Archilochus says that Tyche and Moira influence the fate of a person (fr. 12, 16. 1). Pindar, according to the testimony of Pausanias (*Paus.* VII. 26. 8), considered Tyche one of the Moirae, and the most powerful one. In other fragments Pindar describes her as a protecting goddess (fr. 39): Τύχα φερέπολις; (*Pind. Ol.* 12. 1–2) Λίσσομαι, παῖ Ζητὸς Ἐλευθερίου, Ἰμέραν εὐρυσθενέ’ ἀμφιπόλει, σῴτειρα Τύχα. On the other hand, the poet calls her recalcitrant and gives her control of a rudder (fr. 40): Τύχα ἀπειθῆς ἐτ δίδυμον στρέφοισα πηδάλιον. The dual nature of Tyche is also represented in the tragedies where she can raise someone up or make them fall: τύχη γὰρ ὀρθοῖ καὶ τύχη καταρρέπει (*Soph. Ant.* 1158). And her power is all the greater because no undertaking escapes her influence; unlike τέχνη she does not focus on one field, on the contrary, she claims that she controls and decides everything: τίς εἰμι, πάντων κυρία τούτων βραβεῦσαι καὶ διοικῆσαι; Τύχη (*Men. Aspis* 147–148).⁶ In philosophical and medical tradition τύχη, beginning from the second half of the 5th century BC, is opposed to rational calculus and precognition: the more people acquire knowledge and rely on it, the less significance they assign to τύχη and vice versa.⁷

³ The connection of Hermes with the power of the word (logos) was noted by Plato in “Cratylus” (407e–408a: Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι ὃ “Ἑρμῆς,” καὶ τὸ <ἐρμηνέα> εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον καὶ τὸ κλοπικόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις καὶ τὸ ἀγοραστικόν, περὶ λόγου δύναμιν ἔστιν πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία), Boudon 2000, 11.

⁴ A. Barigazzi refers to a passage of Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* I. 65–83), Barigazzi 1991, 56.

⁵ Tyche // LIMC VIII, 115–117.

⁶ Tyche // LIMC VIII, 116.

⁷ *Democr.* 68 B 119 DK = fr. 32 Luria; Polus (ap. *Plat. Gorg.* 448 c; *Arist. Met.* A 1.981 a 5–3); *Agathon Trag.* Fr. 6; 8; see Dodds 1959, Herzog-Hauser G. Tyche, *RE* VIIA 2, 1667.

S. Matheson argues that the personification of the goddess Tyche was the result of a complex evolution of the idea of an uncontrollable chance or fortune.⁸ Gradually, Tyche has been reimagined as Luck, that can be lured with the help of offerings and talismans. The biggest cults formed around Ἀγαθή τύχη. She patronised individuals, rulers and even cities. In the Roman period, Tyche was identified with the Italic fertility goddess Fortuna; temples of Fortune were built in Rome and the western empire, and temples dedicated to Tyche in the Greek and Greco-Roman east.⁹ The attributes of Fortune were: a cornucopia (because she gave prosperity), a rudder (because she controlled events), a wheel or a ball (because she was fickle).

Note that the images of Tyche/Fortune (statues, coins) familiar to readers of Galen were supposed to create an idea of a benevolent goddess; she was depicted as a guardian of the city with a special headdress (*corona muralis*) and a rudder with which she turned the fate of people. And Galen, apparently, when creating his Tyche, was guided, on the one hand, by the literary tradition, and focused on inconstancy, depravity, blindness;¹⁰ on the other hand, by the philosophical and scientific tradition which emphasised that all the features of Tyche exist only in the perverted minds of uneducated people.

2. Tabula Cebetis. The source of the image of the goddess

Examining the image of Tyche, G. Kaibel noticed that the description of the goddess in “Protrepticus” is similar to the description of Tyche presented in the “Tablet of Cebes”.¹¹ The treatise of Pseudo-Cebes dates back to the 1st century AD. The dating is indicated by the mixture of different traditions typical for this period, as well as plain language and repetition of formulas.¹² The work is written in the form of a dialogue, the author uses the technique of an ekphrasis to depict allegorical figures. In the “Tablet” we learn about a group of young people in the Temple of Kronos who cannot understand the contents of the tablet. The tablet depicts several rows of fortress walls and a crowd of people standing at the gate, as well as many figures inside. An old man comes to the aid of the young people, he describes everything that is depicted in the picture and explains the meaning of each allegorical figure. It turns out that the walls represent a person’s life; the painting depicts a daimon that shows incoming people which way they need to go in order to be saved. However, on the way there are obstacles, presented in the form of personified De-lusion, Lust, Flattery and others. Tyche appears among them.

In one of the passages the young man asks about a blind and mad woman he sees in the painting, and the old man explains that he is looking at Tyche:

ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἐκείνη τίς ἐστιν ἢ ὥσπερ τυφλὴ καὶ μαινομένη τις εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ ἐστηκυῖα ἐπὶ λίθου τινὸς στρογγύλου; Καλεῖται μὲν, ἔφη, Τύχη· ἔστι δὲ οὐ μόνον τυφλὴ καὶ μαινομένη, ἀλλὰ καὶ κωφὴ. (*Tab. Ceb.* 7. 1)

⁸ Matheson 1994, 19.

⁹ Matheson 1994, 23.

¹⁰ Note that although Galen claims that the attributes of Tyche’s instability (a rudder, a spherical pedestal and a headband) appeared in the works of ancient painters and sculptors, the archeological data does not confirm this: Tyche // LIMC VIII, 116.

¹¹ Kaibel 1894, 26–32.

¹² Hirsch-Luipold 2005, 29–30.

But who is this woman who seems to be blind and insane, standing on a round stone? — Her name is Tyche. She is not only blind and insane, but also deaf.¹³

Galen describes the goddess in a similar way, but adds more expressive details :

ἥς τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἐμφανίσαι βουληθέντες οἱ παλαιοὶ γράφοντες καὶ πλάττοντες αὐτὴν οὐ μόνον ἐν εἶδει γυναικὸς ἠρκέσθησαν, καίτοι τοῦθ' ἰκανὸν ἦν ἀνοίας σύμβολον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πηδάλιον ἔδοσαν ἐν χερσὶν ἔχειν αὐτῇ καὶ τοῖν ποδοῖν ὑπέθεσαν βάσιν σφαιρικὴν, ἐστέρησαν δὲ καὶ τοῖν ὀφθαλμοῖν, ἐνδεικνύμενοι διὰ τούτων ἀπάντων τὸ τῆς Τύχης ἄστατον. (*Protr.* II. 2 Boudon)

To put in graphic form how miserable a creature Fortune is, the ancients portrayed her, not just as a woman — as if this were not a sufficient sign of inanity — but also with a rudder in her hands, with a spherical support for her feet, and without eyes. All this was intended to indicate the instability of Fortune. (Transl. P. Singer.)

V. Boudon¹⁴ compares the fragments of Tyche's description and, following G. Kaibel, notes the similarities:

1) in the description of blindness:

ἐστέρησαν δὲ καὶ τοῖν ὀφθαλμοῖν (“she was deprived of her eyes”); τυφλῇ δαίμονι (“blind daimon”). (*Protr.* II. 2; II. 3 Boudon)

ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἐκείνη τίς ἐστὶν ἢ ὥσπερ τυφλῇ <...> εἶναι δοκοῦσα (but who is this woman who seems blind). (*Tab. Ceb.* 7. 1)

2) in the description of instability:

ἀνοίας σύμβολον (“a sign of inanity”); ἔμπληκτός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνους (“impressionable and stupid”). (*Protr.* II. 2; II. 3 Boudon)

ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἐκείνη τίς ἐστὶν ἢ ὥσπερ <...> μαινομένη τίς εἶναι δοκοῦσα (but who is this woman who seems insane). (*Tab. Ceb.* 7. 1)

3) in the description of how Tyche distributes the gifts:

<...> πολλακίς τοὺς ἀξιολόγους ἄνδρας παρερχομένη πλουτίζειν τοὺς ἀναξίους, οὐδὲ τούτους βεβαίως ἀλλ' ὅσον πάλιν οὕτως ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὰ δοθέντα. (*Protr.* II. 3 Boudon)

...she frequently overlooks men of merit and enriches the worthless. But even these she does not enrich consistently: she frequently reappropriates what she has given them.”(Transl. P. Singer.);

καὶ παρ' ὧν μὲν ἀρπάζει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἑτέροις δίδωσι· παρὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖται παραχρημα ἃ δέδωκε καὶ ἄλλοις δίδωσιν εἰκὴ καὶ ἀβεβαίως. (*Tab. Ceb.* 7. 2)

And she steals their property and gives it to others. And then again instantly takes away from those to whom she gave it, in order to give it to the next ones, at random and unreliably.

4) in the description of the plight of her followers:

ἐνθα συναπόλλυνται μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐπόμενοι πάντες αὐτῇ, μόνῃ δ' ἀβλαβῆς ἐκείνη διεξέρχεται καταγελώσα τῶν ὀλοφυρομένων τε καὶ <ἐγ>καλούντων αὐτῇ, ὅτ' οὐδὲν ὄφελος. (*Protr.* II. 4 Boudon)

¹³ The translations are mine unless otherwise stated.

¹⁴ Boudon 2000, 8–9; 121.

And there all her followers go under together, while she alone emerges unscathed, laughing at their pointless laments and accusations.” (Transl. P. Singer.)

οἱ δὲ δοκοῦντες κλαίειν εἰσι παρ’ ὧν ἀφείλετο ἃ δέδωκε πρότερον αὐτοῖς. οὗτοι δὲ πάλιν αὐτὴν κακὴν Τύχην καλοῦσι (*Tab. Ceb.* 8. 2); ἐκπτώσεις γὰρ μεγάλαι καὶ σκληραὶ γίνονται, ὅταν τις αὐτῇ πιστεύσῃ (*Tab. Ceb.* 7. 3)

As for those who look like they’re crying, she’s taken away what she gave them before. That’s why they call her “Bad Luck”; whenever someone believes her, there are very bitter disappointments.

6) in the description of Tyche’s followers:¹⁵

εἰσὶ <μὲν> γὰρ ἐνταῦθα καὶ δημαγωγοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἐταῖραι καὶ πόρνοι καὶ προδόται φίλων, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ φονεῖς καὶ τυμβωρύχοι καὶ ἄρπαγες, πολλοὶ δὲ μὴδὲ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν πεφεισμένοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἱερὰ συλήσαντες. (*Protr.* IV. 4 Boudon)

There are demagogues aplenty, courtesans and catamites and betrayers of friends; and there are also murderers, gravebreakers and robbers; quite a few of them have not spared even the gods, but have pillaged their altars too.” (Transl. P. Singer.)

διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσῃ πάντα ὅσα ἔλαβε παρὰ τῆς Τύχης, ἀναγκάζεται ταύταις ταῖς γυναιξὶ δουλεύειν καὶ πάνθ’ ὑπομένειν καὶ ἀσχημονεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἕνεκεν τούτων πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶ βλαβερὰ, οἷον ἀποστερεῖν, ἱεροσυλεῖν, ἐπιορκεῖν, προδιδόναι, ληΐζεσθαι καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσια. (*Tab. Ceb.* 9. 4)

Because of this, when he squandered everything he received from Tyche, he is forced slavishly to serve these women¹⁶, endure everything, behave shamefully and do everything for them that is harmful, for example, steal, rob temples, give false oaths, betray, plunder and everything like that.

It should be said that the researchers of “Protrepticus”¹⁷ did not examine the treatise for similarities with the fragment by Pacuvius, but we think it deserves the interest (*Rhet. Her.* 2.23.36 = fr. 262 Schierl = 366–375 Ribbeck):

*Fortunam insanam esse et caecam et brutam perhibent philosophi,
Saxoque instare in globoso praedicant volubili:
Id quo saxum inpulerit fors, eo cadere Fortunam autumant.
Insanam autem esse aiunt, quia atrox, incerta instabilisque sit;
Caecam ob eam rem esse iterant, quia nihil cernat, quo sese adplicet;
Brutam, quia dignum atque indignum nequeat internoscere.*

Dame Fortune, some philosophers maintain, / Is witless, sightless, brutish; they declare / That on a rolling ball of stone she stands / For whither that same stone a hazard tilts, / Thither, they say, falls Fortune; and they state / That she is witless for that she is cruel, / Untrustworthy, unstead: and, they repeat, / Sightless she is because she nothing sees / Whereto

¹⁵ G. Kaibel was the first to draw attention to the direct similarity in the description of Tyche’s followers, see Kaibel 1894, 27.

¹⁶ *Tab. Ceb.* 9.1.5 Αὐταὶ τοίνυν ἢ μὲν ἄκρασία καλεῖται, ἢ δὲ ἄσωτία, ἢ δὲ ἄπληστία, ἢ δὲ Κολακεία (They are called Immoderation, Gluttony, Greed and Flattery).

¹⁷ But it was noted in the editions of the “Tablet of Cebes”: Hirsch-Luipold et al. 2005; Fitzgerald, White 1983.

she'll steer herself: and brutish too / Because she cannot tell between the man / That's worthy and the unworthy. (Transl. E. Warmington.)

It is clear that before Pacuvius, certain characteristics of Tyche were already encountered: her blindness, madness, stupidity, inconstancy, etc.¹⁸ However, it is only in this fragment that we find the observations of some philosophers who characterised Tyche with precisely this series of descriptions (*insana, caeca, bruta, instans in saxo globoso volubili*).¹⁹

Returning to the descriptions of Tyche given by Galen and Pseudo-Cebes, G. Kaibel argued that such representation of Tyche should have been widely spread and that the two authors could independently rely on the same source. V. Boudon goes further and suggests that the similarities between two texts and the fact that Tyche's descriptions are more developed in "Protrepticus" may indicate a direct influence of the "Tablet of Cebes" on Galen's treatise.²⁰ The reading of the Pacuvius's fragment allows us to agree with G. Kaibel and assume that all three authors could draw information from a common source.

With this in mind, we will see what changes Galen made to the description of Tyche in pursuit of his literary goals.

3. A symbol of ἀνοία

In one of the passages cited above Galen emphasizes Tyche's fickleness by the fact that she is always depicted as a woman, and a woman is a symbol of foolishness: ἥς τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἐμφανίσει βουληθέντες οἱ παλαιοὶ γράφοντες καὶ πλάττοντες αὐτὴν οὐ μόνον ἐν εἴδει γυναικὸς ἠρκέσθησαν, καίτοι τοῦθ' ἰκανὸν ἦν ἀνοίας σύμβολον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πηδάλιον ἔδωσαν ἐν χεροῖν ἔχειν αὐτῇ... (*Protr.* II. 2 Boudon). Comparing this excerpt with the passages from Pseudo-Cebes and Pacuvius above, the question should be raised: is there any semantic difference behind Galen's use of the word ἀνοία, instead of μαινομένη in Pseudo-Cebes (and *insana* in Pacuvius)?

Words denoting a deviation from the mental norm are polysemantic in any language and their understanding largely depends on the context. The word ἀνοία can be understood as madness, folly or recklessness. The scholars interpret the passage differently: V. Boudon understands ἀνοία as "madness" (*bien que cela suffit à symboliser la folie*).²¹ A. Barigazzi understands it as "lack of sense" (*un segno sufficiente di mancanza di senno*).²² P. Singer understands it as "inanity" (*as if this were not a sufficient sign of inanity*).²³ The context of Galen's passage is in favour of a weaker meaning. Galen in this fragment does not intend to emphasise Tyche's pathological mental condition, he only mentions a traditional reproach to women as being foolish (ἀνοία is characteristic of all women), susceptible to passions and lacking intelligence.

It is rather surprising to see what seems to be a misogynistic statement in Galen's work, given that he rarely allowed such a clear attack on women. Several similar examples in the texts of Galen were found by S. Mattern.²⁴ This is how Galen notes the desire of

¹⁸ Tyche // LIMC VIII, 115–116.

¹⁹ Schierl 2006, 535.

²⁰ Boudon 2000, 10.

²¹ Boudon 2000, 85–86.

²² Barigazzi 1991, 117.

²³ Singer 1997, 35–36.

²⁴ Mattern 2008, 114, 243, n. 50.

women for excesses during pregnancy (*De usu part.* III 885 K.): “Is it necessary to enumerate the mistakes of a pregnant woman who, out of laziness, neglects moderate exercises, eats herself to satiety, indulges in anger, guilt, abuses baths, indulges in love pleasures untimely. Who can enumerate all her delusions. Nevertheless, nature resists all these harmful excesses and in most cases corrects them.” The example does not seem particularly offensive, since in the next paragraph Galen criticises both men and women, reproaching them for not taking care of their own health before conceiving a child (contrary to the farmer, who begins to prepare the soil even before planting seeds) (III 886 K.).

The second example cited by S. Mattern is Galen’s anecdote about his own mother, whom he compared with the wayward wife of Socrates (*Aff. Dig.* V 41 K. = CMG V 4,1,1,28,1–8): “My mother, on the other hand, was so bad tempered that she would sometimes bite her maids; she was perpetually shouting and fighting with my father, treating him worse than Xanthippe did Socrates” (transl. P. Singer). This is a rare example²⁵ in which the shortcomings of a woman are so frankly described. Another example we find in the treatise “On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato” (*Plac. Hipp. Plat.* V.742 K. = CMG V 4,1,2,556,26–33 De Lacy): “For women are similar to men to the extent that they too are rational animals, that is, capable of acquiring knowledge; but to the extent that the male sex is stronger and superior in every employment and discipline, and women are weaker and inferior, in this they are unlike” (transl. Ph. De Lacy). We shall note that in this passage Galen comments on a fragment from Plato’s dialogue “The Republic” (V.454b–456b) where Plato reflects on the role of women in an ideal state, weighs the possibility of educating women on an equal basis with men and their ability to master the art, but notes the natural differences between men and women. Summing up the Platonic argument (about what conclusions can be drawn from the similarities and differences of objects), Galen mentions that women are capable of intellectual pursuits, but are generally inferior to men in this respect.

Given the examples above, we do not believe that Tyche’s description was intended to be offensive to women.²⁶ Galen’s young male audience, for whom the treatise was written, could have seen the joke in the statement that the image of a woman was a sufficient symbol of folly. But more educated readers could have seen a witty reference to Galen’s physiological concepts. We see that Galen’s description in “Protrepticus” is close to the description of women in *Plac. Hipp. Plat.*, although it is expressed more severely — women are generally inferior to men in intellectual abilities, while they are more emotional and mentally unstable. However, Galen implies a relative intellectual weakness, and not a fundamental inability to intellectual activity, which manifests itself in a state of mania.

4. ἔμπληκτος καὶ ἄνους

It should be noted that Galen, unlike the author of the “Tablet of Cebes”, does not use the adjective *μαιομένη* in relation to the goddess Tyche. He describes her as *ἔμπληκτος*

²⁵ But we should not forget Galen’s views on women from a physiological point of view. According to proto-scientific ideas, based on the opinions of Hippocrates and Aristotle, a woman was considered less perfect than a man (Gal. *De usu part.* IV 158.3 K.).

²⁶ See also: Flemming 2007, 259. R. Flemming argues that Galen was not known for writing diatribes against women, however, if necessary, he used the image of a woman to illustrate the vices that he despised (for example, a desire for external goods: jewellery, expensive clothes).

and ἄνους (Protr. II. 3 Boudon). Is there any intent behind this word change? On the one hand, in several treatises Galen used the word μαινόμενος as an antonym for the word σωφρονῶν:

Εἰ μὲν δὴ ἢ συγχωροῦσιν αὐτὸ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν, ἐξαλειψάτωσαν ἐν οἷς γράφουσι, μήτε τοῦ μαινομένου τὸν σωφρονοῦντα μήτε τοῦ νοσοῦντος τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα μήτε τοῦ κοιμωμένου τὸν ἐγρηγορότα πιστότερον ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν. (*De opt. doct.* I 43.3–6 K. = CMG V 1,1,94,18–22)

If they accept this, let them delete the books in which they write that when it comes to knowledge of things, a sane person should not be trusted more than a mad person, a healthy person should not be trusted more than a sick person, a person who is awake should not be trusted more than a sleeping person.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ὅ γε τὸ πρὸς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ὀνομαζόμενον φλέγμα τὸ λευκὸν τὴν χροάν, ὃ βλένναν ὀνομάζει Πρόδικος, ὁ ψυχρὸς καὶ ὑγρὸς χυμὸς ἐστὶν οὗτος καὶ πλείστος τοῖς τε γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς ὀψωσθήποτε ψυγεῖσιν ἀθροίζεται καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ μαινόμενος ἄν ἄλλο τι ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν εἴποι ἄν αὐτόν. (*Nat. Fac.* II 130.11–16 K.)

Thus, the white-coloured substance which everyone else calls *phlegm*, and which Prodicus calls *blenna* [mucus], is the well-known cold, moist humour which collects mostly in old people and in those who have been chilled in some way, and not even a lunatic²⁷ could say that this was anything else than cold and moist. (Transl. A. Brock.)

On the other hand, in a medical context the term μαινόμενος means “experiencing madness without fever”,²⁸ for example:

εἶδες δέ ποτε μελαγχολῶσαν ἢ μαινομένην ἢ πτύουσιν ἐκ θώρακος ἢ ἐμοῦσαν ἐκ γαστρὸς αἷμα, ἢ κεφαλαία κάμνουσαν, ἢ συνάγχη πνιγομένην, ἢ τι τῶν μεγάλων καὶ ἰσχυρῶν παθημάτων ὑπομένουσαν, εἰ καλῶς ἐκκρίνεται τὰ καταμηνία. (*De venae sect. adv. Erasistr.* XI 165.15 K.)

Have you ever seen a woman who has her menstruation in a proper way in a state of black melancholy, or madness, or spitting up blood, or vomiting blood from the stomach, or suffering from headaches or suffocation, or suffering from some serious illness?

To denote *madness*, *mad* Galen usually used the terms *μανία*, *μανικός* or cognates.²⁹ We can hardly imagine the phrase “ἐν εἴδει γυναικὸς ἠρκέσθησαν, καίτοι τοῦθ' ἰκανὸν ἦν [μανίας] σύμβολον” in the context of the treatise. In “Protrepticus” Galen does not diagnose a pathological condition of a goddess, he compares Tyche with women in general. Therefore, we believe that it is not adequate to interpret the word ἄνοια as “madness”, because in this case it will require further clarification. Analysing the treatise we see

²⁷ As opposed to intelligent physicians and philosophers (οἱ σωφρονοῦντες ἰατροὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι): (*Nat. Fac.* II 131 K.).

²⁸ See more examples in: Nutton 2013; Joanna 2013.

In passing, we shall note that Galen, describing a rabid dog, uses the word λυσσάω: Ἄλυσσον, ὀνόμασται μὲν ἄλυσσον ἢ πόα διὰ τὸ θαυμαστῶς ὀνίναναι τοὺς ὑπὸ λυσσῶντος κυνὸς δεδηγμένους (*De simpl. med.* XI 823.1–3 K.); while Pseudo-Galen uses μαινόμενος: Ὑδροφοβὸς ἐστὶ πάθος ἐπὶ δῆγματι κυνὸς μαινομένου γιγνόμενον μετὰ τοῦ ἀποστρέφεσθαι τὸ ποτὸν καὶ σπᾶσθαι καὶ λύζειν (*Def. med.* XIX 418.13–14 K.). We add this example to those given by V. Nutton and J. Joanna as an illustration of how the meaning of the word μαινόμενος in the medical context continues to narrow.

²⁹ Durling 1993, 230.

that instead of the word *μανία* and such, Galen used adjectives *ἔμπληκτος* and *ἄνους*,³⁰ and a noun *ἄνοια*. In the case of Tyche, the adjective *ἔμπληκτος* can mean both “stupid, senseless” or “impulsive, capricious”.³¹ There are examples of Galen using the adjective *ἔμπληκτος* to criticise stupid opponents:

οἱ δ' ἠρνοῦντο τὴν τῶν Θετταλῶν ἐπίστασθαι διάλεκτον, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦθ' ὁμολογοῦντες, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγετο, μηδὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐφ' οὗ κείται πράγματος, ἄλλως δύνασθαι μαθεῖν ἢ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν θεμένων διδαχθέντα. πρὸς μὲν δὴ τοὺς οὕτως ἐμπλήκτους ἕτερός μοι γέγραπται λόγος ἰδία... (*Thrsasyb.* V 868.8–869.5 K.)

They then said that they had no knowledge of the Thessalian dialect—as if that were not to admit my initial claim, namely that the only way to learn the application of a term is from the people who apply it. I have written a separate treatise addressed to those who are so idiotic. (Transl. P. Singer.)

In the example below, Galen criticises Asclepiades' arguments, which contradict Hippocrates, while calling him both a fool and a madman:

ληρεῖ δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ περὶ τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς καὶ τοῦ σπληνός οὔτε τί ποθ' ὑφ' Ἴπποκράτους εἶρηται συνειδὲς ἀντιλέγειν τ' ἐπιχειρῶν οἷς οὐκ οἶδεν ἐμπλήκτῳ τινὶ καὶ μανικῷ³² στόματι. (*Nat. Fac.* II 40.8–12 K.)

He [Asclepiades] also talks no less nonsense about the black bile and the spleen, not understanding what was said by Hippocrates; and he attempts in stupid — I might say insane — language, to contradict what he knows nothing about. (Transl. A. Brock.)

Finally, we have an example in the treatise “On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato”, when Galen combines the concepts of *ἄλογος* and *ἔμπληκτος*; in his view, one who lives by the affections and is not guided by nature, is foolish and lacks reason:

οὐ σμικρά γε οὐδὲ τὰ τυχόντα φησὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπολαύσειν ἀγαθὰ τῆς αἰτίας τῶν παθῶν εὐρεθείσης. εἰς γὰρ τὸ μαθεῖν ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τι τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν ἔστιν, ἐκ τῆς τῶν παθῶν αἰτίας εὐρεθείσης ὠφελήθημεν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ πάθος οὐχ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆ τῇ φύσει, ὁ δὲ μὴ κατὰ πάθος ὁμολογουμένως ζῆ τῇ φύσει. ἔπεται γὰρ ὁ μὲν τῷ ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐμπλήκτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁ δὲ τῷ λογικῷ τε καὶ τῷ θείῳ. (*Plac. Hipp. Plat.* V 471–472 K. = CMG V 4,1,2,328,26–31 De Lacy)

These are no small or chance benefits that he (Posidonius) says we shall derive from the discovery of the cause of the affections. Indeed, the discovery of the cause of the affections helped us to understand precisely what sort of thing it is to ‘live in concord with nature’. For the person who lives by the affections does not live in concord with nature, and the person who does not live by the affections lives in concord with nature. The one follows the irrational and unstable part of the soul, the other the rational and divine. (Transl. Ph. De Lacy.)

³⁰ Barigazzi 1991, 117: “stupida e stolta”; Singer 1997, 36: “impressionable and stupid”; Boudon 2000, 86: “stupide et insensée”.

³¹ LSJ s.v. *ἔμπληκτος*: stupid, senseless — ἔ. καὶ μανικός *Plu. Rom.* 28, *Agath.* 3.24, etc.; *ἔμπληκτα* *ληρεῖν Gal.* 8.693. But in relation to not personified chance: impulsive — αἱ τύχαι, ἔ. ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοσε *πηδῶσι Eur. Tr.* 1205.

³² Same construction in *Plu. Rom.* 28: *Κλεομήδη δὲ ῥώμη καὶ μεγέθει σώματος ὑπερφυᾶ γενόμενον, ἔμπληκτόν τε τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ μανικὸν ὄντα, πολλὰ δρᾶν βίαια.*

In two previous passages the word ἔμπληκτος can be interpreted as a value or emotional judgement. However, the third passage deals with the irrational part of the soul in general, common to all people, and hence it is clear that the word has a pejorative connotation for Galen, but does not imply pathology. The irrational part of the soul is driven by affections, it is impulsive.

This fragment agrees with what we read in “Protrepticus”, namely, the superiority of reason, rationality in any undertaking.³³

5. The term ἄνοια

In Galen’s works, the term ἄνοια occurs in several contexts. Firstly, when the physician sharply criticises opponents for ignoring the methodological principles of medicine.

5.1. ἄνοια as “folly”

A. Εἰ γὰρ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκμαθεῖν τῆς ἀγνοίας τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποφηναμένων ἰατρῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ κοιλιῶν, ἐτέρωθι δέδεικται τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα περὶ πάσης τῆς ἐν ἡ ταῖς ἀνατομαῖς διαφωνίας. <...> οὐκ οὐτε περὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρτηρίαις ἢ φλεψὶ χιτῶνων ἐν τούτῳ χρῆ τῷ λόγῳ μεμνησθαι τῆς διαφωνίας οὐτ’ ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν ἢ πρόσθεν εἶπαμεν ἢ ἐφεξῆς ἐροῦμεν. ἰδίᾳ γὰρ ἅπαντα ταῦτα προαποδείξαντες, ὅπως ἡμῖν ἢ παρούσα διεξοδος αὐτῆ καθ’ αὐτὴν περαίνοιτο μηδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἐφαπτομένη ζητημάτων, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ παντὶ τὰ δι’ ἐκείνων ἀποδεδειγμένα τοῖς ἐνεστώσιν ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενοι τὰς χρεῖας μόνας ἐπέξιμεν ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων, οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἐτέροις εἰρημένων οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐξελέγχοντες τὴν ἄνοιαν ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον, ἣν ἰκανῶς ἀναγκαῖον ἢ πολλοῖς δόγμασιν ἢ κοινῇ χρηστὸν ἔσσεσθαι μέλλῃ τὸ ῥηθὲν. (*De usu par.* III 463 K.)

If anyone wants to know the reason for the ignorance of the number of cardiac cavities by doctors and philosophers, about which they expressed such false opinions, then he will find an analysis of all these issues in my work “On disagreements in dissections.” <...> Therefore, in this book, it is not necessary to recall the disagreements regarding the number of sheaths of arteries or veins, or anything else, which we have already said either before, or will say later. All these questions were posed and analysed by us separately so that our present topic was enclosed within its own boundaries, without touching on other controversial issues. Therefore, throughout this book, taking as the basis of our present research the judgments

³³ 1) ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνος ὀνομάζεται λογικός (*Protr.* I. 4 Boudon) — “it is man alone among them who is called ‘rational’”; 2) τὸ δὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, ὧ παῖδες, ἐπικοινωνεῖ θεοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις, τοῖς μὲν καθ’ ὅσον λογικόν ἐστι, τοῖς δὲ καθ’ ὅσον θνητόν (*Protr.* IX. 4 Boudon) — “The human race, my children, has something in common with the gods, and something in common with the brute beasts: with the former, to the extent that it is possessed of reason, and with the latter to the extent that it is mortal.” 3) τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ’ εἰ ψυχὴν ἔχουσι γινώσκουσι· τοσοῦτον ἀποδέουσι τοῦ λογικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπίστασθαι (*Protr.* XI. 1 Boudon) — “To begin with, they (athletes) are even unaware that they have a soul, so far are they from understanding its rational nature.” 4) ἀλλὰ διττῆς οὐσης διαφορᾶς τῆς πρώτης ἐν ταῖς τέχναις (ἐνιαί μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν λογικαί τ’ εἰσὶ καὶ σεμναί, τινὲς δ’ εὐκαταφρόνητοι καὶ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος πόνων, ἃς δὴ βαναύσους τε καὶ χειρωνακτικὰς ὀνομάζουσιν), ἄμεινον ἂν εἴη τοῦ προτέρου γένους τῶν τεχνῶν μετέρχεσθαι τινα. (*Protr.* XIV. 5 Boudon) — “Now, there is a basic distinction in kinds of art: there are the high arts, which are associated with reason, and there are the despised arts, which are performed by bodily labor — the arts generally known as banausic or manual. Clearly the former kind is the more desirable accomplishment.” (Transl. P. Singer.)

expressed by us elsewhere, we will speak only of the purpose of each of the parts, without refuting here folly given by other authors, except in passing, if this refutation proves sufficiently necessary for many of my doctrinal statements, or if what can be said (as a refutation) is generally useful.

B. ὡσπερ δ' ἐνταῦθα φιλονεικίαν αἰσχυρὰν ἐπιδείκνυνται προφανῶς, οὕτως ἄνοιαν, ὅταν οἴωνται πάνθ' ἑαυτῶν σαλεύεσθαι τὰ δόγματα, κἄν ἐν ὀτιοῦν ἐλεγχθῆ· (*De loc. aff.* VIII 158 K.)

But in this case, they clearly show both a shameful disposition to disputes and folly when they consider that all their dogmas are refuted (shaken) if even one of them is refuted.

C. Δῆλον δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον τοῦδε καὶ ὅτι τὰς φλεβοτομίας ὁ Ἐρασίστρατος οὔτε σὺν ταῖς ἀσιτίαις οὔτε πρὸς αὐτῶν παραλαμβάνει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤκουσί τινες φιλονεικίας ἢ ἀνοίας ὥσθ' ὅταν ἀκούσωσι τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, λύειν μὲν αὐτοὺς οὐδ' ὄλως ἐγγυροῦσι. ὡσπερ δὲ μηδενὸς εἰρημένου λόγων ἀρχὴν ἰδίαν ποιοῦνται τὴν λέξιν ἐκείνην μόνην προχειριζόμενοι, καθ' ἣν ὁ Ἐρασίστρατος φησιν... (*De venae sectione adversus Erasistrateos Romae degentes* XI 228 K.)

It is also no less clear than this that Erasistratus did not use phlebotomy, either in combination with fasting or instead of it. Nevertheless, some have come to such a pitch of contentiousness and stupidity that when they hear such doctrines they make no attempt to solve the problem, but as if nothing had been said they start their own argument by quoting that one passage in which Erasistratus says... (Transl. P. Brain.)

In these passages ἄνοια is synonymous with ἄγνοια. Galen intends to refute the views of those to whom ἄνοια is attributed. He uses a strong evaluative characteristic to emphasise not the pathological condition of his opponents or general folly, but their serious scientific errors that appeared as a result of ignoring the scientific method.

Secondly, the term appears when Galen comments on Plato's ideas (and follows his terminology) about physiological factors that influence rationality and irrationality of the soul.

5.2. ἄνοια as “mindlessness”

A. ὅταν φησιν ‘τὸ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ τροφῆς ἔλαττον ἐπὶ ρεῦμα’ τὴν ὑγρότητα δηλονότι λέγων τὴν ἔμπροσθεν [ὑπ' αὐτοῦ] εἰρημένην τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀνοίας αἰτίαν γιγνομένην, ὡς τῆς μὲν ξηρότητος εἰς σύνεσιν, τῆς δ' ὑγρότητος εἰς ἀνοιαν ἀγούσης τὴν ψυχὴν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὑγρότης μὲν ἀνοιαν ἐργάζεται, ξηρότης δὲ σύνεσιν, ἢ μὲν ἄκρα ξηρότης ἄκραν ἐργάζεται σύνεσιν, ἢ δ' ἐπίμικτος ὑγρότητι τοσοῦτον ἀφαιρήσει τῆς τελείας συνέσεως, ὅσον ἔκοινώνησεν ὑγρότητος. τίνας οὖν θνητοῦ ζῶου τοιοῦτον σῶμα, ὥστ' ἄμοιρον <ὑπάρχειν> ὑγρότητος, ὡσπερ τὰ τῶν ἄστρων; οὐδενὸς οὐδ' ἐγγύς. ὥστ' οὐδὲ συνέσεως ἄκρας [ἐγγύς ἐστί] τι σῶμα θνητοῦ ζῶου, πάντα δ' ὡσπερ ὑγρότητος οὕτω καὶ ἀνοίας μετέχει. (*Quod animi mores corp. temp. sequi.* IV 781–782 K.)

By the phrase ‘when the stream of growth and nourishment which comes upon it is less’ he (Plato) evidently refers to the wetness which he had mentioned previously as the cause of the mindlessness in the soul — dryness bringing the soul to a state of understanding, and wetness to mindlessness. If, then, wetness brings about mindlessness, and dryness understanding, then extreme dryness brings about extreme understanding, while a dryness mixed with wetness will take away from perfect understanding to precisely that extent to

which it partakes of wetness. And indeed, which mortal animal's body is of such a sort as to be without any share of wetness — like the bodies of the stars? There is none which is even close to this. And so too there is no body of a mortal animal which is close to extreme understanding; but all partake of wetness just as they also partake of mindlessness. (Transl. P. Singer.)

Β. εἰ δ' ὑποθίμεθα ταύτην ἀθάνατον³⁴ εἶναι φύσιν ἰδίαν ἔχουσαν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τό γε δεσπόζεσθαι καὶ δουλεῦναι τῷ σώματι καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐκείνον ὁμολογεῖται διὰ τε τῆν τῶν βρεφῶν ἄνοιαν καὶ τῆν τῶν ἐν γήρᾳ ληρούντων ἔτι τε τῶν εἰς παραφροσύνην ἢ μανίαν ἢ ἐπιλημοσύνην ἀφικνουμένων ἐπὶ φαρμάκων δόσεις ἢ τισιν ἐν τῷ σώματι γεννηθεῖσι μοχθηροῖς χυμοῖς. ἄχρι μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λήθην ἢ ἄνοιαν ἢ ἀκινήσιαν ἢ ἀναισθησίαν ἔπεσθαι τοῖς εἰρημένοισι, ἐμποδίζεσθαι φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἐνεργεῖν αἷς ἔχει φύσει δυνάμεσιν. (*Quod animi mores corp. temp. sequi*. IV 787 K.)

If, on the other hand, we were to take as our assumption that the soul were immortal, and had its own specific nature, as Plato used to say, even so it is agreed by this same Plato that, at the very least, it is dominated by and enslaved to the body because of the mindlessness of both infants and the senile as well as that of those who reach a state of derangement, madness or forgetfulness as a result of the taking of drugs, or when certain bad humours have been engendered in the body. For, as far as concerns the fact that loss of memory, mindlessness, loss of motion or loss of perception depend on the things which we have mentioned, one might say that the soul is being impeded from acting with the capacities which it has by nature. (Transl. P. Singer.)

It should be noted that in Plato there are two options for interpreting this term. On the one hand, ἄνοια is described as a disease of the soul, and there are two kinds of it, madness and ignorance: δύο ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ μὲν μανίαν, τὸ δ' ἀμαθίαν (*Ti.* 86b). On the other hand, in “The Republic” ἄνοια is opposed to μανία.³⁵ P. Lauthner believes that ἄνοια is “the general term for the disease of the soul, and it is very likely that Plato uses it to refer to all kinds of disorder in the revolutions of the rational soul.”³⁶ Thus, Galen, following Plato, uses the word ἄνοια in a broad sense — as a general deficiency in rational ability caused by physical factors, but not a pathological condition. However, Galen does not include μανία in this context, unlike Plato who makes it a variation of ἄνοια in “Timaeus”.

Thirdly, Galen uses the word ἄνοια to specify a mental affliction that is characterised by the complete loss of psychic activity — “intellectual paralysis, depressive madness”.³⁷

³⁴ Instead of ἀσώματον. See Singer 2014, 417, n. 4.27.

³⁵ Τί δὲ δὴ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις [ψευδός]; πότε καὶ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἢ τινα ἄνοιαν κακὸν τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρησίμῳ γίνεται; (*R.* 382c); Ἀλλὰ δεδιῶς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. / Ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκείων ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν; / Ἀλλ' οὐδεις, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλῆς (*R.* 382d–e). “But what of the falsehood in words, when and for whom is it serviceable so as not to merit abhorrence? Will it not be against enemies? And when any of those whom we call friends owing to madness or folly attempts to do some wrong, does it not then become useful to avert the evil — as a medicine?”; “Well then, would it be through fear of his enemies that he would lie?” “Far from it.” “Would it be because of the folly or madness of his friends?” “Nay, no fool or madman is a friend of God.” (transl. P. Shorey).

³⁶ Lautner 2011, 22–39.

³⁷ Singer 2018, 387–388.

5.3. ἄνοια as “*amentia*”

καὶ μὲν γε καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς διανοητικῆς ἐνεργείας ἢ μὲν οἶον παράλυσις, ἄνοια, ἢ δ’ οἶον ἔλλιπῆς κίνησις, μωρία τε καὶ μώρωσις, ἢ δ’ οἶον πλημμελῆς, παραφροσύνη καλεῖται. (*Symp. diff.* VII 60 K. = CMG V, 5, 1, 224, 13–16 Gundert)

Furthermore, there is also a kind of paralysis of the rational function itself, *amentia* (*anoia*); a kind of deficient movement, dullness (*moria*) or dementia (*morosis*); and a kind of defective [movement], delirium (*paraphrosyne*) as it is called. (Transl. Johnston.)

J. Jouanna suggests comparing the usage of the “madness” terms in the works by Hippocrates, Plato and Galen.³⁸ While examining the development of the concept “madness” and its types, J. Jouanna shows that in the works by Hippocrates and Plato one can see only two categories of mental afflictions: agitated madness and depressive madness. In Hippocrates, both can be called *μανία*. In Plato, agitated madness is *μανία* and depressive madness is *ἀμαθία* (see above). Galen introduces the third category *μωρία* (or *μώρωσις*), but as J. Joanna argues, it is a variation of agitated madness. The term *ἄνοια* in Plato denotes both types of madness, and in Galen only a variation of depressive madness.

As we see in the third example in medical context Galen distinguishes *ἄνοια* as a separate illness. However, the theme (exhortation to studying arts) and the audience (young men) of the “*Protrepticus*” do not imply the use of the medical technical term especially towards the goddess *Tyche*.

As we have tried to show above, *Tyche* is not being diagnosed by Galen, that is why the third option is not relevant for the context of “*Protrepticus*”. That leaves us with two options: we can either interpret *ἄνοια* in a broad sense as “folly”, or rather understand it in a Platonic sense as “mindlessness”.

“*Protrepticus*” has two more examples of the term *ἄνοια* and its cognate to discuss. Firstly, when Galen describes the souls of the athletes whose lifestyle he despises: οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς νοῆσαι δυναμένην ἀλλ’ ἄνουν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις (*Protr.* XI. 1 Boudon) — “unable to contemplate anything clearly, mindless as beasts without reason” (transl. P. Singer). Secondly, when he makes fun of Milo of Croton, the famous Greek athlete. Milo was famous for his incredible strength, so Galen tells an anecdote about the athlete carrying a bull on his shoulders through the stadium. And then he evaluates his actions: ὦ τῆς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἀνοίας (*Protr.* XIII. 5 Boudon) — “What incredible stupidity that was.” (Transl. P. Singer.)

The examples in “*Protrepticus*” show that the term *ἄνοια* should not be considered in the context of “medical madness”. Although the term appears in medical treatises, the context of “*Protrepticus*” suggests that its definition should rather be associated with the deficiency of the intellect and irrationality of the soul. That is why in the second half of the treatise athletes are ridiculed by the author and presented as irrational creatures. And that is the reason for describing *Tyche* not *μαινομένη*, but *ἄνους*. Galen consistently compares the character, attributes, followers and deeds of *Tyche* and *Hermes*, but all the aspects are united by relation to the *logos*: *Hermes* is called *λόγου μὲν ὄντα δεσπότην*, in contrast to *Tyche*, who is *ἀνοίας σύμβολον*.

³⁸ Jouanna 2013, 97–118.

We have seen in the examples above that Galen uses the term ἄνοια when criticising his opponents, pointing out their erroneous use of reason. Galen relies on the tradition of depicting Tyche as the personification of irrationality, but implements this image in a context where not moral, but intellectual mistakes are important. Instead of using the word μαινομένη Galen replaces it with the word ἄνοια: it is rather associated with a methodologically vicious mind. Thus, Galen does not simply adapt the image of blind fate, whose gifts are expected by vicious people, he also presents the opposition of the ignorant mind, that attaches great importance to chance, and the scientific mind, that minimises its influence.

Thus, the choice of Tyche's figure was dictated not only by the desire to use a familiar image, the topos "Virtue vs Fortune", but also by the desire repeatedly throughout the treatise to emphasise the contrast between λογικός and ἄλογος. Therefore, in contrast to the intelligent and sensible man (Hermes), we suggest translating Tyche's description as a *foolish and irrational woman* (ἔμπληκτος καὶ ἄνοος), a symbol of *irrationality*.

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Описание Тюхе в трактате Галена «Протрептик»

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В статье автор исследует отрывок из трактата Галена «Протрептик», содержащий описание богини Тюхе. Гален противопоставляет Гермеса (мужчину и знатока искусств) и Тюхе (капризную и иррациональную женщину). Фрагмент рассмотрен в контексте всего трактата («Протрептик» был задуман как полемическое высказывание против эмпирической школы и их метода) и его цели (призыва к изучению искусств). Помимо этого, отмечены различия в иконографической традиции изображения Тюхе. Г. Кайбель ранее уже показал, что многие характеристики богини Тюхе в «Протрептике» совпадают с аналогичными описаниями в трактате I в. н.э. «Картина Кивитова» (*Tabula Cebetis*). В результате ученый пришел к выводу, что Гален и автор «Картины» опирались на один источник. Дополнительным подтверждением этому служит фрагмент из текста Пакувия. Однако помимо сходств, которые были подробно исследованы другими учеными, следует рассмотреть и отличия, которые появляются в трактате Галена. Например, Гален заменяет термин *μανία* (*μανομένη* в «Картине») термином *ἄνοια*, по-видимому, пытаясь избежать медицинской коннотации. Переводчики, по-видимому, не придали этой замене значения, и поэтому в переводах мы видим разные варианты интерпретации термина *ἄνοια*: *folie*, *mancanza di senno*, *inanity*. Поскольку в изданиях замена термина *μανία* не комментируется, а существующие переводы демонстрируют разную трактовку, автор статьи приводит дополнительный комментарий, включающий сравнение фрагмента «Протрептика» с другими текстами Галена и сочинениями Платона, а также приводит параллельное место из Пакувия.

Ключевые слова: Гален, Протрептик, Картина Кивитова, Кебет, Пакувий, Тюхе, мания, анойя.

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