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Antiphon in the New Millennium

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This paper is an overview — in it I take a critical look at works that have come out in recent years about Antiphon. My primary focus is on four books: two scholarly works on Antiphon, one by Annie Hourcade and another by Michael Gagarin, an edition of the fragments of Antiphon's treatises with a detailed commentary by Gerard Pendrick, and, finally, a new edition of Antiphon's speeches prepared by Mervin Dilts and David Murphy. There is still a dispute among scholars about the authorship of the *Corpus Antiphonteum*. Some (the separatists) consider that there were separate authors for the speeches, on the one hand, and for the treatises, on the other — Antiphon the orator and Antiphon the sophist, respectively. Others (the unitarians) insist that there was a single author for both the speeches and the treatises. In the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, the separatists had the upper hand, but the situation slowly began to change, and now most scholars — rightly so in my opinion — argue for a single authorship. The separatists are compelled to divide the biographical testimonies of Antiphon between the orator and the sophist. But in the case of a single Antiphon, it turns out there is more than a little information about that person. In this paper, I present a review of scholarly opinion about evidence according to which Antiphon invented τέχνη ἀλυπίας and opened a psychotherapeutic clinic, where he tried to help his patients using verbal therapy. Some scholars call the tradition of the clinic into question. The separatists attribute any evidence about it to Antiphon the sophist. Like other scholars, I uphold the credibility of the clinic. I also take a look at the image of Antiphon presented by Xenophon (*Mem*. 1, 6.). Many scholars consider Xenophon's story to be fictitious or reject it outright. The separatists believe that Xenophon calls Antiphon a sophist in the very first sentence of the sixth chapter in order to distinguish him from his namesake, Antiphon the orator. I think Xenophon's goal is different. Socrates, in conversation with Antiphon during their second meeting, which Xenophon describes later on in the same chapter, likens sophists to πόρνοι (*Mem*. 1. 6. 13). Obviously, Xenophon calls Antiphon a sophist because he intends that the shameful implications of this comparison be applied first and foremost to him. Hourcade and Gagarin want to show that the author of the treatises and the speeches was one and the same person. Even though Pendrick is a separatist, the parallels he draws between the fragments of the treatises and individual passages in the speeches also, I think, favor the idea of a single Antiphon. I conclude that, thanks to the work of these scholars, Antiphon has, although not yet fully, been put back together again.

Keywords: Antiphon, *Corpus Antiphonteum*, *On Truth*, *On Concord*, speeches, grief clinic, encounters with Socrates, self-interested calculation.

This paper is a review of the major literature on Antiphon that has appeared during recent years.[1] I do not intend it to be exhaustive. Instead, I will concentrate on four books: two monographs dedicated to Antiphon, one by Annie Hourcade and the other by Michael Gagarin;[2] Gerard Pendrick's edition of the fragments of Antiphon's treatises;[3] and a new edition of Antiphon's and Andocides' speeches by Mervin Dilts and David Murphy in the OCT series.[4]

For Antiphon scholars, what is most interesting — or at least most discussable — is probably the question of who produced the *Corpus Antiphonteum*. Was there a single author of the speeches and the fragments of treatises that have come down to us, or do we need to distinguish between Antiphon the sophist and Antiphon the orator? Scholars' positions on this question have changed over time.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the separatist position clearly prevailed. Back then, Salomo Luria wrote, somewhat exaggerating, that among scholars John Morrison was just about the only one to assert that the orator and the sophist were one and the same (Luria 1963, 63). The situation, however, gradually began to change, and Morrison's own publications (Morrison 1961; Morrison 1972) were indeed instrumental in bringing about this change. As Harry Avery wrote, "In the first part of the present century separatists seemed to be in secure possession of the field, but more recently unitarians appear to have gained ground" (Avery 1982, 146). Avery himself made a compelling case for a single Antiphon (Avery 1982, 147–156).

The eloquent titles of the first three books convey the positions of their authors: Hourcade and Gagarin are unitarians and Pendrick is a separatist. Comments made by reviewers of these books reflect the changed state of affairs regarding Antiphon's identity. Danielle Allen, for example, begins her review of Hourcade's and Gagarin's books with the exclamation: "At last, Antiphon is made whole!" (Allen 2004, 310). She applauds their positions as unitarians, defending a single authorship of the *Corpus Antiphonteum*. Tania Gergel notes the weakness of Pendrick's position, saying that he "offers little positive evidence to support the separate identities" (Gergel 2005, 411). She is also astonished by the inconsistency of his approach: "it is a little strange that a commentator so cautious in his judgements on other aspects of Antiphon should take such a decisive line on this debate" (Gergel 2005, 412). John Dillon is skeptical about the fairness of Pendrick's separatism (Dillon 2005, 441), and David Hoffman notes that Gagarin's unitarian position seems more convincing than that of the separatist Pendrick (Hoffman 2006, 341). Finally, the publishers of the fragments of Antiphon's treatises and testimonies of him in the Loeb series, André Laks and Glenn Most, support the orator's and sophist's single identity (Laks, Most 2016, 2).

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[2] Annie Hourcade. *Antiphon d'Athènes. Une pensée de l'indivudu*. Bruxelles, Éditions OUSIA, 2001 (Hourcade 2001); M. Gagarin. *Antiphon the Athenian. Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists*. Austin, UT Press, 2002 (Gagarin 2002).

[3] G. J. Pendrick (ed., comm.). *Antiphon the Sophist: The Fragments*. (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 39). Cambridge, CUP, 2002 (Pendrick 2002).

[4] M. R. Dilts, D. J. Murphy (eds). *Antiphontis et Andocidis orationes*. Oxford, OUP, 2018 (Dilts, Murphy 2018).

If we assume a single Antiphon, then we are not compelled to divide the biographical testimonies of Antiphon between the orator and the sophist, and then, as Daniel Graham observes, "we know a fair amount about him" (Graham 2010, 789). But still, the scholars who hold this point of view have yet to present a reconstruction of Antiphon's biography. Neither the very brief sketches of his life's journey in Avery's paper and in Hourcade's book nor the one in Gagarin's book, which is a bit more extensive, claim to be such a reconstruction (Avery 1982, 157–158; Hourcade 2001, 28–30; Gagarin 2002, 178–182). What is more, these publications do not take into account the possibility of dating Antiphon's *On Truth* and *On Concord*, which is, I believe, real. Based on the works of his predecessors, John Finley dated these treatises from the responses to them in several tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles and in Aristophanes' *The Clouds* (Finley 1967, 92–103). A number of scholars have approved the dates that he proposed (e. g., Decleva Caizzi, Bastianini 1989, 211; Ostwald 1990, 296–297; Decleva Caizzi 1999, 323). Pendrick finds it impossible to date both *On Truth* (Pendrick 2002, 38, 341 note 6) and *On Concord* (Pendrick 2002, 46, 383, 386–387, 414) on the basis of these parallels between Attic drama and Antiphon's treatises, which he considers to be either insufficiently close or trivial.[5] I, on the other hand, join other scholars in believing that they allow us to date the time of *On Concord* up to 438 and *On Truth* up to 423.

I will now turn my attention to how these three authors consider the two testimonies of Antiphon: the story of his grief-clinic and the depiction of him in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.

Perhaps the most interesting feature in Antiphon's biography is the evidence of his having opened a psychotherapeutic clinic. This information has been conveyed to us by several authors. Pseudo-Plutarch (*Vit. X orat*. 833 C–D) provides us with the most detailed account of this enterprise. According to his report, Antiphon τέχνην ἀλυπίας συνεστήσατο, ὥσπερ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν ἡ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπεία ὑπάρχει "devised a method of curing distress, just as doctors are able to treat those who are physically ill", and he put his discovery into practice. In Corinth, he set up a room near the agora and posted a notice saying that he δύναται τοὺς λυπουμένους διὰ λόγων θεραπεύειν "was able to cure the grief-stricken with words". By elucidating the reasons for their distress (πυνθανόμενος τὰς αἰτίας), Antiphon comforted his patients (παρεμυθεῖτο τοὺς κάμνοντας).

Photius uses almost the same words to describe Antiphon's psychotherapeutic practice (*Bibliotheca* 486a Bekker = 8. 42–43 Henry). In addition, an anonymous biography of Antiphon, which in the manuscripts is a preface to his speeches, contains a similar account of the clinic (Anonymus *Vita Antiphontis* 5–6). Although shorter, it provides one important detail: Antiphon charged his patients for treatment.

Philostratus gives a somewhat different description of Antiphon's announcement about his psychotherapeutic practice (*Vitae sophistarum* 1, 15 = 498 Olearius): πιθανώτατος δὲ ὁ ᾽Αντιφῶν γενόμενος καὶ προσρηθεὶς Νέστωρ ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ παντὸς εἰπὼν ἂν πεῖσαι νηπενθεῖς ἀκροάσεις ἐπήγγειλεν, ὡς οὐδὲν οὕτω δεινὸν ἐρούντων ἄχος, ὃ μὴ ἐξελεῖν τῆς γνώμης "Antiphon achieved an extraordinary power of persuasion, and having been nicknamed 'Nestor' for his ability to convince his hearers, whatever his subject, he announced

[5] I think that Tania Gergel is right when she chides Pendrick because "when dealing with *On* Concord he presents Antiphon's views as simply a commonplace of sophistic epideixis, and does not explore in any depth possible relationships with Euripides and Plato" (Gergel 2005, 413).

grief-removing lectures, asserting that no one could tell him of a pain or sorrow so terrible that he could not expel it from the mind" (Wilmer Wright's translation, modified).

We will see how the authors of the three books about Antiphon, along with a number of other scholars, have treated these accounts. In his book, Michael Gagarin tries, albeit briefly, to retrace Antiphon's life journey in Chapter 7.5, "The Career of Antiphon" (Gagarin 2002, 178–182). Though he is surprisingly silent on these curious testimonies, he does observe that "Antiphon's career was an unusual mixture" (Gagarin 2002, 181).

In line with the other separatists, Gerard Pendrick feels that the tradition of the clinic pertains to Antiphon the Sophist. Citing the reports of ancient authors about Antiphon's psychotherapeutic activities (T 6(a)–(d)), he acknowledges that "most modern commentators have accepted the story of Antiphon's grief-clinic at face value" (Pendrick 2002, 241) but is inclined to consider the tradition of the clinic to be unreliable: "However, despite the credulity of commentators, who have perhaps been unduly influenced by the example of psychotherapy or modern cognitive therapies, the story of the grief-clinic is more likely than not the fantasy of a comic poet or a fictitious anecdote concocted by a Hellenistic writer" (Pendrick 2002, 241). Pendrick had predecessors, to whom he refers. Wilhelm Altwegg, for one, considered the accounts of Antiphon's clinic to be a fabrication, calling them ludicrous (Altwegg 1908, 40) and unbelievable (Altwegg 1908, 92). He believed that these stories were based on the arguments that Antiphon used in his treatise *On Concord*, in which he showed how you can live by reducing grief to a minimum (Altwegg 1908, 40). Yet another reason, according to Altwegg, could have been the widespread belief in the extraordinary power of Antiphon's oratory: an admirer might have ascribed to him the ability to heal through words (Altwegg 1908, 92 and footnote 1).

John Morrison was skeptical about whether or not Antiphon's clinic really existed. Unlike Altwegg, however, he considered it to be the fabrication of a comedy writer, like Socrates' phrontistery in Aristophanes' *The Clouds*, while at the same time acknowledging that the story might contain a grain of truth (Morrison 1961, 57). Morrison continued to hold that view: «It seems likely that the story, apparently deriving from Caecilius,[6] of his [Antiphon's — *S. T.*] Pain-and-Grief clinic at Corinth, at which he advertised treatment by means of *logoi*, was an invention of the comic stage analogous to Socrates' Thinking-Shop» (Morrison 1972, 108).[7]

It is worth noting that the skeptics have not come up with any arguments that would show the stories about the clinic to be unreliable. They clearly proceed from a disbelief in or doubt about the reality of this enterprise, which would truly have been unusual or even unique for antiquity[8] and seemed suspicious in their eyes, being too similar to modern psychotherapy. It is also noteworthy that, in his comments about the reports of the clinic, Pendrick fails to address the arguments of scholars on the opposite side. On the other hand, Pedro Laín Entralgo wrote a whole book about verbal therapy in classical antiquity, and he accepted the authenticity of Antiphon's clinic at face value (Laín Entralgo 1970, 97–98).[9] He associated the emergence of verbal psychotherapy with Gorgias and Anti-

[6] This is a reference to Caecilius of Calacte, a possible source of evidence about the clinic.

[7] Michael Edwards, who finds the story of the clinic suspect, commends this suggestion: "the anecdotal nature of this story is apparent" (Edwards 1998, 91).

[8] As far as I know, there are no other examples of such a practice in antiquity. It is not by chance that William Furley calls the account in Pseudo-Plutarch about Antiphon's psychotherapeutic clinic "recht überraschende Auskunft" (Furley 1992, 198).

[9] The original Spanish edition was published in 1958.

phon (Laín Entralgo 1970, 241) and had no doubt about Antiphon's psychotherapeutic method (Laín Entralgo 1970, 98), by which he sought to discover the cause of a patient's suffering (Laín Entralgo 1970, 101).

Rudolf Kassel saw a connection between Antiphon's τέχνη ἀλυπίας and the psychological power of the *logos* that Gorgias speaks of in *The Encomium of Helen*. In Gorgias' laudatory testimonial to λόγος, it turns out to be the ruler of the passions, capable of both arousing and terminating them. It is particularly capable of eliminating λύπη (*Hel.* 8). Its effect on the mind is similar to that of drugs on the body (*Hel.* 14).[10] Kassel sees the story of Antiphon's clinic presented by our sources to be basically reliable. Like Gorgias, Antiphon was elated by the power of his λόγοι and displayed them, calling them, as Philostratus reports, νηπενθεῖς ἀκροάσεις. This designation was meant to call to mind the soothing magical drink that Helen prepares with the aid of the Egyptian φάρμακον νηπενθές (*Odyss*. 4, 220). In Antiphon's declaration that there is no grief from which he cannot relieve one who is suffering from it, which is mentioned by Philostratus, Kassel sees the same self-assuredness with which Gorgias and Hippias were prepared to go before the public and give an extemporaneous answer to any question (Kassel 1958, 7, 9).

William Guthrie considered Antiphon to be an extraordinary psychologist for his time and came out in favor of the authenticity of his clinic (Guthrie 1971, 168 and 290–291). George Kerferd also gave credence to Antiphon's psychotherapy (Kerferd 1981, 51).

In a paper with the expressive title "Antiphon der Athener: ein Sophist als Psychotherapeut?", William Furley tries to determine whether or not the fragments of Antiphon confirm the accounts of a clinic. He takes several different tacks in his search for an answer to this question. He shows, for example, the richness of Antiphon's psychological vocabulary (Furley 1992, 200–206), and in an appendix to the paper, he has inserted a list of the psychological terms in the extant fragments of Antiphon's works (Furley 1992, 214–216). Furley also makes it clear that in the fragments of the treatise *On Concord* its author acts as a counselor in problematic situations (Furley 1992, 207–209). And finally, he examines the evidence of Antiphon as an interpreter of dreams (Furley 1992, 209–210), after first recalling the attention that psychoanalysis has given to them (Furley 1992, 200).

This analysis leads Furley to the following conclusion: "Zusammenfassend möchte ich behaupten, dass die überlieferten Fragmente des Sophisten Antiphon von einem ausgeprägten Interesse für die Psychologie zeugen. Sie können natürlich die Richtigkeit der Notiz in der *Vita*[11] nicht beweisen, in der von einer psychotherapeutischen Praxis in Korinth die Rede ist: dennoch liefern sie die Grundlage, die eine solche hätte möglich machen können" (Furley 1992, 210).

Furley also points out that Antiphon's interest in a person's inner world was in the spirit of the time. Here, the parallels with Democritus are indicative (Furley 1992, 211). Just like Kassel, Furley correctly regards Antiphon's bold assertion that he could eliminate any sadness using verbal therapy, as mentioned by Philostratus, to be typical of the Sophists of that era (Furley 1992, 214).

Christopher Gill poses the question of whether mental healing was practiced in antiquity and the answer that he comes up with is generally negative. He notes that there was nothing exactly similar to modern psychotherapy in the ancient world. At the same

[10] Cf. William Guthrie's remark: "This theory was actually put into practice by Antiphon in his 'psychiatric clinic' as reported in the *Lives of the Ten Orators*" (Guthrie 1971, 168).

[11] Furley is referring here to the biography of Antiphon in Pseudo-Plutarch.

time, he admits that "there are some striking borderline cases, on the more psychological margins of medicine, and on the more medical margins of philosophy, that are worth considering closely" (Gill 1985, 317). All the same, within the context of medicine, psychotherapy did not emerge: "…in ancient medicine, the verbal and psychological part of the treatment is only ancillary to the physical treatment. Verbal therapy is not seen as a means of uncovering the source of the mental disorder and thus opening the way for the removal of the disorder" (Gill 1985, 320). On the contrary, modern psychotherapists "regard therapeutic dialogue as the only way to uncover the causative roots of the disturbance, and so bring about a lasting cure" (Gill 1985, 320). Gill, however, believes that such a dialogue did take place in philosophy, and "this makes ancient philosophy sound very much like modern psychotherapy… The belief that the philosopher can function as a doctor of the psyche emerges in the late fifth and early fourth century, B. C." (Gill 1985, 320). Gill goes on to cite Pseudo-Plutarch's account of Antiphon's clinic (Gill 1985, 320). It is clear that he has no doubt about the veracity of this story.

Unlike Gagarin, Annie Hourcade takes note of Antiphon's psychotherapeutic activities. She refers to his clinic twice in her book. In the first chapter, devoted to Antiphon's personality, the third paragraph is entitled "Antiphon interprète des rêves et logothérapeute" (Hourcade 2001, 26–28). Hourcade is prepared to acknowledge that he was engaged in verbal therapy, but, at the same time, she flatly rejects the connection between that activity and the interpreting of dreams, which has been reliably accredited to Antiphon: "La curation par la parole ne présente pas de rapport direct avec l'interprétation des rêves. Il est clair, et il convient de le souligner ici, que cette association, en dépit de celle effectuée par la psychanalyse longtemps après, ne va pas de soi. Il en résulte que l'activité d'interprétation des rêves, que l'on peut semble-t-il attribuer à Antiphon, n'implique en aucun cas celle de médecin de l'âme usant du *logos* pour soulager ses patients" (Hourcade 2001, 28).

It seems to me that Hourcade too hastily rejects the connection between Antiphon's two activities. We should recall that in Herodotus (7. 16. β. 2) Artabanus explains to Xerxes that at night people dream about what has disturbed them during the day (τά τις ἡμέρης φροντίζει). As for Antiphon, we know that he was interested in dreams and strove to interpret them. We also know that, devoting himself as he did to verbal therapy, he tried to deliver people from what was weighing them down. In *On Concord*, he describes what we today call mental anxiety, using, among other words, the noun φροντίς (F 49) and the verb φροντίζω (F 54). If the connection between dreams and mental anxiety was known to Herodotus, could Antiphon, with his interest as a clinical professional in people's inner worlds, have been unaware of it? We cannot, of course, insist on the link between Antiphon's psychotherapy and his interpretation of dreams — we have no idea if he asked his patients about their dreams — but to outright dismiss it is, I think, rash.

Hourcade also takes up Antiphon's verbal therapy in another section of her book entitled "Le pouvoir du logos sur la psyche" (Hourcade 2001, 67–72). At the very beginning of this section, she writes that not only the fragments of his treatise *On Truth* but also certain parts of the courtroom speeches and the tetralogies shed light on what Antiphon thought of a person's inner world (Hourcade 2001, 67). This is true, but the fragments of *On Concord* are even more elucidating. She correctly believes that Antiphon's therapy consisted of two stages: first he listened to a patient and then set about treating them (Hourcade 2001, 69). And she makes an interesting comparison between the effect that Antiphon had on

judges in the tetralogies when he resorted to *eikos*-argumentation and the method that he may have used in verbal therapy (Hourcade 2001, 71). The only point on which I would disagree is with Hourcade's assertion that it is hard to consider Antiphon a forerunner, even a distant one, of Freud (Hourcade 2001, 70).[12]

Unlike Christopher Gill, Han Baltussen believes it possible to speak of a kind of antique psychotherapy (Baltussen 2009, 67, 69–70), and he is inclined to accept the tradition of the clinic: "The genuine nature of these reports has been questioned, but the arguments to support this skepticism strike me as unconvincing" (Baltussen 2009, 74). He explains his position as follows: "The rather skeptical evaluation of this report by Pendrick 2002, 241 …seems over-cautious… We cannot ignore the interesting analysis by Furley (1992, 203–205), which goes a long way in showing that (this) Antiphon has a quite rich vocabulary in assessing emotions and a coherent set of concepts that aims for the control of them and avoid [*sic*] pain and discomfort (*alupia*), which in addition tallies well with contemporary concerns over emotions and how to deal with them effectively. Neither case can be fully proven, but Furley's account of Antiphon's grief-therapy is more plausible than Pendrick's refusal to accept its possibility" (Baltussen 2009, 74 note 24).

I will sum up. Those who support the tradition of the clinic as authentic have convincingly shown that Antiphon's enterprise was in the spirit of the time. There are remarkable parallels between Gorgias' praise of *logos* and the accounts of Antiphon in Pseudo-Plutarch and Photius. According to Gorgias, λόγος can relieve λύπη. And both Pseudo-Plutarch and Photius cite Antiphon's declaration that he was capable of healing the grief-stricken (τοὺς λυπουμένους) with words (διὰ λόγων). Further, Gorgias, concluding his hymn to oratory, likens the effect of words on the soul to that of drugs on the body. We find the very same analogy in the tradition of the clinic: Pseudo-Plutarch compares Antiphon's τέχνη ἀλυπίας, i. e. his verbal psychotherapy, to the healing that patients receive from doctors. There is, then, absolutely no reason to doubt the authenticity of Antiphon's clinic. This enterprise was consistent not only with the spirit of that time but also with Antiphon's personality.

Now I turn to the second testimony, the depiction of Antiphon in the sixth chapter of the first book of *Memorabilia*. This is the most extensive biographical evidence of him. But to what extent does it correspond to the facts? It is widely believed that this work of Xenophon's is not very credible.[13] This long-established assessment has been transferred to the portrait of Antiphon as well. Thus, according to Olof Gigon, in Xenophon's portrayal of him, Antiphon is devoid of any genuine individuality. In his commentary to *Memorabilia*, Gigon writes that Antiphon "nicht mehr als ein Name ist, hinter dem der allgemeine Typus des Sokrates-feindlichen σοφιστής steht" (Gigon 1953, 165). On the whole, according to Gigon, we can learn next to nothing about Antiphon's identity from Xenophon's story (Gigon 1953, 152). At the end of his account of Antiphon's second encounter with Socrates, Xenophon *does* mention that he was present at it: ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούοντι… (6. 14). But many scholars, including Heinrich Maier and Hans Breitenbach, attach little significance to this and other allusions by Xenophon that he was present at one or another

[12] In connection with Antiphon's verbal therapy, Marc-Louis Bourgeois mentions the rational emotive behavior therapy of Albert Ellis and logotherapy of Victor Frankl (Bourgeois 2012, 675).

[13] Within the scope of this paper, I will not, of course, raise the question of how credible *Memorabilia* is as a whole. I would just like to point out that the apologetic nature of this work does not exclude its credibility.

conversation with Socrates, considering them to be pseudo-historical (Maier 1913, 21; Breitenbach 1966, 1779).

This what I consider to be biased attitude toward the credibility of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.6 is shared by a number of authors who have written works about Antiphon. Pendrick doubts whether the clashes between Antiphon and Socrates really occurred: "In the absence of confirming evidence from other sources, we need not assume that the conversations of 1, 6 ever really took place" (Pendrick 1987, 48). Hourcade, citing Pendrick's paper, takes the same stance (Hourcade 2001, 18–19). In his book, Pendrick continues to challenge the historicity of Xenophon's account: "The disputes between Antiphon and Socrates are not attested in any source independent of Xenophon, and it is doubtful whether they actually took place" (Pendrick 2002, 227). Following suit with Maier and Breitenbach, he believes Xenophon's allusion to his own involvement can be ignored (Pendrick 2002, 227). Gagarin takes a similar, though less radical, point of view. He holds that Antiphon's conversations with Socrates in *Mem*. 1. 6 "like the other episodes in this work, are largely fictional" (Gagarin 2002, 40). At the same time, he thinks that in all probability the encounters between Antiphon and Socrates really did take place: "Xenophon presents the two (*scil*. Socrates and Antiphon. — *S. T.*) as rival teachers (*Memorabilia* 1. 6), and although we cannot put much trust in the historicity of the conversations he reports, it is hard to imagine that the two did not encounter each other often" (Gagarin 2002, 5).

Notwithstanding the doubts about, or even rejection of, the evidence presented by Xenophon, scholars still use it. In the first sentence of Chapter 6, Xenophon refers to Antiphon as τὸν σοφιστήν. Calling Antiphon a sophist seems to be what has attracted the most attention, provoking disputes between unitarians and separatists. Pendrick supposes that Xenophon calls him that to distinguish Antiphon the sophist from Antiphon the orator (Pendrick 1987, 51–54). He concludes that the question of Antiphon's identity defies an indisputable solution, although "in Xenophon's characterization of 'Antiphon the Sophist' in *Mem*. 1, 6 we saw convincing evidence (nearly contemporary with both Antiphons) of the existence of a Sophist Antiphon distinct from the Rhamnusian" (Pendrick 1987, 59).

Defending the unitarian point of view, Michael Gagarin proposes a different explanation for Antiphon being called a sophist in *Mem*. 1. 6. 1. He shows that the term σοφιστής can be used rather broadly: it can be applied to orators and, for that matter, to intellectuals. Aeschines, for example, calls Socrates a sophist (1.173) and Demosthenes hangs the same tag on Lysias (59. 21). Consequently, Antiphon, widely known as an orator, could also be labeled with that term (Gagarin 1990, 31–32). Ultimately, Gagarin comes to the following conclusion: "…the expression 'Antiphon the Sophist' is much more likely to designate the well-known orator than anyone else, even if he were not the author of the sophistic works attributed to him. The reason that Xenophon calls him 'the Sophist' and not 'Antiphon of Rhamnus' or simply 'Antiphon' may be that he uses the simple name elsewhere (*Hell*. 2. 3. 40) of a trierarch who was killed by the Thirty" (Gagarin 1990, 32–33).

In his paper, Gagarin is refuting, above all, Pendrick, who in a later response continues to insist that "Xen. *Mem*. 1. 6. 1–15 provides the strongest support for the separatist thesis" (Pendrick 1993, 219). Agreeing with Gagarin that the term σοφιστής could be applied to the logographer Antiphon of Rhamnus, especially in an antagonistic context, he nonetheless stands by his opinion: "The question, however, is not whether Xenophon *could* have called the Rhamnusian a 'sophist' but whether he would have done so, and why. The Rhamnusian is usually identified in ancient texts by name and demotic, or by name

along with the epithet ῥήτωρ (= "politician"), or by bare name; 'sophist' would be an unusual designation for him, and we should have to account for Xenophon's use of it" (Pendrick 1993, 220–221). Pendrick also rejects the above mentioned explanation of Gagarin's, whereby Xenophon uses that designation to distinguish Antiphon the orator and sophist from Antiphon the trierarch (Pendrick 1993, 221).

In books published in 2002, the positions of the two scholars, on the whole, remain the same. As before, Gagarin maintains that Xenophon's picture of Antiphon is wholly compatible with what we know about Antiphon of Rhamnus (Gagarin 2002, 41). And once again he dwells on the question of why Xenophon calls Socrates' interlocutor a sophist. He now offers several possible explanations, including the earlier one: "he (*scil*. Xenophon. — *S. T.*) may have wished only to suggest that the issues Antiphon raises were commonly raised in discussing Socrates' relationships to the Sophists. Or he may be trying to prejudice his readers against Antiphon. Or he may also have used the designation 'Sophist' to distinguish this Antiphon from one or more other Antiphons who were clearly not intellectuals. Possible candidates would include the Antiphon whom Xenophon tells us was put to death by the Thirty in 404/3 (*Hellenica* 2. 3. 40; cf. [Plutarch] *Moralia* 833a–b), or the tragic poet, who died sometime before 367 and thus was almost certainly active when Book I of the *Memorabilia* was composed (ca. 380). These and other Antiphons would clearly be excluded by the designation 'the Sophist' in a way that the Rhamnusian would not" (Gagarin 2002, 42–43).

Pendrick, in his book, is still a resolute separatist. In the introduction, he discusses at length the identity of Socrates' partner in conversation (Pendrick 2002, 3–11). According to him, "the earliest and best evidence for the existence of a sophist Antiphon distinct from Antiphon of Rhamnus is provided by Xenophon's account of a series of conversations between Socrates and Antiphon ὁ σοφιστής" (Pendrick 2002, 3). As for the designation of Antiphon as a sophist, as he sees it, "once it is granted that Xenophon's Antiphon is a professional educator distinct from the Rhamnusian, then the epithet 'sophist' (with its pejorative overtones) and the professional rivalry with Socrates fall into place" (Pendrick 2002, 7). Thus, according to Pendrick, Antiphon the Sophist, as distinct from the orator, is revealed in *Mem*. 1. 6, so he inserts the whole chapter in his collection as evidence (T 1).

Neither Gagarin nor Pendrick were able to explain why Xenophon called Antiphon a sophist straight off. But the reason, I think, is on the surface. During their second encounter, this is how Socrates begins his response to an argument of Antiphon's that he finds insulting (*Mem*. 1. 6. 13):

> ὦ ᾽Αντιφῶν, παρ᾽ ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τήν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μέν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν· καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δὲ ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν,
>
> "Antiphon, it is common opinion among us in regard to beauty and wisdom that there is an honourable and a shameful way of bestowing them. For those who offer their beauty for money to all comers are called prostitutors; but we think it virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is known to be a man of honour. And those who offer their wisdom for money

to all comers are called sophists in the same manner as the former are called prostitutors. But we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a citizen and a gentleman" (Edgar Marchant's translation, modified).

And since in the first sentence of this chapter Antiphon is called a sophist, the shameful implications of comparing sophists to πόρνοι must apply directly to him. In the sixth chapter, Xenophon creates a repulsive image of Antiphon. One of the means of doing so is by calling him a sophist in the very first sentence and then following that with an explanation of what sophists are. This is not, then, a way of distinguishing him from another bearer of that name.

Establishing the identity of Socrates' interlocutor depends, it would seem, on how we understand the words παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται "it is common opinion among us" in the passage cited above. The question of who stands behind the pronoun "us" at one time touched off a heated debate between Eric Dodds and John Morrison. Dodds, alluding to the question of identifying the "Antiphons", noted, among other things (Dodds 1951, 133 n. 100), that "…Socrates' use of παρ' ἡμῖν in Xen. *Mem*. 1. 6. 13 seems to me to imply that the sophist was a foreigner (which would also forbid identification of the sophist with the orator)". Thus, according to Dodds, the phrase "among us", as it is used here, means "among the Athenians", and therefore Socrates' interlocutor, Antiphon the Sophist, was evidently a foreigner. Since Antiphon the orator was an Athenian citizen, it was of course impossible to identify him as the Antiphon the Sophist depicted by Xenophon.

It was not long before Morrison came forward with a response to the interpretation of this passage in Dodds' book. He agreed with Dodds that the words παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται contain a contradistinction between "our" opinion and the opinion of others, among whom Antiphon should be included. But these other people are not foreigners, as opposed to Athenians; they are the outside world, as opposed to the Socratic school. So, Socrates' words παρ' ἡμῖν, according to Morrison, mean "with me and my disciples". Consequently, there is no reason to consider Socrates' interlocutor a foreigner. And if Antiphon the Sophist in *Memorabilia* is an Athenian, then all of the external obstacles to his being identified as Antiphon the orator from Rhamnus fall away (Morrison 1953, 5–6).

Dodds' answer appeared a year later in the same journal, when he pointed out that in the sixth chapter, all the way up to the passage being discussed (1. 6. 13), the participants in the dispute make no allusion to the Socratic school. There is but one hint of this, and it is made earlier by Xenophon himself, at the very beginning of the sixth chapter (1. 6. 1), when he observes (moreover in describing the first, not the second, encounter between Antiphon and Socrates) that Antiphon is striving to discredit Socrates in front of his students: παρόντων αὐτῶν (*scil*. τῶν συνουσιαστῶν). Dodds continues: "The connection between this and the ἡμῖν of 1. 6. 13 is, to say the least, tenuous. It may be, however, that Mr. Morrison can quote passages from Xenophon or Plato where Socrates uses ἡμεῖς in this way, with nothing to lead up to it, to mean 'the Socratic circle'. If he can, my doubt on this score will vanish". Dodds further notes that in *Mem*. 1. 6. 14 Socrates speaks in the first person, using the pronoun ἐγώ, and the contraposition ἡμεῖς — ἐγώ is perfectly natural if ἡμεῖς refers to Athenians but far from it if the reference is to the Socratic circle (Dodds 1954, 94). At the same time, he points out that in his book he has expressed nothing more than a suggestion: "In a recently published book I remarked that Socrates' use of παρ' ἡμῖν

in Xen. *Mem.* 1. 6. 13 seemed to imply that Antiphon the sophist was not an Athenian" (Dodds 1954, 94) and, as he explained in an endnote, "'seemed', because it is just arguable that Socrates is speaking as one Athenian to another and merely *reminding* Antiphon of the Athenian attitude. This is not, however — and here Mr. Morrison agrees[14] — the natural interpretation of the passage" (Dodds 1954, 94 note 2).

The following year, Morrison published his response, in which he attempted to reply to Dodds' objections, (Morrison 1955, 8–12), and several years later, in a general paper about Antiphon, he acknowledged that he had not strayed from his previous stance (Morrison 1961, 58).

This controversy turns out to be quite relevant. Dodds is right in assuming that the first-person plural pronoun in the prepositional phrase παρ' ἡμῖν refers to Athenians. But he is mistaken when he decides that, in this case, Antiphon does not appear to be an Athenian. True, he himself provides for a different conclusion from the way he understands παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται: Socrates reminds Antiphon that for him, as an Athenian, trafficking in wisdom is disgraceful. Dodds, however, considers such a reading of this passage to be unnatural. Meanwhile, Pendrick, in his commentary to this passage, summarizing the controversy, considers it to be a distinct possibility: "Socrates may speak as one Athenian to another, reminding Antiphon of attitudes which he (as an Athenian) ought to share" (Pendrick 2002, 229). I think that this reading is not only possible but correct. Indeed, if Socrates' interlocutor is a citizen of another polis, then why should he defer to the opinion of the Athenians? For an Athenian, however, the general consensus of his fellow citizens is, to one extent or another, binding.

It can now be seen that calling Antiphon a sophist in *Mem.* 1. 6. 1 does not in any way undermine the position of the unitarians. Harry Avery has shown convincingly that an uncommon love for money is a distinguishing characteristic of both Socrates' adversary and Antiphon the orator (Avery 1982, 151–155). I can't but agree with Avery's conclusion: "This congruence constitutes strong evidence that the sophist who opposed Socrates and the orator were the same man. Those who would argue that they were not one person would be forced to accept the highly improbable coincidence that in late fifth-century B. C. Athens there were two separate men, both well known and in closely related professions, with the same name and with the same extraordinary interest in money" (Avery 1982, 155). Gagarin is of the same opinion (Gagarin 2002, 41).

Now a few words about the new edition of Antiphon's and Andocides' speeches prepared by Mervin Dilts and David Murphy (Dilts, Murphy 2018). I will discuss only the Antiphontean part of this edition. The editors deserve to be commended for their generally conservative approach to the text. They also have refrained from overloading the apparatus criticus. As Murphy states in the preface, "We do not record all trivial manuscript errors or corrections" (Dilts, Murphy 2018, xvi). This is a good decision, but they have omitted several emendations that surely merit being reported. For instance, Carlo Lucarini has proposed some interesting conjectures on the text of Antiphon's speeches (Lucarini 2010). They are worthy of close scrutiny, and yet not one of these emendations is to be found in the apparatus, and his paper is absent from the *Conspectus studiorum*. Another example: In Ant. 1. 13 the accuser says περὶ δὲ τῶν γενομένων πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν· δίκη δὲ κυβερνήσειεν. Victor Jernstedt cautiously, in the form

[14] Dodds is referring here to the following statement by Morrison: "Dodds is right in perceiving that Socrates contrasts 'our' opinions with those of others among whom Antiphon is included" (Morrison 1953, 5).

of a question, proposed that we should read here the name of the goddess Δίκη (Jernstedt 1880, xlv). In his second edition of Antiphon, Friedrich Blass reported this emendation in the apparatus (Blass ^{2}1881, 6). So did Thalheim, in a later edition (Thalheim 1914, 6). Wilamowitz obviously approved of Jernstedt's proposal, though he did not mention its author. In a paper devoted to Antiphon's first speech, he wrote the word with a capital letter (Wilamowitz 1887, 202 and note 2).[15] Adelmo Barigazzi, in his edition of *Against the Stepmother*, accepted the emendation, likewise capitalizing the word in the text of the speech, also, unfortunately, without any mention of Jernstedt (Barigazzi 1955, 87). I think there is no doubt that Antiphon was referring to the goddess: as Wolf Aly rightly observed, the phrase Δίκη δὲ κυβερνήσειεν is a prayer (Aly 1929, 83, 159). So, even if one finds grounds not to accept Jernstedt's proposal, it should at least be mentioned.[16]

In the preface, Murphy claims that this new edition adheres more closely to the manuscripts than do those of Friedrich Blass, Theodor Thalheim and Louis Gernet (Dilts, Murphy 2018, xiii). There are indeed examples of such an approach to the manuscripts. There are also, however, examples of the opposite, when Dilts and Murphy, taking their cue from these three editors, have accepted emendations to the text that are either unnecessary or dubious. In Ant. 1. 20, for instance, in the manuscripts the words καὶ χειρουργήσασα refer to the stepmother. In his first edition of Antiphon, Blass transposed them so that they related to the concubine (Blass ^{1}1871, 8). He did likewise in his two subsequent editions (Blass ^{2}1881, 8; Blass ^{3}1892, 8). Thalheim and Gernet embraced this transposition (Thalheim 1914, 8; Gernet 1923, 43). Dilts and Murphy have followed suit and also accepted this shift (Dilts, Murphy 2018, 11). On the other hand, Wilamowitz stood by the text in the manuscript (Wilamowitz 1887, 205); Barigazzi left the text intact and in a detailed commentary justified his refusal to go along with this change (Barigazzi 1955, 93); and Ernst Heitsch came out against Blass' proposed revision as well (Heitsch 1984, 31 note 80, 32 note 83). The arguments of those who defend the manuscript text appear to be well founded.

As a further example, in Ant. 2. δ. 7, manuscript **A** gives the following text: ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔλεγχον παρασχὼν οὐδὲ βάσανον οὐ δίκην δώσει, εἴ τις ἔλεγχος ἔσται. Johann Reiske, considering the text to be unsatisfactory, proposed replacing οὐ with ποῦ, and εἴ τις with ἢ τίς. This sentence, thus altered, turned into two successive rhetorical questions: ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔλεγχον παρασχὼν οὐδὲ βάσανον ποῦ δίκην δώσει; ἢ τίς ἔλεγχος ἔσται; (Reiske 1773, 654). This revision proved to be extremely popular. Blass accepted it in all three of his editions (Blass ^{1}1871, 27; Blass ^{2}1881, 27; Blass ^{3}1892, 27), as did Thalheim, Gernet and Maidment (Thalheim 1914, 26; Gernet 1923, 65; Maidment 1941, 78). Johannes Thiel and Decleva Caizzi also adopted Reiske's conjecture and praised it highly in their commentaries (Thiel 1932, 39, 128; Decleva Caizzi 1969, 102, 206). Dilts and Murphy have done likewise (Dilts, Murphy 2018, 29–30). Eduard Maetzner, however, left the reading of manuscript **A** as it was and in his commentary showed that Reiske's correction was not needed (Maetzner 1838, 33, 169).

Here is yet another example. In Ant. 5. 14, the accused says: ὥστε οὐ δεῖ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τῶν τοῦ κατηγόρου λόγων τοὺς νόμους καταμανθάνειν, εἰ καλῶς ὑμῖν κεῖνται ἢ μή, ἀλλ' ἐκ

[15] This important paper is not included in the *Conspectus studiorum*.

[16] I have written a paper in Russian (Takhtajan 2015), in which I defend the reading Δίκη, and hope someday to publish a revised version of this paper in English.

τῶν νόμων τοὺς τοῦ κατηγόρου λόγους, εἰ ὀρθῶς καὶ νομίμως ὑμᾶς διδάξουσι[17] τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ οὔ. The text of the entire fourteenth paragraph of Antiphon's fifth speech is repeated almost verbatim in Ant. 6. 2. In the second paragraph of his sixth speech, the corresponding sentence is as follows: ὥστ' οὐ δεῖ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τῶν λόγων τοῦ κατηγοροῦντος τοὺς νόμους μαθεῖν εἰ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νόμων τοὺς τούτων λόγους, εἰ ὀρθῶς ὑμᾶς καὶ νομίμως διδάσκουσιν ἢ οὔ. On the grounds that the present tense is used in 6. 2, Reiske proposed that in 5. 14 διδάξουσι should also be replaced by διδάσκουσι (Reiske 1773, 711).

Reiske's conjecture has been accepted by almost all of Antiphon's editors. Admittedly, in his first edition of Antiphon Blass adopted a different emendation, also changing the future to the present tense, this being Andreas Weidner's conjecture διδάσκει (Blass [1]1871, 59–60),[18] but in his second and third editions he changed his mind and adopted Reiske's conjecture (Blass [2]1881, 62; Blass [3]1892, 62).[19] So did Thalheim, Gernet and Michael Edwards (Thalheim 1914, 58; Gernet 1923, 112; Edwards, Usher 1987, 34).

As the two phrases quoted from Antiphon's fifth and sixth speeches show, however, there is no exact match between 5. 14 and 6. 2. On the contrary, Antiphon, from all appearances, strove to make these two passages at least slightly different from each other. Therefore, the very idea of trying to emend one of them on the basis of the other, so that they are almost equivalent, is wrong. Once again Maetzner did not accept Reiske's correction, leaving the reading of manuscript **A**, διδάξουσι, in the text (Maetzner 1838, 69). In his commentary, he explained that the future tense was appropriate here: "Pro futuro tempore διδάξουσι in loco gemino VI § 2 exstat praesens: neque tamen huc inferendum praesens tempus. Etenim praesens κεῖνται ad leges spectat quae fuerunt et adhuc exstant, futurum διδάξουσι ad consilium, quod in singulis actionibus sequuturi sint accusatores" (Maetzner 1838, 209). It is hard to argue with this.

Publication of the first three books that I have considered here is undeniably a welcome development. But can we speak about any concrete results in the research on Antiphon over the past two decades? Yes, we can. According to Hourcade, "l'état actuel des recherches sur la question invite à concevoir un Antiphon en quelque sorte réunifié" (Hourcade 2001, 25). But, as Danielle Allen has aptly noted, Gagarin's and Hourcade's books need to be read together; otherwise, the image of Antiphon will be incomplete: "…a philosopher emerges from one book and a legal theorist from the other. To have a single, whole Antiphon, finally, we have to put H. and G. together, too" (Allen 2004, 312). At the same time, Allen exaggerates when she writes that "both G. and H. can and do rest their 'unitarian' case on the argument that the combined corpus in fact reveals remarkable intellectual consistency" (Allen 2004, 310). Hourcade and Gagarin have not managed to show to the extent possible the intellectual consistency of the *Corpus Antiphonteum*. One of the reasons for this is that they have not made full use of their predecessors' achievements. Michael Nill already showed that self-interested calculation can be seen in both *On Truth* and *On Concord* (Nill 1985, 54–74). Likewise, Friedrich Solmsen (Solmsen 1931, 61–62) and Johannes Thiel (Thiel 1932, 6; 63; 141) indicated that calculation of advantage and loss is present in the speeches of Antiphon. I think that self-interested calculation in

[17] The reading in manuscript **A** is διδάξουσι, but in manuscript **N** it is διδάξει.

[18] About the assistance Weidner provided Blass in preparing this edition, see Blass [1]1871, IX.

[19] Whether the reading here is διδάξει or διδάσκει, the subject for this predicate will be ὁ κατήγορος, but if the reading is διδάξουσι or διδάσκουσι, it will be οἱ λόγοι. The second variant makes the sentence more expressive.

fact unites *Corpus Antiphonteum* into a whole. There is, however, still much work to be done here.

To these two books we should simply add that of Pendrick, with its remarkably complete commentary to the fragments of Antiphon's treatises. Granted, Pendrick is a separatist. All the same, in his commentary, he repeatedly cites, as parallels to passages in Antiphon's treatises, particular places in the speeches of Antiphon the orator, whom he sees as a different author. It seems to me that despite Pendrick's stance on this issue, these parallels do testify to there being a single author of both the speeches and the treatises. Thus, thanks to all three of these books, Antiphon has at long last, though not yet fully, been reunified.

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Антифонт в новом тысячелетии

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Статья носит обзорный характер. В ней я рассматриваю появившиеся за последние годы труды об Антифонте. Главное внимание уделяется четырем книгам. Это посвященные Антифонту исследования Анни Уркад и Майкла Гагарина, издание фрагментов трактатов Антифонта с подробным комментарием, подготовленное Джерардом Пендриком, и, наконец, выпущенное Мервином Дилтсом и Дэвидом Мерфи новое издание речей Антифонта. Среди ученых до сих пор продолжается спор об авторстве *Corpus Antiphonteum*. Одни полагают, что у речей, с одной стороны, и трактатов, с другой, были разные авторы — Антифонт-оратор и Антифонт-софист соответственно (сепаратисты). Другие настаивают на едином авторе речей и трактатов (унитарии). В XIX и первой половине XX века преобладала позиция сепаратистов. Но постепенно положение стало меняться, и теперь большинство ученых, обоснованно, на мой взгляд, высказывается в пользу единого авторства. Сепаратисты вынуждены делить биографические свидетельства об Антифонте между оратором и софистом. А в случае единого Антифонта оказывается, что об этой личности имеется немало сведений. В статье я привожу обзор мнений ученых о свидетельствах, согласно которым Антифонт изобрел τέχνη ἀλυπίας и открыл психотерапевтическую клинику. Там он посредством словесной терапии пытался помочь своим пациентам. Некоторые ученые подвергают сомнению традицию о клинике. Сепаратисты относят свидетельства о ней к Антифонту-софисту. Вслед за другими учеными я отстаиваю достоверность сведений о клинике. В статье рассматривается также изображение Антифонта у Ксенофонта *Mem*. 1, 6. Многие ученые считают рассказ Ксенофонта малодостоверным или совсем отказывают ему в историчности. Сепаратисты полагают, что Ксенофонт называет Антифонта софистом в первом же предложении шестой главы для того, чтобы отличить его от его тезки, Антифонта-оратора. Я полагаю, что Ксенофонт преследовал другую цель. Сократ во время второй встречи с Антифонтом уподобляет софистов πόρνοι (*Mem*. 1, 6, 13). Очевидно, Ксенофонт назвал Антифонта софистом с тем, чтобы уподобление софистов πόρνοι, постыдное для первых, относилось в первую очередь к Антифонту. Уркад и Гагарин полагают, что у речей и трактатов был единый автор. Хотя Пендрик является сепаратистом, те параллели, которые он проводит между фрагментами трактатов и отдельными местами речей, свидетельствуют, на мой взгляд, в пользу одного Антифонта. В заключение я делаю вывод, что, благодаря трудам ученых, Антифонт вновь, пусть пока еще не в полной мере, обрел единство.

Ключевые слова: Антифонт, *Corpus Antiphonteum*, *Об истине*, *О согласии*, речи, психотерапевтическая клиника, встречи с Сократом, эгоистическая калькуляция.

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