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EDITORS’ DEDICATORY NOTE

Alexander I. Zaicev (1926–2000), a celebrated Hellenist, Professor of Ancient Greek at St Petersburg University, a teacher of many classicists in Russia (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Saratov, etc.) and Europe was a scholar of singularly diverse interests which, in the field of Classics alone, ranged from Homeric poems, folklore, mythology and metrics to Indo-European studies, and further beyond these lavished in the reaches of Sanskrit, Hebrew, Egyptian, Hittite and Akkadian languages and higher mathematics, a pastime which he did not forgo until his last day.

Zaicev was born in Leningrad into a family of a Soviet functionary father who was arrested in 1937 and executed in early 1938 and a dentist mother, who was shortly afterwards sentenced to 8 years of labour camps. Since his early school years — as Zaicev reminisces in his Autobiography — he was outspoken in his disapproval of the Communist regime and of Stalin himself (later Zaicev would call him “cannibal Dzhugashvili”). In the course of time, his views only became stronger. While mapping out plans for the future, he hesitated between mathematics and Classical studies, and eventually decided on the latter. Thus, in 1946, he enrolled for a course at the Department of Classics of the Faculty of Philology in Leningrad. His academic skills arrested everybody’s attention, but instead, in 1947, Zaicev himself was arrested, pronounced insane and for seven years was on compulsory treatment in a KGB mental institution in Kazan (this prison term could have been much longer since the sentence was not specified). In 1954, a year after Stalin’s death, Zaicev was released, but the rehabilitation came decades later — only in 1991. After discharge, Zaicev made a secret journey to Lithuania to become a Roman Catholic.

Zaicev returned to Leningrad in the same year, and due to untiring efforts of his senior colleagues (of Jakov M. Borovski, his teacher and then Department chair, in the first place), was reinstated as a student at the university. In 1956, aged thirty, Zaicev graduated with honours defending a thesis on a recently published fragment of Προμηθεύς πυρκαέως (POxy XX, 2245), a satyr play by Aeschylus. In 1959 Zaicev received a teaching position at the Department of Classics in Leningrad and was its permanent member until the end of 1999. His doctoral dissertation of 1969 was dedicated to Alcman’s Hymn to the Dioscouroi, then recent papyrus discovery, and its epic sources. The resulting research cannot be reduced to a mere reconstruction of the hymn, based on fragments and secondary sources, nor can it be viewed as an amassment of the material available; instead, it exhaustively and concisely considers the key episodes of the Dioscourean tradition. This text, together with that of his master’s, was published in full by his pupils in 2006 as part

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of his posthumous *Collected works* edition (currently a four volume collection, to be enlarged by further valuable additions from his archive).

The most abiding trait that distinguished Zaicev was his unremitting devotion to learning and teaching. Among his favourite sayings was the following: “One should never save on brainwork!” He practised this never grudging his time helping his students and colleagues and answering their questions. Never quite satisfied with this, Zaicev adopted his teachers’ tradition of extracurricular seminars for reading and translating ancient texts. These seminars welcomed everybody with some reading knowledge of Ancient Greek, but the hard-core consisted of seasoned graduate students and teaching staff of the Departments of Classics and Ancient Greek and Roman History. The weekly Saturday meetings began in 1963 and were held until the end of 1999. The progress with Greek texts — in Zaicev’s distinctive way — was made at an unhurried pace: it took almost twenty years to read and discuss Plato’s *Laws*; these were followed by Aristotle’s *Politics* and finally by Pindar’s *Odes*. In 1979, at students’ request, it was decided to add a Russian-Latin translation seminar. In the course of years, the circle of participants varied, but some regulars attended the Saturdays for decades.

His *opus magnum* *The Cultural Revolution in Ancient Greece between the Eighth and the Fifth Centuries B.C.* was first published in Russian in 1985 (the German translation *Das griechische Wunder: Die Entstehung der griechischen Zivilisation* followed in 1993, the Japanese *Kodai Girisha-no bunka kakumei* in 2010). Zaicev’s second monograph *Formation of the Greek Hexameter* (1994) came as a result of his research into the history of Indo-European and Ancient Greek metrics. His numerous articles and smaller pieces on the topics that were essential for him — such as Homer’s epic and the history of Ancient Greek religion and mythology — are no less rich, stimulating and sobering. Zaicev was fluent in several languages, but generally wrote and published in Russian, so, according to a sad axiom *Rossica non leguntur*, his works are lesser known in the West than they really deserve.

At the end of 1980s, Zaicev together with his younger colleagues was eagerly promoting the creation of the first Classical Grammar School in Russia (the *Gymnasium Classicum Petropolitanum* was opened in 1989). He never had a chance to get what he called a “regular education” at a pre-revolutionary gymnasium himself, but he passionately participated in discussions of the new school’s syllabus: he insisted, for example, on the two “pillars” of the curriculum — Classical languages and mathematics. He suggested the use of German textbooks for Latin and Ancient Greek, which were translated into Russian and are still in use at the gymnasium. When the school was founded, Zaicev became a member of its advisory board; he also gave lectures for teachers and pupils and always participated in the meetings of the school’s research group “Classica.”

It is hard to overestimate the importance of his figure for Classics in this country, both through his extensive, orderly and accurate knowledge and through the impact his strong personality made. The sharpness, intensity and liveliness of his thought and argument, consistency and validity of conclusions come to the fore every time one meets him, be it in his lectures, seminars, articles or monographs. His spoken word, often in form of a witty apophthegm, engrafted itself onto everybody who knew him, taking to the marrow and often becoming a living principle (see A. K. Gavrilov’s article in the present collection).

This year Alexander I. Zaicev would have turned ninety, and this volume is a contribution from his colleagues, pupils and pupils of his pupils to his fond memory.
THE NOCTURNAL COUNCIL IN PLATO’S LAWS

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The paper discusses the problem of the formation and functions of the Nocturnal Council (NC) in Plato’s Laws, the assembly of the highest officials who have attained advanced philosophical and scientific education. Against the currently prevailing interpretation of the NC (G. Morrow) as the center of scientific and philosophical studies and education in these disciplines, which possesses expert knowledge in the field of laws but does not have legal powers and acts informally through the authority of its members, the senior nomophylakes, the author of the paper argues that 1) there is no textual evidence for the NC as the body that is engaged in studies or performs educational functions: this role is assigned to the school that should be instituted according to 968 c 2 — e 4; the treatment of this piece by some scholars as pointing to the “temporary” formation of the NC should be rejected — the only way of its formation that the text points to is by occupying the highest offices; the NC would be founded in the future and it stands and falls with its taking on persons who have the reputation of philosophically enhanced virtues; 2) the debatable passage 968 c 2 — 7 points not only to the law that should regulate the program of the highest scientific and philosophical studies (as according to Cherniss and Morrow), but also to the law granting legal powers to the NC; 3) these powers are the same as are granted to the NC by the law that constitutes it as the philosophical Guardian of the state (968 a 4- b2), having the task of keeping the laws and the officials aligned with the permanent goal of the state, virtue; 4) the corresponding legal prerogatives of the NC entail the powers of changing the laws (as well as prohibiting persons who do not have philosophically enhanced virtues from being elected as nomophylakes and euthynoi). This interpretation's seeming contradiction to the provisions made earlier according to which only minimal changes of laws are envisaged and these are assigned to the nomophylakes, not to the NC, can be resolved once it is taken into account that the NC is not part of the constitutional mechanism in the usual sense, but the extraordinary means of making the state permanently follow the philosophical principles on which it is built, the optional provision for the future. Lacking an NC, the city of Magnesia should keep the code of laws as rigid as possible; it will nevertheless be open to danger of imminent moral deterioration.

Keywords: Plato, the Laws, the Nocturnal Council, Political theory

This essay is a modest tribute to Alexander Zaicev and to his informal seminar, the reading of Plato’s Laws, over the course of more than twenty years, 1963–1986, with its (inevitably) changing company of participants. I took part in this reading in its final phase, from the autumn of 1980. It had a considerable impact on me and, I would guess, on
many other members of this seminar, being a school of meticulous research that delved into all details of the philology and legal aspects of Plato's proposals and considerations of the effects they could have in real life — the disastrous ones, for the most part, as Zaicev's analysis showed, in spite of his personal sympathy with Plato's moral stance and demand for an educated elite. Given the obvious parallels between the state of the Laws and the Soviet system, this critical approach provoked the authorities of the relatively mild late Soviet regime to prohibit the seminar at the university, so it moved to private apartments. Although Zaicev's plan of writing the commentary on the Laws with his students did not (and probably could not) come to realization, the reading was seminal for Zaicev informal students, although its participants' future fields of study were often quite remote from the subject of the seminar.1

The only published product of Zaicev's work on the Laws is, typically for him, a small essay written in the time of beginning of the seminar: it is devoted to the debatable passage of Aristotle's Politics (II. 1265 a 3–4),2 which Zaicev interpreted as pointing to Plato's plan of the gradual transformation of the "second-best" state of the Laws to the "absolutely best state" of the Republic.3 When properly understood, the problematic account of the Nocturnal Council (NC in what follows), which is described in detail in the end of the Laws, could support this view of Aristotle, as Zaicev believed. Zaicev never wrote the more detailed paper on the NC as announced, but the essentials of his interpretation can be retrieved from the published essay, which remained unconsidered in scholarship because of language barriers. It seems to me an important and still valuable contribution to the on-going debate on the NC. In what follows, I will try to re-open the issue, to make proper use of Zaicev's proposal, and to reveal my own view, which is inspired by it and is opposed to the currently prevailing one, that of G. Morrow. My partial disagreement with Zaicev's briefly stated view (we have no final version of it) does not diminish my debt to it; I firmly believe that his essay will be important for those who will take part in future enquiry into this difficult subject.

1. The Exposition

The first time that Plato explicitly mentions the NC is in Book X of the Laws (X. 908 a 4; 909 a 3–4): one of the prisons, the sophronisterion, is situated close to the NC; only the members of the Council are entitled to visit the imprisoned atheists and to admon-

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1 The monumental commentary by Schöpsdau (1994–2011), which is excellent in all aspects — text criticism and historical and legal matters — filled what Zaicev regarded as the greatest gap in Platonic scholarship.

2 Zaicev 2003 (1967). The paper was delivered at the VIIth International Conference of the Association of Classics of Socialist Countries (EIPHNH) in Leningrad (1964); the reading of the Laws started a year earlier (see Zaiceva, Gavrilov 2003).

3 τῶν δὲ Νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν, καὶ ταύτῃν βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρόν περιάγει πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν. The prevailing view of this passage that Zaicev attacked in his paper has been that κατὰ μικρὸν περιάγει means that Aristotle accuses Plato of involuntarily gradually switching back to the older project of the state of the Republic, instead of launching an alternative more admissible project, as he claimed he did (this point was made also by many modern scholars). Zaicev's proposal is attractive and contains fine observations; still, it should be noted in favour of the traditional view that, in his explication of this statement, Aristotle points only to the similarities between the two projects and not to ways of transforming the second-best project into the absolutely best; the NC is not mentioned at all.
ish them, “trying to save their souls”. The NC’s membership and functions are detailed in Book XII in connection with the accounts of the theoroi, the men aged from 50 to 60, whom the nomophylakes allow to travel abroad, due to their good moral repute (951 a 4–5; c 6–d3). On their return home after 10 years of travelling, they have to give account before the council of those “who watch the laws” (εἰς τὸν σύλλογον ἱτω τῶν περὶ νόμους ἐποπτευόντων), which has a mixed membership “of young and old”. This council gathers every day from the beginning of the last part of night until sunrise. It consists of the following members (951 d 5 — e 5):

1) the priests who have been given the award for virtue, aristeia; these are not the annual priests selected by lot among persons no younger than 60 years (759 d1), but rather, as Schöpsdau points out, the euthynoi, the higher officials with a controlling function; election to this office, which can be held till the age of 75 (XII. 946 c 4), amounts to the award of aristeia (946 b 5) and makes its holder a priest of Apollo and Helios (947 a 5–6);

2) the ten oldest nomophylakes, i.e. the oldest members of the board of thirty-seven officials; the nomophylakes are chosen from among those of them who are no younger than 50 years. They can hold office until they are 70 years old;

3) the current supervisor of education and his retired predecessors, i.e. one of the functioning nomophylakes, who is elected to this office by all the officials by secret ballot;

4) the younger men aged from 30 to 40 years who are invited by the older members.

The members of the council must discuss the laws of their own city (presumably, discussing the laws’ faults and the possibilities for their improvement) and also what found abroad is of importance for legislation, for instance, the kinds of knowledge in other countries whose study might contribute to a better understanding the laws; the junior members should study those that are approved (951e 5 — 952 b 1).

The NC should vet the candidates for junior membership who are proposed by the individual older members: if the candidates are found unworthy, those who proposed them are blamed by the whole council. But those who are approved should be observed in the future by the whole state; in the case of their moral success, they will be esteemed, but if they show themselves worse than the majority of citizens, they will be dishonoured more than is usual.

A voluntary traveller should give account before the NC immediately upon his return. He should report everything he has learned about laws, education, and upbringing.

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4 It is often asserted that there are two anticipatory references to the discussion of the NC in the earlier books: I. 632 c 4 — d 1 on two kinds of guardians of the laws, those who possess philosophical knowledge and those who have only “true opinion” (this is thought to refer to the senior and junior members of the NC), and VII. 818 a 3, the promise of a later discussion of the “more exact education” on the motion of planets (this evidently refers to the programme of the highest studies, which is discussed in book XII, in relation to the NC). Neither passage, however, necessarily refers to the NC, as we shall see.

5 The ἐποπτεύω sounds solemn; here, however, it does not hint at mysteries (cf. Symp. 210 a; Ep. 7. 333 e) and not at the “contemplation of ideas” (cf. Phaedr. 250 c 4), as Schöpsdau, 2011, 555, supposes (knowledge of laws based on the Ideenschau), nor at “illumination” through philosophical studies (Morrow, 1960, 507 n. 17), but rather, since the object of seeing is the earthly laws, at the highest, quasi-divine status of the NC, which, like gods, exercises supreme control over the laws (see LSJ, s. v. ἐποπτεύω I. 1).

6 951 d 6–7: ἑκάστης μὲν ἡμέρας συλλεγόμενος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπ’ ὄρθρου μέχριπερ ἂν ἥλιος ἀνάσχῃ (cf. 961 b 6–8 the sessions should be before dawn, ὄρθριον ἐλχαί, when one is mostly free of private and state affairs). See Wallace 1989, who rejects the standard translation “from dawn to sunrise”, and shows that the designation “Nocturnal Council”, which appears at 968 a 7, is exact.

7 Schöpsdau III, 2011, 577 f.

8 Morrow 1960, 324 f.
ing in the countries he has visited: presumably, everything valuable should be adopted in Magnesia’s laws, after approval by the members; the sciences that are found useful for this purpose would be studied by the younger assistants to the members. The NC should vet the travellers: if they remain as virtuous as they were before travelling but cannot contribute to the moral improvement of the state, they will be simply praised for their zeal; if they return more virtuous, they are praised more in the course of life, and the NC assigns them special honours after their death; the punishment for those found to have morally spoiled while abroad will be discussed (952c 1 — d 4).

The NC appears in the same book again at the end of the whole discussion of Magnesia’s laws. The Athenian stranger (the AS in what follows) asserts that no deed can be considered completed unless the means of its preservation is found (960 b 4-c1). It is thus necessary to find means to make the laws of Magnesia irreversible (960 d5–6). The body that can assure the preservation of the constitution and the laws, the AS asserts, is the NC. An account of its membership is given for the second time, in a form that differs slightly from the earlier one (961 a — b):

1) the ten currently oldest nomophylakes;
2) all those who have received awards for virtue (aristeia);
3) the travellers who have been vetted for their moral integrity and the knowledge they have acquired and have been found worthy of joining the council.
4) the younger people aged no less than 30 who were proposed, one each by each older member, in accordance with their natural faculties and training; if they are approved by the other members, they join the council; if they are not approved, the negative judgement should be concealed from the citizens and especially from the candidates themselves.

The two accounts complement rather than contradict each other. “Those who received an award for virtue” is probably another description of the euthynoi, who were previously mentioned under the name of the priests awarded for virtue, but possibly now admission to the NC of the other persons awarded for virtue is envisaged; the supervisors of education, acting and retired, are not mentioned, either out of negligence or because they are the best of the nomophylakes and thus can be easily among the ten oldest nomophylakes and are certainly among those who were awarded for virtue. 9

The NC consists of three categories of highest officials — the ten oldest nomophylakes, all euthynoi (the priests of Apollo and Helios), the acting and the retired supervisors of education — and of the approved travellers, i.e. the experts in knowledge that contributes to the perfection of laws, but who do not occupy offices. The majority of senior members are thus the functioning magistrates and people of an old age; the membership is not perennial, but limited to their term of office; the junior members not full-scale members, but only the assistants of the senior members, (see below on the difference between the mind and the senses); they should leave the NC at the age of 40.

The Athenian then expresses the hope that the NC, having been cast like an anchor of the city with all the appropriate equipment, would be capable of preserving the integrity of the constitution and laws (961 c 3–6). To answer Clinias’ puzzled question how this would be possible, he starts a long chain of reasoning, whose main sense is that the completion of the legislation and the salvation of the city depend on having the people know the true goal of the state and being able to find means to attain it (962 b 4 — c 2). The salvation of

the city, like that of a living being, however, depends on the combined action of the mind and the senses; the NC should perform this role of the mind, and the goal of Magnesia, unlike that of all other states, is virtue. The knowledge of virtue entails the understanding of its unity and, simultaneously, of its fourfold character; this knowledge can be attained through the investigation of each of the four cardinal virtues, which should be defined, i.e. the senior members of the NC should master the dialectical method, making them real philosophers. A legislator, a nomophylax, a winner of the award in virtue (i.e. any future member of the NC) should attain this knowledge and be superior to all others in the ability to teach the nature of virtues and vices, both to those who need it for theoretical purposes and to those who should be chastised as sinners (964 b 8 — c 3). The younger assistants should perform the function of the city’s senses; they should notice everything that happens in it and transmit this information to the mind, i.e. to the senior members of the NC.

It is now clear that acquiring real Guardians of the state depends on determining a more exquisite system of education for them than for the rest of the city (965 b 1—2). Its programme, outlined by the AS, consists of ethical knowledge based on the dialectic (the understanding of the unity of virtues and their fourfold character, to which end it is essential to grasp the dialectical relation between the one and the many, 965 c 10—966 b 8), and of the theological knowledge that immunises against any atheist or impious suppositions and that can be reduced to the following theorems: the soul is prior to all things that have been generated; it is immortal and accordingly rules over all bodies; the divine Mind (nous) that set the universe in order is in charge of the motion of the heavenly bodies (966 d 4—967 e 1, cf. X. 896 d — 897 b). Someone who grasps this highest knowledge, which should be based on the learning of mathematical disciplines including astronomy, will employ it to harmonise the laws and moral habits of the city and will be able to give a reasonable account of his knowledge. Someone who is not able to attain this scientific and philosophical knowledge beyond the δημοσίαι ἀρεταί (i.e. the virtues of character based on nature and moral education that all citizens share) will never become the “ruler of the whole state”; such a person can be only an assistant to these rulers (967 e 2 — 968 a 3; on the ban of election to the nomophylakes and on awarding for virtue those who do advance in this theological knowledge, see also 966 c — d). I shall return later to the significance of this sentence, which qualifies the members of the NC as the sole rulers of the whole state and makes all other citizens, including the officials, mere servants of them in their ruling functions.

The next part of the text is the most difficult one, and understanding the NC depends in large measure on its interpretation. Here it can be outlined only as follows. The AS asks his interlocutors whether they should add to the previous laws the law that the NC consists of properly educated persons as the Guardians of the state (968 a 4 — b 2). Both Clinias and Megillus are ready to do this, but are aware of difficulties in its execution, namely attaining the educated persons; the AS, who promises his help in this matter, maintains that it is impossible at the moment to enact the law (either on the prerogatives of the NC or on the education of its future members or on both — this is the most debatable point) until due preparations have been made (either the discussion of the future educational system or the process of education itself is meant — this is again debatable) (968 b 2 — c 7).

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10 See Schöpsdau III, 2011, 593.
He next outlines the tasks related to the future education of the members of the NC:
1) it is necessary to make a selection of those who would be appropriate to become the Guardians of the state by their age, their ability to learn the sciences and their moral character;
2) it is not easy (but it is indispensable) to attain knowledge that should be learned either by oneself or from someone who has previously attained it;
3) it is a waste of time to establish in written form the point in time when one should learn each item of knowledge and how long it should be studied; even those who learn these things will realize that they learned them only when they had already attained knowledge of each item.

The AS sums up that the precepts concerning the last item cannot be announced in advance of the process itself, because this would not help make the discussed subject clearer (968 c 8 — e 5).

In the final part of the conversation, the AS points to the risks of their common enterprise. He is ready to take part in it by conveying to two other interlocutors the views he has attained about education that they touched on in the previous discussion. The risk of the enterprise is so great that other people would not be equal to this task, but Clinias should nevertheless master it and, if he is successful, he will acquire the greatest glory as one who has properly arranged the new city; if he fails, he will still have repute as the most courageous man of all those who live or will live later (968 e 7 — 969 b 2). If this divine council arises, the state should be handed over to it, and this will be the appearance in reality of what has been described in the previous conversation as a dream of the union of the reason of older men and the perception of the younger (cf. 961 d 7 — e 5). If the people are properly selected, educated appropriately and, after they have been educated, settled on the acropolis of the country, they should become unprecedented guardians of the virtue and salvation of the state. The other interlocutors agree that they should either abandon the founding of the new state or make the AS a participant in the foundation.

2. The Scholarly Debate on the NC

From the beginning, the discussions of the NC were closely connected with the question how the “second-best” state of the Laws is related to the “absolutely best” of the Republic. The most important contributions of the 19th-century scholars can be summarised as follows. In his brief account, Zeller noticed that the appearance of the NC attests to Plato’s persistent conviction that real expertise in politics should be based on scientific and philosophical education; so far, with the NC, the state of Magnesia obtains to some degree the rule of philosophers and thus appears to be closer to the absolutely best state of the Republic than all the previous treatment suggested. However, since the NC is not properly built into the whole state system and has no functions and prerogatives determined by law (Zeller defined its purpose vaguely as keeping public opinion and with it the whole state on the right path), it is not clear how it can perform its functions; it remains “etwas sehr unsicheres und schwankendes” (“something very uncertain and unsteady”). Here we have in nuce the view that was prominent in later scholarship, “Plato’s partial retreat
from the main concept in his *Laws* — 1) the NC is something similar to the philosopher kings of the *Republic* and thus a certain contradiction of the whole constitution of the *Laws*, presumably because it does not envisage such philosophical leadership; 2) the NC does not receive the real instruments to enforce its superior judgements; 3) this is thus an insufficiently considered and inconsistent attempt to return to the absolutely best state.

The most detailed and thoughtful account of the NC in the 19th century was F. Susemihl’s; today, it is almost forgotten, undeservedly, as will be seen. Susemihl argued that the NC is in many respects similar to the philosopher kings of the *Republic*; and this might support the view that Plato envisages the transformation of the second-best state into the absolutely best one. Susemihl, first, maintained against Zeller that the NC employs the dialectical method and should attain the knowledge of Forms, like the Guardians of the *Republic*; the NC not only selects younger persons as assistants, but also educates them in scientific and philosophical matters (from Susemihl stems the understanding of the NC as an educational body). Second, he pointed out the passages that imply the governing role of the NC: its members are called the Guardians of the state, as opposed to other officials and the true Guardians of the laws, and thus are put on the higher level than the official Guardians of the laws, the body of the nomophylakes; they sit on the Acropolis. Third, the future preservation and improvement of the state and the laws depends on the existence of philosophical expertise; in this sense, the NC is the “anchor of the state”. The NC acts as legislator and exegete of the laws. Fourth, it secures the continuity of the philosophical rule: it carries out the selection of capable younger members of the NC, after they attain due age, to the highest offices of the nomophylakes and the euthynoi (see the ban on the election of non-philosophical persons to these offices and the hint that the whole state should “observe” the young people approved by the NC); the euthynoi then enter the NC as its senior members. As far as possible, all important offices in Magnesia should thus be occupied by philosophers (p. 633–636). Susemihl provided a detailed explanation of how the NC should be formed: the education of the selected persons implies that the first council would consist not of officials, but of the graduates of the advanced programme of scientific and philosophical studies (the idea of the “temporary NC”); afterwards, the senior members should recruit candidates, educate them in philosophical and scientific disciplines and assure the election of people so educated to the highest offices of the nomophylakes and the euthynoi; the latter then enter the NC as its senior members. Last not least: Susemihl pointed to the important passage 968 c 3–7 as meaning that, in the course of time, experience might teach that greater prerogatives may be granted to the NC (p. 635)

But having collected this evidence for the position of the NC as approximating that of the philosopher rulers of the *Republic*, Susemihl then rejected any attempt to treat the NC as a way of transforming the second-best state into the very best one: first, because the final part of the *Laws* shows that Plato doubts that this philosophical body can be attained (he points in 968 e to the risks of the plan and to the lack of a strict educational programme, in contrast to the *Republic*); he explains this by his awareness of the difficulties of the whole enterprise: the philosophical membership depends on unclear perspectives of election of philosophers to be *nomophylakes* and *euthynoi*; Plato accordingly admits

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12 Susemihl 1860, II/2, 633–640; see also his translation of the *Laws* with important notes (Susemihl 1862).
13 See the note in his translation: Susemihl II, 1862, S.1857–1858 n. 881 (clearer than in his earlier monograph).
(I. 632 c) that some of its members will have only “true opinion”, not philosophical knowledge (p. 636–638). Second, although the reasoning on the NC as the bearer of knowledge and the Guardian of the laws implies that it stands above the laws and thus has the right to change them (without this, the state cannot be improved),\(^{14}\) the NC acquires no legislative or judicial powers;\(^ {15}\) it exerts its influence through its members, who are simultaneously the highest officials; in this, he agreed with Zeller; but in difference from him, he explained this not as an oversight on Plato’s part, but as a consequence of the awareness he had acquired since writing the Republic that even philosophical knowledge does not prevent a person from being corrupted by unlimited power; for this reason, Plato preferred the risky path of the indirect promotion of the philosophically educated people to the highest offices and through these to the NC (p. 638–640) — the theory of the “pessimism” of the late Plato, which still plays an important role.

According to Susemihl, all this shows that Plato did not hope that, even in the case of successful constituting, the NC would transform the second-best state into the very best.\(^ {16}\) This interesting analysis left many questions to be answered; one very important one was how the change in the laws that Susemihl diagnosed as necessary and as being the task of philosophical reason should be realised, if the NC attains no prerogatives as the legislative body. It is surprising that Susemihl’s sticking to Zeller’s view that the NC acquires no constitutional powers as the Guardian of the state did not properly interpret the passage (968 c 3–7), which he understood as pointing to the future granting of expanded powers to the NC (p. 635). The philological interpretation of the passage (granting of legal powers) was quite correct, as we shall see, and it clearly contradicts the view of NC as employing moral influence only. Probably Susemihl was here deceived by his own overemphasis on Plato’s doubts about the attainability of the philosophical NC. In fact, in spite of the clear awareness of the difficulties and risks that accompany the creation of this body, the conversation is marked by the conviction that the future salvation of the state depends crucially on its appearance (960 c — d) and that Clinias, as the future legislator (968 e 6 — 969 b 2), should bravely pursue this goal. Equally, although it leaves the prerogatives of the NC to the future, the crucial passage points out clearly that, as soon as the NC has been constituted as the philosophical body, it should acquire its prerogatives (it does not address the possible expansion of these prerogatives, as Susemihl states).

Susemihl’s view of the NC was attacked by I. Bruns, who in a long monograph attempted to prove that the text of the Laws contains pieces from the earlier redaction that were inserted by Philip of Opus, the posthumous editor of the dialogue. Bruns argued that the NC, as it is depicted in the final part of the Laws, is incompatible with the main part of the text: 1) the power of guarding the laws that is here assigned to the NC makes the previously envisaged body of the nomophylakes superfluous; 2) the demand in the final part of the Laws that the members of the NC have philosophical knowledge contradicts the earlier part’s description of its membership as the highest officials, without any mention of their philosophical equipment (XII. 951 c 6 — e 5). Bruns thus asserted that this final part (XII. 960 b 5 — 969 d 3, with the exception of 961 a — b, the mode of formation

\(^{14}\) He noticed that the nomophylakes are only entitled to fill the gaps in the laws left by the initial legislator, but not to change or abandon them, whereas the NC is expected to change the laws.

\(^{15}\) However, he cited two exceptions — the power employed by the NC to punish the impious and depraved legislators (see below on this).

\(^{16}\) Susemihl II/2, 1862, 636–640.
of the NC, which corresponds to the earlier “genuine” version, 951 c 6 — e 5) belongs to
the earlier layer of Plato’s thought when he still hoped to implement philosophical rule, to-
gether with the passage in the book I (632 c 4–8) according to which the legislator should
posit two kinds of guardians of laws, those who possess knowledge and those who have
only the right opinion.17 None of these arguments is convincing: the first one because the
final part clearly admits the existence of the nomophylakes, the oldest of whom also serve
on the NC; the second one because the first exposition of the NC already points clearly
to its competence in philosophical matters (Bruns also ignored Susemihl’s proposal that
the first members of the NC should not be the officials but the graduates of the advanced
educational system).

Bruns’ theory of two redactions was endorsed by some scholars and opened the door
for further attempts to identify various layers in the text,18 but the unsoundness of the as-
sumptions and method of Bruns and Bergk was aptly demonstrated by T. Gomperz;19 the
idea of two contradictory versions of the NC, however, has survived, although in weak-
ened form.

The “unitarians” argued against Bruns in two opposed ways. Zeller argued against
Bruns that 1) the references in the earlier parts show that Plato’s plan was from the begin-
ing to create a philosophical body of Guardians of the laws; 2) the final part does not
show that the NC acquires the prerogatives of an official state body and thus creates no
contradiction with the whole state system as depicted before.20

C. Ritter, in contrast, although also pointing to hints at the NC in the earlier parts of the
*Laws*21 emphasised that according to 968 c 4–6 the powers of the NC should be main-
tained by the law; from Ritter stems the new interpretation of the passage that made the
NC the future author of the law on the basis of its own constitutional powers (p. 364). He
agreed with Bruns that the formation of the NC as depicted at the end of book XII (the
selection of gifted persons for education) differs from the one that is depicted twice earlier
(the highest officials become the members of the NC), but argued, modifying Susemihl’s
earlier proposal, that the former is a temporary mode that should be in force until the state
has acquired a sufficient number of highest officials.22

The result of this first phase of debate, however, was not the victory of the unitarians,
but the temporary victory of the view that Plato changed his mind when writing the last
book. The radical theory of two conflicting redactions was, to be sure, rejected, but the
appearance of the NC was now treated as Plato’s reversion to the *Republic’s* idea of the
philosopher kings, i.e. as Plato’s afterthought, which creates a contradiction with the prin-
ciple of sovereignty of the law that has been maintained throughout the whole previous

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17 Bruns 1880, 192 ff.
18 The best known of such attempts is that of Bergk 1883, 93–107, who developed the complicated and
manifestly false theory of Plato’s intention to develop in the *Laws* the projects of both the second-best and
the third-best states; Philip of Opus, who did not understand Plato’s design, mixed in the edited texts the
pieces related to two different projects (see V. 739 b — e on the second- and third-best states). The NC was
naturally the rest of the second-best project.
19 Gomperz 1903, 3–21.
20 Zeller 1889/1922, 967 f. note.
21 See p. 349 on the promised discussion in 818 a of those “few” who should study mathematics and
astronomy beyond the standard level, i.e. of the education of the members of the NC.
discussion. There are some reasons for this view: in fact, as Barker rightly noticed, there is no convincing evidence that the earlier books already assign to the NC the important role it acquires in the last. But the proponents of this view did not seriously discuss the real problem — the exact sense in which the NC of the final part contradicts the previous discussion.

It is against this vague stance of an “afterthought” and against remnants of Bruns’ view of two conflicting versions that G. Morrow maintained the currently prevailing version of the unitarian view of the NC. His view of the NC can be summarised as follows:

1) the NC is not conceived in any part of the Laws as a legislative or administrative body; apart from minor functions of listening to the accounts of travellers abroad and controlling atheists, its main task is the “salvation” of the laws, viz. it should maintain permanently the principles on which the state of Magnesia is founded; it will thus preserve the knowledge of the ultimate goal of the state, continuously vet that the laws correspond to this goal, fill the gaps in them and even improve the failures of the first legislator; the NC does not have any legal prerogatives; through its members (the oldest nomophylakes and all the euthynoi), it influences legislation and also the activities of the highest officials; it also takes care, again only through its moral authority, of the election of the able younger men who were the junior members of the NC to the highest offices;

2) since the right understanding of the goal of the state and keeping the laws in conformity with this goal demands the knowledge of philosophical and scientific subjects, the main function of the NC is the study of these disciplines and educating the junior members of the NC in them; its parallel is Plato’s Academy, with the difference, however, that the NC can employ its knowledge in improving the laws and the state education system;

3) there is no convincing evidence that the NC is granted some extraordinary prerogatives at the end of the Laws, which would contradict the sovereignty of the law in the whole previous discussion; the passages that were taken to signal this, like “the city should be put in its hands” (969 c), only stress the importance of philosophical knowledge for preventing the state from deteriorating, through the informal influence of its members;

4) no additional law is envisaged that will expand the prerogatives of the NC: the debatable passage 968 c 3–7, which some scholars have taken as indicating such an expansion, should be interpreted, according to Cherniss’ proposal on the text, as the future law, which should regulate “the organisation of the higher studies” of the NC. This law on the NC’s educational programme can be enacted only after the NC’s members have been properly educated, and it should be enacted by the NC itself.

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23 E. Barker (Barker 1918, 402–410) is the typical representative of this view; he notices that the hints at the NC that appear in the earlier parts of the Laws point only to its philosophical knowledge and expertise, while the final part treats it as in institution with political prerogatives, thus far endorsing the theory of two conflicting versions; Barker rejects both the proposal of two redactions and Ritter’s attempts to harmonise the earlier and the latter appearances of the NC, supposing instead that Plato changed his mind at the end of the work and no longer had time to reconcile the final part with the rest (Barker 1918, 402 n.3, 408 n.1; cf. Klosko, 1988, 78). For the other proponents of this view, see Morrow, 1960/1993, 500 n. 2.


Morrow’s view that the NC is conceived from the beginning as the philosophical body that possesses the highest expertise in legislation but lacks constitutional power to enforce its decisions and thus acts informally now certainly carries the day.\textsuperscript{28}

There have been only a few voices of dissent.

Zaicev’s Russian paper, which has remained unconsidered, argued briefly,\textsuperscript{29} implicitly against Morrow, in favour of the view that develops some of the findings of F. Susemihl and C. Ritter that the final part of the discussion contains the promise of the gradual transformation of the NC in future: formed temporarily from the selected and philosophically educated people, it should later be staffed by the highest officials but retain its philosophical membership by promoting its younger members to these highest positions and also by co-opting the best travellers. Finally, the NC should itself lay down the law on its powers, which should approximate those of the philosopher-kings of the \textit{Republic}; the final part thus outlines the way to transform the second-best state into the very best.\textsuperscript{30} In the note to his translation of the \textit{Laws}, Lisi recently propounded a view similar to Zaicev’s.\textsuperscript{31} This view of the NC as the instrument for the future development of the second-best state is now certainly hardly noticed.

Much more well-known is the attempt of R. Klosko, who in several works dedicated to the subject returns broadly to the earlier views as represented by E. Barker and some other scholars — the NC as presented in Book XII is reminiscent of the philosophical Guardians of the \textit{Republic} and possesses real constitutional powers that contradict the principle of the sovereignty of law defended in the previous treatment. He argues against Morrow 1) that there is no direct evidence for the “informal” influence of the NC on the officials; 2) that, on the contrary, passage 968 c 3–7 points to the constitutional prerogatives of the NC (this is correct, although it needs reconsideration, as I will try to show) and 3) finally (this is his most important argument), that the whole treatment of laws before Book XII points to their rigidity; only in some groups of laws are partial changes envisaged within the trial period of ten years; after that, they should be fixed permanently; the task of these amendments is assigned to the nomophylakes; nowhere is any role of the NC mentioned. In Klosko’s view, this rigidity of the laws makes the informal consultative role of the NC

\textsuperscript{28} Morrow’s view is endorsed, with some differences in details, by many scholars: see, for instance, Piérart 1974, 229–234; Tarán, 1975, 21f.; Guthrie, 1978, 374, Kahn 1993, xxi–xxiii; Lewis 1998; Laks 2000, 282–284; Samaras 2002, 285–301; Sier 2008, 294–299; Marquez 2011. Schöpsdau III, 2011, 575–606, in his recent detailed discussion of the NC, endorses in general Morrow’s understanding of the NC as having “informal” functions (p. 580 f.), but he departs from Morrow in two important points: he rejects Cherniss’ interpretations of the crucial passage 968 c 3–7, which Morrow endorses (the law should regulate the education of its members), and he leaves open the option that it points to the future defining of the prerogatives of the NC by law, as in the view that prevailed before Cherniss, although he remains noncommittal about deciding between these options (p. 603 f.); he also argues, thus returning to the earlier view (Susemihl’s), that the mode of formation of the NC as stated in the final part (the selection of persons fit for education) is the temporary mode in contrast to the one explained twice earlier (membership through the highest offices) (p. 576). I will discuss both points in what follows.

\textsuperscript{29} Zaicev 1967/2003.

\textsuperscript{30} By way of summary, Zaicev says: “At the end of the \textit{Laws}, Plato suddenly adds to the system of ordinary administrative bodies an extraordinary order that has a tendency of unlimited expansion of its insufficiently determined prerogatives and which is a holder of the true philosophical knowledge.” The whole sense of his interpretation was that this “suddenly” does not point to Plato changing his mind, but rather to an impression that arises in readers who do not recognise that Plato proposes not a corrective to his system, but rather the means of transforming it (from the second-best state into the absolutely best one).

\textsuperscript{31} Lisi 1999, II, 343–344 n.141.
unlikely, given the importance Plato assigns to it, and it is thus necessary to admit that Book XII assigns to the NC a role that is incompatible with the whole previous reasoning (he points out, like Barker previously, that although there are references to the NC in the earlier books, none of them implies the political functions of the NC, p. 78). Klosko thus comes to the view that the appearance of the NC signals Plato's switching to his favourite idea of the philosopher kings of the Republic and that he was not able to put the whole institutional frame of the Laws in accordance with this institution. Klosko's last point, his treatment of the Magnesia laws as rigid, was much discussed, and I will return to this issue in the proper place: I will try to show that Klosko is close to the truth inasmuch as that the mechanism of legislation as described in the Laws leaves little place if any for philosophical expertise in the amendment of laws, but that he is not right in his treatment of the NC as a retreat from the basic principles of the whole system: the NC duly complements this system, but not in the way Morrow proposed.

In his thoughtful essay on the state of Magnesia, P. Brunt briefly disagreed with Morrow's treatment of the NC as having only informal prerogatives, noticing that it would be futile for Plato's purpose to create the philosophical body for "watching over the laws", "if a body that possessed rational understanding of the system did not have the power to enforce its will, and therefore to enact and not just to initiate new laws". This is a view that I endorse, but unfortunately Brunt did not mention the passage that, as I believe, provides the most important evidence that Plato grants to the NC these necessary powers (968 c 3–7), probably because he was persuaded by Morrow's removal of this evidence.

Although C. Bobonich endorses Morrow's interpretation of the NC as a primarily educational institution with an informal influence on governance, he believes nevertheless that Plato leaves open a range of possibilities for it "between making the NC the sole authority for all changes in law and excluding it from any official role". He rules out, however, that its power might be an unvetted one. Unfortunately, these suggestions remain speculative: like Brunt, he does not take into consideration the passages that really point to the powers of the NC.

To summarize the result of this almost 200-year debate, one readily agrees with Morrow in his rejection of the idea that the NC, as it appears in the final part, stands in purposeful contradiction to the whole project: as for the second version of its membership, although it shows some modifications to the earlier one, it does not signal any revision that hints at a new understanding of its functions. Moreover, the whole concluding conversation is suffused with the thought that the philosophical council should be the means, and in fact the single appropriate means, for the salvation of the future state on the principles on which it was founded (see esp. XII. 960 d 4–6). So far, one should proceed on the assumption that the reasoning in the final part was intended to complement and to strengthen the previous system, which of course does not necessarily preclude unintended

32 Klosko 1988; in his later treatments of the subject, he dropped his references to 968 c 3–7 as the argument in favour of the constitutional powers of the NC, but stuck to his general assessment that the rigidity of laws makes any informal role of the NC in amending them implausible (Klosko 2006, 252–258; 2007).

33 Brunt 1993, 250 f.; without discussion, he points again to 968 b (the powers of the NC should be defined later, after it has been brought into existence; in all probability, Brunt has in view the debatable passage 968 c 3–7) and to 969 b 2–3 (the city should be 'handed over' to the NC); the opinion of the earlier scholars on these passages was based on the idea that the NC should acquire the sovereign position in the state system; Morrow's attempt to explain them away will be discussed in detail below.

34 Bobonich 2002, 391–408.
contradictions; one of the tasks of this paper is to determine whether such contradictions are really present.

In sum, Morrow’s interpretation of the NC as conceived from the beginning to the end as the centre of scientific study and education, with only informal, even if authoritative, consultative functions in the improvement of the laws, needs a thorough revision: apart from some debatable points, his view entails also considerable difficulties that were partly noticed by the scholars after him: first, lack of evidence for the NC’s “informal” influence, on the one hand, and a certain questionability of its effectiveness, on the other. The informal influence can be effective, if the officials, including the highest nomophylakes, who are entitled to modify the laws, are ready to follow the advice of their philosophical colleagues; if for some reasons, moral or intellectual, they refuse to do this, and the vote of the ten oldest nomophylakes cannot prevail over the votes of the other twenty-seven, the NC would not be able to manage the crisis. One might admit that Plato simply did not take into account these eminent dangers (as Zeller thought), but the text, as I hope to show, provides evidence for the opposite. We shall also see that Morrow’s interpretation of the NC as the centre of philosophical and education activities lacks sufficient textual evidence.

Second, Morrow treats cavalierly the difficulties of the text of the final part of the discussion: granted that the rejection of the alternative redaction is correct, it remains nevertheless unclear how the mode of the formation of the NC that is described at the end — the selection of the proper persons, their education and then settling them on the Acropolis as the single true Guardians of the state — fits the previously depicted mode of formation (from the functioning officials, some ex-officials and distinguished travellers and young candidates). Morrow simply holds both kinds of formation to be identical, since he supposes that the NC itself would serve as the educational institution for its future members and that the selection of the persons fit to be Guardians of the state and for the corresponding education (XII. 968 c 9 — e 5) is nothing other than the proposal of candidates to junior membership by the senior members of the NC according to XII. 951 e 3–5; 961 a 8 — b 6; both suppositions are unwarranted, as we shall see. I thus will reconsider Morrow’s interpretation of the NC.

3. The NC as the Philosophical School?

I start from Morrow’s assertion that the NC is engaged primarily in philosophical and scientific enquiries and in the education of its junior members and in this respect is reminiscent of Plato’s Academy. Both the partisans of Morrow’s “informal” interpretation of the NC and those who believe that the NC should acquire the legal prerogatives of control over the state agree, nevertheless, that the NC as a whole is a philosophical and scientific body that educates its future members.35 In fact, there is no evidence for this. According to the single account of its preoccupations (XII. 951 a 5 — b 1), the NC discusses the laws of Magnesia, presumably their possible faults and the possibilities of emending them, and what is outstanding in this field in other countries, such as sciences that might, after scrutiny, help to clarify matters related to the laws, lack of knowledge of which might

35 This view, as far as I can see, goes back to Susemihl II, 2, 1860, 633; in the note to his translation of the Laws, he identifies the proposal of candidates by the senior members with the selection of people for the highest education (Susemihl, 1862, 1857 f. n. 881) — mistakenly, as we shall see.
hinder the understanding of these matters. The disciplines that the NC then approved should then be studied by its junior members.\(^{36}\) The disciplines mentioned here are, most naturally, the same as those that the AS later said were indispensable for true Guardians of laws, i.e. mathematics, astronomy, theology and dialectic. The account of the NC shows that their list is open for future additions: progress in legislation thus depends partially on keeping apace with scientific progress. The capacity of the senior members to discuss the new disciplines that might be useful for these purposes implies that they themselves have been properly educated in philosophical and scientific matters, as one should expect from true Guardians. But at the same time, the account gives no hint that the sessions of the NC (and this is the only time they assemble together, being engaged in administrative duties) are devoted to further study or education: the NC is occupied only in discussions of the possible improvement of laws. The senior members may decide what disciplines should be learned and order the junior members to study them, but of course they do not teach them themselves, since they do not know them; this should be done, presumably, by the travellers who brought home the disciplines approved by the NC or the teachers they recommend, who are thus outside of the NC. Moreover, the sessions of the NC are conducted for a relatively short time and before dawn, when it is still dark, thus in a very inopportune time for scientific and philosophical inquiries and for teaching.\(^{37}\)

The result that the NC itself, as a body, is not engaged in scientific and philosophical study or teaching is further corroborated by the final discussion of the NC: the philosophical and scientific knowledge whose possession is crucial for the salvation of laws and that is the necessary qualification of future members of the NC as the true guardians of laws should be attained by them before they become these guardians (968 a 6 — b 2);\(^{38}\) the same is stated, even more clearly, at the end of the discussion of the NC (969 b 8 — c 3): the appropriate persons should be selected, properly educated and then should be made guardians.\(^{39}\) It is not said directly who will educate them, but the AS points to his experience and hopes to win other similar persons (968 b 5–9) — thus it is next to certain that they will be the invited teachers of philosophical and scientific disciplines, most probably not local Cretan teachers.

\(^{36}\) τὴν δὲ συνουσίαν εἶναι τούτοις καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ νόμων ἀεὶ τῆς τε οἰκείας πόλεως πέρι, καὶ ἕαυν ἄλλοθι πυνθάνωνταί τι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρον, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ μαθημάτων, ὡσποδ’ ἄν ἐν τάρτη τῇ σκέψει δοκῇ συμφέρειν μαθοῦσι μὲν εὐαγέστερον γίγνεσθαι, μὴ μαθοῦσι δὲ σκοτωδέστερα τὰ περὶ νόμους αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀσαφὴ, ἃ δ’ ἄν τούτων ἐγκρίνωσιν οἱ γεραίτεροι τῆς νεωτέρους πάση σπουδῆς μανθάνειν.

\(^{37}\) Sier 2008, 295, following Morrow, cites 967 e as evidence that the members of the NC are “die wichtigsten Erzieher der Polis” (the most important educators of the polis), but what is said here is that those who attained full philosophical knowledge will use it in respect of moral habits and customs, which clearly refers to their watching over laws and to the possibilities of the improvement of the laws and, through them, of the moral habits of citizens; it does not imply that the NC as a body educates its younger members, much less the whole state.

\(^{38}\) ὁρᾶν δὴ χρεῶν νῦν, ὡ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἢδη πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις νόμοις ἅπασιν ἂν καὶ τοῦτον προσοίσομεν, ὡς φυλακὴ ἐσόμενον κατὰ νόμον χάριν σωτηρίας τῶν ἀρχόντων νυκτερινῶν σύλλογον, παιδείας ὁπόσης διεληλύθησαν κοινωνόν γενόμενον.

\(^{39}\) ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν οἱ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεγέθησιν, παιδευθῶσι τε πρὸς προσηκόντως, παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες, φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν οἵους ἡμεῖς οὖκ εἴδομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας γενομένους.
Of course, one can take these final statements as pointing to a temporary system that should work until the properly formed philosophical council emerges,⁴₀ but since the previously discussed account of the NC that consists of philosophically competent persons does not point to enquiries or education either, this is not a justified refuge. Moreover, there is an implicit indication that the system as outlined in the final part should continue to function later. The minimum age for becoming a junior member is 30. Since the system of the highest education in the Laws is essentially the same as the system of the Guardians of the Republic, one can assume, in the absence of conflicting evidence, that the study of mathematics and astronomy at the highest level, which is required for membership in the NC, starts at the age of 20 and continues until 30, as in the Republic; according to both the Republic and the Laws, these studies should be crowned with the grasping of the unity of the mathematical sciences (including astronomy, Rep. VII. 537 b–c; Leg. XII. 969 e 1–3); after that, at the age of 30, those capable of this should be allowed to study dialectic, i.e. start philosophical studies (Rep. 537 d).⁴¹

Thus, even if one assumes that, with time, the NC should become the educational centre for its younger members, it is necessary to admit that they should study the highest scientific disciplines before appointment to the NC — thus, most naturally at the school as outlined by the AS. The result would be that the system drafted in the final part is now divided into the earlier scientific and the more advanced philosophical schools, the latter being identical to the NC. But this division of the highest education between two academic institutions is unlikely: first, as noted, the junior members should occasionally study new subjects most probably outside the NC or at least not with the prevailing part of the senior members, who do not know these things; second, the Republic presents the system of mathematical and philosophical education as a unity. The Laws are not explicit on this point, but it is stated that the students should grasp the unity of the mathematical disciplines (969 e 1–3), exactly as in the Republic, according to which this should be done at the end of mathematical studies and qualifies one for the study of dialectic. Presumably, this is done under the guidance of a philosophical dialectician, not of teachers of particular mathematical disciplines. Thus the continuity of scientific and philosophical educations remains, most probably, in force in the Laws, as in the Republic.

Hence, it is quite plausible that the senior members of the NC should function as the teachers of philosophy (and presumably, some of them as teachers of mathematics and astronomy) in the time when they are free of their administrative duties, not in the NC during its sessions before dawn, but at the school from which they graduated. According to the Republic, the future Guardians spend five years, from 30 to 35, in the study of dialectic, free of any political duties: this is the most plausible age for these studies also for the junior members of the NC, and it means that, between the ages of 30 and 40, they should combine studying philosophy and, occasionally, some new scientific matters with participation in sessions of the NC and serving as assistants to the senior members, probably also filling some minor state offices.⁴² The prolongation of the student years beyond

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⁴₀ This was the view of the earlier scholars who believed that the final part refers to the temporary mode of forming the NC that Schöpsdau recently revived, see below on this.


⁴² The Republic provides a clear outline of the programme and schedule, but is obscure on the place and the organization of teaching: the Guardians, after spending five years (from 30 through 35) in the study of dialectic, should thereafter perform the duties of military and other officials for 15 years; after that, at 50, they should return to dialectic and grasp the Form of the Good and then put in order both themselves and
those foreseen in the *Republic* can be explained by the necessity to perform political duties at the same time.

4. The Formation of the NC

This brings us to the second important point, the formation of the NC: in the final part of the discussion, the AS twice mentions the procedure of selection of those who are fit, intellectually and morally, to study the disciplines whose knowledge is required for the “true Guardians” (968 c 9-d3; 969 b 8): those who were so selected and attained this knowledge would be the members of the NC. This “selection” played a pivotal role in the theory of two contradictory redactions: its proponents argued that this mode of formation of the NC contradicts the one that was described previously (the members are recruited from the highest magistrates and ex-officials and these invite the younger members as candidates to be discussed by the whole NC). However, given that AS reiterates right at the beginning of the final part the earlier mode of formation and the following discussion contains no hint that this mode is changed, the supposition of two conflicting redactions can be definitely rejected, in this respect at least, as Morrow rightly did. But Morrow, who believed that the system of education here outlined is the programme of studies of the NC itself, asserted, in this harmonising vein, that the selection of persons capable of the highest education is the same as the proposal of candidates for junior membership of the NC by the senior members. This cannot be the case: the latter candidates should be persons in the age interval from 30 to 40 years, surely too late for starting to learn mathematics and astronomy at the higher level.

The puzzle of two modes of formation thus remains, and more promising may seem the proposal made by some scholars, in various versions, that the final part refers to the temporary mode of formation of the NC, i.e. that it should initially be created from the young people who should be properly educated (Morrow does not mention these proposals). The earliest of these versions, that of F. Susemihl, which was recently endorsed by Schöpsdau, was that the reasoning of the final stage implies that the AS himself selects the people appropriate for the NC and educates them in the disciplines he outlined, and they then form the NC, which is now entitled to teach the following students. The graduates of this school would later join the NC as its senior members, provided they have been elected by a normal procedure to the nomophylakes, ethnynoi etc., as found in the earlier description.

C. Ritter later modified this proposal: the interim council that should act until there are magistrates qualified for normal membership consists of 10 nomophylakes (elected in accordance with the temporary rule, instead of the regular 37) plus 10 legislators, assigned the whole state using this highest reality as the standard; they should devote their time in turn to philosophical studies and to the education of the philosophers similar to them, on the one hand, and to political duties, as the rulers of the state, on the other (VII. 539 e — 540 a); in this last stage, the people are similar to the senior members of the NC, who are also no younger than 50, are the holders of the highest offices and have already attained philosophical knowledge. The senior NC members can thus be philosophical teachers of the young, for instance those from whom they can propose candidates for junior membership in the NC. But the place of the studies is more naturally the school as organized on the plan of the AS, rather than the NC itself.

43 Morrow 1960, 508.
44 Susemihl 1862, 1857 f. n. 881; Schöpsdau 2011, III, 585 f.; Susemihl’s kind of harmonization that 30 is the age for starting study and for candidacy to NC should certainly be rejected (see above).
by Knossos (702 c) plus the Athenian and Megillus (according to 969 d); it should be supplemented by the young men chosen as able for philosophical education.\footnote{On Ritter’s counting, the regular NC should consist of 65–80 members (10 oldest nomophylakes, 15 euthynoi, epimeletes tes paideias plus 1–2 of his retired predecessors; the travellers accepted in the Council after their reports, i.e. approx. 32 older members plus the same or an even greater number of younger members).} Later, it should be formed as described earlier in 951 d 3 — e 5 and 961 a 1 — c 1, viz. from the current and retired higher magistrates and the younger candidates proposed by the individual magistrates and approved by the whole NC.\footnote{Ritter 1896, 362–364.}

Ritter’s proposal has an advantage over Susemihl’s; granted that the NC should perform from the very beginning its important functions as the Guardian of the laws, it is more plausible that it consists not only of philosophers, but also of the highest officials. But there is no evidence for this rather complicated mode of formation; moreover, the education of the selected people as outlined in the final conversation surely requires considerable time; when they have been educated, there should already be a sufficient number of higher officials and ex-officials to fill the vacancies in the NC, and the temporary mode as supposed by Ritter would be superfluous.

In the course of his interpretation of Aristotle’s passage, Zaicev returned to a variant of the interim council that is close to Susemihl’s: in the beginning, the NC should be formed only of younger people who have been properly selected and philosophically educated.\footnote{Zaicev 383 f. It is not clear whether Zaicev maintains that this initial NC of the graduates of philosophical education should perform any administrative functions; on the one hand, he says that the NC should from the beginning (p. 383) function as described at 951 c 6 — 952 d 4, i.e. listen to the reports of travellers, introduce new subjects for education and even determine the new laws (the latter is a slip that originates from taking ἐγκρίνωσιν 952 a 6 as referring to laws, whereas it refers to μαθήματα); on the other hand, these functions are surely performed by the members elected through the regular mode; thus, “from the beginning” probably should not be taken literally — it is of course implausible that the council consisting of only young philosophers would listen to the reports and perform control over atheists; rather, Zaicev used the phrase to contrast these functions of the regularly elected NC with its expanded functions according to the law that should be laid down later (according to 968 c 3–7).} Later, the NC should be formed from the higher magistrates, as is described earlier, but the measures are envisaged in order to maintain the NC permanently as the philosophical board: first, as persons who have acquired philosophical knowledge, travellers should be regularly added, after scrutiny, to the NC; second, those younger members of the NC (properly educated philosophically, as Zaicev implies) who stood the test of virtue during their participation in the NC should later have advantages in the elections of the nomophylakes and thus would ultimately join the NC again as permanent members.\footnote{Zaicev clearly believed that the candidates to the NC would be proposed from among the philosophically educated people. As for their further career, he pointed to 952 b (advantages at elections) and 966 c–d (the important task is to ensure that only those people who attained the truth about gods are elected as nomophylakes).}

Susemihl’s proposal on the interim council, accepted with modifications by Zaicev and Schöpsdau, is certainly attractive as an attempt to explain the contradiction that emerges between the procedure of selecting the people who are fit for the education, admittedly, of the younger persons, and normal membership by virtue of holding the highest offices, as described earlier. At first sight, this squares well with the final sentence of the AS’s reasoning: the able people should be properly selected, educated in philosophical and scientific disciplines and then settle on the Acropolis as the true Guardians (969 b 8 —
c 2). But precisely this part seems to be incompatible with all versions of the proposal of an interim council, since the AS praises this future council as the final and perfect one, the complete realization of what he earlier showed to be the single means of the city's salvation: to have at the head the philosophical mind combined with the senses (969 b 5–7). This is not only a verbal contradiction. Suschil proposes that the first NC emerges directly from the persons educated by the AS; they educate the next generation, and the representatives of the latter would join the NC as senior members after they had attained the position of nomophylakes and highest officials. But this begs the question how this first council consisting of persons who became members through their education only, not through the highest offices, can claim the highest position in the state and settle on the Acropolis as the true Guardians, whatever weakened sense you assign to these words (for instance with Morrow, that they imply informal influence only).49 And last, as I argued before, there is no evidence that the NC as a body should itself educate anyone, either in the beginning or in future. If this is correct, the words on the selection and education of the future members of the NC do not amount to the creation of the NC.

Another solution commends itself. Selecting people capable to become the Guardians for the highest education based on their capacities to learn and their moral attitudes (969 c 9 — d 3) does not imply the formation of the NC from them directly after the conclusion of their education; equally, the formula at 969 b 8 — c 2 — that the people should be properly selected, educated and then, having settled on Acropolis become the true Guardians — does not mean that they become the members of the NC immediately and automatically after completion of their education. The sense of both statements is that the educational system for future members of the NC should be built; the students should be properly selected by the AS and his interlocutors; the graduates of the system should be recommended as candidates for the highest offices; only when these latter are occupied through elections by persons whose moral virtues have been enhanced by scientific and philosophical knowledge will the council consisting of the nomophylakes and the euthynoi, as described, be constituted as the supreme Guardian of the state by the law. The members of the NC will in future propose the candidates for junior membership from among the graduates of the same educational system, who in due course, provided that they prove their moral and intellectual abilities, would be recommended for the highest offices and join the NC as its senior members.

This does not seem to contradict evidence and there is an indirect support for the view that the NC as the Guardian should be formed through education and election as highest officials from the very beginning: the NC says (966 c 1 — d 3) that guarding the city, the prerogative of the NC, should not be entrusted to people who do not possess the required philosophical knowledge (here theological knowledge is meant, but it clearly holds for all required knowledge), and that “not entrusting” means not electing such people as nomophylakes and not giving them rewards for the highest virtue, i.e. not electing them as euthynoi. This statement shows that the proper way of forming the philosophical NC is through the election of philosophical people as the highest officials. The proponents

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49 Notice further that the earlier picture of this union of Mind and Senses clearly refers to the NC, which functioned on the whole scale, with the older and the younger contributing to their role in the “salvation” of the whole city with the younger keeping guard on the city and reporting what they perceive to the older, and the latter having consultations on what happens and giving instructions to the younger as their attendants (964 e — 965 a).
of the theory of the interim council take this statement as referring to the future “normal” mode of the NC’s staffing, but, granted that the text nowhere hints at two different modes, it indicates the initial and single mode, which should work permanently.

I would not definitely rule out another option — that the NC should be created at the beginning as the consultative body of the highest officials, but acquire its final form through the law (968 a 4 — b 2) on it as the Guardian when it possesses the philosophical membership of the philosophers elected as the highest officials, as described before. I personally earlier preferred this variant, because it seemed to me plausible that Plato would make the NC itself play the decisive role in its gradual transformation — through the proposals of philosophical junior members and by controlling the elections to ascertain the success of philosophers; it also may seem more in accord with Plato’s awareness of the difficulties of implementing the unusual measures, an awareness he often shows in the Laws, than with the drastic creation ex nihilo of the philosophical controlling instance. But, on consideration, there is simply no evidence for the earlier non-philosophical NC: all mentions of the NC from the very beginning (the conversations with atheists, the vetting of travellers, the decision-making on new disciplines for younger members to study) entail its philosophical competence, which is of course the upshot of its final reasoning.

Thus the former option — the constitution of the NC only in future and with purely philosophical membership — seems to be better in accord with the text. This implies that the city will not have its “anchor” and the means of its salvation for some decades after its foundation. In a way this is true, but the final statement on the making of the NC is made in the conditional form (969 b 2 — c 2) — thus it is not certain that this body will emerge at all. At the same time, we need not think that, without the NC, the city will be deprived entirely of the philosophical element. The system of scientific and philosophical studies will be built immediately on the foundation of the city; as I argued before, there is no need to identify this institution with the NC. The nomophylakes who are charged with supplementing the gaps in the initial code of laws should ideally be philosophers and thus, admittedly, the graduates of this philosophical education. On any interpretation, that of Morrow or of the “interim” council, the inescapable result is that the true council can be attained only with educated philosophers, viz. after a time. We shall see that there are serious reasons for this non-making of the NC in the absence of philosophers; contrary to Morrow’s view, the NC should be charged with powers that are too considerable to be entrusted to officials with the usual, non-philosophical virtues. We thus turn to the core of the “informal” understanding of the NC.

5. The Prerogatives of the NC

In his refutation of the view that the NC signifies the return to the philosophical rulers of the Republic, Morrow pointed (p. 512) out the phrase “the state should be handed over to the NC”, the only one, according to him, that might support such a view. He argued contra that the phrase does not mean that the NC is intended to stand above the law, in contradiction to the principle of the sovereignty of law on which the whole project of the Laws is built, and that the expression is vague and is compatible with the assumption that the NC should provide only “informal” philosophical guidance and has no “legal powers”, granted that there is no evidence for the contrary.
Now, the problem of standing above the law is the more difficult one, but Morrow certainly was not right that the expression is vague and can imply an “informal influence”. The same expression, “to hand over the state”, was previously used in the discussion (IV. 715 a 4–5) of who are qualified to be the officials of the future state. There it certainly implied legally maintained prerogatives, not informal ones. The same sense should be assigned to it when it is used now for the NC. The NC thus attains a role superior to all other officials, again in the legal sense. Nor is this phrase the only one that points to the legal powers of the NC. The statement on the law on the NC provides further and more important confirmation of these prerogatives (XII. 968 a 4 — e 5):

ΑΘ. ὁρᾶν δὴ χρεὼν νῦν, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἢδη πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις νόμοις ἅπασιν ὅσους διεληλύθαμεν εἰ καὶ τούτον προσοίσομεν, ὡς φυλακὴν ἐσόμενον κατὰ νόμον χάριν σωτηρίας τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων νυκτερινὸν σύλλογον, παιδείας ὅσης διεληλύθαμεν κοινωνὸν γενόμενον· ἢ πῶς ποιῶμεν;
ΚΛ. ἂν, ὥς λύστε, πῶς οὖ προσοίσοιμεν, ἂν τῇ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ δυνηθήμεν;

This formulation, even if it is not the exact text of the law, brings forward three important points: 1) the functions of the guardians are granted to the NC by the law; 2) these functions are determined by the law (κατὰ νόμον); 3) they are granted to the NC, which is educated to be adequate both intellectually and morally to the task of “salvation”. Point (1) and especially point (2) make purely informal authority very unlikely: they show that the NC should act in accordance with the prerogatives granted it by the law and within the limits of these prerogatives.50 This does not necessarily mean, however, that the NC would not have prerogatives to change the laws.

The next evidence on the legal prerogatives of the NC is debatable. We need to cite the whole piece that ensues; it discusses the law about the NC:

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν πρὸς γε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁμιλληθῶμεν πάντες. συλλήπτωρ γὰρ τούτου γε ὑμῖν καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνοίμῃ τῆς τοὐτοῦ ἡλικίας τε καὶ μαθημάτων δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἔθεσιν καὶ ἔθεσιν· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἃ δεῖ μανθάνειν οὔτε εὑρεῖν ῥᾴδιον οὔτε ηὑρηκότος ἄλλου μαθητή γενέσθαι. πρὸς

50 In his paraphrase of this passage, Morrow 1960, 507, typically does not render this important stipulation and uses it as the confirmation of his view that the NC should be “first of all an institution for the higher education”, contrary to its direct sense, which is that its members are the products of this education, not the teachers (see above on this). One can object that this stipulation may imply that the NC acts in accordance with the law in its non-legislative and non-administrative functions, like vetting travellers and atheists, consulting about laws etc. (Morrow further [p. 513] notices that the NC is appointed to admonish the atheists, but those who resist are convicted in court, which confirms, as he argues, that it has no power to override the law). But this contradicts the logic of the whole reasoning — the law should maintain the functions that prevent the state and the laws from deteriorating, and the NC cannot perform this function according to the law if the latter determines the NC’s prerogatives only within narrower tasks like those Morrow mentions.
τούτοις δὲ χρόνους, οὓς τε καὶ ἐν οἷς δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἕκαστα, μάταιον ταῦτ’ ἐν γράμμασιν λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τοῖς μανθάνουσι δήλα γίγνοιτ’ ἄν ὃτι πρὸς καιρὸν μανθάνει, πρὶν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκάστῳ που μαθήματος ἐπιστήμη γεγονέναι. οὕτω δὴ πάντα τὰ περὶ ταύτα ἀπόρρητα μὲν λεχθέντα οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο, ἀπρόρρητα δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν προρρηθέντα δηλοῦν τῶν λεγομένων.

The AS asks his interlocutors whether, in addition to the previously discussed (and thus passed) laws, they should also pass a law that the Nocturnal Council of “the rulers”, having had the education just discussed, will be constituted as the Guard. Clinias responds (also on behalf of Megillus) that they are eager to pass such a law, if they are able to do this even to a small degree; and the AS promises to help them with his expertise in “such matters” and also to win other competent persons for this purpose. It is thus next to certain that the difficulty lies in the educational field. Clinias proposes to investigate what the “right way” (presumably to create the NC) is, and the AS maintains that it impossible to legislate “such things” until they have been arranged.

The standard interpretation of the crucial sentence τότε δὲ κυρίους ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι νομοθετεῖν — was for a long time that the indirect question κυρίους ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι depends on the second νομοθετεῖν, which would mean that the legislation on such things (i.e. on the NC) should be postponed until the NC has been established. After that, it would be possible to legislate what prerogatives they should have, i.e. νομοθετεῖν, κυρίους ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι.51 According to the variant of this interpretation proposed by Ritter, αὐτοὺς is the subject of the second νομοθετεῖν — it will possible after that for them (the members of the NC) to legislate what their prerogatives should be.52

H. Cherniss rejected this interpretation (he argued directly against Ritter’s version) in the course of his devastating criticism of Gerhard Müller’s monograph;53 Müller used the passage to prove that the final parts of the Laws prefigured the discussion of scientific and philosophical education in the Epinomis and as evidence that the Laws and the Epinomis form an indivisible unity. According to Müller,54 Clinias’ question (to which the debatable passage is the response) is imprecise (τίς δὲ ὁ τρόπος without specification): he asks what both the prerogatives of the NC and its educational programme should be. The answer of the AS refers also to both — the laws on such things, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων (on the prerogatives and the educational programme) can be laid down only after the NC has been constituted: then it would be possible to establish by law what the constitutional prerogatives of the NC should be (κυρίους ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι): this corresponds to the standard treatment of syntax (Sussemihl), but Müller added, following his understanding of περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, that κυρίους ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι may alternatively have the meaning

51 See Sussemihl II/2, 1860, 635.
52 Ritter 1896, 364. He rightly admitted that his interpretation would be more plausible if κυρίους and αὐτοὺς changed places. This is certainly the case, and one should add that the idea that a body should legislate on its own prerogatives has no support in the text and is hardly plausible by itself.
53 Müller’s thesis (Müller 1951/1968), which is aporetic throughout, was that the Laws and the Epinomis are, on the one hand, stylistically and theoretically homogenous, and, on the other, entirely different from Plato’s work; this urges us to admit that either both were not written by Plato (the option he could not accept), or (the option he preferred but found unexplainable) that Plato wrote both treatises in opposition to his previous teaching and in distinction from his earlier style; this dilemma was rightly rejected as being wrong about both the homogeneity of the two treatises and about the contrast between the Laws and Plato’s other dialogues.
54 Müller 1951/1968, 30–33.
über welches Wissen sie verfügen sollen", i.e. the law promulgated in future should be specifically on what knowledge the members of the NC should possess (the ambiguity of the German verfügen (which can mean “possess” or “control”) played, as we shall see, the fatal role in the future debate). The final sentence of the passage (αλλὰ ἤδη τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζον διδαχή μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς γίγνοιτ’ ἂν, εἰ γίγνοιτο ὀρθῶς) refers to the discussion of the system of education, as implied by the next passage on the difficulties of selecting future students, on finding the disciplines they should learn and who should teach them and of making a proper schedule on the sequence of disciplines to be learned and the time needed for each. The promise of such a discussion, Müller believed, anticipated the discussion in the Epinomis.

Cherniss’ main goal in his criticism of Müller was to prove that there is no reference in the Laws to the Epinomis; he argued that the process Müller implies is not logical: if the difficulties that make the interlocutors postpone legislating on the NC are those that should be settled by the following discussion, why is the law postponed until the NC has been constituted, i.e. properly educated (both he and Müller admitted that these processes are identical), rather than until the discussion has been completed? Cherniss accordingly proposed his own interpretation of the passage: the AS’s outline of the process of education shows that determining the time necessary for studying each subject is possible only for those who have already attained knowledge in the course of this study (see 968 d 4-e4). The teaching (διδαχή) that is necessary before enacting the law on the NC thus cannot be the discussion of the educational system but only the education itself, and since the details of this system will be clear only for persons who have been so educated, they alone will be capable of implementing such a law: in Cherniss’ interpretation, the debatable parenthetic sentence refers in fact to this effect of education: “Legislation is no longer possible about such matters [as those concerning the council] until it has been organized, and then it is possible for masters of what they must become masters to do the legislating; but training of that kind, if done right, would already amount to schooling by long association”. Cherniss thus modified the traditional understanding of the syntax (the indirect question dependent on νομοθετεῖν) and proposed instead that κυρίους is the subject of νομοθετεῖν and that ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι (sc. κυρίους) specifies this subject.

Morrow endorsed and used this treatment of the passage (which Cherniss himself did not develop in a definite view of the functions of the NC) in his argument that no granting (or expansion) of legal prerogatives of the NC is promised in the text; this argument has since gained universal approval, with only a few exceptions. But in fact Cherniss’ view is unconvincing in several points. The full phrase, according to Cherniss, should be τότε δὲ (δύνατον ἔσται κυρίους, ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι (κυρίους), νομοθετεῖν (viz. περὶ τῶν

55 In the Addendum of 1968, Müller definitely gave preference to this second option (p. 194 n.2): the future law regulates die "Beherrschung des Wissens".
56 Müller’s initial view of τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζον was that it refers to the imagined process of establishing the NC through the education of its members; in the second edition, he preferred to relate it to the preparatory discussions.
57 Cherniss 1951, 373–375.
58 Morrow 1960, 513 n. 22 (with severe doubts about the meaning of the passage that he regarded as probably corrupted; like Cherniss, Morrow considered as an alternative only Ritter’s interpretation, as popularised by Bury, not that of Susemihl).
59 Cherniss’ interpretation was endorsed, from a philological point of view, by Tarán 1975, 21 ff.; Sier 2008, 297 f.
τοιούτων). Its main advantage is that the second part of the sentence is related to the same object of legislation: it is not possible to legislate on educational matters before these have been ordered; it will be then possible for those who became the masters of these things, i.e. who went through this system of education, to legislate on them. But this advantage is bought at a high price. Cherniss' treatment of syntax is by no means more natural than the traditional one. It entails changing the construction from the impersonal one in the previous sentence to the personal and a rather obscure description of the new subject ("the masters, i.e. the connoisseurs, of things of which they should become masters"); it is further necessary to imply another κυρίους as the predicate of γίγνεσθαι. Again, αὐτούς stands in a rather unnatural position: given the syntax Cherniss proposes, one expects it after δεῖ, not before it.60 This all would be tolerable, granted that there is no alternative, but that is not the case, as we shall see.61

The greater difficulty for Cherniss' proposal, and one that seems to be fatal for it, is the unusual meaning he assigns to κύριοι with the object in the genitive case — "those who possess knowledge of something".62 All examples of κύριος in the Laws, apart from the metaphoric meaning "the most important, essential", belong to the standard usage "being a master (of land, a house etc.)" or "having power over something" (the people, laws, magistrates) or "valid" (for laws, testaments etc.). The dictionaries provide no example of the usage supposed by Cherniss. His ambiguous translation ("masters of knowledge" in the sense of "possessors of knowledge") thus disguises the fact that the Greek κύριος does not have the polysemy that the English "master of something" has — one who commands in a field and one who is expert in a field; the same is true of Müller's intentionally ambiguous translation, "über welches Wissen sie verfügen sollen".63

The lack of relevant examples and the implausibility of this meaning of κύριοι were rightly noticed by Lisi (1999, II, 343–344 n.141), who rejected Cherniss' interpretation and returned to Susemihl's understanding of the sentence. However, Schöpsdau, who also rejects Cherniss' understanding of syntax and opts for Susemihl's rendering of it, nevertheless finds Cherniss' understanding of κύριοι as "connoisseurs" acceptable (along,
however, with the alternative one — “Befügnisse”, “prerogatives”), and he cites against Lisi the passage that Müller already adduced in support of the supposed meaning “Beherrschung des Wissens”.64

1) Leg. 665 d 1–5 (on the necessity to have the third chorus of the older people):

ΑΘ. Ποῦ δὴ τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως, ἡλικίαις τε καὶ ἅμα φρονήσειν πιθανώτατον ὁν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἄδον τὰ κάλλιστα μέγιστ’ ἂν ἔχει, ἢ τοῦτο ἀνοήτως οὕτως ἀφήσομεν, δὲ κυριώτατον ἂν εἰς τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ὑφελιμωτάτων φύσιν;

Müller thus supposes that it means something like “should we so foolishly neglect this category of people, which is the ablest in performing the most beautiful and the most useful songs”?65 However, here it is entirely possible to assign to κυριώτατον with genitive its usual meaning, “the most prominent, essential for something”; this meaning also corresponds better to the superlative, since the point here is that the older people are singularly able to perform the most beautiful and the most useful songs, not that they are the best in this quality. τοῦτο and ὃ refer, accordingly, not to τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως, i.e. to the chorus of the older men, but to the question itself, how to make the singing of this chorus most useful. The sentence thus means “or should we so foolishly neglect what is the most important prerequisite for having the finest and the most useful songs?”

2) The second example that Müller cited is Epin. 989 d 2:

τοῦτο δὴ οὖν τὸ μέρος εἶναι φάσιν κυριώτατον καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς οἶον τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάσκοι τις.

Müller connects κυριώτατον with μαθεῖν. It is not entirely clear whether τὸ μέρος refers here to the “best natures” or to the part of wisdom they should learn, i.e. astronomy, which contributes to piety (the latter option seems to me preferable). In any case, even if μαθεῖν depends on κυριώτατον as the epexegetical infinitive, which is by no means obvious, here κύριος does not designate one who possesses knowledge: the meaning is either that this knowledge is the supreme one to learn, or that these people are the most entitled to learn it.

So far, granted that there are no convincing examples of κύριος with the meaning Cherniss proposed, it is commendable to return to Susemihl’s understanding both of syntax and of the meaning of κύριος, which removes all these difficulties and gives a quite satisfactory sense: “then it will be possible to lay down by law what the prerogatives of the members of the NC will be”. It is not necessary to join some of the proponents of the traditional treatment of the syntax (Ritter, England) in admitting that this intended law should be laid down by the NC itself, which would have the paradoxical result, for which there are no precedents in the Laws, that a body should itself determine its prerogatives.66 The

64 Schöpsdau 2011, 603, see his translation (II, 51): “Oder wollen wir so unvernünftig sein und auf diesen Teil verzichten, der doch wohl im höchsten Maße über die schönsten und nützlichsten Gesänge verfügen wird?...”

65 Cf. already England I, 312, who renders κυριώτατον as “perfect masters of”; and adds “it includes... the idea of ‘the best authority’, citing the examples for the latter, where κύριος with genitive means “having authority, being valid” due to knowledge or the like, but of course does not change the fact that κύριος itself conveys the notion of authority or validity, rather than that of knowing.

66 From the linguistic point of view, the idea is equally improbable: if the meaning were that the members of the NC should themselves decide what should be their prerogatives, the subject of the decision could not be omitted (for this reason Ritter wished to have κύριος and αὐτοὺς change places in the text). It need
first νομοθετεῖν has no expressed subject and depends on the impersonal οὐκέτι δυνατόν ἔστιν: it is impossible at this point to lay down the laws, viz. impossible for the interlocutors, who cannot yet determine its content and to propose it to the body that should lay down the set of the laws of Magnesia. The run of the sentence suggests that the second νομοθετεῖν is ruled by the same impersonal expression. Thus the future legislators are not the members of the NC, but, again, the interlocutors, or, granted that the organization of the NC as the philosophical Guardian may take a long time (the required persons should be duly educated and attain the highest offices, in the interpretation I propose), the definite law should be laid down by the nomophylakes, who are entitled to make alterations in the body of law in future (see VI. 769 a — 771 a): of course, the AS hopes that these would follow the philosophical principles on which the whole project is founded.

Now we should discuss another difficulty that provoked Müller to interpret κυρίους ὄν as pointing to the possession of knowledge and that led Cherniss to adopt this infelicitous meaning from his opponent, although rejecting his treatment of the syntax. This is the triple τὰ τοιαῦτα in the text at 968 b 8, c 4, and c 6. The reference of the first is not expressed explicitly, but the AS mentions his enquiry into “such things” and his experience with them and promises to find also other, similarly competent persons; 67 this is usually taken, most naturally, as referring to philosophical and scientific subjects, in which the AS alone is an expert, to his experience both in studying and teaching them and to his possibility of finding other scholarly minds; 68 it is thus about the organization of the educational system for the future members of the NC, on the lines pointed out in the previous conversation on the philosophical and scientific disciplines that the true Guardians of laws should study. It is natural, accordingly, to take the second τὰ τοιαῦτα (οὐκέτι … περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνατόν ἔστιν νομοθετεῖν) as having the same reference: thus, the AS says that it is not possible at this point to lay down the laws about the educational system. This is further confirmed by the meaning of the third τὰ τοιαῦτα: the AS says that the process of arranging “such thing” turns out to be teaching by means of long conversational intercourse (τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζον διδαχὴ μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν): it is not immediately clear whether this teaching means the AS’s explanation of the future system to his companions or the training of future philosophers (see below on this point), but it is clear that τὰ τοιαῦτα in these sentence are not the prerogatives of the NC. 69

67 συλλήπτωρ γὰρ τούτου γε ὑμῖν καὶ ἐγώ γιγνοίμην ἂν προθύμως—πρὸς δ’ ἐμοὶ καὶ ἑτέρους ἴσως εὑρήσω—διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπειρίαν τε καὶ σκέψιν γεγονυῖαν μοι καὶ μάλα συχνήν.
68 This is confirmed by the AS’ further remark that he is ready to take part in the common enterprise by sharing the views he had previously formed on the kind of education he presented as necessary in the earlier conversation (ταῦτα ποιητέον, ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν συγκινδυνεύσω τῷ φράζειν τε καὶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι τά γε δεδογμένα ἐμοὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς τῆς νῦν αὖ κεκινημένης τοῖς λόγοις 969 a 1–3).
69 See Schöpsdau 2011, 603, with whom I entirely agree on the identical reference of three τὰ τοιαῦτα.
Lisi’s attempt to treat τὰ τοιαῦτα at 968 c 4 as meaning the prerogatives of the NC is attractive at first sight — the rejoinder that it is impossible to legislate further on such things seems to look back at the law that constitutes the NC as the Guard of the state (968 a 4 — b 2), see Lisi 1998, II, 343 n. 141 (here he argued against Cherniss that the debatable passage refers to the future defining of the prerogatives of the NC; earlier, Lisi 1985, 356, still following Cherniss’ understanding of the parenthetical sentence as relating to the knowledge rather than the prerogatives, nevertheless also took τὰ τοιαῦτα at 968 c 4 as meaning the prerogatives). Nevertheless, the neighboring position of two τὰ τοιαῦτα with different meanings is implausible, and since both the τὰ τοιαῦτα before 968 c 4 and the one immediately next to it clearly refer to educational matters, there is
Now, since the parenthetical sentence on future legislation is sandwiched between the two statements on education, and the immediately preceding statement is that it is impossible to legislate on this matter, the inference seems to be inescapable that the subject of the law in question should be again the system of education, not the prerogatives of the NC, as according to Cherniss. Nevertheless, Cherniss' interpretation of the sentence is untenable, as I tried to prove. Moreover, the presence of a law on education only, not on prerogatives, would create a series of inconsistencies: the interlocutors have agreed before that it is necessary to lay down the law that the NC, who participated in the system of sciences and philosophy, should be made the Guardian of the state (968 a 4 — b 2) — but this law suddenly disappears and we have instead only the one on the educational programme. Moreover, at the end of the discussion, the AS says that if the divine council emerges, the city should be handed over to it, and he explicates this as follows: the people should be exactly selected, be properly educated and then, having settled on the Acropolis, become the true Guardians, the realized image of the union of mind and senses (969 b 2 — c 2). This shows that finishing this educational stage should be crowned by a certain political action (handing over the city to the NC, settling on the Acropolis), and the most plausible correspondence to this action is laying down the law on the NC. 

So far, there are reasons to resist this inference that the only law mentioned is the law on the educational system. In fact, the meaning of the debatable passage is clear enough and depends on the logic of the preceding conversation. The interlocutors have agreed no choice other than to assign the same meaning to the middle one. Lisi believes that if one takes τὰ τοιαῦτα c 4 as referring to sciences and their learning, a contradiction emerges: it is said here that it is impossible to legislate on such things until they have been arranged, but it seems to follow from the further conversation that it is, in principle, impossible to regulate in written form the knowledge that the members of the NC should acquire (968 d — e), and thus to lay down the law on these things. But in fact the AS maintains that the impossibility of regulating matters of education in written form is related to only one aspect of it — the duration of study of single disciplines and accordingly the time of moving from one discipline to another (968 d 4 — e 2); because he further expresses his readiness to share with the interlocutors his experienced opinion on matters of education (969 a 1–3), and this is related most naturally to the other aspects that were previously mentioned — the principles of selecting future students, the disciplines to be learned and their possible teachers (968 c 9 — e 5). Thus far, there is no statement that the law on education is impossible at all, and it is natural to take τὰ τοιαῦτα c 4 as referring to educational matters, like τὰ τοιαῦτα before, 968 b 8, and immediately after that, 968 c 6; it is only impossible to regulate these things before they have been properly arranged (πρὶν ἂν κοσμηθῇ).

Thus, Schöpsdau 2011, 602 f., having rejected Cherniss' understanding of the syntax of the parenthetical sentence, nevertheless feels uneasy about its meaning, because of two neighbouring τὰ τοιαῦτα, which he rightly takes to refer to educational matters, and thus, with consideration, prefers for κυρίους ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι the ambiguous translation “über welche Kompetenzen sie verfügen müssen” (p. 159) giving it both senses — legal prerogatives and scientific competences, which of course is unacceptable, granted that this ambiguity of meaning is not attested for Greek, as I've argued.

Schöpsdau III, 2011, 601 f., is the only commentator who believes that that law has already been laid down and our passage deals with another one, either on matters of the education of the NC or on its legal prerogatives. But although this is compatible with what is literally said, I find it little credible that the law on the educational system cannot be laid down until the system has been created, while the law on the NC has already been enacted, the law that grants prerogatives to people who should be educated according to this system and who do not exist yet.

Morrow's theory leaves no place for any action that should occur after the members of the NC, senior and junior, have been philosophically educated, because he believes (Morrow 1960, 507 f.) that the process of education as depicted in the final part of the conversation is one in which the NC itself is engaged and which has accordingly no termination (he identifies the selection of candidates for this education with the senior members' invitation to younger candidates, p. 508), wrongly, as I have argued.
that it is necessary to lay down the law that the NC, who participated in the system of sciences and philosophy, should be made the Guardian of the state (968 a 4 — b 2). Clinias' reply (‘Ἀλλ’, ὦ λάσσετε, πῶς οὐ προσοίσομεν, ἂν πη καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ δυνηθῶμεν;) shows, on the one hand, that he is ready to lay down this law, but, on the other, is aware that the difficulty is great and that success can be only partial. The difficulty is thus not in the formal procedure, but in fulfilling the conditions to which the NC should correspond — i.e. its philosophical equipment, of which Clinias is now aware due to the preceding conversation. The AS calls on the discussants to struggle to attain such a thing (τὸ τοιοῦτον) — i.e. the NC, as described above, with its philosophical membership and its functioning as the Guardian — and promises his help in organising the education (968 a 8).73 The crucial and the most difficult point of the enterprise is thus the education of the future Guardians, and this becomes the subject of the remaining part of the conversation. Clinias is ready to pursue this and asks about the mode (τίς δὲ ὁ τρόπος ἡμῖν γίγνεται), i.e. the mode of attaining such a body, which is primarily related again to the organization of this education. The debatable answer of the AS follows:

ΑΘ. Οὐκέτι νόμους, ὦ Μέγιλλε καὶ Κλεινία, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνατόν ἐστιν νομοθετεῖν, πρὶν ἂν κοσμηθῇ—τότε δὲ κυρίους ἄν αὐτούς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι νομοθετεῖν—ἀλλὰ ἤδη τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζον διδαχὴ μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ γίγνοιτο ὡρθάς.

The answer, as Cherniss rightly stated, like the question, is related primarily to the education, not to the prerogatives of the NC: it is impossible to lay down any laws on educational matters (περὶ τῶν τοιούτων). However, this need not have the meaning that suddenly a different law, that on education, emerged in the conversation, instead of the previous one that should constitute the NC as the Guard of the state. Notice the plural νόμους as opposed to the singular of the law on the NC above, which certainly points to the generalising character of the answer (certainly what is envisaged is not several laws on these matters), and the seemingly illogical οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνατόν ἐστιν νομοθετεῖν, “further not possible to legislate on such matters”, although there was no earlier legislation on this system of education. This clearly refers to the earlier discussion of which philosophical and scientific disciplines the future Guardians of the state should study. The sentence presumably has the meaning that no further definite rules on this education can be made at this point; in the language of the interlocutors it means to lay down the laws, since the rules they elaborate become the laws of the city they found. These disciplines were clearly determined and might be made the content of the law, but any further provisions on education cannot be made as yet, until something that is related to educational matters (τὰ τοιαῦτα) has been put in order (πρὶν ἂν κοσμηθῇ).74

This latter condition can be understood in two ways, either as the creation of the educational system or as making it function properly, and this depends on the treatment of τὰ τοιαῦτα as the product of the process designated by κοσμηθῇ or as something that is meliorated by it (the difference is the same as between the internal

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73 Καὶ μὴν πρός γε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁμιλληθῶμεν πάντες. συλλήπτωρ γὰρ τούτου γε ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ ἕτοιμος—πρὸς δ’ ἔμοι καὶ ἑτέρους ἱσώς ἐφερεῖ—διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπειρίαν τε καὶ σκέψιν γεγυναύτα μοι καὶ μάλα συχνὴν.
74 Many scholars, including Müller (in the first edition) and Cherniss, take κοσμηθῇ as meaning the establishment of the NC, thus implying something like ὁ σύλλογος as the subject, but it is more natural that the subject is τὰ τοιαῦτα, i.e. matters of education.
and the external object of the verb in the active tense). I will return in a moment to this alternative, but first it is necessary to determine what process is described in the last sentence (ἀλλὰ ἤδη τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζον διδαχὴ μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ γίγνοιτο ὀρθώς). Müller takes this sentence to be the instructions on educational matters that the AS is ready to give his interlocutors, and Cherniss takes it to refer to the process of education of the future members of the NC. 75 The former option, granted that the first sentence refers to the organization of the system, rather than to the establishing of the NC, is more plausible. One might say, of course, that what creates the educational system would be the training of students itself (Cherniss’ view that the education itself will settle the educational difficulties), but it would be very strange to say that the long training (which demands not less than ten years) is only a minor condition (ἀλλὰ ἤδη) for creating this system. 76

Thus it seems to be reasonable to take the first and the third sentences of the passage as referring to two stages in the creation of the educational system: the first (πρὶν ἂν κοσμηθῇ) points to the complete arrangement; the second (τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζον διδαχὴ μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς γίγνοιτ’ ἄν), to the preliminary discussion of the educational process. 77 The latter is hinted at, pace Cherniss, in the ensuing rejoinder of the AS (968 d 3) and even more clearly mentioned in the next one (969 a 1–3): he is ready to explicate to the other his thoughts on the matters of education. 78 This of course does not make the Epinomis, with its discussion of the programme of philosophical and scientific disciplines, Plato’s conceived sequel of the Laws; much less does it make him the author of this sequel. But the attempt of Cherniss, endorsed by some other scholars, 79 to show that the further discussion of these matters is ruled out by the final part of the Laws is mistaken, in my view.

This brings us again to the question already mentioned — what the major prerequisite for laying down the law on educational matters should be (πρὶν ἂν κοσμηθῇ). This latter condition can be understood in two ways, either as the creation of the educational system or as making it function properly, depending on whether τὰ τοιαῦτα is the result

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75 Cherniss 1953, 373 f., argued that διδαχὴ refers to the educational process itself (this is also the view of Lisi, 1984, 355; Schöpsdau 2011, 584; 664) and that no preliminary discussion is mentioned in the conversation at all, against Müller 31, who believed that this points forward to the discussion in the Epinomis.

76 Cherniss is surely right in his understanding ἄλλα ἤδη as having this meaning of the prior and the minor condition (“but training of this kind would already amount to schooling by long association”), although I cannot understand what more considerable condition for making the NC he implies. On the contrary, in my view, both Müller and Schöpsdau are mistaken when they assign the meaning “jetzt” (just now) to ἤδη.

77 Müller who initially believed, like Cherniss, that (τὰ τοιαῦτα) κοσμηθῇ means the establishing of the NC (p. 30), later, in the addenda to his second edition (194 f.), he proposed that τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζον is identical to (τὰ τοιαῦτα) κοσμηθῇ and that both refer to the preliminary discussion. This is unlikely: ἄλλα ἤδη implies that (τὰ τοιαῦτα) κοσμηθῇ refers to the more important and logically following condition to be fulfilled in comparison with τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζον; probably, for the same reason, in order to distinguish two processes, the verb κατασκευάζω is used, in difference from κοσμέω.

78 Cherniss 1953, 374 takes this, far from what seems natural, as “he proposes to associate himself with them in selecting the candidates and helping to train them for the councillorship”.

79 See Tarán 1975, 21 f. with nn. 84, 85, who follows Cherniss in his interpretation of 969 a1–3 (see the previous note) and, more recently, Brisson 2005, 18, who pays no attention to the AS’s promise to explain his views on education at 969 a 1–3, although he cites the text and, from the intention to realize the “dream” of the Mind and Senses treated in the previous discussion (969 b 5–6), surprisingly infers that “the next stage will no longer be a discussion… about the Vigilance committee, but its establishment in reality”. 
of the process designated by κοσμηθῇ or as something that is meliorated by the process (the difference is the same as that between the internal and the external object of the verb in the active tense). The latter option seems to me preferable — the law on educational matters can be laid down only when the system shows that it works properly and produces the appropriate graduates — but I would not rule out the former, more modest condition, either: that it would be possible after the system has been properly organized (the programme maintained, the teachers found and invited, the students selected). Since the conversation concentrates on the subjects to be studied and on their teaching, the crucial point is that the law on educational matters cannot be laid down before they are properly organized; it does not mean that it should be laid down immediately at this point.

This, I hope, sheds light on the debatable sentence. The parenthetical sentence says that only after the educational system is fully organised or is functioning will it be possible to lay down the law on the prerogatives of the NC. This is not what Clinias had in view when asking the question (he asks about education), but it reminds us of the main subject — the necessity to lay down the law on the NC as the philosophical Guardian. This remark makes the difficulties explicit that prevented the law on the NC from being made immediately, as guessed by Clinias and clearly recognised by the AS: this law cannot be laid down immediately, because its main prerequisite — fully philosophically educated members — is still lacking in this initial stage. The law on the NC as the Guardian, i.e. on its legal prerogatives, would be possible only when (and if) the system of education of its members is organised (and, presumably, works properly). Notice that this does not mean that the law should be laid down immediately at this point; it only means that this cannot be done earlier. But — the AS adds — the preparatory stage for making this system already demands a lot of discussion (i.e. among the trio of legislators).

The parenthetical sentence is thus informative in spite of its lamentable abruptness: the future law on the NC as the philosophical Guardian entails the exact definition of the prerogatives of its members. Further, we need not think that this is referring to two different laws: the mention of the NC’s prerogatives is provoked precisely by the fact that the law on these prerogatives should be enacted together with the rules (not laws) on the educational system, in correspondence with the earlier formula of the law on the NC: it will grant the position of the Guardian to the NC, which consists of the members who received the proper education — in fact we can think of these as parts of one and the same law.

In the final part of the conversation, the AS points out that the creation of the state they conceived is open to a great risk: its success, as he makes clear, stands and falls with the appearance of the NC (968 d 6 — 969 b 2). This duly rounds out the point made at the beginning of the conversation on the NC: the state needs a body that would make the established laws irreversible (960 d 4–6). The primary difficulty, as the accompanying remark shows, is to make the system of philosophical and scientific studies for the future members of the NC; this task should be in part resolved due to the instructions on this matter that the AS promises to give (969 a 1–3). But the risk for “the whole state” that the AS hints at is presumably not this difficulty, but rather the process of creating the NC: the appropriate persons for the Guardianship should be selected, properly educated and made

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80 The further remark of the AS shows that the important aspects of the system cannot be settled before the educational process begins or even before it is considerably advanced (968 e2-e5), and this may be a reason to prefer this option: the law on the education of the possible members of the NC can be laid down only when the system has showed that it works properly.
Guardians, having been settled on the Acropolis (969 b 8 — c 3). If my previous argument is correct, this succinct formula implies the constant process of selecting candidates for “advanced studies”, their further promotion to the highest offices of the nomophylakes and the euthynoi, and only after these conditions have been fulfilled, the creation by the law of the NC, consisting of the philosophical officials. The difficulties that accompany each of these steps are in fact enormous. For this reason, the AS prescribes to “give over” the city to the NC in the conditional form — only if it emerges (969 b 2–5). I turn further to another risk of this plan. Meanwhile it is necessary the difficulties which accompany my proposal that the NC should be equipped with the legal powers and the unrestricted ones in view of the principles on which the state of Magnesia should be built.

6. The NC and “the Sovereignty of Law”

Morrow resisted the view that the introduction of the NC undermines the principle of the sovereignty of the law on which the whole project of Magnesia has been built and argued that the NC possesses only philosophical expertise in the field of laws, not the legal powers to change them. As I have tried to show, Morrow was not right: the NC is constituted as the Guard of the state by the law (968 a 1 — b 1) and its legal powers should be defined by the same law (see above on 968 c 4–5, against Cherniss). This suggests that its holding conversations “on the domestic laws, on the outstanding laws in other countries and on the scientific subjects that would help to clarify the matters related to the laws (951 e 5 — 952 a 1)” entails legal powers to enforce changes of the laws, and not only to make recommendations to the nomophylakes, as Morrow supposed. When, further, the AS argues that the state should have a philosophical body that has the knowledge of the state’s ultimate goal and of the means of attaining it, he adds that this entails knowledge of “what, primarily, laws and, secondly, people advise well and what not” on attaining this goal (962 b 4-c3). Since the law on the constitutional position of the NC as the Guard also defines its powers in this respect, this knowledge should be also understood as equipped with the power (and the absolute power, of course) to change the laws (or to effectively resist changes), as well as the power to control all officials, including the highest ones.81 The most probable example of exercising such a power is the ban on election to euthynoi and nomophylakes of those who have not attained the proper philosophical knowledge (966 c 4 — d 3, cf. 964 b 3 — d 1; 965 c 9 — d 3).

Morrow argued that, within the prerogatives explicitly granted to the NC, it is not given the power to override the law, and he illustrated this with two instances that, according to him, show that the NC has no right to impose penalties.82 In fact, both examples prove the contrary:83 in the first, the NC should admonish the better sort of the impious — those who have wrong views, but not vices of character. They are sentenced to imprisonment in the sophronisterion for not less than five years and may communicate in this time only with the members of the NC, who dissuade them from their erroneous views. At the end

81 Morrow and Schöpsdau 2011, III, 440, suppose this, of course, but since they do not admit any law on the legal prerogatives of the NC, they believe that the NC influences the process through the nomophylakes who belong to the NC.
82 Morrow 1960, 512 f.
83 Susemihl II/2, 1860, 638 f., already pointed out, correctly in my view, that both examples imply judiciary and administrative powers for the NC, in contrast, as he thought, to its general informal influence.
of this term, the imprisoned should be vetted: if it is found that they have acquired correct views in the meantime, they are released, but if not, they should be sentenced to death (X. 908 e 5 — 909 a 8). It is true that the special court makes the initial decision on the category to which the impious belong and accordingly on imprisonment (906 d 7 — e 7, 909 a 1), but it is at least probable that the final verdict on the mental state of the prisoners is made by those who communicated with them, i.e. by the members of the NC, and that this decision amounts to the sentence of the judge.84

The second case Morrow refers to is the decision the NC makes on the traveller who was found to have been corrupted during his stay abroad; the NC prohibits him from holding conversations “with younger or older”. If he disobeys, any official should take him to court and accuse him of “undue meddling with education and laws”; the convicted is sentenced to death (XII. 952 c 5 — d 2). Morrow stresses that “his case is come before the courts for judgement by the regular processes of justice” (p. 513). But in fact, the NC in this case makes an authoritative judgement that no court in Magnesia is entitled to make: it prohibits a certain person from engaging in any activity that can be regarded as teaching and discussion of laws; the court, on the contrary, decides only on the fact of forbidden behaviour. The decision of the NC amounts to a decree with indisputable force. Instead of indicating the informal authority of the NC, both examples suggest rather the real legal powers granted to it, which in both cases are not limited by any other official body. At the same time, Morrow is certainly right that in both of these instances the NC does not “override the law”. In fact it is the law that grants it these prerogatives, in the same way as it grants it the prerogatives of the Guardian of the state according to 968 a 4 — b 1, which are also employed without being limited by any law or other officials.

Two possible objections seem to undermine my inference that the NC has the prerogative of changing the laws. First, the whole system of Magnesia’s laws is conceived in the dialogue as being as rigid and unchangeable as possible. Second, if the NC has unlimited powers to change the laws, this would violate the principle of the sovereignty of the law that underlies the whole preceding reasoning.

I will start with the first objection — there is in fact ample evidence that Magnesia’s code of laws is intended to be as immovable as possible. There are both general statements that the laws should be unchangeable85 and instructions in particular cases that show that changes should be possible only within the limited “trial” period and after that should be made very difficult, even practically impossible. For instance, in the most explicit case, the provision on the laws on choruses and sacrifices prescribes that, after the death of the
initial legislators (the AS, Megillus and Clinias), the corresponding officials should report
the remaining faults of these laws to the nomophylakes, who are entitled to make changes
within a period of of ten years, after which the laws should be finally fixed (VI. 772 b 5 —
c 6). Further changes may be made only in extraordinary circumstances and through
a very complicated procedure: the proposal should be approved by all officials and the
whole people, together with the ordinance of the oracle, one citizen’s vote against the pro-
posal being sufficient for its rejection (772 c 6 — d 4). The fixation after the period of trial
is envisaged explicitly also for some other laws, and Schöpsdau supposes that the same
principle holds for the whole code. He admits that there are indications that even after
the final fixation some extraordinary circumstances can evoke changes, as in the just cited
case of the laws on the choruses and sacrifices, but the complicated procedure prescribed
for such changes makes the laws of Magnesia practically immovable, in his view.

Schöpsdau himself finds it unthinkable that the NC, with its constant discussions
of the laws of Magnesia, plays no role in possible amendments of laws. Since he agrees
with Morrow that the evidence leaves to the NC only an informal role, he supposes that it
performs its “advisory and controlling function” in relation to the legislation as the Guard
that observes the state’s pursuit of its ultimate goal, virtue, through the personal influence
of the ten oldest nomophylakes, who sit in the NC. 86 As follows from my previous argu-
ment, I disagree with Morrow’s and Schöpsdau’s view that the NC performs only informal
influence. But this does not make any difference here: if Schöpsdau is right and the task
of the NC is reduced to its part in changing the laws within the limited period of trial
and occasionally in making later extraordinary changes, then no matter what its informal
influence or legal prerogatives, it is, on the one hand, superfluous, because all changes
envisaged are of a technical character and entail no superior expertise, and, on the other
hand, it is dubiously effective, because the procedure of amendment leaves little place for
philosophical authority and practically excludes it after the trial period. Also, the creation
of the NC should take considerable time, certainly more than the trial period mentioned
for some laws in the text.

Some scholars who endorsed the “informal” view of the NC, including Morrow him-
self, argued that the provision of the final fixation is not envisaged for every field and
the possibility of permanent changes leaves room for the expertise of the NC. 87 I tend
rather to agree with Schöpsdau that, even in that case, all envisaged changes are routine
and those accepted within a short period of trial can be fixed after the short trial period
because future experience cannot bring something that was not taken into account during
this time. 88

An important test case is the law that prohibits non-marital relations and pederasty
(VIII. 840 e — 842 a): the initial strict law on the subject may prove ineffective because
of depraving external influences. Accordingly, the alternative law, which is less restrictive
(under it, both are allowed but not openly), is formulated and philosophically argued in
the course of the conversation. It will be up to the future nomophylakes whether and when
they should enact this new law, instead of the initial one, to prevent the state from further
deterioration. Significantly, even in this case, although the decision on promulgating the
corresponding law is left to the future nomophylakes, no philosophical expertise on the

88 The relevant cases are listed by Schöpsdau II, 2003, 364.
necessary measures is expected of either the nomophylakes or, even less, of the NC: the nomophylakes should only initiate the procedure of enacting the law that the initial legislator has written and equipped with the appropriate philosophical foundation.

According to the all provisions made in the text, these considerations that Magnesia should acquire a practically unchangeable code of the laws and that the few and temporally limited amendments do not imply any participation of the NC, impelled Klosko to argue that the concluding part of the discussion signals Plato’s change of mind: the NC now acquires the prerogatives of making revisions in laws.89

Klosko’s proposal, however, oversimplifies the case, like the earlier proponents of the view that the NC changes the whole design of the Laws. In fact, although there is no evidence that the NC has the role, constitutional or informal, of amending the laws before the end of Book XII, there is a clear statement already in Book VI that the process of amending the initial code of laws should be continuous and that this task is assigned to the nomophylakes, who should possess philosophical knowledge of the ultimate goal of the state. In his peroration addressed to the future nomophylakes, the pupils of the initial legislators, the AS compares the legislator to the ideal painter who will never find his work complete and who will take care to leave his successors after him to improve on it in future (769 a 7 — c 8). He advises the future nomophylakes to amend the inevitable mistakes of his own work, and his command to endorse laws that correspond to the goal of the state and to blame those which fail to do this (770 e 6 — 771 a 2) does not entail any temporal limitation on this process. It also suggests that the nomophylakes are entitled not only to improve the laws, but also to abandon inappropriate ones, including those laid down by the initial legislator. Their prerogatives in this respect are unlimited, in the same way as the NC is charged in Book XII with evaluating all the laws for correspondence to the ultimate goal of the state (962 b 4 — 9) and with continually discussing during its everyday sessions possible improvements to the laws, without any limitations (951 e 5 — 952 b 1).90

Schöpsdau’s attempt to weaken the strength of comparison with the perpetual improvements of a picture in the peroration to the nomophylakes and to demonstrate that they are limited to changing the laws during a trial period is not convincing. This attempt not only contradicts the direct meaning of the peroration, which does not mention any limitations; moreover, as we have seen, the improvements of the trial period have a purely technical character and do not entail any philosophical expertise, unlike those that the peroration envisages. The latter makes philosophical knowledge decisive in making crucial decisions on legislation to keep the state in agreement with its virtuous goal, which entails sacrificing all material goods to this purpose, including the prosperity and even the existence of the polis itself, rather than seeing it under the rule of the worse (769 c 7 — e 4). Of course, whatever changes are thus permanently within the purview of the bearers of philosophical knowledge, these changes are conceived as amendments to the initial design, which should not be revised as a whole. But this has nothing to do with constitutional restric-

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89 Klosko 1988; in his later treatment of the subject (Klosko 2006, 252–258; 2008), he is more cautious on the prerogatives of the NC, but still sticks to the proposal of change of mind.
90 The permanency of this task of changing the laws is further implied by the double titling of these officials as nomothetai and nomophylakes, both in the peroration to them (VI. 770 a 8–9) and in the final speech on the philosophical Guard (XII. 964 b 3). Schöpsdau II, 2003, 442 supposes that this refers to changes only within 10 years of the trial period, but the final speech makes no limitations on these tasks, and its goal is to institute the NC, which consists of the philosophically educated nomophylakes, thus pointing to a far later time than any trial period.
tions on their powers. Rather as Klosko (2006, 183) pertinently noticed on account of the other philosophical rulers, that of the Republic, ‘Plato makes the highly optimistic assumption that the truths the philosophers will discover are those he himself holds sacred.’ As concerns the Laws, Plato certainly shows no doubt that the future rulers will have the same view as he of the fundamental principles on which the state had been built

Thus the philosophical authority that has the permanent power to amend the laws is not new with Book XII, and the only possibility is to suppose that the NC assumes the role that was previously assigned to the nomophylakes. I will argue that even this, a comparatively less significant contradiction, does not necessarily follow from the text.

To summarize, the constitutional mechanism of the Laws is depicted as leaving little if any scope for either the formal or the informal influence of philosophical knowledge in amending the initial code of laws. Since it is not true that this idea appeared at the end as an afterthought, we are left to conclude that Plato purposefully builds his second-best state on the assumption that it does not contain the philosophical element organised as a political body, i.e. that it might lack the necessary prerequisite for its preservation in accordance with the initial design. In default of this philosophical element, the only means of its preservation would be almost absolute rigidity of the laws. Provided, on the contrary, that the required conditions — the building of an effective system of the highest studies and the election of properly educated people to the highest offices — is fulfilled, the philosophically equipped legislators would be charged with vitally important and much more considerable changes than those mentioned in the text.91

Now to the second difficulty for my proposal — that granting the NC absolute power to change the laws violates the principle of the sovereignty of the law, which is fundamental for the whole project of the second-best state.92 Here it is useful to remember Plato’s clearest statement of the relation between philosophical knowledge and the law. According to the Statesman, which was written at approximately the same time as the Laws, the best option is philosophical rule and, as far as possible, direct philosophical rule (292 b — 293 e). Since, however, it is impossible for the philosophical ruler to perform his power personally in every particular case, he will legislate (294 c 10 — 295 b 8); and when he is not present in a given particular case or is absent for a long time, the citizens should unquestioningly obey the law, enacted by him, which should be, presumably, unchangeable (295 b 10 — c 5, 297 d 5–8).93 The law, however, even if created by philosophical reason, remains imperfect in comparison with the decisions of reason itself: it is inevitably too general and thus too crude, being unable to take into account particular situations and particular persons (294 a 6 — c 9). If the true bearer of knowledge comes back, he can act in contradiction to his own law or change the law in accordance with the demands of reason (295 c 6 — 296 a 3). In the absence of the philosopher ruler and his elastic art of rule, the second-best option will thus be strict adherence to the law that has been laid down by the philosopher, without making any changes. It should be noted, however, that these op-

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91 My proposal in this respect is somewhat similar to Bobonich 2002, 395–408, but he does not use the single piece of evidence that the real constitutional powers should be granted to the NC, since he endorse Cherniss’ and Morrow’ interpretation of XII. 968 c 3–7.

92 Morrow 1960, 513. 576.

93 This is not stated directly, since the reasoning concentrates on obedience to the law, not on the right to change it, but it follows from the comparison: the expert doctor and trainer are contrasted with the absolutely unknowing persons they take care of, for whom they leave the written prescriptions. Of course, unknowing persons are even less entitled to change the prescriptions than to disobey to them.
tions are in fact two sides of the same coin: in less metaphoric language, it means the ideal of the state with laws made and changed only by philosophical reason, acting without any restrictions and abstaining from changes as long as philosophical reason is not present.

It is often assumed that at the time when he wrote the Laws, Plato was already disappointed in philosophical absolutism, either because he thought that the persons who would possess philosophical knowledge together with political power were unattainable or because he now thought that even such persons can be corrupted by unlimited power, and accordingly came to the view that the sovereign power of the law is the single attainable option (Plato’s ‘pessimism’). If this were correct, any proposal that granting to the NC (which consists of bearers of philosophical knowledge) the absolute power to change the laws would be of course untenable. However, I do not think that there are sufficient reasons to admit this shift in Plato’s views. The proponents of Plato’s later “pessimism” rightly compare the state of Magnesia to the second-best option of the Statesman, as having no philosophical rulers and living accordingly in strict obedience to the initial law. But the crucial question is whether this rigidity is now conceived as the single possible option, rather than as the condition that is inevitable in absence of the philosophical ruler, as promulgated in the Statesman. The statements in the Laws that the partial sets of regulations should stay as immovable as possible are certainly impressive, but they are explicitly opposed to the changes that would be produced by an arbitrary desire for changes, as for instance the prohibition of changes in dancing and singing (656 d-e; 816 c) or plays of children (797 a-c; 798 a-d), which might insinuate vain desires for other changes that can ultimately overturn the initial customs and laws.

On the contrary, there explicit statements, both in the peroration addressed to the nomophylakes and in the description of the NC, that the decision on changing the laws is the prerogative of those who possess philosophical knowledge without any signs that their authority in this is restricted. It thus pertinent to check whether the evidence usually used to ascribe “pessimism” about philosophical knowledge to the Laws somehow contradicts to these statements. First of all this is a passage in which the AS asserts that the person who has attained true philosophical knowledge should be placed above the law (875 c 6 — d 2). This is precisely the view of the Statesman. This passage is often taken in the opposite way, as the expression of Plato’s “pessimism”, as if it asserts that even the bearer of philosophical knowledge is liable to corruption because of unlimited power, but the proponents of

\[\text{94 See, for instance, Morrow 1960, 583; Brunt 1993, 248; Samaras 2002, 198, 293, and the scholars cited further on the ‘pessimism’ of the Laws, which is often connected with Plato’s negative experience with the holders of unrestricted power in Syracuse. Here, I cannot discuss in detail Morrow’s view (1960, 577–584), who argued that even in the Republic the philosophical rulers are bound by the law, although ‘the constraint upon them is moral, not legal’ (p. 582); Schofield 2006, 325 equally contrasts the philosophical rulers of the Republic, bound by the laws, with the absolutism of the Statesman. The evidence that is adduced proves, however, only that the Kallipolis should have laws, both written and unwritten, and that not only other citizens, but also the Guardians should obey them in their daily activities. This obedience to the laws should not, however, be confused with the sovereign power the future Guardians will possess to enact new laws (see IV. 425 d-e) and to assign other persons to the positions they hold after them (VII. 540 b), admittedly without any restraints. The only ‘restrictions’ they are bound by is Plato’s certainty, many times expressed, that the genuine bearers of philosophical knowledge would not dissent from the general principles on which the philosophical state had been founded, since they will agree with the initial founders and with each other on these principles.\]

\[\text{95 These passages are cited by Schöpsdau II, 2003, 440 in confirmation of his view that, after the trial period, the laws should be absolutely unchangeable.}\]

\[\text{96 Bobonich 2002, 264 f.}\]
this view unduly stress the first part of the passage, which is about the person who was able to grasp “through the political and true art” that it is necessary to prefer “the common interest to the partial, individual or class” interest; but in his position as autocratic ruler, this person fails to preserve this understanding because of the weakness of human nature, which yields to pleasure and ultimately makes him blind to this principle (875 b 1 — c 2). The continuation of the passage, however, indicates clearly that the person who would be able ‘to learn these things,’ viz. the necessity to take care of the common interest, should stay above the law and the constitutional order, admittedly because he will remain uncorrupted by this unrestricted power; the justification for this — that there is nothing stronger than knowledge, and the mind (nous) should not be the obedient to anything but rather the ruler of all — shows clearly that the cognitive state that the second person is able to attain is knowledge (875 c 2–6). The aforementioned autocratic ruler who is not immune to corruption thus did not attain knowledge, in spite of his intellectual progress. The crucial difference between two types of person is in the cognitive states they are able to attain. This is no different from the intellectualism of the Republic; there, the ability to attain the true knowledge depends on inborn and trained moral habits, as the process of the education of the Guardians shows, but the result that ensures no further corruption through wrong desires is nevertheless knowledge.

So far, this statement shows no “pessimism” about the force of knowledge itself in making its bearer incorruptible. But the AS says that the person who would be capable both of grasping what is useful for the state and of retaining this understanding against all challenges, can be born due to “a divine lot” (875 c 3–5), and that since this, viz. standing beyond the law due to knowledge is almost impossible, it is inevitable to prefer the second-best option, that of the domination of the law, which “looks at many things and sees them, but is incapable of looking at all” (875 d 2–3). This is understood to mean that, contrary to the stance of the Republic and the Statesman, Plato now absolutely disbelieves in the appearance of such a person. However, one should be careful about making inferences from this passage about whether such a person is possible in principle. The entire train

97 ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἰ ποτὲ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ικανὸς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθεὶς παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἰ, νόμων οὐδὲν ἀν δὲσιον τῶν ἀρξόντων ἑαυτοῦ- ἐπιστήμης γὰρ ὡς νόμος οὔτε τάξις οὐδὲ μεταλλεύεις κρείττων, οὐδὲ θέμες ἐρεῖν νοῦν οὐδένος ὑπηρέτουν οὐδὲ δοῦλον ἀλλὰ πάντων ἀρξόντα εἶναι, ἐάνπερ ἐληθικὸς εἰλιθικός τοῦ ἄντως ἢ κατὰ φύσιν παραλαβεῖν, as Schöpsdau, III, 2011, 347, rightly notices, implies learning from somebody, viz. both persons are depicted as students of philosophy: successful and unsuccessful ones.

98 Bobonich 2002, 541 n. 86 rejects the plain meaning of this text because it contradicts the passages in which, according to him, Plato pleads for the view that “even those with the sort of knowledge had by philosophers” can be corrupted by unrestricted power (he wrongly ascribes this view to Vlastos; the latter claimed only that Plato when writing the Laws stopped believing in appearance of person who might attain such a knowledge, not than he abandoned the earlier view that philosophical knowledge is the warrant against the corruption of the power, Vlastos 1981, 212, 216, and esp. 214 n. 25.). But none of the passages he cites amounts to such a statement: III. 689 b 3–5 (the human soul resists knowledge (plural), opinions and reasoning) appears to mean that the holder of genuine knowledge can act in opposition to it, but the immediately following description of these persons shows that they are intellectually developed but do not have the “harmony” without which phronesis, wisdom, is impossible (689 c 8 — d 3). The “harmony” presumably implies that their irrational desires are not educated (through music and gymnastics, as in the Republic), but the point is that they cannot attain genuine knowledge, not that this knowledge does not immunise against false desires. Two other passages, 691 c 5 — d 4; 875 d 2 f, on human nature being unable to remain uncorrupted by unrestricted power, should not be taken literally (see below).

99 νῦν δὲ οὗ γὰρ ἠστὶν οὐδὲμοι ὄντων ἀρξόντων, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ βραχύ- διόδο τὸ δεύτερον αἴρεσον, τάξιν τε καὶ νόμον, ἁ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὅρα καὶ βλέπει, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄδυνατεί.

100 Vlastos 1981, 214 n. 25.
of reasoning on two types of person is a digression made in the course of the argument that the legislator cannot prescribe all the details of criminal law; verdicts should depend on judges, who should be equal to this task. The judges thus will stand over the law “to a small degree”, since they are not philosophers and may be corrupted, viz. the prescriptions should be as detailed as possible. The reasoning is entirely adapted to the conditions of Magnesia, and it is plausible to take the statement that it is absolutely impossible to have a person who would stand above the law tout sens as applied to Magnesia: its state is created on the condition of the absence of philosophers. The earlier statement (875 a 2–4) that human nature is not capable of both knowing what is useful for the state and retaining this cognition against the temptations of unrestricted power, is also not an absolute denial of the possibility of such persons, as the following assertion about the divine lot shows — one who is capable of this should possess a nature that is higher than human. This all thus does not rule out educating future philosophers and elevating them to power in future.

Equally, Plato’s main statement on the sovereignty of the law in the dialogue (IV.713 c 1 ff) does not preclude the appearance of philosophical authority that will stand over the law itself. According to the myth of Cronus, the god in prehistoric times put divine beings, the daimones, in charge of human states, being aware that no human soul is capable of remaining devoid of injustice when ruling human affairs (IV.713 c 5 — d 2). The best possible approximation for us of this divine rule is to obey to the degree of divinity in us and to rule private and public affairs, calling the directions of the divine Mind the “law” (713 c — 714 a). The officials of the rightly constituted future state are called the servants of the law (715 d 3–6). This is often treated as the abandonment of the sovereignty of philosophical reason, as is typical of the Republic and the Statesman, in favour of the “sovereignty of the law”, viz. the written law.

This reasoning certainly provides the philosophical foundation for the absolute power of the law in Magnesia. But there is no idea, as Morrow takes it, that the power of law is therefore opposed to the power of a person in general, including that of a philosophical ruler. The primary purpose is to blame the existing political forms that are constituted in the interests of a person or a group or the majority of citizens, in negligence of the other part of the citizens; each ruler imposes the laws that correspond to his interests and tramples these laws for the sake of his insatiable desire. In opposition to these states, the state of Magnesia will be created in obedience to the divine Mind, to reason. Its citizens

101 νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς is a strong assertion, but the addition ἀλλ’ ή κατὰ βραχύ suggests that it is impossible for Magnesia, not absolutely. Schöpsdau, III 2011, 347 f. may be right that νῦν here does not have a temporal meaning (“it is now impossible”), but modal, and is employed to emphasise the reality in opposition to what would be the case in the unattainable condition (“if it would be the case, then…, but in fact…”). This, however, does not mean that this condition is unattainable in principle or categorically deny the possibility of the appearance of the philosophical rulers — it would be clearly so only if the mode of the conditional sentence on the appearance of a philosophical ruler were irrealis, not potentialis (347 f.).

102 Schöpsdau III, 2011, 347, who cites Rep. 493 a 1–2. According to the most explicit statement in the Laws, the very best state with community of property, wives and children of the ruling class (it certainly entails that class’s philosophical training), although appropriate to the gods or the children of gods (V.739 b 8 — d 8), is nevertheless an actual option that can be proposed to a possible legislator, along with the second-best and third-best constitution (V.739 a 6 — b 7). The reference to gods and demi-gods thus should not be taken literally; it designates only the virtue and knowledge that elevate their holders far above normal human nature; this is what Plato has in view when saying that it is impossible for human nature to remain uncorrupted by unrestricted power.

103 Morrow 1960, 544.
will regard the commands of the divine Mind as the law; thus the laws they will obey claim obedience to them as being impartial directions of super-human reason. They are such because they are made by philosophical reason, which understands the directions of the divine Mind. Thus there is no statement to the effect that the rule of philosophers is excluded: the reasoning only exposes once again the principles on which Magnesia is built — obedience to the written laws made by the philosopher as the projections of the divine Mind’s directions.

Thus, there is no unambiguous evidence that, when writing his last dialogue, Plato abandoned the conviction that the bearer of genuine knowledge cannot be corrupted by unrestricted power or was disillusioned about the possibility of attaining it; on the contrary, there clear signs that he still sticks to it and admits the imperfection of laws, even those based on philosophy, in comparison with the direct rule of philosophical reason. The plan of creating the NC can be thus taken as the attempt to bring the philosophical ruler back, in the sense of the Statesman. It need not be seen as the removal of the whole constitutional mechanism of the Laws. As the Statesman shows, the rule of philosophers can be implemented not as a state without laws, but as the supreme control of reason over the laws, viz. as the unrestricted power to change the laws and adjust them to a particular situation. This corresponds to what is expected from the NC, if my interpretation of its functions is correct. The NC is conceived as the primary means of salvation of the whole state mechanism and of its laws. This entails primarily the philosophical understanding of the principles on which the state has been built, its ultimate goal of virtue in its unity and the capacity to find the means of attaining this goal. The latter does not imply intervention

104 It is surprising that both Morrow, 1960, 544 and Schöpsdau II, 2003, 182 hold the view that the founded city should be named for the god, as opposed to democracy, oligarchy etc. which systems are named for their respective ruling group (713 a 2–5), is Law and that it should be called ‘the rule of the law or nomocracy’. There is no statement to the effect that the law is the god (Morrow) nor that it is the name of the god (Schöpsdau). The god after whom the city will be called is hinted at already at 713 3–4 (it is the god of those who have reason, nous) and 713 e 5 — 714 a 2 makes it clear that the only accessible way to imitate the direct rule of the god in the age of Cronus is to obey that portion of deathlessness we possess in private and public life, regarding the commandment of reason (nous) as law. It follows that the guiding principle nowadays is of course the god, not the law, and that this god is the superhuman universal reason, nous, which ruled directly in the age of Cronus through the divine rulers. One should imitate this direct rule of divine reason as far as it is accessible, viz. following the measure of divinity accessible to us; this is, of course, divine reason itself to the degree that we can attain it through philosophical knowledge (cf. Tim. 90 b–c). The commands of the laws should be obeyed accordingly to the degree that they correspond to the commands of this superhuman reason. This statement, of course, is adapted to the constitution of Magnesia with its rule of the laws written in accordance with reason, but it does not assert that the written laws are the only representatives of reason that are accessible for us. The state of Magnesia should be properly called “the state of Reason, nous”, the noocracy”, not “nomocracy”.

105 It may seem that the myth of Cronus conveys this idea, because it is said that the god was aware of human nature’s inherent, fatal incapacity to remain uncorrupted by unrestricted power and that the god accordingly assigned the daimones as the rulers of the human herds. This, however, need not mean more than that the true philosophical person stands beyond standard human nature, as is clear from the reasoning discussed above. The exception is not mentioned because the myth justifies the rule of the laws, not that of philosophers, and also because there were no philosophers in the mythic past. If that were not the case, it would be a considerable departure from the employment of the same myth in the Statesman, where the direct rule of the god under Cronus serves as a model for the authoritarian philosophical ruler. However, both versions can be read as entirely compatible, once we take into account that in the myth of the Statesman the rule of the supreme god who uses the daimones as assistants is used as the paradigm for the earthly absolute ruler, who has to delegate a part of his functions to the written laws. The Laws use the same paradigmatic image, but adapt it to the conditions of Magnesia and stress the daimones as the prototypes of the written laws.
in the daily administration of the city, and thus violating the laws as the usual practice, but rather making decisions of cardinal importance, namely control over the correspondence of the whole set of laws and of the officials with this purpose (962 b 4-c3).

I am nevertheless less certain than the 'unitarians' usually are that it was Plato’s idea when he first started writing the Laws to entrust the philosophical Guard of the state to the NC; it might be the case that originally the nomophylakes were conceived as such a body, as the reasoning in Book VI may imply. Of course it can be also the case that the demand that the nomophylakes should possess philosophical knowledge and guard the laws, does not mean that this task is assigned to the body of the nomophylakes: the statement may anticipate their role as members of the NC. But even if afterthought, the NC as it stands in the text does not contradict to the whole concept; it is appended to the whole as the indispensable means of salvation; it is anchor of the ship of the state, not a part of its daily ruling mechanism. It remains in any case true that any serious and permanent changes are entrusted to philosophers only. Without them the state should live on the rigid laws.

One may ask why Plato considered it necessary to constitute not only the philosophically educated nomophylakes, but also the body that should have powers superseding these officials. The answer is implicitly given by the statement in Book I (632 c 4 — d 1) that in order to subordinate the state to the Mind, viz. to follow the right hierarchy of goods, to esteem the “divine” as the first, viz. the virtues with wisdom as the supreme, and the ‘human’ goods, such as wealth, health, etc., as subordinate, it should have two kinds of guardians of the laws, those who possess wisdom, philosophical wisdom beyond doubt, and those who have “true opinion”: according to Plato’s standard distinction, the latter are those who are capable of right judgement of particular cases but do not have general knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Forms that provides knowledge why this is the case and that makes this knowledge unshakeable against counterarguments. The scholars often assume that the reference is to the senior and junior members of the NC, i.e. those who attained philosophical knowledge and who are still studying sciences and philosophy. This is however implausible, not because, as Sier, 2008, 292–294, argues, the junior members could not be considered to be in the stage of true opinion (they could because they are only in the process of studying philosophy), but because the junior members are not the guardians of the laws, but only assistants to them. This distinction, on the contrary, fits the official guardians, the nomophylakes; Book VI already points out that, as the heirs of the first legislators, they should possess the knowledge of the ultimate goal of the state, and the final part definitely asserts that those who would be elected to the nomophylakes and acquire the award for virtue, i.e. who are entitled to be the euthynoi, should attain the knowledge of the unity and diversity of virtue (964 b 2–6) as well as the knowledge of gods (XII. 966 c 6 — d 2). The nomophylakes should thus ideally attain full-scale philosophical knowledge, but there is no guarantee for this and no test to evaluate it: the prerequisites

106 It is often asserted that there are two foreshadowing references to the discussion of the NC in the earlier books: one of them is VII. 818 a 3, the promise of the later discussion of the “more exact education” on the motion of planets (this evidently refers to the programme of the highest studies that is discussed in Book XII in relation to the NC). But this is also an education, which the nomophylakes and the euthynoi should acquire; the second is I. 632 c 4 — d 1, on which see further in the text.

107 Susemihl 1860, 637; Bruns 1880, 196 (who treats this passage as an interpolation by the same hand that wrote the final part on the NC); Ritter 1896, 350 n.; Schöpsdau I, 1994, 188–189, with discussion; Schöpsdau III, 2011, 585.
for election to office are virtuous behaviour and philosophical education. Thus, it is not excluded that some of them will have only “true opinion”, i.e. will have morally correct judgements based on education and their natural capacities, but shakeable ones, like the judgements of the assistants to the Guardians in the Republic.108 The creation of the NC, which consists of the senior watchers of the highest officials, the oldest nomophylakes and the euthynoi, diminishes this risk of having a person only imitating knowledge and thus provides an additional guarantee that the state is entrusted to persons who have really attained knowledge that cannot be lost in challenging situations.

In the final part of the conversation, the AS hails Clinias as one who will have the reputation of the bravest person among all living if the process of creation of the NC ends with failure (969 a 7 — b 2). I would guess that the risk of the enterprise thereby hinted at is not the general risk that accompanies the difficult process of educating and promoting philosophers (the failure of which will endanger the permanence of the principles on which the state should be built, but is not risky for the reputation of its founders). Rather it is the danger, often mentioned in my previous discussion, that unlimited power would be given to seeming, not true philosophers, like the educated autocratic ruler who is corrupted because he did not attain knowledge (IX. 875 b 1 — c 2), as discussed above. The trio of legislators is ready to face these risks, thus attesting to Plato’s unhesitating faith in the attainability of true philosophers and the indispensability of doing so for integrity of the state, under the condition, as I argued, that this trio acquires constitutional powers for enforcing its judgements.

My last point is a question that has often been debated: whether the NC is conceived as the means of transforming the “second-best state” into the absolutely best. Plato, as I argued, envisages that the NC as the body that possesses philosophical knowledge should acquire real constitutional powers, not only informal authority in performing the control over the integrity of the state thus coming close to the philosophical rule of the Republic and the Statesman. Nevertheless, this does not mean that he thus plans the transformation of the second-best state into the absolutely best.109 This seems to contradict the depiction of the NC as the necessary means of the preservation of the whole system of the second-best state; there is no hint, as far as I can see, that the creation of the NC implies making the second-best state closer to the very best; rather it is the condition under which the whole system of the second-best state can be lasting. One should take into account,

108 Some scholars, most recently Sier 292–294, suppose that the reference is to the nomophylakes, but for another reason. They believe that the distinction between knowledge and true opinion corresponds to the distinction within the body of the nomophylakes: the oldest 10 members, who are members of the NC, possess philosophical knowledge, while the other have only true opinion. But there is no reason to think that the oldest nomophylakes differ from the younger in this respect — they all are philosophically educated virtuous persons aged a minimum of 50 years who, ideally, have already attained philosophical knowledge; their admission to the NC does not depend on a test of knowledge. It is incorrect that the reference cannot be to the nomophylakes, as Schöpsdau, I, 1994, 188–189, argues; he thinks that this passage means that these guardians should be installed only after the completion of all legislation, whereas the nomophylakes should be elected immediately after the foundation of the colony. In fact, the whole piece 631 b 3 — 632 d 1 describes the logic of ideal legislation (which broadly corresponds to the discussion of the dialogue), not the sequence of the imaginary foundation of the colony; 632 c 1–4 indicates only that the guardians should be created for all the laws, not when this should be done.

109 This was the main point of Zaicev’s paper; F. Lisi (1998, 102–103) defends the similar view that Plato envisages the transformation of the state of the Laws into the very best state by educating philosophers and giving them, as the NC, supreme power in the state.
moreover, that the absolutely best state entails, as the Laws succinctly formulates, not only philosophical rulers, but also community of property, wives and children among it, as well as other provisions (V.739 b 8 — c 5, cf. VII.807 b 2–7). Only under these conditions can the integrity of the ruling class be preserved in the long run, if not perpetually. The institution of the philosophical council with superior prerogatives maintained by law shows that, in one respect, the second-best state is closer to the very best one, but not that Plato recommended the complete transforming of the state of Magnesia into that of Kallipolis.\footnote{I am grateful to Mitch Cohen (Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin) for very helpful language corrections.}

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В статье рассматривается проблема формирования и функций Ночного совета (НС) в платоновских «Законах». Автор доказывает, полемизируя с преобладающей в настоящее время интерпретацией Г. Морроу, согласно которой НС занял научными и философскими занятиями, а также преподаванием, и обладает высшим знанием в области законов, но не обладает официальными прерогativas и действует неформально, через своих членов — десять старейшин: 1) в тексте нет прямых или косвенных указаний, что НС в совокупности заняты научными и преподаванием: эта роль отводится специальной коллегии, которая создается согласно указаний, что НС в совокупности заняты научными и преподаванием, и обладает в этом случае, если эти должности будут заниматься людьми, добро-
добродетели которых будут упрочены философским знанием; 2) спорный пассаж 968 с 2–7 указывает не только на закон, который будет определить научные и философские занятия высшего порядка (как понимал Чернисс и Морроу), но и на закон, который определяет официальные прерогativas НС; 3) эти прерогativas идентичны тем, что предоставляются НС в качестве философского строя государства (968 с 4 — b 2), который должен обеспечить соответствие законов и должностных лиц неизменной цели государства, добродетели; соответствующие прерогativas НС включают право изменять законы, а также накладывать вето на избрание на высшие должности евтинов и номо-
филаков лиц, добродетели которых не опираются на философское знание. Кажущееся противоречие с предыдущими установлениями, которые допускают лишь минимальные изменения в законах и передают законодательные функции номофилакам, разрешится, если принять во внимание, что НС не является частью конституционного механизма в обычном смысле, но особым средством, которое обеспечивает следование его тем философским принципам, на которых оно было построено. Его появление необходимо, но не безусловно возможно. При отсутствии подобного института государство Магнесии должно блюсти изначальный свод законов со всей возможной строгостью, но будет, несмотря на это, подвержено нравственной порче.

Ключевые слова: Платон, «Законы», Ночной совет, политическая теория.

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THE CHILDREN OF MNEMOSYNE:
A CONTRASTIVE METAPOETICS OF PINDAR AND BACCHYLIDES

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The article investigates the uses to which the figures of the Muse(s) are put in the poetics of Pindar and Bacchylides, considered against the background of their earlier employments in elegiac and melic poetry. Based on a thorough examination of the evidence, it argues that the two poets pursue different strategies: whereas Bacchylides develops a poetic mythology of named Muses (particularly, Ourania), Pindar redeploy the single unnamed Muse of the earlier hexameter and choral traditions, envisioning her as the poet’s collaborator. Pindar may thus be seen to originate the notion of the Muse as a deity associated with poetic composition, as contrasted with her mnemonic-epistemic role in hexameter verse.

Keywords: Archaic Greek lyric, epinikion, metapoetics, authorship, the Muses, Pindar.

The epinikion is unique among Archaic Greek melic genres in that it is represented, for us, by two sizable contemporary corpora. In this regard, epinikion can be compared to Attic tragedy and the “Homeric” corpus of dactylic hexameter poetry; in the latter two cases, intensive comparative work has yielded profound insights into both the poetics of particular texts and, more generally, the evolution of the literary system in Ancient Greece. Much less work has been done on a contrastive poetics of epinikion. Since the discovery of the papyrus containing the work of Bacchylides in 1896, the tendency has been to view him as a “lesser” Pindar, similar in many respects, but not as challenging, forceful or original. In fact, a systematic juxtaposition of the poetics of Bacchylides and Pindar, considered irrespective of their relative “aesthetic” value, could tell us much about the constitution of professional poetic self-consciousness at a crucial moment of transition from the Archaic period, largely dominated by the poetics of genre, to the Classical period, when authors — ranging from Aristophanes to Thucydides — were pursuing self-consciously individual projects. Significant divergences between the two epinician poets permit us to assess the areas and the extent of their individual innovation or traditionalism. The evidence of metapoetics — the manner and fashion in which texts refer to their own composition or performance — is particularly valuable for analyzing the emergent qualities of the literary. As I will argue, the metapoetics of the Muses indicates an effort,
by both poets, to develop distinctive strategies of “branding” their texts not only as specially composed for the occasion, but also as uniquely produced by a particular author. In particular, what accounts for the rise of individuating metapoetic markers is the exigency of choral (re)performance of epinikia that made the employment of author’s name in a σφραγίς, as in the opening of the Theognidea, impracticable. In this respect, the late Archaic genre of the victory ode, in which the constraints of a traditional medium and collective performance practice encountered a highly innovative artistic culture, presents what is perhaps the most telling evidence of a poetics caught in a moment of transformation. Before turning to a close examination of the victory ode, however, it will be necessary to survey the appearances of the Muses in earlier elegiac and melic poets.4

The Muse(s) in melic and elegiac poetry

Composers of elegiac verse, not unexpectedly, appear to be particularly dependent on uses that derive from the hexametric tradition. Notably, in the entire body of Greek elegiacs, the Muse appears in the singular only once: in a parody of an epic invocation in Hipponax fr. 128 W, which uses the form Mousa VOC + ἔννεπε + PN (familiar from the Odyssey), yet with an appended ὅπως-clause that is usually rendered “how he may die a wretched death … on the shore of the barren sea.”5 While idiosyncratic from the syntactic point of view, the passage reflects the original use of ἐν(ν)έπειν with an object clause. As for appearances of the Muses in the plural, they fall into two categories. First, we find two appeals to the Muses: Solon fr. 13 W (which includes a notably broad request to bestow on the speaker ‘prosperity’ coming from the gods), and Theognis 1.15 W, where the Muses and the Kharites, singing together at Kadmos’s marriage, utter the maxim “what is beautiful is agreeable, what is not beautiful is not agreeable” (ὅτι καλὸν φίλον ἐστί, τὸ δ’ οὐ καλὸν οὐ φιλὸν ἐστί). While no definite conclusions can be drawn based on just two instances of usage, these may point to an older stratum in the representation of the Muses as potent divinities whose domain was not limited to verbal art and musical performance.6

4 The present work builds on Maslov 2016, which discusses the metapoetics of the Muses in the corpus of dactylic hexameter poetry as well as in early choral lyric. Types of usage — “the clear-voiced Muse,” “the prooimial Muse” — that will be referred to throughout this article are introduced in this earlier publication.
5 Μοῦσα μοι ἕως ὑμεθ' ὑμεθ' ἐν ἔνεπεν στὶς τὴν ποντοχρῆβιν, / τὴν ἐνγαστριμαχαραν, ὡς ἐσθὲι ὦ κατὰ κόσμον, /ἔννεφ' ὅπως σφιθρὴν < > κακὸν οἶτον ὀλεῖται. This poem was quoted by Polemon of Ilium (apud Athenaeum 698b) in demonstration of the thesis that Hipponax invented parody. Faraone 2004 translates ὅπως as introducing a purpose clause “in order that he may die,” arguing that the Hipponax fragment is not an epic parody, but a hexametrical incantation directed at a would-be pharmakos represented as a famine demon. Faraone acknowledges that the invocation of the Muse presents the most serious impediment to his argument, but proposes to translate the opening request as “Muse, identify the son of Eurumedon as the Sea-Monster etc.” (taking ἐν(ν)έπειν to mean ‘call, identify’). This, to my mind, unlikely, since the reference to the Muse, in combination with ἐν(ν)έπειν, must still be a (parodic) echo of a prooimial convention. Faraone’s alternative explanation — “it is sublimely fitting that a master of iambos should call upon his Muse” — is not supported by any parallels in iambic poets and, moreover, can be argued to be anachronistic: the poet’s Muse (sing.), insofar as we can tell, does not predate Pindar. On the other hand, a parody of an epic diegetic device may not be out of place in a text that, as Faraone demonstrates, stages a pharmakos ritual. Faraone points out that Hipponax’s use of the patronymic “son of the One-Who-Rules-Widely” identifies the pharmakos as an aristocrat, and there was “a tradition in scapegoat myths of connecting famine or plague with the insatiable greed of a young prince or aristocrat” (2004, 226). What appears to be an innocuous literary parody may be viewed as an important testimony to a sociopolitical dimension in the early reception of Homeric epic.

The second, apparently more recent category comprises references to the Muses as a metonym for poetic activity broadly conceived.⁷ An especially common collocation is δῶρον / δῶρα 'gifts of, things provided by' with the genitive plural Μουσέων (Μουσῶν),⁸ which, contrary to modern intuitions, does not refer to an innate gift of poetic composition, but rather to mousikē in general, i.e. music, song, and — in the case of recited verse — any kind of verbal art that employs meter.

By the same token, the association with the Muses becomes a means of referring to a specialist in poetic craft. Uniquely within the elegiac corpus, Theognis declares that “an attendant and messenger of the Muses” should not be over-eager in sharing his knowledge with the uninitiated (Μουσῶν θεράποντα καὶ ἄγγελον Theognis 1.769–772 W; cf. Hes. Theog. 100). Similar expressions will recur in Bacchylides.

In the scarce remains of solo melic poetry, the Muses appear several times in the vocative plural, in conjunction with the Kharites.⁹ The usage in Sappho (frr. 103, 128; cf. 127 LP) is an archaisrn in that it retains the older meaning of the Muses as a choral group.¹⁰ Yet there are also instances of metonymic expansion: in Sappho fr. 55 LP, we find an allusive reference to “roses from Pieria” of which the speaker claims a share; in Anacreon, fr. 346 PMG (frr. 11+3+6, lines 8–9) one encounters the familiar collocation δώρα Πιερίδων.¹¹ In Stesichorus’s fr. 210, reconstructed on the basis of a quotation in Aristophanes (Pax 775), an appeal to a single Muse may represent an independent reflex of the earlier choral convention of invoking the “clear-voiced Muse”; given an overt rejection of the topic of war, it may also be a parody of the “prooimial Muse” of the later Greek epic.¹²

It appears that, direct references to Homer aside, Archaic poets working in elegiac and melic media do not participate in the semantic developments that the metapoetics of the Muses undergoes in dactylic hexameter poetry (Maslov 2016). In addition to retaining the notion of the Muses as a choral group, this subcorpus shows an independent metonymic development ‘singing-and-dancing collective of the Muses’ > ‘the art of poetry/music’ (mousikē); later on, this term would develop an even broader metonymic meaning ‘intellectual life, culture’, equivalent to Latin humanitas.¹³ Keeping in mind the risks of re-

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⁷ For the same semantic development, cf. the use of Ἀφροδίτη or Κύπρις for what is more commonly described as ἔργα Ἀφροδίτης.

⁸ Already in Alcman fr. 59b PMG. Later examples: Arch. fr. 1.2 W (Μουσέων ἔρατον δώρον ἐπιστάμενος); Arch. fr. 328 W (Μουσῶν καὶ βιοὺς σαφέροντος); Solon fr. 13.51 W (Ὀλυμπιάδων Μουσέων πάρα δώρα διδαξθέιν); Solon fr. 26.2 W (ἔργα δὲ Κυρηνοῦς νῦν μοι φίλα καὶ Διονύσου καὶ Μουσῶν); Theogn. 1.250 (ἀγλαὰ Μουσάων δώρα ἰοστεφάνων); Theogn. 1.1056 (Μουσῶν μνησόμεθ’ ἀμφότεροι. / αὕται γάρ τάδ’ ἐδώκαν ἔχειν κεχαρισμένα δώρα).

⁹ One example of the word μοῦσα in the accusative singular is in Alcaeus 304, where the fragment provides no context; the meaning ‘poem’ is possible. Ibycus fr. 282.23–30 PMG includes a rehearsal of the beginning of the Catalogue of Ships: here we are dealing with a highly self-conscious sequence of allusions to Ἰλ. 2.484ff., as well as the Nautilia portion of Hesiod’s Works and Days (see Steiner 2005 with further bibliography). I quote Campbell’s text (1982–1993, 3, 222): καὶ τὰ μὲ[ν ἂν] Μοίσαι σεσοφισμέναι / Ἑλικω[νίδες] ἐμβαίεν λόγω[ι· / ἁθατό[ς] δ’ οὔ κεν ἀνὴρ / διερὸς [……] οὗτοι ἔκαστος / ναῶν ὅσσος ἀριθμὸς ἀπ’ Αὐλίδος / Αἰγαῖον διὰ [πό]τις ἀνὸς ἀργαῖος / ἡλύθοιν [ν ἀργαῖον] / ἐπιστρέφον[ν].

¹⁰ An extensive argument for the original chorality of the Muses is presented in (Maslov 2016).


¹³ On the later broadening of the sphere of the Muses’ influence, see Curtius 1953, 228–246, who cites Cicero’s ”cum Musis, id est, cum humanitate et doctrina” (Tusc. 5.23, 66); cf. (Otto 1955, 36–9, 68).
lying on negative evidence, it is significant that in these texts the Muse is never associated with poetic inspiration or composition.

**Bacchylidean Muses**

In both Pindar and Bacchylides, the Muse(s) are highly prominent, and both display conservative as well as innovative features in the uses to which they put these figures. In view of how little of earlier choral lyric survives, innovations often have to be speculatively deduced from differences between the two poets. On the other hand, a comparative analysis of the appearances of the Muse(s) in Pindar and Bacchylides is of great aid for understanding Pindar’s distinctive contribution to the metapoetic apparatus that was inherited by the later tradition. This two-fold goal calls for detailed discussion of the relevant usage in both poets. I begin with Bacchylides’s corpus, which, due to its smaller size,14 can serve as a testing ground for the investigation of the Pindaric usage. An overview of the evidence is presented in Table 1. Out of 30 total instances, there are 4 examples of the Muse in the singular, 16 of the Muses in the plural, 10 mentions of three particular Muses by name (all in the singular), in particular Ourania (4), Kleiō (4), and Kalliopa (1).

**Table 1: Muse(s) in Bacchylides (30 total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SINGULAR (Mousa)</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>voc.</th>
<th>DF 1 (diegetic frame deriving from catalogue poetry)15</th>
<th>15.47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 nom.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(generic) ‘musical performance, song’</td>
<td>2.11, 3.92, 21.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLURAL (Mousai, Moisai, Pierides)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>nom., voc., acc., dat., nom./voc.</td>
<td>choral divinities</td>
<td>1.1–7, 13.189, 19.35–6, 28.9, 65.13–14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>= (met.) mousikē (“gifts/adornment/etc. of…”); ‘poet’s competence’ (2)</td>
<td>3.71, 5.4, 9.87, 10.11, 20b4, 20c3; 19.3, 55.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>“servant etc. of…” = ‘poet’</td>
<td>5.193, 9.3, 63.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMED (Ourania 4, Kleiō 4, Kalliopa 2)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6 voc., 2 nom., 1 gen.</td>
<td>modifications of the prooimial Muse [Ourania 2, Kleiō 3, Kalliopa 1]</td>
<td>6.10, 16.3, 3.3; 12.2, 13.195; 5.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(met.) “honor from…” [Kalliopa]</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>“servant etc. of…” [Ourania]</td>
<td>4.8, 5.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 nom.</td>
<td></td>
<td>? no context [Kleiō]</td>
<td>12.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grammatical case in which the Muse(s) appear can give us important indications about diachronically distinct patterns of usage,17 some of which recur in Pindar. The absolute majority of examples in Bacchylides are in the nominative (the Muse(s) as the agent), genitive (the Muses as an attribute), and vocative (Muse(s) addressed). Practically

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14 The corpus of Bacchylides includes 11,171 words, including dubia (vs. 31,052 words in Pindar). Data is based on Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, whose text is based on Irigoin 1993 for Bacchylides, Snell and Maehler 1987, 1989 for Pindar.

15 DF is short for “diegetic frame.” The abbreviations — DF 1 (catalogue poetry) and DF 2 (“the clear-voiced Muse”) — used in the Tables are explained in (Maslov 2016).

16 Form without iota printed metri gratia in 3.3 (papyrus reads KAEIOI).

17 Restrictions on case usage can provide important information on the history of concepts. To give an example from a different historical period: in Machiavelli’s Italian, lo stato ’state’ is generally used in the accusative, and only very rarely in the nominative, because, in contrast to later political theory, it cannot as yet be thought of as an agent of action (Hexter 1973, 187–8). A similar disproportion in case usage has been observed for Latin res publica (Stark 1937, esp. 35).
all of the genitive uses are to be explained by the kind of metonymic expansion observed in elegy and solo melic poetry, which equates the Muses with the 'domain of mousikē' (this usage accounts for about half of all instances: 14 out of 29). Nevertheless, a shift in emphasis may be detected in what phenomena Bacchylides assigns to that domain.

First, Bacchylides uses the attributive genitive of the Muses (or of a name of a particular Muse) five times to create an ad-hoc meaning 'specialist in poetic craft' and (possibly) 'performer': Bacchylides's speaker refers to Hesiod as an "attendant of the Muses" (πρόπολος Μουσῶν 5.193) and to himself as a "divine spokesman of the violet-eyed Muses" (Μουσῶν γε ιοβλεφάρων θείος προφ[ά]τας 9.3) and a "sweet-singing rooster of Ourania of the lordly φόρμιγξ" (ἄδειτης ᾧ[ναξφόρ]μιγγος Οὐρ[ανί]ας ἀλέκτωρ 4.8), as well as a "famous [or: new?] attendant of golden-frontletted Ourania" (χρυσάμπυκος Οὐρανίας κλεινός [καινὸς?] θεράπων 5.13; cf. also: [Πιερ]ίδων θεράπων 63.1). In the last passage, the reference is unmistakably to the poet Bacchylides, which suggests that other instances also refer to the composer of the text, not its performer.

The redeployment of this construction to describe the poet is a distinctive feature of Bacchylidean metapoetics. The nouns used are in part traditional — θεράπων, πρόπολος (cf. Hes. Theog. 100, Theogn. 1.769: Μουσῶν θεράποντα καὶ ἄγγελον) — and in part unexpected, such as ἀλέκτωρ "rooster". The use of προφάτας to refer to the poet can be paralleled in Pindar18; it has no mantic connotations and is equivalent to ἄγγελος 'messenger' in Theognis 1.769.

The general idea of Theognis 1.769–772 — poetic σοφία is not something that is or should be shared indiscriminately — recurs in Bacchylides's fr. 55, where the familiar collocation “the gifts of the Muses” has a more restricted meaning: the gift given by the Muses to the poet. The same shift in meaning can be observed in Bacchylides 19 (Dith. 5).1–14, where the Athenian chorus seems to address the poet as the “much-praised Cean toiling mind (εὐαίνετε Κη[νία μέριμνα).” After stating that the one who “has obtained [λαχοῖσαν] the gifts of the Pierian Muses” can travel “a myriad of roads of immortal songs” (μυρία κέλευθος ἀμβροσίων μελέων), the chorus urges the addressee “to take the best road, the one that has obtained [λαχοῖσαν] the foremost honor from Kalliopa.” The poet now lays a claim to an intimate, personal relationship with the deity.19 More specifically, in this passage, the mastery of the poet is expressed by the topos of ἀφθονία ‘abundance’ or εὐπορία, which is also quite prominent in Pindar.20

18 Of the poet: Pa. 6.6. The morphologically transparent etymological meaning of the word in the Archaic period is ‘one who speaks out’; in N.9.50 Pindar uses it of a mixing bowl which “proclaims” the celebration. Elsewhere, he applies it to ταύντες who announce the gods’ will (Teiresias, Teneros, and Amphiareus) and in fr. 150 Pindar boldly puts the speaker in the position of a spokesman of the prophesying Muse. Fuller discussion in Maslov 2015, 188–201.

19 Contrast Archilochus (fr. 1 W), whose speaker deems himself “an attendant of the lord Enualios, skilled in the lovely gift of the Muses’ (ἐμι δ’ ἐγώ θεράτων μὲν Ἐνυαλίου ἄνακτος καὶ Μουσέων ἐράτων δῶρον ἐποτήμενος): the speaker did not receive a special gift, but rather claims expertise in the domain of the Muses. It is also worth pointing to the Aeolic form of the participle λαχοῖσαν — an unicium in Bacchylides, who otherwise uses only Ionic dialect participial forms (Verdier 1972, 49) — which here seems to lend a lofty air to the metapoetic statement.

20 In Greek, εὐπορία ‘resourcefulness’ is the opposite of ἀπορία. While Pindar does not use this word, it has already been applied to his poetics (Kurke 1988, 113; cf. Miller 1979, 184–5 on the topos of εὐπορία in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo). This idea may have originated in the notion of the Muses as agents of divine omniscience, as they figure in catalogue poetry. Yet whereas in the Iliad the Muses serve as a source of narrative detail to an otherwise incapable narrator, in Bacchylides and Pindar they guarantee availability of a variety of poetic resources from which the poet can freely choose. The linkage of poetic vocation and
A further peculiarity of the Bacchylidean usage consists in his fondness for individual Muses, and in particular for Ourania, whose prominence in Bacchylides in not matched by any other poet (Pindar never even mentions Ourania). While it is not clear why Bacchylides favored Ourania, what seems certain is that frequent mentions of this figure were intended as markers of the Bacchylidean poetic brand.

Given the prominence of particular Muses in Bacchylides, the relative dearth of references to the single unnamed Muse is worth our attention. The only instance of vocative use is a reminiscence of the metapoetic frame associated with catalogue sections in Homer, with the singular Muse substituted for the plural Muses (for the substitution cf. already II. 2.761): “Muse, who was the first to begin the righteous words?” (Μοῦσα, τίς πρῶτος λόγων ἀρχεν δικαίων; 15[Dith. 1].47). As in the case of Ibycus fr. 282 PMG, this reflex is in all likelihood mediated by the Iliad. The three other uses represent the generic employment of the noun μοῦσα to refer to ‘musical performance, song’: “sweet Muse” (Μοῦσά τε γλυκεῖα) is mentioned along with “sweet wine in Boiotian cups” (καὶ Βοιωτίοισιν ἐν σκύφοισιν οἶνος ἡδύς fr. 21.4), the Muse — in this case, referring to remembrance through musical performance is said to nourish “the light of accomplishment” (ἀρετᾶς … φέγγος 3.92); finally, there is “the Muse born on the spot” — i.e. song performed at the site of the victory (Μοῦσ’ αὐθιγενής 2.11; on this epinikian sub-genre, see Gelzer 1985). Bacchylidean usage thus offers further support to the argument (advanced in Maslov 2016) that the solitary Muse (without appellative) is a result of later semantic development and cannot be claimed to have predated the Muses as a dancing-and-singing collective.

It is significant that the widest distribution of grammatical cases — i.e. of different syntactic, as well as semantic, functions — is attested for the plural Muses. They carry traditional epithets describing their appearance (ἐρασιπλοκ 28.9, χρυσὰμπυκες 65.13–14, φοινικοκραδέμνοις 13.189), in contrast to the adjectives with abstract meaning ‘sweet’ and ‘born on the spot’ in the case of the single Muse. Similar kind of distribution is found in Pindar, again pointing to the primacy of the choral Muses. Two further examples of the plural Muses represent likely survivals of pre-epic usage. Bacchylides’s Epinikion 1 begins with a cultic appeal to the Pierian maidens to come and praise Poseidon (the patron deity of the Isthmian festival), and 19(Dith. 5).35 refers to the ability of the Pieridai to provide “a respite from grief.” While the former points to the original choral aspect of the Muses, the latter may be either an allusion to Theogony 98–103 or (more likely) a reflection of a broader set of beliefs about the healing (epaoidic) capacity of the Muses.

It is noteworthy that Bacchylides never (and Pindar only rarely) employs the prooimial “clear-voiced Muse” that was prominent both in the early choral poets and in the more recent hexameter corpus.²¹ This metapoetic device, a common feature of poetic culture of the seventh-sixth centuries, apparently became outdated by the time of Bacchylides and

²¹ The dactylic hexameter corpus, as it is here construed, encompasses the Homeric Hymns, which display a diachronically stratifiable set of metapoetic patterns, some of which predate the Odyssey proem, as well as attest to the influence of the early choral appeal to Μοῦσα λίγεα. Complete list of occurrences of this collocation: Od. 24.62, Hes. Scutum 206, Hom. Hymn to Mother of the Gods 2, Hom. Hymn to Dioscuri 1, to Hephaistos 1, Alcman 14a1, 28.1.1 (adverb λίγ'), cf. also fr. 30.1 PMG, Pind. Pai. 14.32, Stes. 63.1, 101.1 PMG; it is also a likely supplement for a lacuna in Sappho 44.22 LP.
Pindar. For these poets, moreover, the prooimial Muse was more closely associated with recited epic than with early choral lyricists, as the rhapsodes’ success placed hexameter poetry — first and foremost, the Homeric corpus — at the center of the late Archaic literary system. This renders the task of disentangling the influences of choral and hexametrical conventions in Bacchylides and Pindar particularly challenging. Nevertheless, it is precisely the prooimial Muse — the Muse whose involvement was thought to be essential to any exercise in *mousikē* and who is therefore so often invoked in the beginning of the text — that forms the basis for the emergence of the Muse as a goddess of poetic inspiration. Bacchylides and Pindar both testify to the crucial early phase of this development.

Bacchylides twice begins an epinikion with an appeal to Kleiō, whose general association in Archaic Greece must have been with κλέος ‘fame’ (in later allegoresis, she became the Muse of History). While the idea of poetic praise bestowing κλέος goes back to a shared Indo-European tradition, Bacchylides’s reference point may be more specific. He prefers the Ionic form Κλειώ (Pindar has Κλεώ), attested in *Theogony* 77, which in itself is not surprising in light of Bacchylides’s Ionizing dialect. Yet it is significant that Bacchylides seems to reserve Kleiō for opening apostrophes, whereas Ourania never stands in the vocative, even where she seems to stand in for the prooimial Muse as a diegetic framing device: in 16.3 the speaker claims that “Ourania sent for me from Pieria a cargo ship loaded with hymns” (ὁλκάδι ἔπεμψεν ἐμοὶ χρυσέαν ἑπόθρονος Ὀὐρανία) and in 6.10–14 we are told that “the hymn of Ourania is honoring” the son of Aristomenos “on account of his victory” (Οὐρανίας ὤμος ἐκατ Νίκας … γεράτε). In the latter example “the hymn of Ourania” should be construed as a periphrasis for ‘Bacchylides’s poem’, given the poet’s use of this Muse as a branding device.

It is thus conceivable that the key association of Kleiō was with κλέα ἀνδρῶν, lit. ‘fames of men’ celebrated by epic poetry. This would explain why Bacchylides employs Kleiō as an analogue of the prooimial Muse (placed in the vocative) of poetry written in dactylic hexameter. Whereas in the case of Ourania what is emphasized is the notion of εὐπορία, Kleiō has a more restricted, conventional role. In *Epinikion* 3, commissioned by Hiero of Syracuse, she is addressed in a characteristically hymnic fashion, except that Bacchylides mixes immortal and mortal objects of praise: “Kleiō of sweet gifts, hymn Demeter who reigns in Sicily of the best grain, and the violet-crowned Kore [Persephone] and the swift Olympian-running horses of Hieron” (Ἀριστο[κ]άρπου Σικελίας κρέουσαν Δ[ά]ματα ἰοστέφανόν τε Κούραν ἕκατι Νίκας … γεράτε). In the opening of another epinikion, Kleiō “who lords over hymns” (ψυνόνασσ’) is asked to guide straight “our minds” (φρένας ἀμετέρας) as a wise steersman would, “if ever she did that before” (εἰ δή ποτε καὶ πάρος 12.2). From the viewpoint of the function of the diegetic device, this address is equivalent to the prayer “to begin a hymn,” but the addition of a *da-guia-dedisti* formula signals that Kleiō and the poet have a long-standing personal relationship. Finally, Kleiō’s name can be discerned in the beginning of another epinikion (13.9), but the papyrus provides no context for it; Bacchylides took up the opening address in the closure of the poem: “if it was indeed the bloom-giving Kleiō who has dipped it [χάρις ‘grace’ of the poet’s relationship with the victor’s father] in my mind, songs that have words of delight will herald him to all the people”

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Another modification of the prooimial Muse, familiar from Pindar, is uniquely represented in Bacchylides in 5.176. The myth is interrupted by an appeal to Kalliopa: "White-armed Kalliopa, stop your well-made chariot here" (λευκώλενε Καλλιόπα, στᾶσον εὐποίητον ἄρμα αὐτοῦ). Yet what appeared to be a break-off motif is immediately converted into a prooimial device, for the text continues, as if it is only starting, with an imperative: "Hymn Zeus, son of Kronos, the Olympian chief of the gods, Alpheus of untiring flow, the strength of Pelops, and Pisa, where the famous Pherenikos [Victory-Bringer, name of Hieron’s horse] has won bringing to well-towered Syracuse to Hieron a leaf of good fortune" (Δία τε Κρονίδαν ὕμνησον Ὀλύμπιον ἀρχαγὸν θεῶν, τόν τ’ ἀκαμαντορόαν Ἀλφεόν, Πέλοπός τε βίαν, καὶ Πίσαν, ἔνθ’ ὁ κλεεννὸς ὑπὸ σοι νικάσας δρόμωι ἔλθεν Φερένικος ἐς εὐπύργους Συρακόσσας Ἱέρωνι φέρων [εὐδαιμονίας πέταλον]). Bacchylides is here using the same strategy of sneaking in a mortal addressee (a tyrant with the ambition of receiving posthumous cult-honors) into the list of deities.

To sum up, Bacchylides put the mythology of the Muse(s) to a very particular use: the conceptualization of a specialist in mousikē as someone who enjoys a personal partnership with the divine. The Muses — and particularly, the solitary Muse (or individual, named Muses) — proved particularly serviceable figures for the somewhat paradoxical project of developing individuated choral poetics. Although they have Homer as testimony for their claim to be Olympian deities and are broadly associated with χορεία, they are only marginally significant to Greek cult and therefore are more readily available for (meta) poetic appropriation.

In the post-Simonidean age, which saw the rise of an inter-polis market of mousikē linked to Pan-Hellenic centers and such institutions as athletic games and polis-sponsored collective θεωρίαι, poets found themselves competing over commissions. Self-promotion became an essential element of their metapoetics, which called for a distinct notion of poet-composer (as opposed to performer) that had to be signaled in a choral medium. The major strategy used by Bacchylides and Pindar to solve this task was to redeploy the Muses, minor deities originally associated with folk collective song-and-dance, which they sought to tie to their highly individual poetic programs.

Pindar and the invention of the poet’s Muse

As in the case of Bacchylides, the exercise in diachronic stratification will prove indispensible for understanding both Pindar’s general metapoetic strategies and formal choices made in particular texts. Out of the total of 71 references to the Muse(s) in the Pindaric corpus, 25 are to the singular Muse, 42 to the Muses in the plural, and only 4 to single Muses provided with an appellative. The data is summarized in Table 2.

To facilitate comparison with the evidence of Bacchylides, I also present a comparative chart with the most important figures (for each of the two poets, the total number of instances of each type is coupled with percent out of total number of uses in the corpus):

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23 Excluded: O. 2.27a (later addition, del. metri causa by Aristophanes of Byzantium); Dub.334.3 (no context; unclear whether singular or plural); P.1.12/P.1.14, I. 8.57/I. 8.60, and Pai. 7b.15/Pai. 7b.19 counted each as one instance.
Table 2: The Muses in the corpora of Bacchylides and Pindar: a synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bacchylides</th>
<th>Pindar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Word count</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epin. 4000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Epin. 21946</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dith. 1348</td>
<td></td>
<td>Olymp. 6102</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dith. frag. 3590</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pyth. 7719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alia 2233</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nem. 5119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>11171</td>
<td>31052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>freq. of Muses (relative to total word count)</strong></td>
<td>0.268 %</td>
<td>0.228 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muses (instances / %)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generic</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>non-gen.</td>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>freq. of Muses (relative to total word count)</strong></td>
<td>0.268 %</td>
<td>0.228 %</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SING.</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>freq. of Muses (relative to total word count)</strong></td>
<td>0.268 %</td>
<td>0.228 %</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PLUR.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>freq. of Muses (relative to total word count)</strong></td>
<td>0.300 %</td>
<td>0.285 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAMED</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>freq. of Muses (relative to total word count)</strong></td>
<td>0.116 %</td>
<td>0.056 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First of all, it should be noted that the difference in overall frequency of references to the Muses in Bacchylides and Pindar (0.268 % vs. 0.228 %) is not statistically significant, which suggests that their usage, at a very basic level, reflects a common feature of choral lyric at the time: on average, every 500 words one expects an encounter with a Muse. Turning to specific kinds of such encounters, the most obvious difference concerns Bacchylides’s fondness for individually named Muses (33.3 % vs. 5.6 % in Pindar), which is balanced by a striking expansion of non-generic uses of the solitary Muse in Pindar (19.7 % vs. 3.3 % in Bacchylides). Whereas the single instance of the non-generic Muse in Bacchylides (15.47) is entirely derivative from the conventions of catalogue poetry (DF 1), in Pindar the Muse is repeatedly referred to as an agent who shares the poet’s effort in the composition of the text. It is thus very likely that “the Muse” construed as a goddess intimately involved in the poet’s work — a figure of paramount importance for later European literature — is a Pindaric invention. Although careful observation of this figure in Pindar reveals older patterns of behavior, particularly that of the prooimial Muse, her ubiquity in the corpus projects an image that is quite different from that found in Alcman or in the Homeric prooimia.

On the other hand, there are no discernible quantitative differences between Pindar and Bacchylides in their references to the Muses in the plural. The metonymic employment — this category subsumes the numerous attributive uses which approximate the use of the adjective Μουσαῖος in Pindar — was clearly an inherited element of the poetic language, shared by Bacchylides and Pindar (note the identical percentage of total occurrences: 36.6 %). Yet a closer look at the evidence reveals a curious divergence. Whereas Bacchylides repeatedly describes the specialist in poetic craft (and principally, himself) by using set collocations of the type “servant of the Muses” (4.8, 5.13, 5.193, 9.3, 63.1), Pindar tends both to vary such expressions and to apply them more broadly. In particular, he is

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24 The probability that the difference is determined by chance is in this case 46 % (for a difference to be considered statistically significant one expects this probability to be below 5 %).
clearly reluctant to describe himself in this way, particularly in the epinikia. In *Olympian* 6.91, Aineas, the chorus master (and Pindar’s representative) in Syracuse, is described by a unique expression “message stick of the Muses of lovely hair” (ηὺκόμον σκυτόλα Μοισάν) and in *Isthmian* 9.8 the Aiginetans are praised as “wise stewards of the Muses and agonistic contests” (ταμίαι τε σοφοί Μοισάν ἀγωνίων τ’ ἀεθλῶν). A generalized reference to poets as “ploughmen of the Pieridai” (Πιερίδων ἀγόραται) is found in *Nemean* 6.32. The declaration in *Pai. 6.6* — where the speaker deems himself “a spokesman of the Pieridai” (ἀοίδιμον Πιερίδων προφάταν) — is therefore quite exceptional.

I believe that Pindar’s avoidance of the traditional means of designating a specialist in poetic craft in the epinikia is in part due to his cultivation of a malleable, inclusive speaking persona, which very often encompasses the singing chorus (cf. Maslov 2015, 105–115). In this respect, *Paian*. 6.6 presents an exception, which probably has to be explained by the more conventional shaping of the ἐγώ in the Paian and in non-epinician genres more broadly.

Pindar is also far less likely than Bacchylides to use traditional appellatives of the Muses. Compared to Bacchylides’s rather idiosyncratic employment of the figures of Kleio and Ourania, Pindaric usage is occasional and easy to explain. The mention of Kalliopa in the list of the traditional virtues of the Epizephyrian Lokrians, where one would expect the generic Muse, is not that surprising, seeing that Kalliopa is interchangeable with the generic singular in the earlier poetic tradition. The appearance of Terpsikhora in *Isthmian* 2.7 in the description of “songs with silvered faces” exploits the etymological connection of her name and χορός ‘chorus’. As for the appearance of Kleo in the ending of *Nemean* 3, where her willingness is the condition for further propagation of the “light” issuing from Aristokleidas’s victory, she both evokes the victor’s name (Aristokleidas ‘offspring of the

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25 An expression “nurslings of the Muses” (θρήμματα Μουσῶν) is listed among poeticisms in Aristides *Or. 45.3* and, based on context, is attributed to Pindar as a dubium by Snell-Maehler (fr. 352). This attribution is indeed very uncertain.

26 Cf. Bowra 1964, 3: “Normally, when he speaks of his own function, it is in image or metaphor, but it is noteworthy that he avoids the vaguer forms of periphrasis, such as calling himself the θεράπων of the Muses (Hes. *Theog.* 100; Bacch. 5.14), or their ὀπηδός (Hom. *Hymn.* 4. 450) or πρόπολος (Bacch. 5.192).”

27 Most famous is Pindar’s fr. 150: μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, προφατεύσω δ’ ἐγώ, cited by as a parallel to *Il.* 1.1 by a Homeric scholiast and by Eustathius (van der Valk 1971: 16). Another Pindaric fragment of three words (fr. 151) — Μοῖσ’ ἀνέκμε — is quoted by Eustathius (1971, 16 and 275). It is not clear if anything is to be made out of the epic form of the verb (noted in Slater 1969, s.v. ἀνίημι), but Eustathius’ interest in these fragments may imply their quasi-prooimial function. Note that Eustathius uses the Ionic form Μοῦσα in both fr. 150 and 151. Further discussion of these two fragments can be found in Maslov 2015, 200. I point to two more examples of self-designation of the speaker in Pindaric fragments: Μοισάν / ἐμὲ δ’ ἐξαίρετον / καρύκα κατὰ / Μοῖσ’ ἀνέκμε / ἐννόμων θ[υσ]ίαν “O Paian, receive the one who frequently has a share of the lawful /[tuneful?] sacrifices of the Muses” (Pai. 6.181; I follow the interpretation of Kurke 2005, 122–4, taking this line as a reference to the involvement of the Aeginetan chorus in the “sacrifices of the Muses”). An example of more traditional type of diction is presented in *Dith.* fr. 70b.25: ἐμὲ δ’ ἐξαίρετον / κάρυκα κατὰ / Μοῖσ’ ἀνέκμε / ἐννόμων θ[υσ]ίαν “The Muse set me up as a chosen herald of wise words for Hellas of beautiful dancing places” (reference probably to the poet, but possibly to the Theban chorousetai).

28 Kalliopa is probably introduced for the sake of *variatio* (cf. the prooimial Muse in *L.3* — note Pindar’s preference for keeping apart generically and functionally distinct types of Muses). This praise of the inhabitants of a polis for their cultivation of mousikē is a Pindaric topos (Bundy 1986 [1962], 24–6).

29 Passages where Kalliopa stands for the generic “Muse”: Hom. *Hymn.* Hel. 2; Alcman 27.1 PMG; Sappho 124.1 LP, S260.11; Stesichorus 63.1 PMG.
One-of-Great-Fame’) and poses as an embodiment of subsequent κλέος (note the significant positioning at the end of the poem).³⁰

Pindar’s achievement lies elsewhere: he was able to transform the non-distinct Muse of the late epic prooimia into a companion of the poet-composer (and thus a means of signaling his unique authorship) as well as render her continuously present in the jolting, uneven movement of the Pindaric epinikion. The task of the following analysis is to show that, contrary to the received view, for Pindar the Muse was not a pre-defined figure, a staple of the poetic tradition. Instead, Pindar confronted different kinds of Muses, shaped by generic contexts that determined their semantic associations and diegetic functions. Yet whereas in Bacchylides these diachronic patterns are easy to tell apart, and the locus of experimentation is the domain of individual μυθοποίησις (as in the furthering of the idea of the poet as Ourania’s servant), Pindaric usage is more syncretic in that it repeatedly demands that we see several motivations at once in a given reference to the Muse (in Table 3, those are presented in brackets). In at least five cases, where the Muse is mentioned

³⁰ Kleō makes a second appearance at the end of a fragmentary Paian: Κλεός ἑκατὶ ‘for the sake of Kleō’ (Pai. 7a.7). On the abnormal short genitive ending, see Rutherford 2001, 242–3, with bibliography.
in close association with the ego, I have assigned them to a separate category “the poet’s Muse,” even though these instances can be derived from the prooimial Muse (except in fragmentary poems, where the context is insufficient).

In only two of Pindar’s surviving epinikia, a plain vocative addressed to a singular Muse is placed conspicuously at the beginning. In the opening of *Pythian* 4 — Pindar’s longest preserved poem, whose self-conscious reliance on the model of epic narrative is unmistakable: “it is necessary that today you stand by the dear man … in order that you increase the owed breeze of hymns for the Latoidai and for Pytho” (Σάμερον μὲν χρή σε παρ’ ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ στᾶμεν, εὐίππου βασιλῆι Κυράνας, ὄφρα κομάζοντι σὺν Ἀρκεσίλα, Μοῖσα, Λατοίδαισιν ὀφειλόμενον Πυθώνι τ’ αὔξης οὕρον ὑμνων). Here the appeal to a single Muse may be taken as an allusion to the openings of hexameter epics, although this is not borne out by Pindar’s phrasing; one might also think of the conventional address to the generic (“clear-voiced”) Muse in Alcman and Stesichorus.

The same is true of the opening of *Nemean* 3, where the speaker beseeches the Muse to come to Aigina, where “young men, the craftsmen of sweet-speaking revels, wait by the Asopian water, seeking after your voice (ὕδατι γὰρ μένοντ’ ἐπ᾽ Ἀσωπίῳ μελιγαρύων τέκτονες κόμων σέθεν ὄπα μαιόμενοι).” The Muse (Kalliopa) here is a figure for the voice of the chorus; she has nothing to do with the composition of the text. Yet Pindar continues, and by a slight shift of emphasis, converts the Muse into a confidante of the poet-composer:

> τὰς ἀφθονίαν ὄπαζε μήτιος ἁμᾶς ἄπο· ἄρχε δ’ οὐρανοῦ πολυνεφέλα ἐνιπάτων· 
> ἀρχετρέσκες ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἄριστον· ἄρρητον ὑμνων· ὁμός, ἀρχετρέσκες ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἄριστον· 
> τὰς ἀφθονίαν ὄπαζε μήτιος ἁμᾶς ἄπο· 
> ἄρχε δ’ οὐρανοῦ πολυνεφέλα κρέοντι, θύγατερ, 
> δόκιμον ὑμνων· ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἄριστον· ἀρχετρέσκες ἐγώ· ἀράτιον ὑμνων· ὁμός, ἀρχετρέσκες ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἄριστον· 
> λύρα τε κοινάσομαι. (N. 3.9–12)

Yield an abundance (ἀφθονίαν) of song from my mind. Begin an acceptable hymn for the one ruling over the much-clouded skies, [Zeus’s] daughter, and I will make it a common possession of both their voices and the lyre.

The topos of ἀφθονία is the first signal of the ensuing forceful splintering of the persona of the poet and the singing chorus, yet the two are bridged by a reminiscence of the prooimial Muse — the diegetic device whose function is limited to making the performance “begin.” But why begin a hymn to Zeus? This is not to say that such a move is

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31 In *Olympian* 10, the Muse is coupled with “Alatheia, daughter of Zeus” (θυγάτηρ Ἀλάθεια Δίως), and both are asked “with straight hand to restrain the blame of falsities that harm guest-friends” (ὁρθὰ χεὶ ἐρξετον ψευδέων ἐνὶ πάντε Ἀλατόξενον). This request (and the coupling) are quite unparalleled, pointing to the liberty with which Pindar had come to treat this figure. The larger context clarifies the logic of this address: “Read aloud to me the Olympic victor, son of Arkhestratos, where he is written in my mind: I have forgotten that I owe him a sweet song: Muse! but you and Alatheia, daughter of Zeus …” (Τὸν Ὀλυμπιονίκαν ἀνάγγυμεν ἀληθέατόν παῖδα, πόθι φρενός ἐμάς γέγραπται· γλυκὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ μέλος ὀφειλόμενον ἐπιλελάλλη· ὦ Μοίσα, ἀλλὰ σῷ καὶ θυγάτηρ Ἀλάθεια Δίως). The Muse is clearly invoked in her prooimial function — as suggested by *alla* ‘but’ following the imperative, *Moisa* is to be taken closely with the preceding clause (a song is owed, hence it must be urgently begun, note similar reference to debt of song next to the mention of the Muse in the beginning of O. 3 and P. 4). The following request to correct the wrong is primarily motivated by the introduction of Alatheia. Another possible example of a vocative addressed to the singular Muse in the opening of the poem is fr. 150.

32 I am referring both to its dialect features (Maslov 2013, 14) and to the choice of a heavily dactylic version of the dactylo-epitrite.
unexpected: an epinikion for a Nemean victor can be framed as a hymn to the Nemean Zeus (who is addressed again in line 65). Nevertheless, the idea that the poem represents, or includes, a hymn to Zeus is not taken further, nor is it motivated by the preceding context. The opening of Nemean 3 thus seems to represent a sequence of generically distinct moves, whose ultimate telos is the conversion of the prooimial Muse into an entirely different figure, more closely involved in the process of composition rather than performance.33

The same pattern informs the opening of Olympian 3, where the reference to the Muse could be doubly classified (as “the prooimial” or “the poet’s Muse”). Notably, this poem is both an epinikion and a cult song for the festival of theoxenia in Akragas.34 Here the opening reference to the visiting gods (Helen and the Tyndaridai) is followed by a metapoetic reflection, again serving to foreground the persona of the poet speaking through the choral medium:

… Μοῖσα δ’ οὕτω ποι παρέστα μοι νεοσίγαλον εὑρόντι τρόπον
Δωρίῳ φωνὰν ἐναρμόξαι πεδίλῳ
ἀγλαόκωμον· ἐπεὶ χαίταισι μὲν ζευχθέντες ἔπι στέφανοι
πράσσοντι με τοῦτο θεόδματον χρέος,
φόρμιγγά τε ποικιλόγαρυν καὶ βοὰν αὐλῶν ἐπέων τε θέσιν
Αἰνησιδάμου παιδὶ συμμεῖξαι πρεπόντως, ἅ τε Πίσα μὲ γεγωνεῖν… (O. 3.4–9)

The Muse thus somehow has taken a stand next to me as I devised a new, still glossy way of fitting the sound of glorious celebration to the Dorian sandal. For garlands yoked to hair exact from me a divinely-founded debt, to mix together in a fitting fashion for the son of Ainesidamos the many-voiced φόρμιγξ, the shout of the αὐλοί, and the arrangement of words — and Pisa [demands] that I cry out…

Several essential elements of Pindar’s metapoetics are on display in this passage: poetic presence figured through divine presence,35 the discourse of εὕρησις ‘invention’, the posture of the poet as a mastermind “mixing” together different elements of the performance (dance, music, text), and the notion of poetic commission as a χρέος ‘debt’, imposed on the poet by the victor’s glorious achievement. In the context of the present discussion, however, this passage is of interest because it showcases the metamorphosis of the generic singular Muse, via the prooimial Muse, into the Muse who oversees the poet’s preparation for the performance. We are witnessing the birth of a new diegetic frame (and one that will have a long afterlife): the appeal to the Muse as an aide in the composition of the text. In contrast to the Homeric Muse, Pindar’s Muse does not dictate the contents of the poem based on her knowledge of the past or merely incite the singer to perform (as in Od. 8.73),

33 Note also the use of the language of kinship in this passage: the Muse is deemed “our mother” in l. 2 and then “daughter” (supply: of Zeus), a juxtaposition that makes the poet into Zeus’s progeny. Kinship metaphors are in general characteristic of the construction of the Pindaric ἐγώ: in Pai. 6.12 the speaker compares himself to “a child obeying his dear mother in his heart” (with apparent reference to Pytho); cf. also l. 1.1. There are some other curious parallels between the beginning of N. 3 and Pai. 6: λίσσομαι ‘beseech’ and the phrase containing the motivation for the address (ὕδατι γὰρ), which emphatically localizes the choral performance “by the water” (following the mention of the Muses — possibly due to the association of the Muses with springs, for which see Otto 1955, 30).
34 For a detailed discussion of the theoxenic context of this poem, see Krummen 1990, 217–66.
35 Maslov 2015, 201–212. The same verb, παρίστημι ‘stand by’, is used in P. 4.1.
but helps the poet in his labor of putting it together. The Muses’ tie to Mnemosyne is being severed.

Whereas in Olympian 3 Pindar’s starting point is the prooimial Muse, in Olympian 1.111–112 a similar transformation occurs in the case of the plain generic use. In Nemean 1.12 the Muse is said to “be fond of calling to mind great contests” (μεγάλων δ’ ἀέθλων Μοῖσα μεμνάοθαι φιλεί). The same notion is expressed in Bacchylides 3.92, where the Muse — in this case, referring to remembrance through musical performance — is said “to nourish the light of achievement” (ἀρετᾶς γε μὲν ἄλλα μυήτε βροτῶν άμα σῶματι φέγγος, ἀλλὰ Μοῦσα νιν τρέφει). Moreover, in Pindar’s Olympian 10.95–96, this idea is conveyed by the use of the same verb, yet the Muses are referred to in the plural as “the Pierian daughters of Zeus”: they “nourish broad fame” (τρέφοντι δ’ εὐρύ κλέος κόραι Πιερίδες Διός). (It should be noted in passing that this reference to the Muses in the plural supports the view that in Bacch. 3.92 and N. 1.12 the Muse is in the generic singular.) The objective description of the function of the Muse(s) is transformed into a subjective statement of the poet’s competence in O. 1.112, where the poet declares: “for me then the Muse is nourishing a missile most powerful in valor” (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν Μοῖσα καρτερότατον βέλος ἀλκᾷ τρέφει).36 As the Muse’s responsibility shifts from the propagation of the memory of the past (and actual musical performance) to the preparation for future acts of praise (and thus to the individual poet’s εὐπορία), a generic Muse takes on the traits of Pindar’s poetic Muse.

Perhaps the most significant locus of formal innovation in Pindar is the juncture between segments of epinikia — often signaled by “break-off” formulas.37 These seemingly unmotivated leaps of narrative are to a large extent responsible for Pindar’s later reputation as a poet of sublime, irrational genius. Within the poetics of epinikion, a form that sutures together different preexistent primary and secondary genres, these junctures stand as a reminder of its hybridity. Yet Pindar’s metapoetic choice to focus attention on the disunited, multifarious nature of his texts demands an explanation. Pindar’s break-offs — which tend to include an explicit dismissal of the previous (mythical) segment of the poem as irrelevant to the given occasion — appear to be a perfect example of what Viktor Shklovsky called “the baring of the device,” referring to the self-conscious display of the formal construction of a literary text. For Shklovsky, the baring of the device was endemic to literature.38 I would look for a more specific motivation behind Pindar’s formal experiments in the changing nature of poetic authorship. Genre mutation puts additional pressure on the author function, forcing it to do the extra work of authentication, which would be unnecessary in a text that follows a well-established genre. The hypertrophy of the Pindaric ego is thus directly related to the innovative nature of Pindaric epinikion.

Pindar is exploiting moments of juncture as occasions for self-presentation and self-promotion. A comparison with Bacchylides is particularly suggestive here: the only voca-

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36 The syntax and semantics of ἀλκᾷ in this passage is disputed; see (Gerber 1982, 170–172) for alternative translations. The shifting between objective (referring to the victor, victor’s city, etc.) and subjective (referring to the ego) statements is a notable feature of Pindaric poetics (the distinction was introduced in Bundy 1986).

37 The English term is Bundy’s calque of Abbruchsformel (cf. Schadewaldt 1928, e.g. 268). On Pindar break-offs see Race 1989; on the history of this device, cf. (Carey 1981, 6–7).

38 A classic discussion of the “baring of the device” is Shklovsky’s analysis of Tristram Shandy (Shklovskii 1965, translation of Шковский, В. «Тристав Шанди» Стерна и теория романа. Петроград: ОПОЯЗ, 1921).
tive appeal to the Muse in the middle of the poem (following the myth) at 5.176 is neither used as an occasion to foreground the poet's presence, nor is it left unmotivated structurally, as it is directly followed by a request to hymn Zeus. While in other respects distinct from Pindaric usage, this Bacchylidean passage serves as a reminder of the prooimial provenance of those Muses that are addressed in the middle of Pindar's epinikia.

If the Muse is seen as an agent whose intervention is crucial to the beginning of the text/performance, her transposition to the other significant node of the text — as it is suddenly diverted from its previous course and set on a new beginning — need not strike us as particularly surprising. It is remarkable (again, in contradistinction to Bacch. 5.176) that this transposed prooimial Muse in Pindar is generally asked to hymn not Zeus or other gods, but the victor. In some cases, as in Pythian 1.58–60, a reminiscence of the earlier pattern persists: “Muse, I bid you sing (κελαδῆσαι) also at the side of Deinomenes — for the victory of a father is not an alien joy — come then let us devise a hymn friendly to the king of Aetna” (Μοῖσα, καὶ πάρ Δεινομένει κελαδῆσαι πιθεό μοι ποινὰν τεθρίππων· χάρμα δ’ οὐκ ἄλλοτριον νικαροφία πατέρος, ἀγ’ ἔπειτ’ Αἴτνας βασιλεὶ φίλιον ἀξεύρωμεν ὤμον). This, in essence, is a request to the Muse to perform at Aetna (which Hieron passed on to his son Deinomenes). There ensues a catalogue of Dorian settlements (lines 61–66), which in the following prayer are revealed as indications of Zeus's long-standing grace: “Zeus the Accomplisher, ordain such a lot to the citizens and kings near the water of Amenas, as a truthful account of men” (Ζεῦ τέλει’ , αἰεὶ δὲ τοιαύταν Ἀμένα παρ’ ὑδῶρ αἶσαν ἀστοῖς καὶ βασιλεύσων διαιρέων ἔτυμον λόγον ἀνθρώπων 67–68). It is thus possible to regard the hymn that is “friendly to the king of Aetna” as a hymn of praise addressed to Zeus.39

A similar moment occurs in Nemean 7.75–84, where the speaker interrupts (ἔα με) a supposedly all-too-lengthy digression to utter a metapoetic reflection, which characteristically converts the hymnic Muse into the Muse of the epinikian poet:

νικῶντι γε χάριν, εἴ τι πέραν ἀερθείς ἀνέκραγον, οὐ τραχύς εἰμι καταθέμεν. εἴρειν στεφάνους ἐλαφρόν, ἀναβάλεο· Μοῖσά τοι κολλᾷ χρυσὸν ἐν τε λευκόν ἐλέφανθ’ ἁμᾶ καὶ λείριον ποντίας ὑφελοῖσ’ ἐέρσας. Δίος δὲ μεμναμένος άμφι Νεμέα πολύφατον θρόον ὑμίνων δόνει ἡσυχᾷ. βασιλῆα δὲ θεῶν πρέπει δάπεδον τόδε γαρυέμεν ἡμέρᾳ ὁπί·

I am not stubborn — [even] if, lifted up, I cry out something overmuch — [when it comes to] paying down a favor, to the victor at any rate. It is easy to weave crowns — strike up [on the lyre]! The Muse, indeed, binds together gold and white ivory and, having fetched it from below, a lily-like flower of coral.40 And, having remembered [masc. sing.] Zeus around Nemea, stir up a renowned [speaking in many voices?] murmur of hymns quietly: it is fitting in this plain to sing of the king of the gods in soft voice.

39 It should be noted that, even beyond this context, Zeus is a very prominent figure in Pythian 1. Several lines below the speaker again prays to Zeus (ll. 71–72); another prayer to Zeus is found at line 29.

40 For an alternative translation, “rosemary,” see (Egan 2005, 54–7), who compares the hapax πόντια ἐέρσα to Lat. *ros maris* (explained as a calque from Greek) and cites evidence for the use of rosemary in crowns.
In this passage, the mention of the Muse (in the nominative case) as the agent responsible for the intricate work of composition — compared to the weaving of a crown — is preceded by an unmistakable marker of a proem, the middle voice of the verb ἀναβάλλομαι ‘to strike up on the lyre’.

The sense that, near the end of the poem, Pindar is only getting started is reinforced by the reference to ritual remembrance of the god, a common feature of cultic poetry (including the Homeric Hymns). The imperative — self-reflective, rather than addressed to the Muse (the participle μεμναμένος is masculine) — that enjoins the chorus to hymn Zeus, the king of the gods, again belongs firmly in a prooimial section. Yet, as in Pythian 1.58–60, the whole apparatus of the hymnic prooimion is put at the service of the commission at hand. In the process, the prooimial Muse assumes new, distinctively Pindaric traits.

In several other epinikia, the Muse is addressed in the moment of transition from the myth to the enkomiastic segment of the poem. In Isthmian 6.58–59, Pindar interrupts the myth, and invokes the Muse before launching into the victory catalogue. Exactly the same pattern is found in Pythian 11.41, where the Muse is reminded that given that “she contracted to furnish her voice silvered for pay” (εἰ μισθοῖο συνέθευ παρέχειν φωνὰν ύπάργυρον), she is to sing the achievements of the father Pythonikos and the son Thrasu-daos, not the — supposedly irrelevant — myth of Orestes’s rescue and revenge. What follows is a victory catalogue. In itself, the narration of a myth is not irrelevant to the enkomiastic purpose of the poem, inasmuch as the inclusion of a mythical section assimilates the epinikion to songs performed as part of cult ritual, thus giving more symbolic weight to the praise of the victor. Moreover, an address to the Muse introducing a victory catalogue suggests another generic affiliation: that of hymns to the gods which contain their aretology (the narrative of their deeds), and often include catalogues of places of cult worship.

Finally, note that in Pythian 11.41 the voice of the Muse is described as “silvered.” It is conceivable that the singular Muse stands as a figure for the performing chorus, in the tradition of earlier choral lyric. This is confirmed by a parallel from Isthmian 2.6–8 — a passage in which the speaker reminisces about the times when “the Muse was not yet a lover of profit, nor one who works for hire” (ἁ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδής πω τὸτ’ ἤν οὐδ’ ἐργάτης): for at that time “the sweet soft-voiced songs of Terpsikhora, their faces silvered, were not being bought and sold” (οὐδ᾿ ἐπέρναντο γλυκεῖαι μελιφθόγγου ποτὶ Τερψιχόρας ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι άοιδαί).

The combined reference to Terpsikhora and “silvered faces” suggests a (costumed?)

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41 The original technical meaning of the verb was probably ‘deliver a prelude on a stringed instrument’ (cf. P.1.3; see West 1981, 122, Rocconi 2003, 48–9). On its use as a term referring to the “kitharodic” prooimion, see Koller 1956, 170.

42 The victory catalogue also follows the transitional invocation of the Muse in fr. Isthm. 6a, but there is little context to say more about the function of the Muse in this fragment.

43 On intimations of hero cult for athletic victors in Pindar’s epinikia, see Currie 2005 whose conclusions, however, are too far-reaching.

44 In N.6.28–29 the structure is different, as there is strictly speaking no break-off in the text: the address to the Muse — “come, Muse, direct the glorious breeze of words onto this [household]” — is embedded in the lengthy praise of the victor’s clan, the Bassidae (and a catalogue of their athletic victories). Praise through genealogy suggests hymn as a generic precedent. Note, however, that here we may be dealing with a postponed prooimial invocation of the Muse as the opening of N.6 is occupied by gnomic material.
chorus in performance. Yet both these passages can also be assigned to the rubric of “the poet’s Muse.”

It bears emphasizing that this particular, arguably most distinctively Pindaric, function of the Muse as the poet’s aide is restricted to the epinikia. As I suggested above, this is due to particular pressure on the composition of the epinikion as a compound genre and the correspondingly hypertrophied authorial presence. By contrast, the diegetic device that is distinctive of the Iliad and Theogony (DF 1), and which occurs once in a dithyramb of Bacchylides (15.47), in Pindar only occurs in the cultic genre of paian. Notably, in both cases where he employs this device Pindar (in contrast to Bacchylides) preserves the plural number of the Muses addressed. In Paian 6.54–60 the speaker addresses the Muses: “But maidens, for you know everything, Muses, you hold this ordinance [or adornment] along with your father of dark clouds and Mnemosyne, attend to me now: for I arrived at the broad assembly for Loxias in the [time] of the gods’ xenia and my tongue desires to [pour down?] honey’s choicest part” (ἀλλὰ παρθένοι γάρ, ἴσθ’ ὅτι, Μοῖσαι, πάντα, κε[λαι]νεφεῖ σὺν πατρὶ Μναμοσ[ύν]α τε τούτον ἐσχετ[ε] τεθ[μόν, κλύτε νῦν· ἔρα[ται] δὲ μο[ι] γλώσσα μέλιτος ἀφτον γλυκὸν … ἀγόνα Λοξία[ι] καταβάντ’ εὐρύν ἐν θεῶν εξενα).

The identity of the speaker is moot: it is possible that this uncertainty serves to ease the transition from the posturing of the poet as a “spokesman of the Pieridai” in the opening of the poem to a more diffuse choral subjectivity operative in the body of the poem (since most of the first triad is missing, this can only be a hypothesis).

The address to the Muses in Paian 6.54–60 is prompted by the preceding gnome “as to whence [the strife?] of the immortals took its beginning, it is possible for the gods to persuade the wise (σοφοὺς = the poets), but impossible for mortals to find out” (καὶ πόθεν ἀθανάτων ἔρις ἀρξατο. ταῦτα θεοῖσι μὲν πιθεῖν σοφοὺς δυνατόν, βροτοῖσιν δ᾿ ἀμάχανον εὑρέμεν). The whole passage may be taken as a reminiscence of Iliad 2.484–492, but note a difference between the Iliadic and Pindaric metapoetics: whereas the speaker of Iliad 2.484ff says that, in contrast to the Muse, “we/I know nothing” (οὐδὲ τι ἴδμεν), thus aligning himself with the mortals of Paian 6.52, Pindar confidently claims privileged access to divine knowledge. This conceptualization of poetic σοφία, which is particularly characteristic of Pindar (although not narrowly Pindaric, cf. Theognis 1.769–772), recurs in Paian 7b.15–20, where the speaker prays to the Muses, “for minds of men are blind, whoever without the Helikoniades seeks for the deep road of σοφία” (τυφλαὶ γὰρ ἀνδρῶν φρένες, ὁστὶς ἄνευθ’ Ἑλικωνιάδων βαθεῖαν … ἐρευνᾷ σοφίας ὁδόν).

The second example of the Iliadic diegetic frame (DF 1) is Paian 8.102–4, where the Muses are confronted with a question regarding the appearance of the third Delphic temple: “What was the shape of that temple [wrought] through the artful skills of Hephaistos and Athena?” (ὡ Μοῖσαι· το<υ> δὲ παντέχχο[yος / Άφαῖστον παλάμας καὶ Λαθά[νας / τίς ὁ ρυθμὸς ἑφαίνετο). As one would expect with this diegetic frame, the Muses immediately oblige, and the text continues with the description of the temple made of bronze and gold.

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45 For the (meager) evidence for the use of masks in choral non-dramatic performance in Archaic Greece, see Ferrari 2008, 16–7. In case, the description of the songs’ faces as silvered evokes both embellishment and remuneration (Bury 1892, 40–41); see Maslov 2015, 260–262 for further discussion of secondary literature on this passage). Note the use of a definite article with Μοῖσα in I. 2.6, is unique in all of the Archaic corpus and appears to be due to a greater degree of personalization in the description of the Muse, unmatched elsewhere in Pindar.

46 There is a lacuna in the papyrus; possible supplements are discussed in Rutherford 2001, 309.
Pindar's use of this traditional device in the paians, but not in the epinikia, is an important piece of evidence for genre differentiation within the Pindaric corpus. The contrast between the usage in the paians and the epinikia is particularly striking in light of the fact that Pindar thrice uses rhetorical questions closely related to those that appear in DF 1, but never calls on the Muse(s) in these contexts.47 It appears that Pindar not only uses an older metapoetics in the paians, but that he also consistently avoids certain devices in the epinikia.48 I would suggest that Pindar is not interested in employing a highly traditional device in a genre that allows, and perhaps demands, a more innovative poetics and, correspondingly, a more aggressive and individuated metapoetics. Conversely, the concept of the poet's Muse is restricted, in the surviving corpus, to the epinikia,49 where Pindar's general strategy was to promote his own poetic mythology of the singular Muse, only referring to the plural Muses in marked contexts.

In fact, if we omit the attributive use of the genitive plural and metonymic expressions, there remain only nine occurrences of plural Muses in the epinikia, and none of them appears to permit the substitution of the singular for the plural. In several poems, the Muses appear as a group of divinities attending, with their choral song and dance, well-known mythical events: the marriages of Kadmos and Harmonia, Peleus and Thetis (P. 3.90, N. 5.24), and the funeral of Achilles (I. 8.57–8).51 The Muses also perform at Zeus's side on Olympus, enchanting the thoughts of the Olympian gods (κῆλα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνων θέλγει φρένας52), but filling with terror "all that Zeus does not approve of" (ὅσσα δὲ μὴ πεφίληκε Ζεὺς P. 1.12–14). This is not the only possible allusion to what may be regarded as an epaoidic substratum in Pindar's representation of the Muses in Pindar.53 In the opening

47 O. 10.60–63: τίς δὴ ποταίνιον ἔλαχε στέφανον (cf. the same topos in a fragment of Simonides's epinikion [506 ]); P. 4.70–71: τίς γὰρ ἀρχὰ δέξατο ναυτιλίας; I. 5.39–42: λέγε, τίνες Κύκλοι, τίνες ἔκτορα πέφνον (here the answer — Aiakidai — is proleptically provided in the preceding sentence). Christopher Carey describes this topos as "the epic question to the Muse" (1981, 4), but does not remark on the fact that Pindar does not address the question to the Muse(s). In the case of P. 4.70–71, scholia contain remarks on the similarity of the phrasing to the Homeric device (Drachmann 2.116; for discussion see Phillips 2016, 178).

48 It is not possible to interpret this genre restriction along the lines of J. M. Bremer's explanation for the avoidance of the use of the term χορός 'chorus' for the performers of the epinikia (namely that an all too close association with cult poetry was seen as inappropriate in a "secular" genre [1990.55]): the diegetic frame that involves a request for information, although very old, does not seem to have a specific association with cult poetry.

49 There may be two exceptions: fr. 150 and fr. 151 for which we have no context. These fragments could also belong to lost epinikia, as has been suggested for fr. 150 (Snell and Maehler 1989, 128).

50 In P. 3.90 the Muses' performance dedicated to the marriage of Peleus and Thetis takes place "on a/the mountain" (χρυσαμπύκων μελπομενᾶν ἐν ὄρει Μοισᾶν), which remains unnamed (it is generally assumed to be Pelion; cf., e.g., Gildersleeve 1885 ad loc.). Perhaps this unusual lack of specificity reflects the idea that mountains are the proper locus for the Muses' activity (Maslov 2016, 416–417).

51 In two further poems, the Muses are invited to join the Pindaric κώμος 'revel' (Pindar's unmarked term for the chorus of the epinikia) as choral divinities: in Nemean 9.1, the Muses are invited to undertake a "festive procession", presumably across the Ionian sea, from Sikyon to Aetna, and in Olympian 11.17, the imperative "there join in the revel" appears to include the Muses.

52 κῆλα is usually rendered as 'shafts' (of song), see (Slater 1969, 278) following (West 1966 ad Theog 708), but, next to θέλγει, a (folk-etymological? purely contextual?) association with κηλέω 'to bewitch' is very likely (cf. Maehler 1963, 82). For this verb and its derivatives in (meta)poetic contexts, see (Maslov 2009, 29, n. 64).

53 For a hypothetical reconstruction of the underlying conception of the Muses as ambiguous, healing/harm-bringing divinities see Toporov 1977; further discussion in: Maslov 2016, 438–441. In his unpublished dissertation (1954), Elroy Bundy discusses this paradoxical quality of music in Pythian 1.12–14 in
of *Nemean* 4 “wise songs, daughters of the Muses” (σοφαὶ Μοίσαν θύγατρες) are said (in a gnomic aorist) “to enchant toils by touch: not even warm water makes limbs as soft as praise singing along with a *phorminx*” (θέλξαν νιν ἁπτόμεναι. οὐδὲ θερμὸν ὑδώρ τόσον γε μαλθακὰ τεύχει γυῖα, τόσον εὐλογία φόρμιγι συνάορος).\(^{54}\)

There remain only two examples where Pindar uses the plural form without an obvious motivation. Yet closer analysis shows that such a motivation does exist. In *O*. 6.21, the Muses are said to “entrust” (ἐπιτρέψοντι) the oath-taking to the speaker, and in *O*. 13.96, the speaker declares that he has come as an ἐπίκουρος ‘ally’ “to the brilliantly-throned Muses and the [clan of] Oligaithidai” (Μοῖσαις γὰρ ἀγλαοθρόνοις ἑκών Ὀλιγαιθίδαισίν τ’ ἐβαν ἐπίκουρος). A notable literalism in Pindar’s use of juridical categories (Maslov 2015, 223–224) may rule out the use of the (originally) generic singular in the first passage, and the plurality of the Muses in *O*. 13.96 aids in the construction of the image of a militant collective comprising the divinities and the victor’s clan.

The evidence thus bears out the hypothesis that Pindar’s singular Muse is not only restricted to the epinikia, but also strongly preferred in this genre. This is an important indication that the Pindaric epinikion, in addition to embedding older layers of metapoetics, also includes highly innovative elements. In particular, the following two Pindaric developments are worth emphasizing: the employment of the (originally) prooimial Muse in transitions between different segments of a poem, and the concomitant transformation of the generic Muse into the poet’s confidante. Whereas Bacchylides creates a personalized mythology of named Muses, Pindar remolds the figure of the Muse into a structural element inextricable from the workings of his poetic form.

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conjunction with a similarly violent aspect of ἡσυχία in the prooimion to *Pythian* 8. He concludes that both reflect the duality at the heart of Pindar’s *Weltanschauung*, which is embodied in the principle of helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies. More specifically, this principle has a social dimension: ἡσυχία stands for the fellow citizens’ acquiescence to the success of the victor (1954, 161). Bundy does not consider the fact that it is the Muses’ voice (rather than the sound of the φόρμιγξ) that is harmful to Zeus’s enemies. In my view, Bundy’s explanation, perhaps especially adapted to *Pythian* 8, does not necessarily exclude the presence of an epaoidic subtext in *Pythian* 1.

\(^{54}\) In this passage, I take the pronoun νιν to refer to the toils (plural) as the most likely antecedent. Another Pindaric locus where the Muse may have epaoidic connotations (but here this possibility is rather remote) is *Pythian* 5.65: in a hymnic aretology of Apollo, his bestowal of “remedies for heavy diseases for men and women” is mentioned first, and immediately afterwards he is said “to give the Muse [generic use] to whomever he wishes.” The passage can also be read as a list of traditional forms of σοφία (Solon fr. 13.51–60 W), but the direct juxtaposition of healing and *mousikē* is, at the very least, suggestive.


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ДЕТИ МНЕМОСИНЫ: 
К СОПОСТАВИТЕЛЬНОЙ МЕТАПОЭТИКЕ ПИНДАРА И ВАКХИЛИДА

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В статье рассматривается вопрос о разных типах использования Муз(ы) в поэтике Пиндара и Вакхилида и их преемственности по отношению к элегической и ранней мелодической поэзии. На основании детального обзора словоупотребления выдвигается гипотеза о различии в метапоэтических стратегиях упомянутых поэтов: в то время как Вакхилид разрабатывает индивидуальную мифологию поименованных Муз (прежде всего, Урании), Пиндар переосмысливает безымянную Музу эпической и ранней хоровой лирики как сотрудницу поэта, вовлеченную в сам творческий процесс. Таким образом, именно у Пиндара Муза приобретает — в дополнение к мнемонической и побудительной функции, которые она имела в гекзаметрической поэзии, — тот характер помощницы поэта в составлении оригинальных поэтических произведений, который отличает ее в позднейшей литературной традиции.

Ключевые слова: греческая лирика, эпиникция, метапоэтика, авторство, Музы, Пиндар, становление литературы.

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In P. Oxy. XLI 2954 verso ii.12–25 we find several documents at least two of which discuss the same matter — sale of a property by one side in a partnership. The first document is an edict of the governor of Egypt C. Avidius Heliodorus and the second one is a court decision, apparently from a later date. The governor’s decision has no parallel in Roman law; Herrmann and Rupprecht come to the conclusion that it was based on the local Egyptian law, by which neighboring owners have preferential rights to buy a property. More evidence for the presumed Egyptian law is found in a letter from one brother to another, in PSI XII 1259 (= SB V5997) from the second or third century C. E.; and P. Madrid 11 (= SB VI 9621), from the third century C. E., which Youtie sees as additional evidence for this law, in my opinion contradicts it and requires an alternative explanation. Three more documents discussing the same matter are found in SB XIV 12139 from the second century C. E. In each of them we can see additional details of the practice of the law in question under Roman rule in Egypt. It seems that the Egyptian law in question has a parallel in the rabbincic law of dina de-bar mitsra (law of a neighboring owner), which asserts a preferable right of neighbors in buying property (BT Bava Metsia 108a). The common basis of both the Egyptian and the Jewish laws seems to be an archaic Feldgemeinschaft (field alliance). Maybe another level in the development of the same idea is represented by the Greek law concerning the “border-money” (amphourion). An interesting point, as Albeck says, is that the Jewish sources for this law are Babylonian only, which may indicate a deeper influence of the Roman law on the Palestinian Jewish law than on the Babylonian one.

Keywords: Egyptian law, Roman law, Greek law, Jewish law, Juristic papyri, Roman governor of Egypt, Roman Egypt.

In P. Oxy. XLI 2954 verso ii¹ we find several documents at least two of which discuss the same matter — sale of a property by one side in a partnership. First document is an edict of the governor of Egypt C. Avidius Heliodorus (presumably from 137 C. E.²) and the second one is a court decision, apparently from a later date.

1 According to R. A. Coles, it is the 3rd column of the papyrus, see The Oxyrhinchos Papyri, 41, 1970, 85; Coles, 1970. See online http://www.trismegistos.org/text/30376.
3 For κοινωνιμαίων.

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Gaius Avidius Heliodorus, the prefect of Egypt, says: I see that many people apply to me on the matter of common property sold without asking for the opinion of the co-owners. If previously he (the co-owner) does not pass a message to the co-owners 60 days ahead, and to the neighbors 30 days ahead, if he sells without passing them a message, the money will be taken from him, and he also will be punished. Twenty second year of the rule of the Emperor Hadrianus, Thoth 10.

The first editor of P. Oxy. XLI 2954 Revel A. Coles has noticed two differences between the low practiced in Egypt according to this papyrus and the Roman law:

1. The governor does not mention any difference between common and undivided property (communio pro indiviso) and common but divided property (communio pro diviso) while the second kind of property is not known in the Roman law, but was in use in Egypt; for the papyrologic evidences see Egon Weiss and Rafael Taubenschlag. Subsequently, Johannes Herrmann and Hans-Albert Rupprecht came to the conclusion that this decision was based not on the Roman but on the local Greek-Egyptian law, and wrote extensive articles on the subject. I see no need to discuss it here, but I would like to mention the fact that it is a fine example of a difference between the Roman and the local Greek-Egyptian law while the prefect decides according to the last.

2. The second point mentioned by Revel A. Coles is that in the Roman law there was no rule for neighboring owners to have preferential rights to buy a property, but Avidius Heliodorus says that not only the co-owners but also the neighbors are to be noticed 30 days ahead before the sale, otherwise the sale will be invalid (ll. 7–13). As in the previous example, this order seems to be based on the local law. The time periods mentioned are reasonable: if during the first month following the announcement the co-owners did not come to the agreement, there is no point to pass the message about it to the neighbors.

More evidence for the presumed local law is found in a letter from one brother to another, in PSI XII 1259, ll. 4–12 (= SB V 7997), from the second or third century C. E.:
ἔτεροι ὡνοῦνται αὐτὴν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἔφην αὐτῷ λέγων 'Ἀνὰ μέσον ἐστίν τῶν οἴκων αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ | δύναται ἑτερος ἀνήσασθαι αὐτὴν'.

"I wish you to know that Moros, the ferryman's son, the former assistant, came to me saying regarding the house of Ptolemaeus the Cabbage-head that 'if your younger (brother) will not hurry with this acquisition, I intend to give an offer, before the others do, since I know that the others are bargaining about it'. And I said to him that 'it is in between his houses, and the others cannot bargain about it'" (ll. 4–12). We do not see here any mention of a law or an edict, and the issue seems to be obvious to the writer.17

According to Taubenschlag, in PSI 313 (III–IV cent. C.E.) the preferential right of a neighbor to buy a property is called πρωτέρια:

προσήλθον τῇ ἀγοράσει [. . . . . .] μου ἔχοντο τὰ πρωτέρια.18

"I come to the sale… while I have a pre-emption right" (l. 3–4).19

The same or possibly another variation of this term appears in BGU 3 830 (I cent. C.E.), reconstructed by the first editor as προτερικόν and by Olsson (1925) as προτερ[αῖ(?)] ν(?):

ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔχω προτερ[αῖ(?)] ν(?). ἔπει γὰρ καὶ γείτων αὐτοῦ | εἰ[μ]ι.

«… For I have the pre-emption right since I am one of his neighbors» (l. 20–22).

Although it is impossible to establish the exact term, it is clear that it is derived of πρότος, «the first», may be in a comparative form.

Raymond Westbrook21 does not mention any similar phenomena in ancient Near East law systems, but the discussed local law in Roman Egypt has a parallel in the Jewish law of dina de-bar mitsra (literally “law of the neighbor”, i.e. pre-emption right), which asserts a preferable right of neighbors in buying property.22 It is not formulated anywhere in the Jewish sources directly, and we have only a description of the possible situations related to it in Babylonian Talmud, mostly in Bava Metsia 108a–b (and Yalkut Shimoni referring to it), and also in Bava Metsia 68a, Bava Kama 114a, Ketubot 44a, and Bava Batra 5a (see the Appendix), then in the Responsa of the Gaons, and then in the works of the later commentators of those texts. It is not a law de-Orayta (derived from the text of Torah) but a rule (takanat khahamim, i.e. “a rule established by the sages”) based on the moral principle ‘And thou shalt do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord’23. It means that the pre-emption right is understood as a natural «right thing to do» which may suggest that this rule is actually very ancient.

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16 According to Youtie 1973, 895. Michael Pozdnev suggests «the former servant of the ferryman» (personal communication); he also suggests that Moros here probably is not a proper name but a nickname, «Fool».

17 Youtie suggests that P. Madrid 11 (= SB VI 9621) is also related to the same matter, but there is no evidence in it which would indicate that the property in question is neighboring one, so it seems to be irrelevant here; see Youtie 1967, 384–390. See also Korzakova 2002, 202–203.

18 See Taubenschlag 1955, 320 n. 6; the term suggested by Taubenschlag is hapax legomenon, see PSI IV 313: τα πρώτ[α] ἔρια ?. Cf. Levy 1951, 119 ff.

19 See Pringsheim 1950, 280 n. 9.

20 Zereteli 1903; see online: http://www.trismegistos.org/text/25638.


23 Deuteronomy 6:18.
One of the differences between C. Avidius Heliodoros’s edict and the Jewish «Law of the neighbor» is that in the latter there is no sanction on the seller, and the only part which may suffer the consequences of breaking it is the buyer who may lose his opportunity to purchase the particular plot of land; the time within which the seller must inform the neighbors is not mentioned either. C. Avidius Heliodoros does not say directly whether the sale should be cancelled or not, but we can assume it should, since the pre-emption right is mentioned as obvious one in the other documents. A case of this kind could be brought to the court only if one of the neighbors or co-owners disagreed with the sale and wanted to buy the property in question himself. If so, the decision of C. Avidius Heliodoros means that not only the sale will be cancelled but the seller also will be punished, most probably by a fine.

Another difference between the Talmudic rule and the Greek-Egyptian one is that the Jewish sages discuss some exceptions from the rule, such as in case where the land was sold to a woman or an orphan, which means that it would be very uncomfortable for the buyer to cancel the acquisition, and if so, the Biblical rule ‘And thou shalt do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord’ will not be fulfilled. Another case when the fulfillment of the rule is not required is when the sale is much more beneficial for the seller because of the place, the time, or the means of a payment (for the full list of the exceptions see Bava Metsia 108b in the Appendix). In the Greek-Egyptian law, at least as it is represented in the documents we have discussed, we do not see any mention of such exceptions (which does not mean that they could not be present in the actual lawsuits that we have no documents on).

In the Greek law we can see a related idea represented by the law concerning the “boundary-money”, as Rafael Taubenschlag formulates it: “The conveyance of real property required a formal act by which the grantor calls upon his neighbors and pays them boundary-money (ἀμφούριον). Thereupon he asked them to make a deposition that he was entitled to sell the property, that he had not sold it to anyone else, before, and to bear witness that he conveyed it to the grantee”.24 ἀμφούριον is mentioned in P. Halle 1, l. 253, from Apollonopolis, Egypt (after 259 B.C.E.)25, and in the inscription from Rhodos (200–180 B.C.E.), SEG III, 674, l. 4026.

A possible trace of the ἀμφούριον law can be seen in the law from Thurii (South Italy) mentioned by Johannes Stobaeus who quotes Theophrastus (IV–III cent. B.C.E.)27. First Theophrastus says that in various communities there are various rules concerning a publication of a future property sale, without mentioning any preferential right of the neighbors (though it is interesting that according to him in Athens the seller was obliged to inform the public on his intention to sell the property 60 days before the actual sale, the same period mentioned in the edict discussed regarding the co-owners), he adds (as Stobaeus quotes, which may be not exact): Οἱ δὲ Θουριακοὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀφαιροῦσιν, οὐδ’ ἐν ἀγορᾷ προστάτουσιν, ὅσπερ τάλλα, διδόναι δὲ κελεύουσι κοινῇ τῶν γειτόνων τῶν ἐγγυτάτω τρισὶ νόμισμά τι βραχὺ μνήμης ἕνεκα καὶ μαρτυρίας. (“But the people of Thurii do away all such measures nor do they post a notice in the agora as they do with other

26 See also Schwahn 1935, 57–63; Pringsheim 1950, 151ff.
27 Fortenbaugh 1993, 492–495, no. 650 (Anthologium 4.2.20; t. 4 127.20 — 130.26 Hense). The quoted ‘Theophrastus’ book on laws among various nations, On contracts, which is now lost.
things, but they enjoin parties in common to give a small sum of money to the three nearest neighbors so that will remember and give witness.”)28

Some kind of parallel to ἀμφούριον mentioned above can be seen in a passage from BT Bava Metsia 108a: “What if one came to take counsel of him [sc. the neighbour who enjoys the right of pre-emption] and asked, ‘Shall I go and buy it?’ and he replied, ‘Go and buy it’: is mikna (Aramaic for “acquisition”, kinyan in Hebrew) from him necessary, or not? — Ravina ruled: No mikna is necessary; the Nehardeans maintained: It is. And the law is that a [formal] acquisition is needed”. Mikna (= kinyan) here is an act of formal acquisition of something which is not material (a right to buy in this case); later it was done by holding a material object in the present of witnesses29, but there is no specification here, so we cannot know if the neighbor was supposed to receive any money for his consent or not during the Talmudic period. To my opinion, the term mikna (kinyan) may indicate that at least at some early stage this acquisition could be real, i.e. the neighbors indeed were receiving some ἀμφούριον-like payment, although from the buyer and not from the seller, as we see in the Greek law.

In the Talmudic texts concerning dina de-bar mitsra several rabbis are mentioned, such as Rav (rabbi Aba ben Eivo, or Aba Ariha, ca. 175–247 C. E.), rav Nahman (ca. 250–320 C. E.), rav Ashi (352–427 C. E.), his fellow Ravina, his teacher Amemar, and his son Mar, which points to the dates contemporal or later than those of the Greek documents discussed; we have to keep in mind though that the rabbis used to base their decisions on the previous tradition which is sometimes much older.

An interesting point is that the Jewish sources for this law are Babylonian only (Babylonian Talmud, and then the Responsa of the Gaons). Albeck suggests that in Jewish Palestine the attitude was not as morally high as it did not meet the principle of ‘And thou shalt do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord’30, but to my opinion it may also indicate a deeper influence of the Roman law on Palestinian Jewish law than on the Babylonian similar to what was observed for Palestine compared to Egypt31. We cannot exclude the possibility that the Greek and the Jewish law could influence each other somewhere in the undocumented past, but if they had not, there is another explanation for their similarity. Rafael Taubenschlag thought that the source for the law concerning ἀμφούριον is an archaic Feldgemeinschaft (field alliance) which had included also the passage right, the irrigation right, etc.32 It seems that the remains of this alliance are reflected both in the Greek-Egyptian and the Jewish Babylonian laws concerning the sale of property and the preferential rights of the neighbor in it (but apparently lost from the Jewish Palestinian laws).

The Roman law on servitudes (see Digesta 8, various chapters) reminds of Feldgemeinschaft’s consequences, but it’s origin is different: the servitudes were established after division of a larger property into smaller units, firstly the communal one into private fields, and then larger plots into smaller ones, when the new smaller units needed certain resources one from another.

28 Fortenbaugh, ibid.
If Rafael Taubenschlag’s suggestion is correct and the discussed Greek and Roman Egypt laws (and, as I suggest, the Jewish Babylonian law too) are based on Feldgemeinschaft principle, the lack of such a law in the classical Roman system may be explained by the fact that in Rome the private property on land was established at a relatively later stage, being finally standardized by Lex Thoria in 111 B.C.E. Why the ancient Near East law systems also lack such a law (presented in Raymond Westbrook’s book), is a matter for another research.

The Jewish sources I have used may need an additional discussion by the specialists who can find the Greek-Egyptian parallel useful. For the reader’s convenience I have gathered them here in the Appendix.

Appendix. Dina de-bar mitsra in Babylonian Talmud.35

*Bava Metsia* 68a:

Rav Ashi also said: The elders of the town of Mehasia told me, What is the meaning of mashkanta [a pledge]? That it abides with him [the mortgagee]. In respect to what has this a practical bearing? — In respect to [the right of] pre-emption.

*Bava Metsia* 108a–b:

Rav Judah said in Rav’s name: If one takes possession [of an estate lying] between [the fields belonging to] brothers or partners, he is an impudent man, yet cannot be removed. Rav Nahman said: He can even be removed too; but if it is only on account of the right of pre-emption, he cannot be evicted. The Nehardeans said: He is removed even on the score of the right of pre-emption, for it is written, ‘And thou shalt do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord’36. What if one came to take counsel of him [sc. the neighbor who enjoys the right of pre-emption] and asked, ‘Shall I go and buy it?’ and he replied, ‘Go and buy it’; is [formal] acquisition from him necessary, or not? — Ravina ruled: No [formal] acquisition is necessary; the Nehardeans maintained: It is. And the law is that a [formal] acquisition is needed. Now that you say that a [formal] acquisition is necessary, — if he did not acquire it of him [and bought the field], it advances or falls in his [the abutting neighbor’s] ownership. Now, if he bought it for a hundred [zuz], whereas it is worth two hundred, we see: if he [the original vendor] would have sold it to any one at a reduced figure, he [the abutting neighbor] pays him [the vendee] a hundred [zuz] and takes it. But if not [and it was a special favor to the vendee], he must pay him two hundred and only then take it. But if he bought it for two hundred, its value being only one hundred, — it was [at first] thought that he [the abutting neighbor] can say to him, ‘I sent you for my benefit, not for my hurt.’ But Mar Kashisha, the son of rav Hisda, said to rav Ashi: Thus did the Nehardeans say in rav Nahman’s name: There is no law of fraudulent purchase in respect to real estate.

33 Appian, *De bello civili* 1, 27.
34 See Westbrook, op. cit.
35 The translation is based on *Soncino Talmud* (Babylonian Talmud, ed. by I. Epstein, London, 1935–1952), with some alterations.
36 Deuteronomy 4:18.
If one sold a griva\textsuperscript{37} of land in the middle of his estate, we see: if it is of the choicest or of the most inferior quality, the sale is valid; otherwise it is mere evasion.

A gift is not subject to the law of pre-emption. Said Amemar: But if he [the donor] promised security of tenure, it is subject thereto. When one sells all his property to one person, the law of pre-emption does not apply.

[Likewise, if it is sold] to its original owner, it is not subject to the law of pre-emption. If one purchases from or sells to a heathen, there is no law of pre-emption. 'If one purchases from a heathen' — because he [the purchaser] can say to him [the abutting neighbor], 'I have driven away a lion from your boundaries.' 'If he sells to a heathen' — because a heathen is certainly not subject to [the exhortation], 'And thou shalt do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord.' Nevertheless, he [the vendor] is placed under a ban, until he accepts responsibility for any injury that might ensue through him [the heathen].

A mortgage is not subject to the law of pre-emption. For rav Ashi said: The elders of Matha Mehasia told me, What is the meaning of mashkanta [a pledge, mortgage]? That it abides with him [the mortgagee]. What is its practical bearing? In respect to pre-emption.

When one sells [an estate] that is far [from the vendor's domicile] in order to buy one that is near, or an inferior property to repurchase a better, the law of pre-emption does not apply.

[When an estate is sold] for poll-tax, alimony [of a widow and her daughters] and funeral expenses, the law of pre-emption does not apply, for the Nehardeans said: For poll-tax, alimony, and funeral expenses an estate is sold without public announcement.

[A sale] to a woman, orphans, or a partner is not subject to the law of pre-emption. Of urban neighbors and rural neighbors, the former have priority; of a neighbor [but not of the field to be sold] and a scholar, the latter takes precedence; of a relative and a scholar, the latter has priority. The scholars propounded: What of a neighbor and a relative? — Come and hear: Better is a neighbor that is near than a brother that is far off.\textsuperscript{38}

If one offers well-formed coins, and the other full — weight coins, the law of pre-emption does not apply. If these [the coins of the abutting neighbor] are bound up, and those [of the purchaser] unsealed, there is no pre-emption. If he [the neighbor] says, 'I will go, take trouble, and bring money;' we do not wait for him. But if he says, 'I will go and bring money;' we consider: if he is a man of substance, who can go and bring the money [without delay], we wait for him; if not, we do not wait for him.

If the land belongs to one and the buildings [upon it] to another, the former can restrain the latter, but the latter cannot restrain the former. If the land belongs to one and the palm-trees [upon it] to another, the former can restrain the latter, but the latter cannot restrain the former. [If a stranger wishes to purchase] the land for building houses, and [the abutting neighbor wants] the land for sowing, habitation is more important; and there is no law of pre-emption. If a rocky ridge or a plantation of young palm trees lay between [the fields], we consider: If he [the abutting neighbor] can enter therein even with a single furrow, it is subject to the law of pre-emption, but not otherwise.

If one of four neighbors [on the four sides of a field] forestalled the others, the sale is valid; but if they all come together, it [the field] is divided diagonally.

\textsuperscript{37} 519.84 m\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{38} Proverbs 27:10.
**Ketubot** 44a:

It is obvious [that the reason why both deeds are valid where] the first [was a deed] of sale and the second [a deed] of gift [is because the action of the owner] was intended to improve the other's rights, as a safeguard against the law of pre-emption; and much more [is this obvious where] the first was for a gift and the second for a sale, for it may then be presumed that the latter was written in that manner in order to safeguard the other against a creditor's rights.

**Bava Kama** 114a:

Rav Ashi further said: A son of Israel who sells to a heathen a field bordering on one of a fellow Israelite deserves to have a shamta (lit. 'desolation'; a ban, or excommunication) pronounced against him. For what reason? If because of the right of [pre-emption enjoyed by] the nearest neighbor to the boundary, did the Master not state that where he buys from a heathen or sells to a heathen the right of [pre-emption enjoyed by] the nearest neighbor to the boundary does not apply? — It must therefore be because the neighbor might say to the vendor: 'You have placed a lion at my border.'³⁹ He therefore deserves to have a shamta pronounced against him unless he accepts upon himself the responsibility for any consequent mishap that might result [from the sale].

**Bava Batra** 5a:

Runya bought a field adjoining a field of Ravina. The latter thought he was entitled to eject him in virtue of his right of preemption. Said rav Safra the son of rav Yeva to Ravina: You know the saying, Four for the large skin, four for the small skin, tslala (or: Four for the skin, four for the tanner, tsalala).⁴⁰

**References**


³⁹ «It was no uncommon practice for the unscrupulous heathen to interfere with the irrigation on which the life of the neighboring fields depended and then force the owners to move out and seek their existence elsewhere», see Funk, 1902, 1, 16.

⁴⁰ I. Epstein in *Soncino Talmud* translates: “The hide costs four zuzim, and four are for the tanner”, and adds a note: “Apparently R. Sapha meant that by having two fields instead of one, Ronya, who was a poor man, would save expense, and therefore Rabina ought to let him keep it. But the exact application of the saying here is obscure. v. Rashi and Tosaf”. According to another explanation of this obscure proverb, it means “four for a small skin, four for a large skin”. In any case, the general meaning of rav Safra’s notification to Ravina is clear: the rule is ‘And thou shalt do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord’, so Ravina must fulfill it by letting Runya to buy the land in question, since Runya is the poorer one and needs it more.


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**СЛЕДЫ FELDGEMEINSCHAFT (ПОЛЕВОГО СОЮЗА) В ЮРИДИЧЕСКОЙ СИСТЕМЕ РИМСКОГО ЕГИПТА И В ЕВРЕЙСКОМ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВЕ**

Хава Броха Корзакова

Р. Оху. XLI 2954 verso ii.12–25 содержит несколько документов, по меньшей мере два из которых посвящены одной и той же теме — продаже собственности одним из совладельцев. Первый документ представляет собой указ римского наместника Египта Гая Авидия Гелиодора (предположительно от 137 г. н. э.), второй — решение суда, очевидно, более позднее. Указания наместника не имеют параллелей в римском законодательстве; Герман и Руппрехт приходят к выводу, что они основываются на местном египетском законе, согласно которому у соседей есть преимущественное право приобретения собственности. Ещё одно свидетельство существования предполагаемого египетского закона находится в письме от брата к брату в PSI XII 1259 (= SB V5997), датируемом вторым или третьим в. н. э.; третий документ, P. Madrid 11 (= SB VI 9621), относящийся к третьему в. н. э., который Юти считает дополнительным свидетельством существования этого закона, по моему мнению, противоречит ему и требует иного объяснения. Три текста, в которых обсуждается эта же тема, находятся в папирусе SB XIV 12139, относящемся ко второму в. н. э. В каждом из них мы можем увидеть дополнительные детали применения обсуждаемого закона в Римском Египте. Представляется, что обсуждаемый египетский закон имеет параллель в талмудическом «Законе о соседе» (דינה de-bar miṣra), согласно которому соседи имеют преимущественное право приобретения собственности (BT, Бава Мециа, 108а, см. Elon 1973, 513–514). Представляется, что оба закона, и египетский, и еврейский, основываются на понятии архаического *Feldgemeinschaft* (полевого союза). Возможно, другая стадия развития той же идеи представлена в греческом законе, касающемся «пограничных денег» (αμφυρίον). Любопытно, что, как замечает Албек, еврейские источники этого закона сводятся исключительно к вавилонским, что может указывать на более сильное влияние римского законодательства на палестинское еврейское законодательство, нежели на вавилонское.

**Ключевые слова:** египетское право, римское право, греческое право, еврейское право, юридические папирусы, римский наместник Египта, римский Египет.

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The disparaging report of Remmius Palaemon in Suet. DGR 23 contains his own seemingly absurd vainglorious dicta and a contemporary vis-à-vis joke aimed at his sexual appetites. The first cannot be as pointless as they seem given the great authority of Palaemon as a scholar and the second is textually unsatisfying, and thus not quite clear. The present study tries to improve on both, uncovering the actual witticism of Palaemon’s words in the first case as well as the real meaning of his opponent’s pun in the second. Thus, it turns out that behind the repulsive portrait drawn by Suetonius hides a much more sympathetic and less depraved personality.

Q. Remmium Palaemonem Persii magistrum (Vita, v. 11 Clausen) Quintiliani praeceptorem (Schol. ad Iuv. 4, 452; 7, 215), ‘Artis grammaticae’ auctorem et grammaticorum sui temporis principem (Suet. De gramm. et rhet. 23, 2; Plin. NH 14, 49) scriptorum, qui vitam moresque eius posteritati mandare voluerunt, ipsum reprehensionis ansam dedisse satis constat. Nimia enim opinione ingenii sui sapientemque se iactavit et hoc quidem coram discipulis. Inde ambitionis fama in schola, cuius rector fuit, orta scholasticorum more nutrita et usque ad imperatorum aures prolata est (Suet. loc. cit.). Mentionem vanitatis, quae nota mire in illo fuit, Plinius (NH 14, 50) non ita longe post exitum Remmii fecisse videtur2 eandemque vanitatem testantia verba Suetonius inter alios rumores servavit, cum scripsit arrogantiam viri tantam esse, ut M. Varronem porcum appellaret, secum et natas et morituras litteras iactaret, nomen suum in Bacolcis non temere postum sed praeasagente Vergilio fore quandoque omnium poeta rum ac poema tum Palaemonem iudicem, glorìabatur etiam latrones quandoam sibì propter nominis celebritatem parsisse (Gramm. 23, 4).3

Haec dicta quasi nuda et e sermonis contextu exempta accepinus causasque talia pronuntiandi ipse Suetonius ignorare videtur. Quam absurdum, qui grammaticus peritis-

2 Ita etiam Kaster 2003, 229.
3 Suetonii textus hic et infra secundum Brugnoli 1972, 26.

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simus putaretur, eum se litterarum non modo vindicem, sed etiam auctorem profiteri! Verumtamen litteras cum Palaemon et natas et morituras ad tres illas, quas Ti. Claudius invenit atque in separato volumine tractavit (Suet. Cl. 41, 3), pertinere posse suspicimus. Dixit fortasse Remmius, qui in ludo suo litteras Claudianas docere iubetur, imperatorem de earum necessitate secum egisse atque approbationem suam obtinuisse. Quas tamen litteras supervacaneas non diu victuras, auctoritate sua, non voluntate principis in usu permansuras esse praedavicat. Superbe quidem dictum, verum etiam facete. Per verborum enim lusum Remmius sententia cum ambiguitate etiam salem suum perdidit.


Illud certe vanitatis vitium apud vv. dd. haud insitatum Romanis autem omnium invisissimum (notum est illud Ciceronis nec vero est quicquam turpis vanitate: Off. 1, 150) primoribusque populi in homine liberto praecipue irridendum, causa fuit Tiberio et postea

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4 De quorum imaginibus atque originibus: Oliver 1949.
5 Quocirca infantem illum, cui Ecl. 4 dedicavit Augusti aevo natum ideoque felicem aevi aurei praenuntium etiamnunc false interpretantur, sicutiam pridem interpretati sunt. Asinius Gallus olim, sibi Ecl. 4 dedicatam esse proclamavit (Ascon., SD ad v. 11).
6 L. Annaeus Cornutus, qui Persii magister alter post Remmiium fuit, in commentariis, quorum fragmenta apud Servium servata sunt, Vergilium de vaniloquentia accusabat (GRF 29, 35). Eiusdem generis reprehensiones apud Persium invenientes (1, 96–97).
8 Kaster 2003, 238: “Since such toughs would typically be as uneducated as they were fierce, their clement respect for a man of culture would be doubly remarkable.”
9 Ibid. 232: “P. was no doubt a provocative figure, whose success… aroused invidia in others.”
Claudio, cur dicerent *nemini minus institutionem puerorum vel iuvenum committendam* (Suet. *De gramm.* 23, 2). Minime tamen eis credendum est, qui propter hanc sententiam paediconem notissimum Remmii fuisse putent.\(^{11}\) Ipse enim Suetonius, etsi *infamem omnibus vitii* eum proclamat, nihil certe ea de re nuntiare potest.\(^{12}\) Mulierum amator (de hoc mox infra), si etiam puerorum amator notitates sua dissererat, num scholam publicam diu et prospere exercere potuisse? Sed nocet arrogans nimiumque superbus puerorum doctor, cui mediocres invident, meliores ad exemplum eius ipsi arrogantiores prodeunt. Ad hoc derisorem fuisse Remmii nullamque auctoritatis reverentiam habuisse satis manifestum est.\(^{13}\)

De vanitate eis hactenus. Inter rumores, quos Suetonius congerere studuit, ut de praeverba Palaemonis mores illustraret, unum reperit, qui ad libidines pertinere:

*Sed maxime flagrabat libidinis in mulieres usque ad infamiam oris: dicto quoque non infaceto notatum ferunt ciusdam qui [quae?] eum in turba osculum sibi ingerentem quamquam refugiens devitare non posset, *"Vis tu — inquit — magister, quotiens festinantem aliquem abligurrire?"* (Gramm. 23, 6).

Quae corrupte tradita esse omnibus fere editoribus appararet. Duae igitur quaestiones solvendae sunt: prior de genere masculino, altera de ioci sensu. Cur mulierositatem Remmi fuisse illustravit, cuius deuteragonistam virum esse masculini generis pronomina *qui* et *aliquem* clarissime monstravit?\(^{14}\) E magno emendationum numero notandae sunt tres: <hominesque> post *mulieres* Ernout *mares* pro *mulieribus* Jernstedt et al. *moliores* Baldwin. Omnes videlicet *mulieres* aut exclusae aut ad exemplum eius ipsius adiungere aut in viros deformare aut saltius virili veste induere volunt.\(^{15}\)


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11 Baldwin 1995, 381.
12 *Tib.* 45 et *Galb.* 22, quae afferit Baldwin, nostra cum fabula male conferuntur. Nam de Remmii libidinis arte et amibuge, quia argumenta prope nulla habuit, de Tiberii et Galbae aperte apertum et copioso dixit.
13 „P’s alleged arrogantia et luxuria would have been sufficient per se to render him suspect”: Kaster 2003, 235; cf. ibid. 231–232: „Elements in the sketch occasionally combine to produce an out-of-focus portrait: though notorious for vices that should have caused any right-minded parent to shun his school, P. was none the less the most successful gramm. of all surveyed in the DGR; though utterly sunk in self-indulgent luxury, he was none the less *diligentissimus* in the management of his *res familiaris*. The portrait as a whole is reminiscent of other stereotyped sketches of depraved and unworthy parvenus, including freedmen who were thought to have risen above their station."
14 Commate post *libidinibus* textus interpungitur a Kaster, op. cit. 26. Quod nec Latine nec iuste videtur. Cf. Baldwin 1995, 380: „I suppose the traditional text could be rescued by having (e.g.) commas after *libidinibus* and *oris*, thus creating separate statements of homosexual and heterosexual proclivity. But this is (to say the least) forced in itself, as well as leaving a peculiarly weak collocation of maxime... quoque and still being vulnerable to further objections."
raro absolute usurpatur. Itaque ad aliquem prospiciens Medii Aevi librarius praecedens pronomen correlativum quae, quod in archetypo per unam litteram q corretum vitid\textsuperscript{16}, in masculinum qui vertit eo facilius, ut cuiusdam qui copulatio usitatissima esset, cuiusdam quae rario oculis et manui apparet.

Nonnulli etiam part. festinantem corruptum censent\textsuperscript{17}, quod tamen ceteri sensu translato pro coeunti vel masturbanti, i. e. quasi ad summum Venerei properar, dictum esse lusumque verborum facetias dicto addere sentiant. Sic ingeniosissime Housman eumque sequentes alii, qui osculum cum re obsceniore conferunt\textsuperscript{18}. Sed (ab)ligurrire sensu obsceno nil aliud significat, quam mulieris pudenda lingere. Cuius usus exemplum dedit Suet. Tib. 45: hircum utelum capreis naturam ligurrire\textsuperscript{19}. Idem apud Ausonium invenies, Epirg. 87: Eunus Syriscus inguinum ligurritor etc; cf. eiusdem in eundem, 86: Eune, quod uxoris gravidae putria inguina lambis. Talia cum pueris ‘festinantibus’ parum congruunt. Itaque opprobrii amore cum Suetonio certare nolumus, sed de muliere eum scripisses credimus. Et magister Palaemon in turba non a discipulo apellatus est, sed quia ludum Romae exercerbat et doctrina notus erat (cf. ex. gr. Petr. 55, 5: rogo, inquit, magister, quid putas inter Ciceronem et Publilium interesse; Schol. ad Hor. Serm. 1, 9, 76 : sic Servius magister).

Restat pauca de ioco addere, cuius sal omnis in verbo abligurriendi positus est. Festinantem ad sua negotia puellam (libertinam fortasse talem, quam describit Hor. Carm. 1, 33, 14–16; Ep. 14, 15–16), senex attentus in turba videt ac simulata salutatione basio salaci subito oblinit.\textsuperscript{20} Quae hanc procatitatem tam lascive exprobravit, ut osculum Palaemonis cum voraciter edendo compararet. Verbo enim ligurriendi vel abligurriendi optimae Latinitatis auctores pro avide mandendo, comedendo, hauriendo, devorando et sim. saepissime utuntur (Ter. Eun. 936; Hor. Serm. 1, 3, 81; 2, 4, 79; Apul. Met. 10, 14; inde ligurritio vel abligurritio pro gula sagina voracitate arcessitur: Cic. Tusc. 4, 26; Script. Hist. Aug. 15, 2). Ergo abligurrire per hyperbolam ad immodice osculandum adhibuit hoc fere sensu: “Num inopinantem si quem vides, ilico tam avide osculas, ut comedere velle videaris?”\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{16} Simili vel eadem abbreviatura in MSS corripiuntur qui et quae: Capelli 1928, 301–302; Havet 1911, 182–183, §§ 775–776.
\textsuperscript{17} os tuentem coniecit Beck; fascinantem Christ, alia v. in app. crit. apud Brugnoli 1972, 26.
\textsuperscript{18} Housman 1931, 412: “Pro festinantem Reifferscheidius haesitantem, cuius dicti facetiae mihi non apparent. Quanto satius erat vel ab hoc uno loco discere festinare vulgari sermone dici qui in certamine venerei ad finem et seminis emissionem properat, iam cum praesagit gaudia corpus / atque in eost venus ut muliebria conserat arva (Lucr. 1106–1107)” Eadem: Adams 1982, 144; Williams 2010, 398. Quorum vis non omnibus patebat. Baldwin (1995, 381–382): „Why should a person trying to escape the lust of Remmius Palaemon be himself on the point of orgasm?” nom. festinans proposuit sensusque nescioquos obsceno obsceniores Suetonio suo inculcare temptavit, „applying the seminal build up to Palaemon himself “. Quod iterum nec ad sensum nec ad rationes palaeographicas quadrat.
О ХАРАКТЕРЕ И ПОРОКАХ РЕММИЯ ПАЛЕМОНА

Михаил Михайлович Позднев

Рассказ Светония о Реммии Палемоне окрашен презрением к герою. Пороки Реммия отвечают его происхождению: биограф изображает прославленного грамматика тщеславным и недалеким выскочкой, к тому же слюнявцем. По ходу повествования автор приводит некоторые, известные, вероятно, по школьным преданиям, высказывания Реммия. Слова с подозрительной точностью вписываются в портрет — хвастливые, однако и глупые до абсурда. Под конец Светоний вспоминает некую шутливую отповедь, полученную Реммием, по-видимому, в ответ на его вполне вольную манеру здороваться. Текст здесь неясен, убедительных исправлений не предложено, трактовки соперничают в обсценности. Впрочем, сперва восстановим контекст, затем оценим положение — во-первых, вернём словам Реммии остроумие, ожидаемое от человека, чье имя, став нарицательным, означало у римлян «филолог», и во-вторых, сообщить внятный, пусть в ущерб игривости, смысл последним строкам гл. 23 De grammaticis et rhetoribus. В итоге за грубыми штуками Светония проступает образ, внушающий больше симпатии.

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The goal of this article is to analyze the construction of space in Seneca’s *Hercules Furens*. It argues that the tragedy establishes a multi-tiered structural analogy among three conceptual domains — 1) the world of supernatural myth, which cannot be ‘shown’ on stage and which, for that reason, is described in rhetorically overblown ekphrastic passages, 2) the visually perceptible world of the stage action, and 3) the abstract world of ‘human life’. These three conceptual domains form an imaginary hybrid space within which philosophically relevant thought is not so much formulated as staged, thereby producing an emotionally powerful — and potentially transformative — effect on the recipient. In addition to offering a new interpretation of *Hercules Furens*, this article thus sheds some important light on the vexed issue of the philosophical intent of Senecan tragedy in general.

**Keywords:** Seneca, Hercules Furens, tragedy, philosophy

Die Forschung zu den Tragödien Senecas ist seit Jahrzehnten von zwei Oppositionen geprägt, die dafür sorgen, dass viele interpretationsrelevante Probleme als kompromisslos ‚entweder/oder Fragen‘ formuliert werden. Zum einen versucht man vergeblich, eine Einigkeit in der Frage zu erzielen, ob es sich bei Senecas Tragödien um rein literarische Darstellungen oder um rein philosophische Lehrstücke handelt.¹ Zum anderen bemüht man sich unermüdlich darum, den Status der senecanischen Tragödien entweder als zur Aufführung bestimmte Theaterstücke oder als nur für private Lektüre geeignete literarische Texte mit ähnlicher Eindeutigkeit zu bestimmen.² Da es bekanntlich keine direk-


ten antiken Zeugnisse gibt, die eine dieser Theorien unwiderlegbar beweisen könnten, verwandeln sich die auf Grundlage solcher binären Logik geführten Forschungsdebatten notgedrungen in reine Glaubensbekenntnisse, bei denen man zur Bekräftigung seiner eigenen Überzeugung das eine Element der Dichotomie hervorzuheben und das andere als zweitrangig und somit als weniger beachtenswert zu behandeln tendiert. Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, eine Alternative zur üblichen binären Logik der Seneca-Forschung anzubieten. Am Beispiel einer Tragödie (des Hercules Furens) soll gezeigt werden, dass die Wahrnehmung der senecanischen Stücke in erster Linie durch die Konstruktion ihres imaginären Bühnenraums bestimmt wird. Innerhalb dieser Konstruktion kann man zwischen drei ontologischen Ebenen unterscheiden: 1) der Welt des übernatürlichen My- thos, der sich auf der Bühne mimetisch nicht darstellen lassen kann und darum in der Regel in rein deskriptiven — ekphrastischen — Passagen beschrieben wird; 2) der Bühnenwelt, in der nur in der empirischen Realität denkbare Handlungen stattfinden; und 3) der Welt die die Welt der Bühne, in der die Rezipienten der Tragödie (ob es sich dabei um Zuschauer oder Leser handelt, ist für die Konstruktion des imaginären Bühnenraums von geringer Relevanz) durch die Bühnenhandlung aufgefordert werden, ihre eigene Selbstwahrnehmung zu ändern. Diese drei Räume — der Bereich des fantastischen Mythos, die Bühne und das Ich des Rezipienten — werden aufeinander projiziert und formen als Folge das, was man in der modernen Kognitionswissenschaft als „blended mental space“ bezeichnen würde, — einen hybriden imaginären Raum, der etwas zu konzeptualisieren erlaubt, was sich ohne diese doppelte Fiktion gar nicht (oder zumindest nicht mit der gleichen Überzeugungskraft) zeigen ließe. Die binären Oppositionen, die der Seneca-Forschung traditionell zugrunde liegen, sollen somit einer komplexen konzeptuellen Vermischung weichen, in der die private Lektüre der Tragödien notgedrungen zu einer zwar imaginierten, doch auch empirisch realisierbaren Bühnenaufführung wird und in der die Stücke dank, und nicht trotz, ihrer mimetischen Konstruiertheit als genuin philosophische Dramen betrachtet werden können.

Im Prolog zum Hercules Furens werden sowohl die zentralen Themen der Tragödie als auch die höchst schematische Beschaffenheit ihrer Raumkonstruktion und Handlung angedeutet. Die Prologssprecherin Juno beklagt sich zunächst über die zunehmend be- sorgnisregende Allmächtigkeit des Hercules: Nachdem er alle Monster der Erde be- siegt und nun mit der Vollendung seiner größten Heldentat (der Be- siegung der Un-
terwelt) eine bisher als absolut geltende Grenze überschritten habe, bestehe die durchaus begründete Befürchtung, er könne nun auch den Himmel erobern wollen und dadurch die gesamte bestehende Weltordnung durcheinander bringen. Wir sehen sofort, dass Hercules in erster Linie als ein gefährliches Paradoxon dargestellt wird, das die räumliche Ordnung — die dreiteilige hierarchische Struktur des Universums — in den Zustand des ursprünglichen Chaos zurückstößt und somit die scheinbar entgegengesetzten kognitiven Kategorien miteinander vermischt. Dieses monströse Geschöpf muss nun beseitigt werden, was nach der schematischen Logik des Prologs nur durch Hercules selbst geschehen kann (es gibt ja schließlich nach der Vollendung seiner Heldentaten niemanden mehr auf der Welt, der ihn herausfordern könnte). Die Unantastbarkeit der räumlichen Struktur der Welt kann folglich nur dadurch wiederhergestellt werden, dass Hercules die letzte Konsequenz aus der sein Wesen bestimmenden Vermischung zwischen dem größten Helden und dem größten Monster zieht, wodurch sein Selbstmord zu einer Überbietung einer herculeischen Heldentat werden müsste.

Die Konfrontation mit dem inneren Chaos kann aber für Hercules nur als Folge seiner Konfrontation mit dem räumlichen Chaos eintreten — einer Vermischung zwischen der empirischen Realität und der Welt des übernatürlichen Mythos, die er besiegt hat. Es ist höchst bezeichnend, dass Juno die Katabasis des Hercules als eine frevelhafte Offenbarung der Geheimnisse der Unterwelt auffasst — als das Sichtbarmachen von etwas, was für immer unsichtbar bleiben sollte. Die darauf folgende detaillierte Beschreibung von Gestalten der Unterwelt, die Hercules zur Selbstzerstörung bewegen sollen, zeigt, dass diese einmalige Offenbarung zu einer verhängnisvollen kognitiven Verwirrung führen muss, was Juno mit unmissverständlicher Klarheit betont, als sie Hercules verspricht, dass er erst hier (hic) die echte Unterwelt erleben wird — hier auf der Bühne, wo man sie am wenigsten erwartet. Die gesamte darauf folgende Handlung lässt sich als eine permanente Oszillierung zwischen einer Aufspaltung und einer Vermischung von verschiedenen räumlichen und konzeptuellen Bereichen verstehen.

Am Ende des Prologs des Hercules Furens führt Juno den gerade einsetzenden Tagesanbruch als Hauptgrund dafür an, dass sie mit der Ausführung ihres Plans möglichst schnell beginnen muss. Dieser konkrete Naturvorgang dient dem Chor als Ausgangs-
punkt für seinen ersten Auftritt. Wenn man alle Chorlieder im *Hercules Furens* zusammen betrachtet, könnte man sagen, dass ihre Funktion, wie auch in anderen senecanischen Tragödien, in erster Linie darin besteht, einerseits den Status des tragischen Mythos als einer bloßen poetischen Fiktion und andererseits die Notwendigkeit dieser Fiktion für die Darstellung der sonst kaum darstellbaren Aspekte der menschlichen Existenz zu betonen. 


Nach dem ersten Chorlied gelten die drei räumlichen Komponenten des Dramas — der übernatürliche, der szenische und der außerszenische Raum — als völlig etabliert, und die Handlung besteht hauptsächlich in einer gegenseitigen Projizierung dieser drei Räume aufeinander. Im zweiten Akt wird die Gültigkeit der übernatürlichen Welt, im Einklang mit dem ersten Chorlied, dadurch in Frage gestellt, dass Lycus, der während Hecules’ Abwesenheit dessen Thron usurpiert hat, sowohl an der göttlichen Abstammung des Throns als auch an der widersinnigen Möglichkeit, seine Herrschaft aufrechtzuerhalten, scheitert. Der Chor beendet seinen Auftritt mit einem moralphilosophisch befehlenden Stichwort (der einfachere Lebensweg sei besser als die illusionären Vorzüge der mythologischen Heldenhaftigkeit), verfestigt endgültig die provisorische Trennung zwischen der gesamten mythologischen Bühnenhandlung und der entmythologisierten Außenperspektive des Chors.

13 Zu Senecas Chorpassagen im Allgemeinen siehe Kirichenko 2013, 249–279.

dass Cerberus eine Zuflucht vor dem Sonnenlicht nur unter Hercules’ Schatten finden kann, denn nur dort fühlt er sich wohl, entfaltet dabei eine transparente symbolische Bedeutung: Nicht nur bringt Hercules also das Infernalische im wörtlichen Sinne auf die Erde; er trägt es — für die Bewohner der Unterwelt bereits deutlich erkennbar — wie eine Metapher in sich.


26 Kirichenko 2013, 260–263.
29 Sen. HF 875ff.: Thebis laeta dies adest. / aras tangite supplices, / pingues caedite victimas; / permixtae maribus nurus / sollemnes agitent choros, etc.
31 Sen. HF 858–863: qualis est vosis animus, remota / luce cum maestus sibi quisque sensit / obrutum tota caput esse terra? / stat chaos densum tenebraeque turpes / et color noctis malus et silentis / otium mundi vacuaeque nubes.
32 Sen. HF 865–866: nemo ad id sero venit, unde numquam, / cum semel venit, poterit reverti.


Die mythologisch übernatürliche Bildlichkeit erweist sich im vierten — und letzten — Auftritt des Chors als geradezu unentbehrlich für die Schilderung emotional ver-

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er die Banalität des menschlichen Lebens, die der Chor in seinem ersten Lied so über-
chwänglich lobte, in eine Projektion der heroischen Bühnenhandlung: Als die größte
Heldentat des Hercules galt bis dahin seine Katabasis,45 nun kommt etwas so Banales wie
das Leben als solches (*vivamus*) hinzu — eine Heldentat, die nach der im Laufe des Stücks
konsequent angewendeten heroischen Logik, größer sein muss als die Bezugung der
Monstern der Unterwelt.46 Hercules' Entscheidung, die verwirrende Komplexität des Le-
bens zu konfrontieren, anstatt in der sicheren, feinsäuberlich kategorisierten Welt der my-
thologischen Fiktion Zuflucht zu suchen, wird somit zu einer Parabel für das menschliche
Leben als solches, das unter Umständen zu einer Heldentat werden kann.47

Dem scheinbar banalen Gedanken, am Leben zu bleiben sei unter Umständen hel-
denhafter als zu sterben, begegnen wir zwar auch in Senecas philosophischen Schriften.48
Es ist jedoch die innerhalb des imaginären Bühnenraums der senecanischen Tragödie
stattfindende Vermischung zwischen dem Mythologischen und dem Alltäglichen, die
dazu beiträgt, dass dieser Gedanke eine emotional besonders wirksame Überzeugungskraft
entfaltet. Dass in der Tragödie inszenierte introspektive Sehen des Unsichtbaren
scheint somit einen im Grunde philosophischen — protreptischen — Zweck zu verfol-
gen. Denn durch diese schmerzhafte Visualisierung wird schließlich jeder Rezipient der
Tragödie indirekt dazu animiert, mit dem mühsamen Prozess seiner eigenen philosophi-
schen Selbsttherapie zu beginnen.49

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45 Vgl. Sen. *HF* 529–557, wo die Katabasis als die letzte — und somit die größte — Heldentat erwähnt
wird.
46 Es darf wohl kaum überraschen, dass man in Euripides' *Herakles* nichts Vergleichbares findet. Bei
Euripides wird Herakles zwar auch — dieses Mal von Theseus — erfolgreich überredet, von einem Selbst-
mord abzusehen; dies geschieht jedoch mit der Begründung, er könne sich in einem der zahlreichen athe-
nischen Heiligtümern einer rituellen Reinigung unterziehen: Eur. *Her.* 1313–1420; vgl. die letzten Worte von
Senecas *Hercules Fures* (Sen. *HF.* 1341–1344): nostra te tellus manet. / illic solutam caede Gradivus manum
/restituit armis: illa te, Alcide, vocat, / facere innocentes terra quae superos solet. Zum Vergleich zwischen den
Schlusspartien der beiden Tragödien siehe Lieberg 1994.
47 Kirichenko 2013, 27–33.
48 Sen. ep. 78, 2: saepe impetum cepi abrumpenda vitae: patris me indulgentissimi senectus retinuit.
cogitavi enim non quam fortiter ego mori possem, sed quam ille fortiter desiderare non posset. itaque imperavi
mihi, ut viverem. aliquando enim et vivere fortiter facere est. 104, 3 indulgendum est enim honestis adfectibus;
et interdum, etiam si premunt causae, spiritus in honorem suorum vel cum tormento revocandus et in ipso ore
retinendus est, cum bono viro vivendum sit non quamdiu iuvat sed quamdiu oportet: ille qui non uxorem, non
amicum tanti putat ut diutius in vita commoretur, qui perseverabit mori, delicatus est. hoc quoque imperat sibi
animus, ubi utilitas suorum exigat, nec tantum si vult mori.
49 Für eine detaillierte Besprechung des protreptischen Potenzials der senecanischen Tragödien (in
30: ἰατρεῖ οὖν ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ σχολείον· οὐ δεῖ ἡσθέντες ἐξελθέν, ἄλλ’ ἀληθίσαντας. Zum
Allgemeinen, Sorabji (2000), 159–300. Vgl. Sen. ep. 6, 1 et hoc ipsum argumentum est in melius translati
animi, quod vita sua, quae adhuc ignorabat, videt; Bartsch (2006), 191–229.
ВООБРАЖАЕМОЕ СЦЕНЕЧЕСКОЕ ПРОСТРАНСТВО
В ТРАГЕДИИ СЕНЕКИ «ГЕРКУЛЕС В БЕЗУМЬЕ»
Александр Леонидович Кириченко

Целью данной статьи является анализ построения пространства в трагедии Сенеки Безумный Геркулес. Статья демонстрирует, что трагедия базируется на структурной аналогии между тремя концептуальными областями — 1) миром сверхъестественной мифологии, который не может быть правдоподобно показан на сцене и поэтому детально описывается в дескриптивных пассажах, 2) визуально воспринимаемым миром сценического действия и 3) абстрактно мыслимым миром 'человеческой жизни'. Эти три области сливаются в единое воображаемое пространство, в рамках которого философская мысль оказывается не столько сформулированной, сколько наглядно инсценированной, подвергая зрителя /читателя эмоциональному воздействию, потенциально способствующему его внутренней трансформации. Таким образом, помимо интерпретации трагедии Безумный Геркулес данная статья предлагает новый общий подход к роли философии в драмах Сенеки.

Ключевые слова: Сенека, Безумный Геркулес, трагедия, философия.

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ON THE ORDER OF COMPLEMENTS IN LATIN SUPPORT
VERB CONSTRUCTIONS: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH

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The article investigates the ordering of complements in Latin support verb constructions (SVC) of the type bellum inferre or insidias facere with prototypically trivalent verbs, which can either keep or lose the third valency in such constructions. After the brief synopsis of the issues regarding general aspects of the SVCs, the author focuses on the order of the Direct and Indirect objects within the nine constructions (304 occurrences in total) taken from the works of Classical Latin writers. The theoretical background of the analysis applied is the idea of interaction and competition between the three language dimensions, i.e. semantic, pragmatic and deictic-denotative ones, which can determine various orderings of the complements in their relation to each other. On the basis of a previous corpus study concerning the argument structure of Latin trivalent verbs, the author considers the order Direct-Indirect object (DI) as unmarked (neutral), while the opposite order ID as resulting from either special deictic-denotative properties of the arguments or pragmatic factors. As regards the deictic-denotative properties, they depend on the place occupied by the noun or the pronoun in the animacy hierarchy. The promotion of the Indirect object to the priority position is explained by the animacy of its denotatum or by the status of speech act participant, if it is expressed by a personal / reflexive / anaphoric pronoun.

The author analyzes the order of the Direct and Indirect objects in the nine support verb constructions selected from the works by Caesar, Cicero and Sallust (304 occurrences in total). The analysis demonstrates that the order ID is attested three times as often as the opposite order DI, because the Indirect objects are usually animate or pronominal in the constructions of this type. In some cases, however, the pragmatic factors such as focus, contrast or emphasis may also influence the ordering. The findings are represented in the table and are followed by the examples.

Keywords: Latin support verb constructions, constituent order, syntax, pragmatics, deictic-denotative properties of the constituents, valency center.

1. Introduction

In Latin, as well as in many other languages, there are analytical constructions consisting of verbs with “bleached” semantics and abstract nouns, which bear the main lexical meaning. Such verbal constructions initially were studied on the base of the French language and were called “les construction à verb support”, but since the nineteenth, they have drawn attention of the experts in other languages including Latin, and became very popular as an object of investigation under a variety of names: periphrastic constructions, collocations, support verb constructions (SVC henceforth), light verb constructions, verb-nominal constructions, Functionsverbgefüge. The study of this phenomenon in such corpus language as Latin is considered to be a matter of great importance from the typological point of view (Baños 2012, 37). Normally, SVCs in Latin are the combinations

1 I would like to express my gratitude to Olga Spevak for the invitation to participate in the Journée d'étude: Les constructions à verbe support en latin in September 2016, Toulouse, where I presented a part of this study. I am also grateful to Tatiana Nikitina and Evgenij Filimonov whose useful remarks aided in revising this article for publication.

of the verbs facere, dare, ferre (afferre), capere, agere, gerere and some others with different abstract or verbal nouns. In such constructions, the verb does not completely lose its semantics (unlike in the idioms of the type morem gerere), but it weakens — to some extent — its lexical meaning, while keeping the grammatical meaning of person, number, tense, aspect, mood and voice. Its main contribution is to actualize the process (Gross 2004, 167; Spevak 2014, 202).

Typically, these constructions are analytical correlates to the simple verbs with similar semantics: insidias facere — insidiari, spem capere — sperare, usum habere — uti etc.

What is the existence of such analytic constructions in a synthetic language like Latin determined by? The researchers answer this question in different ways.

If SVC has a simple verbal correlate of the same root (e.g. vitam ago — vivo, fugam facio — fugio), the right of this construction to exist is explained by the need for the expression of different kinds of nuances (Flobert 1996, 196; Gross 2004, 167), as well as by the fact that the analytical constructions give an opportunity to modify the noun by means of adjectives or pronouns, and therefore, to refine or make more precise the predicate's meaning, as in example (1), where the SVC messim facere with the modifier primam is used instead of the simple verb metere (Pinkster 2015, 74):

(1) ardius messim primam eius facere oportebit … (Columella Rust. 2, 10, 28)

Apart from semantics, there may also be a syntactic factor motivating the use of complex construction instead of a simple verb, as exemplified in (2):

(2) Messi facta spicilegium venire oportet (Varro Rust. 1, 53, 1)

In this clause, the Ablative absolute would have been impossible with the simple verb metere (Pinkster 2015, 76).

If there is no simple verb with a certain meaning in a language, the SVC is believed to compensate for its lack, as verba facere ’to speak in a public place’.

Some SVCs can be considered as substitutes of the passive forms for deponent verbs: admiror — in admiratione esse, obliviscor — in oblivionem adduci / de memoria excidere (Flobert 1996, 194).

Previously, it has been thought that the verbo-nominal constructions are characteristic of the colloquial style (Hofmann, Szantyr 1972, 754–755), but now this opinion is not so popular (Pinkster 2015: 76): SVCs, indeed, look appropriate in the philosophical writings of Cicero as well as in his letters, or didactic treatises of Columella and Varro, or in the Plautus’ and Terence’s comedies.

How the support verb constructions can be identified and distinguished from the idioms?

In literature on the topic, a variety of criteria can be found. Thus, Pierre Flobert (1996, 195–196) points out inter alia the following properties of SVCs:

1) SVCs can be transformed into a passive (insidias facere / insidia e fieri),
2) some SVCs have “conversion” pairs (fidem dare — fidem accipere),
3) the same noun can be combined with different support verbs (spem capere / facere / habere, afferre, dare; bellum inferre, gerere, facere).3 The nuances of meaning provided by these verbs are not always obvious and concern mainly the aspectual differences: one

3 The Tatiana Taous’ analysis of the collocations with the noun bellum and different support verbs showed that the choice of a verb can depend on the literary genre: whereas in prose the verb gerere oc-
can therefore distinguish between the durative *agere*, punctive *facere*, terminative *gerere*, ingressive *ferre* etc.,

4) the set of SVCs in a language is constantly updated, as it is seen from Petronius (42, 1: *staminatas ducere*; 34, 7; 73, 6: *tangomenas facere*) and Egeria (9, 1: *vigilias agere*; 37, 7: *spiritum reddere*).

Some other criteria for SVC identification were proposed by Gaston Gross in his Introduction to the special edition of *Linguisticae Investigationes* dedicated to support verb constructions in different languages (Gross 2004, 168). He drew attention to the following properties of SVCs:

1) the construction can be converted into a relative clause: *insidias facere* — *insidias, quas Clodius Miloni fecit*;

2) the noun can be modified by an adjective or a possessive pronoun: *bellum gerere* — *eius bellum, gratias agere* — *maximas gratias*;

3) the verb cannot be subject to nominalization: *insidias facere / parare* — *factio / paratio insidiarum* (?). These properties do not hold for idioms, and consequently can serve to distinguish these two types of constructions. Compare, e.g., *morem gerere* — *mos, quem …gerit* (?)

G. Gross also recommends to separate the *support verb construction* both from the *light verb constructions* of the Anglo-Saxon tradition and from German *Functionsverben*, since they may include *des constructions de nature adjectival* (e.g., *être en mouvement*) or causative ones (e.g., *mettre en mouvement*) (Gross 2004, 167). This point is supported by André Valli (2007, 45), who insists on distinguishing between *les construction verbales figées* (*les locutions verbales* in Gross’ terms (2004, 168)) and *les constructions à verbe support*.

Note, however, that the criteria suggested by scholars do not always work, and a general consensus on this point has not been reached.

One of the most interesting problems concerning verbo-nominal constructions is syntactic incorporation, particularly if both a SVC and the verb with incorporation coexist in a language. Emanuela Marini (2015) considers the constructions *bellum gerere* and *ludos facere* as full semantic equivalents of the verbs *belligero* and *ludificor*. According to Pierre Flobert (1996, 197) and Jose Miguel Baños (2012, 2013), incorporation is the last stage in the evolution of verbo-nominal constructions. Sometimes the two similar constructions can undergo completely different syntactic processes resulting in the SVCs with different levels of grammaticalization, as, for example, *ludos facere*. Baños demonstrated that, on the one hand, the construction *ludos facere + Acc.* ‘to make a fun of smb’ has converted into the incorporating verb *ludificari*, because the support verb *facere* lost its original meaning, and the whole SVC underwent full grammaticalization (Baños 2012, 47); on the other hand, the homonymous construction *ludos facere + Dat.* with a completely different meaning ‘to organize the game in someone’s honor’, was not subjected to grammaticalization and incorporation, because the verb *facere* in this case preserved its meaning. According to Baños (2012, 55), these two constructions are the two poles on the continuum: from the SVC with the verb which has not lost its semantics to the structure subjected to syntactic incorporation. Interestingly, close connection between a verb and

curs more often, in poetry the variety of verbs is considerable (*movere, facere, ducere, ferre, gerere*) (Taous 2015, 279).

4 For the purpose of clarity, I substituted the author’s French examples for the Latin ones.
a noun does not always result in incorporation, if this connection is lexical rather than syntactic one, as in the verb *manumittere* ‘to free a slave’ (Fugier 1994, 88).

As it is seen from the above observation, the Latin language produced homonymous collocations with completely different meaning. This difference is manifested in their unequal syntactic behavior, which seems to be another interesting topic related to verbo-nominal constructions. The SVC *fidem facere*, for example, has two different meanings and hence, two types of extension. When it means ‘to lend credence’, it is used with the dative complement, as is exemplified in (3):

(3) ... *Quoniam auribus vestris propter incredibilem magnitudinem sceleris minorem fidem faceret oratio mea* (Cic. Cat. 3, 4, 7).

When, however, the construction has the causative meaning ‘make believe’, it is accompanied by the AcI, as in (4):

(4) *Etenim si populo consulis ... fac fidem te nihil nisi populi utilitatem et fructum quaerere* (Cic. Leg. agr. 2, 22, 2).

The types of complements in SVCs and the number of valencies of both a verb and a noun is another interesting topic which I would like to consider in detail. It is the alignment of the complements or, in other words, their order within the SVCs that will be of my particular interest.

2. Valency center, number of arguments and constituent order in SVCs: a brief synopsis

The number of valencies of support verbs and nouns in SVCs as well as the ordering of the constituents is a very topical issue. In recent years we have witnessed a lot of studies on the topic.

According to Hannah Rosén (1981: 144), the centre of valency in verbo-nominal constructions is either the noun, the underlying verb or the whole syntactic construction. The idea of a whole construction as valency center is supported by Olga Spevak (2010, 125–126) and Roland Hoffmann (2015, 368), who consider the noun and the verb as a pragmatic unit, in which the two components are in close connection with each other. Combining a verb and a noun in the syntactic unity can reduce a number of the verb valencies and thus change the verb’s argument structure. In the construction *insidias facere* ‘to intrigue against smb’, the verb *facere* ‘to do’ is supposed to admit three arguments: Agent, Patient and Recipient, but in fact, the third argument depends on the noun *insidias* ‘intrigue’ or on the construction as a whole rather than on the verb. For this reason, the proper question to the clause in (5) should be ‘what happened to Milo’ or ‘whom did Clodius intrigue against’ rather than ‘what did Clodius do to Milo’:

(5) *Clodius insidias fecit Miloni* (Cic. Mil. 60, 5)

There is no doubt that the number of verbal valencies is often reduced in SVCs, but it is also clear that to find the valency center of a SVC is not always an easy task. In my study, I am going to focus on the constructions with prototypically trivalent verbs, e. g.
facere / agere ‘to do smth for smb’, dare ‘to give smth to smb’, (in-, ad-) ferre ‘to bring smth to smb’. Each of them admits complements in the accusative and in the dative, with prototypical semantic roles of Patient and Recipient, but in fact, as Harm Pinkster points out, in these combinations, further arguments do not depend on the verb, but rather on the noun (Pinkster 2015: 74).

If we take into account the reduction of the verb’s valencies in SVCs, it seems reasonable to talk about the argument structure in syntactic, rather than semantic terms (i. e. to use the terms “Direct (D) and Indirect (I) objects”, or “complements” instead of Patient and Recipient).5

The next interesting issue is how consistent or, conversely, inconsistent the word order in such constructions is. This question has been repeatedly raised by scholars especially in its relation to the level of cohesion between the constituents in SVCs, and therefore, to the degree of grammaticalization. In other words, the more consistent the word order in SVC, the further SVC has proceeded along the path of grammaticalization.

The position of the verb (V) and the noun (N) in verbo-nominal constructions has been studied in detail by Olga Spevak (2010: 125–131) who applied the pragmatic approach to the constituent order in classical Latin prose. Spevak believes that in verbo-nominal constructions neither the verb nor the noun is a candidate for Focus, but they function together as a pragmatic unit (Spevak 2010, 125–126). A detailed examination of 178 constructions taken from Caesar, Sallust and Cicero allowed her to conclude that ordering of the main components is not fixed, but demonstrates a strong tendency to be NV, since the noun precedes the verb in 71% of cases. Spevak also notes that the more the number of complements in the construction is, the greater the amount of variations that can be observed. In general, she comes to the important — in view of my study — conclusion that the relative ordering of the verb and the noun in verbo-nominal constructions cannot be definitively established, because their behavior depends on their syntactic capacities and their semantic properties (Spevak 2010, 131). Whereas the position of V and N in SVCs is investigated rather well,6 the ordering of the other constituents is not so clear. In the following sections of my article, I am going to examine the order of the complements within the verbo-nominal constructions and to establish whether the syntactic, semantic or other properties of the constituents in question are crucial for the ordering.

3. The Ordering of Direct and Indirect objects in support verb constructions

In view of these data, I will proceed to the main purposes of my study: first, to reveal what the order of Direct and Indirect objects in SVCs depends on, and second, to try to establish what language processes or tendencies stand behind it.

As it has been mentioned above, I will concentrate on the constructions with the support verbs which are prototypically trivalent or, at least, admit the complements in the accusative and the dative (dare, (ad-, in-) ferre, facere, parare, gerere). The question

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5 Since Latin is a pro-drop language, in this study I will ignore the position of the first argument (Agent, or Subject).

6 See Spevak 2010, 126; Marini 2015, 120.
about their ordering is closely related to the general problem of verb argument structure in Latin, which I analyzed in my previous study (Zheltova 2014).\(^7\) The examination of the verb *mittō* ‘to send’ and some other trivalent verbs with Direct (D) and Indirect (I) objects clearly showed that the order of D and I in relation to each other is a result of the competition between different linguistic dimensions, i. e. syntactic, pragmatic and deictic-denotative ones. The neutral order of the arguments determined exclusively by the semantic roles was found to be *DI* (i. e. Direct — Indirect object), but it can be easily converted into *ID* under the influence of both pragmatic factors and deictic-denotative properties of the arguments including animacy and the status of speech act participants.\(^8\) Having analyzed different combinations of nouns with personal pronouns as well as personal / reflexive / anaphoric pronouns with each other, I came to the conclusion that the priority of I over D which contradicts the neutral order, can be explained by the higher position of animate nouns and pronouns in the animacy hierarchy.

Now my aim is to examine whether such multidimensional approach holds for support verbs. In this study, I will restrict my corpus to the three authors of the classical period — Caesar, Cicero and Sallust. Later, I am going to extend my empirical base by adding the authors belonging to the other periods of Roman literature, to look at the phenomenon in the diachronic perspective. As regards the collocations, I selected 9 SVCs corresponding to the pattern ‘support verb + noun in Acc.’ The eight collocations admit complements in the dative, and only one (*bellum gerere*) governs prepositional phrases *cum + Ablative* or *contra + Accusative*.

4. Methodology

For the purpose of my analysis, I used the electronic database PHI-5.\(^9\) I examined 9 constructions with support verbs *agere, dare, (ad-, in-)ferre, facere, parare, gerere* (304 occurrences in total) found in the works of Caesar, Cicero and Sallust. The aim of this examination is to reveal the order of Direct and Indirect objects in each construction without taking into account, whether the Indirect object is governed by the verb or by the noun, or by the structural unity of both, and to realize, what variations in ordering depend on. The data are represented in the table.\(^10\)

In the table, the three columns are occupied by the combinations of the Direct object promoted in the first position, with animate, inanimate and pronominal Indirect objects respectively; the following three columns are given to the combinations of animate, inanimate and pronominal Indirect objects with the Direct object. The two right columns contain the statistics of correlation between the combinations *DI* and *ID*, and the total number of occurrences for each verbo-nominal construction.

\(^{7}\) Желтова Е. В. Дейктико-денотативная иерархия и конструкции с трехвалентными глаголами в латинском языке. Philologia classica 2014, 9, 228–247.


\(^{9}\) A resource prepared by the Packard Humanities Institute.

\(^{10}\) The abbreviations in the table: D — Direct Object, I — Indirect Object, an — animate, inan — inanimate, pro — personal / reflexive / anaphoric pronoun.
It is worth noting that the participants D in the table are always inanimate, whereas the participants I can be either animate or inanimate, or pronominal, so the ordering of the participants in each construction is expected to depend on the properties of the latter rather than the former.

5. Results

5.1. Preferred order of the complements in the selected constructions

The analysis of the combinations represented in the table highlighted the following points:

1) the pattern ID is attested in 72% of cases, i.e. almost three times as often as the opposite order DI (28%), although it is DI that is believed to be neutral and most frequent in the construction with typical trivalent verbs;

2) the combination IproD, with pronominal argument in a prominent position, is an absolute champion in number, since it occurs in 37% of cases. This can be explained by the fact that personal / reflexive pronouns occupy the highest position in the animacy hierarchy as speech act participants (the so-called locutors);\(^{11}\)

3) the combination IanD ranks next in frequency of occurrences (31%), because animate nouns also tend to occupy the higher levels of the animacy hierarchy. Interestingly, names of animals do not occur as dative complements, only human names and collective nouns, such as senatus, populus etc., which in Latin, unlike in Russian and some other languages, are thought to be animate (Zheltova 2015, 255–256\(^{12}\)) and therefore, obtain a very high position in the empathy hierarchy of the ancient Romans.

To sum up, animacy clearly makes a contribution to the ordering of constituents in verbo-nominal constructions, hence, we must agree that the deictic-denotative dimension prevails over the semantic one in Latin SVCs.

\(^{11}\) About animacy and personal hierarchies, see Zheltova 2014, 230–231.

\(^{12}\) Желтова Е. В. Почему «река» одушевленнее «рака»: о нестандартных случаях проявления категории одушевленности в латыни. Philologia classica 2015, 10, 245–266.
The examples of support verb constructions in the table are given below:

(6) *Agit hominibus gratias et eorum benivolentiam erga se diligentiamque conlaudat* (Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 161).

(7) *Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, ob-sides dederant, magnopere orabant, ut sibi auxilium ferret* (Caes. BGall. 4, 16, 5).

(8) …*neque enim tibi haec res adfert dolorem, sed quandam incredibilem voluptatem* (Cic. Cat. 1, 25, 3).

(9) …*si inuiuriam tibi factam quereris, defendam et negabo* (Cic. Div. Caec. 58, 2).

(10) …*infer patriae bellum, exsulta impio latrocinio* (Cic. Cat. 1, 23, 8).

(11) *Cum Armeniorum rege Tigrane grave bellum nuper ipsi diuturnumque gessimus* (Cic. Sest. 58, 8).

(12) …*bellum ego populo Romano neque feci neque factum umquam volui* (Sall. Iug. 110, 6, 2).

(13) …*hic dies meaque contentio atque actio spem primum populo Romano attulit libertatis reci-perandae* (Cic. Fam. 10, 28, 2).

(14) *Nam Pompeius haec intellegit nobiscumque communicat, insidias vitae suae fieri* (Cic. QFr. 2, 3, 4).

5.2. Explaining different orders of complements: a pragmatic approach

If we look closely at the penultimate right columns of the two tables, it will be obvious that the choice of the orderings varies significantly in different SVCs. Some of them distribute the orders ID and DI almost equally, without preferences, like *inuiuriam facere* (12: 12), *insidias facere / parare* (8: 8). Others prefer the order ID, like *gratias agere* (114 occurrences out of 131), *auxilium ferre* (19 out of 22), *dolorem dare / afferre / facere* (7 out of 8), *auxilio esse* (13 out of 19), or, on the contrary, choose the opposite order DI: *bellum facere* (6 out of 9), *spem afferre* (12 out of 16). Many of them demonstrate a very high level of consistency in ordering that seems even suspicious in a language with the syntactically free constituent order. How can this be explained?

It is obvious that neither the syntactic, nor the deictic-denotative dimension suffices for explaining this phenomenon, so a third — pragmatic — dimension should be involved.

To prove this, let us first concentrate on the most frequent construction in my corpus — *gratias agere*, which definitely prefers the order ID. The special status of this SVC needs no explanation: what construction appears more often in any language than the expression of gratitude? It is natural that in the majority of cases, it occurs with the *animate* dative complements (129 out of 131 in my corpus), and in a considerable part of them, the complements are expressed by personal pronouns. As Spevak pointed out (2010, 94 — 95), if such pronouns are used in an oblique case, their placement in the clause is variable and not necessarily initial, because they do not have a special pragmatic function. It means that my hypothesis about the priority of the deictic-denotative dimension, which determines the initial position of the pronouns, is credible. Nevertheless, in some cases the pragmatic dimension does really work as well.

One of such cases is exemplified in (15), where Cicero chose the order DI, which is not typical for the constructions with pronominal Indirect objects:

(15) *qui etiam gratias tibi agere debo quod me ex fortissimorum civium numero seiungendum non putasti* (Cic. Vat. 26, 2)
'When I ought rather to return you thanks, for having thought me deserving of not being separated from the number of gallant and virtuous citizens' (transl. by C. D. Yonge).

The constituent *gratias* is emphatic, that is why it occupies the initial position, before the personal pronoun *tibi*, which does not have special pragmatic function in this context. The importance of pragmatic dimension is clearly seen in comparison of examples with the same constituents expressed by the same nouns, as in (16), (17), and (18):

(16) *quem cum supremo eius die Maximus laudaret, gratias egit dis immortalibus, quod ille vir in hac re publica potissimum natus esset* (Cic. Mur. 75, 2) ’a man with respect to whom Maximus, when he was pronouncing his funeral panegyric on the day of his death, expressed his gratitude to the immortal gods for having caused that man to be born in this republic above all others’ (transl. by C. D. Yonge).

(17) *at vero aut honoribus aucti aut re familiari, aut si aliud quippiam nacti sumus fortuiti boni aut depulimus mali, tum dis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostrae laudi adsumptum arbitramur* (Cic. Nat. D. 3, 87, 6) ’On the other hand when we achieve some honour or some accession to our estate, or obtain any other of the goods or avoid any of the evils of fortune, it is then that we render thanks to the gods, and do not think that our own credit has been enhanced’ (transl. by H. Rackham).

(18) *num quis quod bonus vir esset gratias dis egit umquam?* (Cic. Nat. D. 3, 87, 8) ’Did anyone ever render thanks to the gods because he was a good man?’ (transl. by H. Rackham).

In (16) exemplifying the *DiAn*-pattern, the constituent *dis immortalibus* is a focus and, therefore, is placed at the end of the clause, which is normal for focal elements, whereas *gratias* appears in the initial position. The pragmatic dimension is here more important, than the others. In (17), on the contrary, *dis* bears a function of the discourse topic, which normally occupies the initial position, and besides, this is an animate noun with a very high status, so its prominence is determined by both the pragmatic and the denotative dimension. As regards the passage (18), which in Cicero’s work appears immediately after the excerpt represented in (17), *gratias* bearing the function of the contrastive focus (in relation to *quod bonus vir*) is placed in the prominent position before the topical element *dis*, so in the competition of the three dimensions, the pragmatic dimension is a winner again.

There is a construction in the table, which is worth particular attention. This is *dolorem dare / afferre / facere*, which is, by contrast with *gratias agere*, attested only 8 times in my corpus, and almost exclusively in a single combination *IproD*, with pronominal Dative complement promoted in the front position, which highlights, in my opinion, the importance of deictic properties of arguments in the constructions under consideration. Thus in (19), the initial position of *mihi* placed before *dolorem*, is due to its locutor (i.e. speech act participant) status:

(19) *tantum enim mihi dolorem cruciatumque attulerunt errata aetatis meae, ut non solum animus a factis sed aures quoque a commemorazione abhorrent* (Cic. Fam., 16, 21, 2) ’For the errors of my youth have caused me such grief and agony that not only do my thoughts shrink from what I have done, but my very ears shrink from hearing it talked about’.

Nevertheless, there is an example definitely demonstrating the pragmatically determined order *DI* in this SVC:

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13 The emphatic elements are often placed in the prominent initial or final position (Spevak 2010, 47).
(20) [neque vero desistit, ubicunque est, omnia in me maledicta conferre. nihil mihi umquam tam incredibile accidit, nihil in his malis tam acerbum.] sed augeo commemorando dolorem et facio etiam tibi (Cic. Att. 11, 8, 2)

‘[And he does not cease, wherever he is, from heaping all sorts of abuse on me. It is the most surprising thing that ever happened to me and the bitterest of all my present sorrows.] But I increase my own sorrow, and yours too, by speaking of it’ (transl. by E. O. Winstedt).

In this example, the constituent tibi, modified by the focusing particle etiam,14 with the underlying question ‘to whom do I also make a trouble’, definitely bears the focal function and thus stands in the very end of the sentence.

In some cases, the pragmatic factors can cooperate rather than compete with deictic ones, as in (21):

(21) quin illud maereo quod tibi non minorem dolorem illorum orbitas adferet quam mihi (Cic. QFr. 1, 3, 10)

‘Rather I grieve that their orphan state will cause you no less sorrow than it does me’ (transl. by W. G. Williams).

The priority position of tibi with respect to dolorem can be explained both by the higher status of the speech act participant and by the contrast with mihi.15

Interestingly, in my corpus the SVC dolorem dare / afferre / facere appears very rarely (8 occurrences) and exclusively in Cicero’s speeches and letters. I think that in this particular case, it is allowed to talk about the SVC as belonging to the colloquial Latin.

As regards the constructions choosing the opposite order DI, I will focus on spem afferre / proponere / dare. Since the order DI proved to be neutral in the constructions with trivalent verbs, as it was shown above, one can state that the order of complements attested in the majority of occurrences of spem afferre / proponere / dare is definitely determined by the syntactic dimension. In some cases, however, the influence of pragmatic factors cannot be denied, as in (22) and (23). Thus, in (22) the priority position is given to tibi as a contrastive (in relation to aliis) pronoun:

(22) nam superioribus litteris non unis sed pluribus, cum iam ab aliis desperata res esset, tamen tibi ego spem maturae decessionis adferbam (Cic. QFr. 1, 1, 1)

‘For not in one, but in several of my previous letters, in spite of others having given up the idea in despair, I gave you hope of being able at an early date to quit your province’ (transl. by W. G. Williams).

In (23), the placement of Fufio before spem is due to the focusing particle etiam modifying the dative complement and making it appear earlier:16

(23) …qui in Asia sunt rerum exitum exspectant, Achaici etiam Fufio spem deprecationis adferunt (Cic. Att. 11, 16, 2)

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14 About the focusing particles see Spevak 2010, 49–51.
15 About the sentence initial position of contrastive (or emphatic) pronouns see Spevak 2010, 95.
16 As Spevak (2010, 49) has shown, the focusing particles signal the constituents that contrast with another, expressed or understood constituent, when this is contrary to expectations or presuppositions. The example in (23) seems to be the case. On the other hand, the initial position of Fufio may be due to the predilection of the Latin language for bringing constituents referring to people close together (Spevak 2010, 95) and hence, due to denotative properties of the constituent. In this case, the pragmatic and deictic factors interact with each other again.
‘Those who are in Asia are waiting to see how things turn out: those in Achaia too keep holding out to Fufius the hope that they will petition to pardon’ (transl. by E. O. Winstedt).

To sum up, the ordering of the Direct and Indirect objects results from the competition or interaction of the three paradigmatic dimensions, i.e. semantic, pragmatic and deictic-denotative ones.

5.3. Ordering of the complements and the problem of valency center

The competition of paradigmatic dimensions can explain the alternation of different orderings within the same construction, but it cannot help explaining why some SVCs apparently prefer ID-, whereas others — DI-pattern. As it is clearly seen from the table, the ID-pattern occurs much more frequently in our corpus, but some SVCs still choose the opposite pattern, or distribute both patterns almost equally. The question arises what it depends on.

I suppose that this can depend on whether the support verb or the abstract noun, or their structural unity attaches the Indirect object.

It seems that the ID-order is chosen when the Indirect object depends on the abstract noun rather than on the verb or on the whole construction, as in gratias agere, auxilium ferre, dolorem dare / afferre / facere, bellum gerere. For some of them, the dependence on the noun is confirmed by the fact that, when used beyond the SVC, they admit complements in the same syntactic form as the SVC. 17

Thus bellum governs the prepositional phrase cum + Abl. both in SVC bellum gerere and when used separately, as in (24):

(24) equidem ad pacem hortari non desino; quae vel iniusta utilior est quam iustissimum bellum cum civibus (Cic. Att., 7, 14, 3)

‘As for me, I cease not to advocate peace. It may be on unjust terms, but even so it is more expedient than the justest of civil wars’ (transl. by E. O. Winstedt).

For others, there are simple cognate verbs that admit complements in the same case as the SVC, so gratulor 18 and auxilior are used with the Dative, like gratias agere and auxilium ferre, whereas belligero occurs with cum + Abl., like bellum gerere. I suppose that similar syntactic behavior of both the simple verb and the complex expression belonging to the same semantic field, can serve as an additional argument for the noun as a center of valency in the SVCs analyzed.19

The DI-order, on the contrary, seems to be normal for the SVCs with the complements depending either on the support verb or on the whole construction, such as iniuriam facere, bellum facere, spem afferre / proponere / dare, insidias facere / parare. 20 Although it is not always easy to distinguish, whether a verb or the unity of a verb and a noun governs a complement, but the order DI may be, at least, regarded as characteristic of such a type of

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18 Different meanings of gratulor with human and non-human dative complements are analyzed in detail by Marini (2014, 382).

19 Rosén (1981, 144) also highlights that “there remains considerable doubt whether the dative can be regarded as selected by the auxiliaries such as facere or even dare (as in salutem dare alicui)”. 20

20 According to Rosén (1981, 142), in such cases it cannot be decided whether the dative is dependent upon the underlying verb.
SVCs. Thus, in the SVC *bellum facere*, \(^{21}\) with its preferred complement order *DI*, the noun *bellum* does not attach a Dative complement, when used beyond the SVC, consequently, it is the verb *facere* or the whole construction that attaches the Dative and, therefore, can be regarded as a valency center.

It is clear that the alignment of the arguments contributes — to some extent — to the solving of valency problem in Latin support verb constructions, which is still far from the final solution.

### 6. Conclusions

The analysis of the 304 verbo-nominal constructions has demonstrated that the order Indirect — Direct object (*ID*) occurs almost three times as often as the opposite order *DI*. This is explained either by the influence of deictic-denotative properties of the constituents, such as animacy and locutor status, or by pragmatic factors (focus, emphasis, contrast etc.). These two language dimensions compete with each other as well as with the semantic dimension, which determines the priority of the Direct over the Indirect object in the unmarked (neutral) contexts.

It is also observed, that the ordering *ID* is preferred by the constructions with valency center on the abstract noun, whereas *DI*-ordering is preferable when the verb or the unity of a verb and a noun governs the Indirect object.

Further investigation of the SVCs with prototypically trivalent verbs on the extended empirical base that will include archaic and late Latin texts, could help to make more precise the data obtained in the present study and to draw more reliable conclusions.

### References


\(^{21}\) See example (12).
В статье исследуются латинские аналитические глагольно-именные конструкции типа bellum infere или insidias facere с прототипически трехвалентными глаголами, которые в составе таких конструкций могут терять одну из своих валентностей. После краткого обзора проблем, связанных с изучением данных конструкций, автор подробно останавливается на анализе порядка прямого и косвенного дополнений в 9 конструкциях, встречающихся у римских прозаиков классической эпохи (всего 304 употребления). Применяемый автором метод исследования базируется на идеологическом взаимодействии и конкуренции трех парадигматических измерений — семантического, прагматического и дейктико-демонстративного, — которые могут влиять на порядок дополнений. Основываясь на данных, полученных в результате исследования аргументной структуры латинских трехвалентных глаголов, автор предлагает считать порядок «прямое-косвенное дополнение» нейтральным (нейтральным), а противоположный порядок объясняет действием дейктико-демонстративных или прагматических факторов. Что касается влияния дейктико-демонстративных свойств, выдвигение косвенного дополнения в приоритетную позицию может объясняться одушевленностью имени или статусом участника речевого акта у местоимения. Проведенный автором анализ порядка дополнений в аналитических глагольно-именных конструкциях показал, что порядок «косвенное — прямое дополнение» превалирует над противоположным, поскольку косвенные дополнения в большинстве случаев выражены одушевленными именами или личными / возвратными /анафорическими местоимениями. Что касается прагматических факторов, то фокус, эмфаза и контрастивность тоже могут влиять на порядок дополнений. Тот факт, что различные конструкции отдают предпочтение неодинаковым порядкам дополнений, объясняется разными центрами валентностей у каждой конструкции. Результаты исследования представлены в таблице и сопровождаются примерами.

Ключевые слова: латинские аналитические глагольно-именные конструкции, порядок слов, синтаксис, прагматика, дейктико-демонстративные свойства имени, центр валентности.
SOME REMARKS ON GRAMMATICAL ASPECT IN LATIN

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The existence of grammatical aspect in Latin is a much discussed issue. The main aim of this article is to review different approaches to this question and to discuss important arguments that have to be taken into consideration. Besides the traditional view according to which there is an aspectual difference between the infectum and perfectum stems, two other arguments claiming the existence of aspect in Latin have been proposed: aspect as a category inherited from Indo-European and aspectual difference between the Latin perfect and imperfect tense. On the one hand, I will argue that the difference between the perfect and the imperfect is of a temporal nature and that the Latin perfect is used both for telic (terminative) states of affairs and atelic (non-terminative) ones. Furthermore, the Latin perfect combines with expressions of duration which, except for special cases, are excluded with Russian perfective verbs.

Keywords: Grammatical (verbal) aspect, perfect tense, imperfect tense, perfective, imperfective, duration, narrative, foreground, background.

1. Introduction*

This article deals with grammatical (verbal) aspect. As a grammatical category, aspect is defined as “different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation” (Comrie 1976, 3). When talking about grammatical aspect (i.e. expressed by morphological means), “perfectivity indicates the view of the situation as a single whole, without distinction of the various separate phases that make up that situation, while the imperfective pays essential attention to the internal structure of the situation” (ibid., p. 16). Lexical aspect (Germ. Aktionsart) is a term for expressing aspect by lexical means (iterativity, inchoativity, distributivity, etc.).

According to Szemerényi (1987, 7), there are two almost generally accepted systems of grammatical aspect:
— in Ancient Greek, where aspect does not form a separate category but is linked with tense (the so-called aspecto-temporal system). Especially three aspectual values are involved: durative (present stem) ἔγραφον ‘I was writing’, punctual (aoristic stem) ἔγραψα ‘I wrote’, and resultative (perfect stem) γέγραφα ‘I have written’;
— in Slavic languages, where grammatical aspect is developed from verbal prefixes or preverbs: pisat’ (imperfective verb) — napisat’ (perfective verb), and suffixes: perepisat’ (perfective verb) — perepisyvat’ (imperfective verb). Suffixes are mainly found with the so-called secondary imperfectives, i.e. imperfective verbs derived from perfective ones.

* I would like to express my gratitude to Elena Zheltova for offering me the possibility to participate in the The Joseph M. Tronsky XX Memorial Annual International Conference Indo-European Comparative Linguistics and Classical Philology in June 2016, where I presented a shorter version of this text. I would also like to thank Prof. N. Kazansky for his warm welcome. My special thanks go to the anonymous reviewer for his/her suggestions; I am aware of the fact that lot of has been written on aspect and that my references are too selective.

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From a morphological point of view, Latin has both several verbal stems as Ancient Greek, and verbal prefixes as Slavic languages. The question is whether these means fulfil the same function as in Ancient Greek and in Slavic languages.

Latin has two verbal stems, called "_infectum_" and "_perfectum_" (see Table 1). These appellations, which evoke the aspectual distinction in Slavic languages, are conventional and go back to the Roman grammarian Varro (1st century BC). From a traditional point of view (Szantyr 1972, 300), these two stems are supposed to reflect an inherited aspectual imperfective — perfective distinction:

- _laudo_ 'I praise' (infectum stem)
- _laudavi_ 'I have praised' (perfectum stem).

In other words, the tenses formed from the _infectum_ tense are supposed to have an imperfective value and the tenses from the _perfectum_ stem, a perfective value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The <em>infectum</em> stem</th>
<th>The <em>perfectum</em> stem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tense</td>
<td>Indicative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td><em>dele-o</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'I am destroying'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperfect</td>
<td><em>dele-bam</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'I was destroying'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td><em>dele-bo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'I will destroy'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, Latin does not exactly continue the threefold Indo-European distinction between the present, aoristic, and perfect stem. The Latin perfect, often viewed as a merger of the Indo-European aoristic and perfective stems, is in fact new creation, although the morphemes used in the most regular verbs, - _av_- and - _ev_- , are of unclear origin; only some aoristic (_scripsi_ 'I have written') and perfective (with reduplication, _cucurri_ 'I have run') forms have survived as residual.

Apart from this traditional view, it has also been claimed that the aspectual opposition in Latin resides in pairs: simple verb vs compound verb as in Slavic languages; simple verbs are supposed to exhibit an imperfective value, compound verbs, a perfective value, for example, _sequor_ 'to follow' vs _adsequor_ 'to pursue' (Meillet 1897 and Meillet & Vendryes 1948, 301–3). Van der Heyde (1926) has convincingly shown that this theory is untenable, since Latin verbal prefixes always have a lexical value. There is an additional argument against this view: both simple (_miror_ 'to wonder') and compound verbs (_inrideo_ 'to laugh at', _exerto_ 'to stick out') can be combined with verbs expressing phases of an event, such as 'to begin', 'to stop', see examples below. For semantic reasons, these verbs cannot be used for an event which is already complete: one cannot start or stop something which is already accomplished. Therefore, the infinitives in (1) and (2) must have an imperfective value: _mirari_ corresponds to _udvliat'sia_ (1), _inirdere_ to _smeiat'sia_ , and _exertare_ to _vys-ovyyvat'_. In Slavic languages, only imperfective verbs (primary or secondary) can be used with these verbs; combinations with perfective verbs would be ungrammatical (*_nachat' posmeiat'sia_).

(1) desinite _mirari_ (Rhet. Her. 4, 36)
'cease to wonder'
Deinde Gallus inridere coepit atque linguam exsertare. (Quadr. Ann. frg. 10b, ap. Gell. 9, 13, 12)
‘Then the Gaul began to laugh at them and to stick out his tongue.’

The traditional approach following Szantyr (1972, 300) has been criticised, especially by Pinkster (1983, 296, and 2015, § 7.3, 380–1), who has objected that the imperfective — perfective opposition does not affect the Latin tense system as a whole but is only partial. Instead of a mixed inherited aspecto-temporal category, for which there is little support in Latin, he envisages a purely temporal category for Latin tenses and describes them as a relative tense system where notions such as anterior, simultaneous, and posterior apply, with respect to the time of speaking: the past, the present, and the future (see Pinkster 2015, § 7.4, 384 for more detail).

Despite of this convincing explanation, which is first of all systematic in that it encompasses not only the indicative but also the subjunctive and the imperative mood as well as verbo-nominal forms (infinitives and participles), the discussion about the existence of grammatical aspect has arisen once again and two other claims have been made. Firstly, from a point of view of Indo-European linguistics, Oldsjö (2001, 52–73) has suggested that since grammatical aspect is supposed to have existed in Indo-European, it must have been inherited by Latin as well. This assumption is wrong from a methodological point of view: Latin data cannot be interpreted on the basis of a putative grammatical category in Indo-European. Secondly, Haverling (2010, 437ff.) has argued that there is an inherited aspectual opposition in Latin, between the perfect and the imperfect tense, perceptible especially in narrative texts. In the following sections, I will discuss arguments against these claims in more detail.

2. Latin perfect and imperfect — an aspectual opposition?

The most important objections against the existence of grammatical aspect in Latin can be summarised in three points:

a) the opposition between the perfect tense and the imperfect tense is not a systematic opposition because it is restricted to the indicative mood only;
b) the putative aspectual opposition between the perfect tense and the imperfect tense is confused with functions of these Latin tenses in narrative texts;
c) combinability of the Latin perfect with expressions of duration is not taken into consideration in a sufficient way.

I will pay special attention to points b) and c) in sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.1

2.1. Narrative vs descriptive tense

Unlike most of Slavic languages (except for Bulgarian), Latin has two tenses, the perfect and the imperfect, for referring to past events, and one pluperfect for the expression of anteriority in the past. Following Weinrich (1964), two levels of narrative are distinguished: the foreground level corresponding to the main narrative line and the back-

1 For the point a), see Kravar (1980, 129) and Pinkster (1983, 296; 2015, § 7.3, 380–1). The Latin perfect does not only enter in opposition with the imperfect but also with the present and, as for subjunctivs, there is no perfect vs imperfect opposition at all.
ground level that serves for description of circumstances. In a narrative, the Latin perfect is used for narration of main events, and the imperfect for descriptions (3). The question is: what is the nature of this opposition?

(3) Cenabam apud Seium, cum utrique nostrum redditae sunt a te litterae. (Cic. Fam. 9, 7, 1)
'I was at dinner with Seius when a letter from you was delivered to each of us.'

Is the difference between the imperfect cenabam and the perfect redditae sunt a difference of aspect, since both the perfect and the imperfect are past tenses (Comrie 1976, 3)? Haverling (2010, 438) actually claims that it is an aspectual difference. There are two problems.

The first one is that a “specialisation” of the use of tenses in a narrative (narrative tense, descriptive tense) is secondary. Whatever the difference between them is, a language will not develop such an opposition for narratives only. These tenses have their own semantic value: the perfect expresses an event which is finished in the moment of speaking, the imperfect expresses an ongoing event in the past. Sometimes a perfect tense can suggest a “perfective” interpretation and an imperfect tense, an “imperfective” interpretation, but this is only a side effect, as in (3) where cenabam actually has an imperfective value and is translated by uzhinal in Russian, and redditae sunt has a perfective value, Rus. byl peredan. However in (4), the imperfect peribat corresponds to the imperfective umiral but the perfect vidi is translated by the imperfective videl.

(4) Quin ego quom peribat vidi. (Plaut. Bacch. 469)
'I even saw him when he was dying.'

The second problem is that regarding the difference between a narrative tense (Latin perfect) and a descriptive tense (Latin imperfect) as an aspectual opposition is forgetting the discussion of Slavic linguists about the situation in Old Church Slavonic where the aorist and the imperfect and the emerging aspectual — imperfective and perfective — pairs of verbs coexist. Dostál (1954, 598–9) has convincingly shown that the aorist — imperfect opposition in Old Church Slavonic is of a temporal nature: the aorist expresses “finished, accomplished” events, and therefore it is suitable for narration; the imperfect expresses “ongoing” events in the past — and is thus used for descriptions. As Dostál (ibid.) demonstrates, the fact that an event is finished — he himself terms it Cz. časová hotovost (vremennaia gotovost’) — is not the same thing as perfectivity, and the fact that an event is ongoing is not the same thing as imperfectivity. In this context, it is also worth mentioning Havránek (1939) and Maslov (1985, 28) who also distinguish “temporality” from “aspectuality”. By the way, some languages can exhibit a relatively rich system of past tenses (Černý 1970, 214) but such a subdivision is not necessarily an indicator of the existence of the grammatical aspect.

To sum up, the Latin tense system has two past tenses: the perfect expresses an event which is finished in the moment of speaking, the imperfect expresses an ongoing event in the past. These tenses are used for structuring a narrative: at the foreground level, the perfect, and at the background level, the imperfect. This opposition is linked with hierarchi-
cal subdivision of events and circumstances, which has nothing to do with grammatical aspect. In Russian, there is no such a means for indicating what belongs to the narrative line and what are secondary circumstances.

2.2. Expressions of duration

There is another point that is not taken into consideration in a due way in the literature about aspect: combinability of verbs with expressions of duration.

Temporal and relationship with different time expressions are indeed crucial for any consideration of aspect. Vendler (1957/1967) elaborated four main categories of state of affairs, starting from a preliminary distinction of telic (terminative) states of affairs (T), which are brought to an end, and atelic (non-terminative) states of affairs (A), which do not imply an end. They are summarised in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State (A)</th>
<th>Activity (A)</th>
<th>Accomplishment (T)</th>
<th>Achievement (T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to live for some time / since</td>
<td>to write for some time / since</td>
<td>to write in some time</td>
<td>to win at a moment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the opposition between the Latin perfect and imperfect — or more generally, between the perfectum stem and the infectum stem — were an aspectual opposition, one would expect that atelic states and activities are expressed by the imperfect, and telic accomplishments and achievements by the perfect. However, Kravar (1980, 152; cf. Tronsky 1973) has shown that states and activities can be expressed in the perfect in Latin and can correspond to imperfective verbs in Croatian and in Russian, for example in (5). Furthermore, they can be combined with expressions of duration, such as noctem perpetem “the entire night” (accusative of duration).

(5) *Ibi cenavi atque ibi quievi in navi noctem perpetem.* (Plaut. Amph. 732–5)
‘There I had dinner (uzhinal) and there I rested (spal) the entire night on the ship.’

The Latin perfect is normally used for states and activities which last some time; the Latin imperfect is by no means “specialised” in expressing durative events. According to Torrego (1989, 267), in Livy there are 47 perfects vs 16 imperfects with expressions of duration. Further examples are not difficult to find, of states (6), or activities (7)–(8).

(6) *Adest, adest fax…, multos annos latuit* (Enn. Trag. 63, ap. Cic. Div. 1, 67),
‘It comes, it comes, that torch … though hid from sight (byla skrytaia) for many years.’

(7) *Itaque (pecunia) usus est menses XIII.* (Cic. Att. 7, 7, 2)
‘Accordingly, he used (ispol’zoval) the money for fourteen months.’

(8) *Biennium provinciam obtinuit.* (Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 216)
‘He governed (upravlial) the province for two years.’

Whereas the Latin perfect is combinable with expressions of duration, there are restrictions in Slavic languages (Table 3).
Table 3: Categories of state of affairs with Russian examples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State (A)</td>
<td>zhit' sorok let / dolgo ‘to live forty years / longtime’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity (A)</td>
<td>pisat' chas / dolgo ‘to write for an hour / longtime’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accomplishment (T)</td>
<td>napisat’ za chas ‘to write in an hour’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement (T)</td>
<td>pobedit’ (kogda?) ‘to win (at which moment?)’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In particular, imperfective — perfective pairs seem to be in a complementary distribution in that for activities imperfective verbs are used (pisat’), whereas for accomplishments, their perfective counterparts (napisat’). Verbs expressing states usually do not form aspectual pairs. In Latin — as well as in English — the verb is formally the same (to write) for activities and for accomplishments but it can be combined with different temporal expressions and their aspectual interpretation depends on the context in which they are used.

From this it can be argued that the Latin perfect tense is aspectually neutral: it can be used in a “perfective” or an “imperfective” context. In the case of action verbs, Latin scripsi ‘I wrote’ can cover actions as well as accomplishments in Vendler’s terminology, but in Russian, as we have seen, actions require an imperfective verb; and accomplishments, a perfective verb.

3. Conclusions

Claiming that Latin must have inherited grammatical aspect from its Indo-European ancestor is not a sufficient argument for proving the existence of this grammatical category. There are important factors that have to be taken into consideration when envisaging aspectual oppositions in Latin: (a) the functioning of aspect in the system of tenses (and moods), which is not the case when one restricts aspect to the Latin perfect and the imperfect; (b) the relationship between tenses and aspect, more specifically, between the function of tenses (narrative/descriptive) in narration and aspect, as it has been shown for Old Church Slavonic and Bulgarian; and (c) combinability with expressions of duration. Application of these criteria suggests that the Latin system of tenses does not show an aspectual opposition.

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5 Aspectual pairs in Slavic languages typically concern “mutative verbs” that imply some change.
К ВОПРОСУ О КАТЕГОРИИ ВИДА В ЛАТИНСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ

Ольга Спевак

Наличие или отсутствие грамматической категории вида в латинском языке — это одна из дискуссионных проблем. Главной целью данной статьи является критический обзор существующих подходов к данной проблеме и анализ аргументов, существенных для ее решения. Помимо традиционной точки зрения, согласно которой существует видовое различие между основами инфекта и перфекта, в научной литературе вдвигается два других аргумента в пользу существования категории вида в латыни: вид как категория, унаследованная из праиндоевропейского языка, и видовое различие между латинским перфектом и имперфектом. Задача настоящей статьи — показать, что разница между перфектом и имперфектом в латыни имеет временную, а не видовую природу и что перфект используется для передачи как терминативных, так и нетерминативных значений. Кроме того, он может сочетаться с выражениями длительного действия, что, за исключением некоторых случаев, невозможно с глаголами совершенного вида в русском языке.

Ключевые слова: категория вида, перфект, имперфект, перфектив, имперфектив, выражение длительности, нарратив, нарративное время, дескриптивное время.

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BILINGUAL WRITINGS ON BILINGUAL WRITINGS: J. WIDEKINDI’S LETTERS TO M. G. DE LA GARDIE

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The collection of J. Widekindi’s letters to M. G. De la Gardie, preserved in the National Archives of Sweden, has not received decent attention in the research concerning the origins of Widekindi’s main work, *Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici Decennalis*, which describes the events of the Russian Time of Troubles and the Ingrian War. Especially important in this respect is the last of the eleven letters, dated 15th March 1672 and dealing almost exclusively with *Historia*. From it we learn that the original text of this bilingual work was written in Latin (although the Swedish version was published first). Hence the status of the versions: the Swedish edition from 1671 is a translation, hastily made by several persons, while the Latin edition from 1672 is a revised and incomplete text of the original written by Widekindi himself. With the help of another letter we find out that Widekindi had started working on the book as early as by 1661. His main scope, clearly indicated in yet other letters, was to glorify his patron’s father, Jacob De la Gardie. But M. G. De la Gardie, who was aware of the project for a long time, gave his support to it only in 1666 (or later) — probably because it became quite relevant for his foreign policy. From the letters we also find out that Widekindi took care of Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna’s library from the middle of the 1650s. This fact, along with the extensive usage of one of Oxenstierna’s drafts in the first book of *Historia*, gives a clue to where Widekindi got acquainted with many of his sources. The catalogue of Oxenstierna’s book collection shows this suggestion to be correct.

Keywords: Time of Troubles, Ingrian War, Swedish Neo-Latin, 17th century historiography, Rossica, Johannes Widekindi, Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie.

The period of social and political turbulence in Russia in the beginning of the 17th century is known as the Time of Troubles. As it involved Polish and Swedish intervention, the events that took place in the years 1605–1618 are described in a wide range of sources written, apart from Russian, in Swedish, Polish, German — and Latin.

*The history of the Swedish-Muscovite ten-years war* (Swed. *Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie*, Lat. *Historia belli Sveco-Moscovitici decennalis*, hereafter referred to as *Historia*) by the Swedish historiographer of the Realm Johannes Widekindi (ca 1620–1678), published in Swedish in 1671 and in Latin in 1672, belongs to the most important...
sources on the Russian Time of Troubles in general and on the Ingrian war (1610–1617) in particular. Apart from Linnaeus’ and Swedenborg’s writings, the Latin version of the book is the only large piece of Swedish Neo-Latin literature ever translated into Russian\(^1\) — thanks to the scholars from the Leningrad Institute of History in the 1930s and their colleagues (mostly from Moscow) in the 1980s, who, apart from editing the translation, provided it with a rich historical commentary and an apparatus where differences between Latin and Swedish versions are enumerated.

Kari Tarkiainen, a famous specialist in Swedish 17th century historiography, after quoting a passage from Widekindi’s letter to his patron, Chancellor of Sweden Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, where the book is mentioned, states: “it is not known how the work was effected”.\(^2\) This is, however, a bit too pessimistic. The small collection of letters, as it turns out, can tell us about the history of *Historia* more than we could wish.

There are 11 letters preserved in the Swedish National Archives (De la Gardieska samlingen, E1596), five of them in Latin and six in Swedish. The first one was written in 1661, the last one in 1672. This last letter deals almost exclusively with *Historia*; its full text can be found in the Appendix to the article. Previously the letters have been studied by Tarkiainen (who for some reason quotes passages only from those written in Swedish), Theodor Westrin\(^3\) (who paraphrases them, quite briefly, as is natural for an encyclopedia entry; it will be discussed further), and Sven Edlund\(^4\) (who is interested only in the letter treating the organisation of the Stockholm Gymnasium), so I found it necessary to begin with a synopsis of all of them with particular emphasis on the references to the *Historia*.

Letter 1, 8th January 1661, Latin\(^5\)

We become immediately aware that Widekindi and De la Gardie have never met before: “Post novi anni felix auspicium et solennem appreciationem decenter contestatam, illustri\<smie> Excellentiæ Tuæ vultum subire audet haec ignoti nominis Epistola…”. Widekindi pays compliments to De la Gardie’s virtues and then describes his own background. Seven years have passed since he returned to Sweden and became a teacher at the Stockholm Gymnasium. The late Chancellor of Sweden Erik Axelsson Oxenstierna (1624–1656) committed to Widekindi to take care of his father’s (i.e. the great Axel Oxenstierna’s) library. Widekindi found there a lot of material concerning relations between Sweden and Poland and got a wish to write a history of these relations beginning with the death of John III. In 1659 he presented this project to Charles X Gustav and got an approval. However, early in the next year the king died, and besides that, Widekindi found out that Habaeus and Loccenius\(^6\) were already working on the same subject. Thus he switched to some other material (“arripui hunc, quem transmissa pagina intimat, laborem, ...

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\(^1\) Видекинд, Ю. *История десятилетней шведско-московитской войны*. Перевод С. А. Аннинского, А. М. Александрова / Под ред. В. Л. Янина, А. Л. Хорошкевич. Москва, 2000. The resulting translation merges both Latin and Swedish versions into one text.

\(^2\) Tarkiainen 1986, 184.

\(^3\) Westrin 1921, 263–264.

\(^4\) Edlund 1954, 256.

\(^5\) Whenever the place is indicated at all (and that is the case in № 1, 2, 3, 9 and 11), the letters are sent from Stockholm.

\(^6\) Christian Hab(b)aeus (ca 1627–1680), ennobled in 1664 as Lichtenstern, was a diplomat and a Royal secretary. His only known work is *Ursachen, wodurch eigentlich die Königli. Mayst. zu Schweden bewogen worden, den Herzog von Churland ausz seinem Fürstenthumb hinweg in Verwahrung zu ziehen* from 1659, also translated into Latin. Johannes Loccenius (1598–1677) was a German scholar in Swedish office;
eum magna ex parte absolvii, sed ita, ut multa restent”). Now he wants to finish the book, but his financial resources are scarce. Fortunately, some profitable position in Stockholm is vacant (“tale munus, cui studia mea magna ex parte dicata”), and Widekindi asks for De la Gardie’s help in obtaining it. He is sure that, whatever his duties at this post may be, he will still have enough time for yet another project (“alteri cogitato labori, si approbaris, contextendo”).

Letter 2, 2nd March 1662, Latin

Widekindi expresses his deep concern about De la Gardie’s illness (“post amissionem tot Patronorum,” non poteram non spiritu deiici”) and looks forward to seeing him in good health again. He has looked through “Messenianum scriptum,” sent to him by De la Gardie. The attempt of Messenius is, says Widekindi, praiseworthy, but a lot has to be corrected both in style (“non satis latini et florentis seculi cultum redolens”) and in content. The history of most ancient times has to look more convincing. However, what does not seem too absurd, may be left intact: Sweden has as much right to construct its glorious past as many other nations, from Assyrians to Danes, who use extremely doubtful writings of a certain Berosus9 to achieve this goal: “detur et haec licentia nobis, ac veneratio antiquitati” 10. There follows a quotation from Seneca (Dial. 12, 7, 5): “Assiduus est humani generis discursus...” etc. Widekindi is ready to discuss Messenius’ work when he meets De la Gardie personally.

Letter 3, 17th July 1662, Latin

After having experienced De la Gardie’s benevolence, Widekindi turned back to his former interest in historiography, which he had temporarily left aside for legal studies after the death of Charles X Gustav. Now he is mainly occupied with Lumen Chronologicum, but works on another historiographical writing as well: “Caepi quoque tumultuum Sveoet Moscho-Poloniensium initia historico charactere signare”. His other plans include notes on old Swedish law, critical notes on Messenius’ work and its edition. But he has neither proper status nor salary for pursuing his projects, whereas making too long a pause in the work is risky: after all, both Widekindi and his patron De la Gardie are mortal. If De la Gardie wants this work to be continued, he had better provide Widekindi with a decent position. His current one requires, among other things, glorifying the deeds of the royal

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7 Erik Axelsson Oxenstierna died 1656, his brother Johan Oxenstierna 1657, and king Charles X Gustav 1660.
8 Johannes Messenius (1579–1636) was a Swedish historiographer; in 1616 he was accused of participating in a conspiracy and imprisoned. His main work is the huge Scondia illustrata, written in prison and finally published in 1700–1705 by Johan Peringskiöld. It is probably this manuscript that Widekindi is talking about.
9 I. e. the famous forgeries of Annius of Viterbo. In Swedish historiography they became quite popular since Johannes Magnus’ Historia de omnibus Gothorum Sveonumque regibus (1554), and Widekindi was actually the first in Sweden to put them into doubt openly, namely in his Lumen Chronographicum, published in 1664 (see Wifstrand Schiebe 1992, 56–60). Thus the letter provides us with a sort of background to Widekindi’s harsh judgment, expressed two years later.
10 Probably an allusion to Livy’s preface, with a similar wording (Livy has “datur haec venia antiquitati”) and a similar context.
11 Sic. The work was published as Lumen Chronographicum, but Widekindi’s works from 1666 are entitled Continuatio Luminis Chronologici and Introductio in Lumen Chronologicum.
family on different occasions, but he does not number it among his merits and does not get paid for it either. He does not want to attend funerals, as is common for some of his colleagues ("more aliorum hic in funera prodire, et pudet et dedecet honestatis cultorem"). Widekindi would be grateful for any position De la Gardie can help him to get.

Letter 4, 1st March\textsuperscript{12} 1663, Swedish

De la Gardie has promised Widekindi the position of a historiographer. Therefore, Widekindi asks him to provide him with an official document that would give him access to the State archives, for he will need to get prepared for his new duties. He is also ready with his \textit{Lumen Chronologicum}, but complains about the high costs required by the printer. Widekindi suggests that his expenses may be covered by the Gymnasium's salary of Tolstadius, the deceased lecturer in theology.

Letter 5, 2nd March 1663, Swedish

Widekindi begs pardon for writing to De la Gardie too often. He has found out that Tolstadius' salary for the year 1662 had been paid to Zacharias Klingius.\textsuperscript{13} Thus he asks to get Tolstadius' salary for the year 1663 instead. Once again Widekindi asks De la Gardie for an improvement of his condition. He is tired of working as a teacher in a gymnasium and of all the speeches he has to hold "nomine publico" without getting a penny for it. He has just begun working on a history of ancient Swedish law as well as on the "pragmatic history of our affairs with Poles and Muscovites", where the deeds of De la Gardie's deceased father "shine notably" ("märkeligen liusa"). He does not conceal that the subject is chosen deliberately, putting a quotation from Livy (4, 35, 7): "Eo nempe laborem lubenter impendimus, unde honos et emolumentum speratur".

Letter 6, 3rd June 1663 (?),\textsuperscript{14} Latin

Widekindi is still looking forward to getting the historiographer's position promised to him by De la Gardie. A conversation on his duties and salary may wait until De la Gardie has time for it, but now that Widekindi is ready with his \textit{Lumen Chronologicum}, he needs to get access to the archives as soon as possible, to check some documents concerning both ancient and more recent history. He compares his work to a geographical map, but applied to history. As for the work of Messenius, he does not know if De la Gardie read his letter with a review of it, so he briefly repeats its contents. Widekindi leaves it to De la Gardie's own decision whether he should go on with Messenius, "vel an propiora seculo nostro mihi committere placeat".

Letter 7, 29th January 1665, Swedish

Widekindi reminds De la Gardie about his wish that the salary of Nicolaus Salanus,\textsuperscript{15} who has left the Gymnasium, should be paid to one of his students, who helps him with

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item This date is given in Tarkiainen 1986, 181, but, as far as I can see, it does not appear anywhere on the letter itself. However, the following letter, dated 2nd March, suggests indeed that the preceding one had been written a day or a couple of days before.
\item Zacharias Klingius (1603–1671) was a bishop and a Court chaplain. He taught theology in the Stockholm Gymnasium for several years.
\item The year is not indicated, but as \textit{Lumen Chronographicum} was published 1664, it must be either 1663 or 1664.
\item Nicolaus Salanus (1618–1671) was a priest. In the Gymnasium he first taught Greek, later theology.
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transcription of a minor work he is occupied with. There are two circumstances that make him repeat his wish: on one hand, he has heard of some less worthy persons who aspire to the money; on the other hand, he wants to help a printer from Gothenburg, Amund Grefve, in moving his little press to Stockholm and thus to divide the sum between the two. He has no doubts that he will succeed, if De la Gardie helps him — just as he had done in 1663. Widekindi also expresses his deep discontent with the Gymnasium, mentioning that he has already voiced his opinion to Mr. Biörnklow, as De la Gardie had asked him to. He is eager to get a better position, since he has been watching the success of so many of his equals during the last ten years.

Letter 8, 8th May 1665, Swedish
Widekindi thanks De la Gardie for the new position he has been promoted to, “Charge på Cantzlie Staten”. Then he expresses his wishes and views concerning the organisation of the printing house, the reformation of the Gymnasium and a reward for his assistants.

Letter 9, 16th November 1666, Swedish
Widekindi is almost ready to proceed to what is now his direct duties, i.e. to writing histories, but asks De la Gardie for a respite, so that he may finish what he had begun before. Afterwards he is going to occupy himself with what De la Gardie has asked for: “the famous actions of your late father in the Muscovite war”. He is also eager to write annals, covering the years from the death of Gustav I (i.e. 1560) to his own time, in Swedish with a Latin compendium. He has already prepared some extracts for this work. The letter ends with a traditional plea for money: Widekindi has not yet been paid anything in the Chancellery and asks De la Gardie to keep his salary in the Gymnasium.

Letter 10, undated (apparently about 1670, rather later than earlier), Swedish
Widekindi asks for 200 silver daler as a reward for his assistants. He is working on Additamentum to the history of Gustav I, some additions to the history of King Erik’s and King John’s rule, and the history of Gustav Adolf’s first quinquennium. He is almost completed with them.

Letter 11, 15th March 1672, Latin (see Appendix)
Widekindi begs pardon for not talking to De la Gardie personally, as he was occupied with the burial of his brother. He has followed De la Gardie’s order and erased the genealogical appendix from the Latin version of his book (this appendix put into doubt the right

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16 We may suppose that it is Introductio in Lumen Chronologicum.
17 Amund Nilsson Grefwe (d. 1677) is known as the first printer in the city of Gothenburg.
18 Mattias Biörenklou (1607–1671) was a diplomat and a councilor of the Realm. He was one of the key figures in Swedish political life in the 1660s.
19 This work was published in 1672. Its full title runs as follows: Additamentum, eller Tilökning på någre tänckwärda stycker som synas feela vthi Konung Göstaffz den I. Historie, hwilken aff Erick Göranszon Tegel vthförlein, och aff Aegidio Girs summewijs författat är.
20 Apparently never published.
21 The plan to write the entire history of Gustav Adolf’s reign was never fulfilled. The opening part of it was published posthumously, in 1691, as Then fordom stormächtigeste... herr Gustaff Adolphs den andres och stores Sweriges, Götes och Wändes etc. konungs Historia och lefwernes beskrifning, then första deel. A large part of the edition was confiscated and destroyed by the authorities after the protests from Danish and Russian diplomats concerning certain passages in the book. See Wadén 1959.
of the Romanov dynasty to the Russian throne). He mentions that he wrote *Historia* in Latin first, and then translated it into Swedish, hastily and with the help of some other people. He should have polished it better, but he paid more attention to the factual truth and also thought that the style of the Swedish text should be simpler. The Swedish text may be improved in the second edition, he says. The greatest difficulty during the work was the lack of sources, although Widekindi has read countless letters, diaries etc. He tried to be moderate and not to make too many judgments. In relating speeches and letters he rarely digresses from the actual words of historical figures and never from their opinions. Finally, Widekindi mentions his difficulties with printing his other books — the additions to the history of Gustav I and the history of Gustav Adolf’s reign — and asks De la Gardie for help.

From this small collection of letters we get extremely important information on how *Historia* was written and some indications on when it was written.

The fact that the Swedish text is a translation from Latin, as clearly indicated in the last letter, is of fundamental importance for any philological analysis of the work (not to mention that it may here and there be important from a historian’s point of view). Unfortunately, it has been ignored in the recent research. The editors of the Russian translation call the Latin text “translation” several times, Tarkiainen always refers to (and quotes) only the Swedish version in his works, and Stina Hansson has not included it into her list of translations into Swedish in the 17th century.

Westrin lets the information that the work was first written in Latin be followed by a somewhat misleading statement: “The Latin version is hardly more than a compendium of the Swedish one”. Strictly taken, this claim is absurd. It suggests that Widekindi, after having written the Latin text and translated it into Swedish, took the Swedish text as the base for writing a “compendium”. It is not only general considerations that make such a theory look strange, but also the texts themselves. Wherever we know some Latin source of Widekindi, its text is repeated in the Latin version not only word-for-word, but sometimes with striking similarities in punctuation, as irregular as it was in the 17th century, whereas the Swedish text may here and there be abridged. Moreover, the Swedish version, taken as a whole, proves to be a result of a translation made hastily and not “polished enough”, as Widekindi says himself. Already in the preface one may notice the “ètre gifwin Orsak” that is supposed to mean “after a reason had been found”, with a participial construction as impossible as the English “after given reason” in this sense, but easily understandable if one bears in mind the expression “data causa” in the full Latin title of the work (*Historia belli Sveco-Moscovitici Decennalis, quod... primum adversus Rebelles*

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22 This difference between the two versions has been noted in Kovalenko et al. 2000, 559.
23 Kovalenko et al. 2000, 545, 559, 560. Helander 2004, 187, 197 also mistakenly calls the Latin text “translation”, but the context may allow him to do so: he is talking about the Latin equivalents for modern (Swedish) terms.
25 Westrin 1921, 264.
26 Compare, for instance, the parts of the passage on Cossacks (pp. 346–350) taken from Th. Ziegler’s *Theatrum Vitae Humanae* (p. 4354) with the source indicated.
27 Compare e. g. the excursus on Pskov in Latin (pp. 304–308), almost entirely sewn up of passages from D. Chytraeus and R. Heidenstein, and in Swedish (pp. 373–379) versions.
28 *Förtalet*, s. [2].
et Lithuanos, mox Polonos, tandem data causa contra ipsos Moscovitas... varia fortuna ab anno seculi hujus septimo, in decimum septimum gestum, et ardua pace compositum est).

Another example where the source language is obvious may be found in book 3 (p. 78). The Latin ablative absolute "quo facto", introducing a sentence with "nos" as supposed subject, is quite normal, whereas the Swedish text (p. 98) goes: "Hwilcket när thet war skedt åre wij...". The relative pronoun "hwilcket" could have been the subject — but the translator has noticed the following words, put the demonstrative "thet" as the correspondent to "quo" and made "wij" the subject; "hwilcket" hangs loosely and should be expunged. Examples of this and other types are so numerous that they would have been indeed enough for us to see which of the texts was written first, if we had not learned it from the author himself.

If we have to understand Westrin’s term “compendium” in a more general sense, i.e. that the Latin text is simply shorter than the Swedish one, the statement is still not quite correct. The Swedish version is technically twice as long as the Latin one, but in the Latin text books 9 and 10 are simply missing. If we take only the first eight books, they cover 431 pages in the Latin edition and 562 pages in the Swedish one. The layout is similar: about 1200 characters per page in both versions. Taking into account the structural differences between two languages, the ratio looks not far from perfect: if the versions were identical, we would arrive at ca. 530 pages of Swedish text.29 However, one should keep in mind that there are many (although usually short) passages missing in either version, so this sort of arithmetic is almost pointless.

To sum up, the original complete text — the draft written by Widekindi himself in Latin — is lost. What we have is, on one hand, its inaccurate Swedish translation made by several persons, and on the other hand, its incomplete and slightly revised printed Latin version. It is the latter that should be the primary object for any philological analysis of the work.

So much for the “mechanism”. What do we know about the chronology? As the text was translated into Swedish “hastily”, we may cautiously put the translation around 1670. Why was it translated at all? Probably it has something to do with Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie’s political views: he is well-known not least for promoting a stronger position of the national language.30 Probably De la Gardie expressed at some point a wish that the work would appear in both languages (not knowing that its draft had already been written in Latin). It will not be too bold to assume that he did so in response to letter 9, which could suggest such an idea to him.

The assumption that De la Gardie approved the publication of Historia after Widekindi’s letter in November 1666, fits quite well into the political situation of the time. The tension between Sweden and Russia grew steadily during the second half of the 1660s and up to 1671, and Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie was the main advocate of an aggressive policy.31

So, the publication of the work must have served De la Gardie’s political goals. However, what Widekindi had in mind, at least initially, during its composition, was the glorifi-

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29 I have taken eight short passages (one from each book) which do not contain any serious discrepancies between the versions, and compared the number of characters. 7395 characters in the Latin text correspond to 9088 in the Swedish one, i.e. the Swedish text is ca. 1.23 times longer.

30 See e.g. Hansson 1984, 39–40.

31 See Kovalenko et al. 2000, 533–540.
cation of his patron’s father. This is what we learn from letter 9, and also earlier, from letter 5, written in March 1663. When did Widekindi actually start his work? The first explicit mention of Historia may be found in letter 3 (July 1662). But it may be proved that the work began even earlier. Let us go back as far as to letter 1.

Unfortunately, we cannot suggest that the transmissa pagina, sent together with the letter as a “trailer” to some of Widekindi’s works, had to do with Historia. The possibility is not to be excluded altogether, but it seems unlikely for three reasons. Firstly, Widekindi had several projects at the same time, so it may have been, for instance, Lumen Chronologicum. Secondly, if it was Historia, Widekindi did not need to “confess” in which language it had been written, eleven years later. Finally, Widekindi mentions the transmissa pagina just after having said that he had abandoned the thought of describing Swedish-Polish relations, and we know that he regarded the Muscovite war as an integral part of these. In the preface to Historia Widekindi writes: “Hoc… obtineam… parte laboris confecta viam mihi parasse ad bellum Svecio-Polonicum describendum, quod hoc antecessit, excitavit, fovit et seqvutum majori animorum offensa… suspensum subinde inducis, dilatum tractationibus, tandem in seculo hoc… usque ad sexagesimum <sc. annum> desaeviens, optata pace compositum est”. The Muscovite war is pars laboris, not a different subject.

Transmissa pagina is consequently hardly to be put in connection with Historia. But there is still an indication that by 1661, Widekindi had already made remarkable progress in writing the history of the Muscovite events.

Talking about his original project (the one on the history of Swedish-Polish relations) in the first letter, Widekindi describes it as “opus causa grave, consiliis multiplex, fortuna varia gestum”. A very similar wording may be found in the preface to Historia (p. 3): “Opus nascitur causa grave, consiliis multiplex, difficile judicio, animorum affectibus, et rerum eventu varium: neque hactenus ex proposito et plano a quoquam tentatum”. It has been pointed out32 that it is a well-veiled allusion to the beginning of Tacitus’ Histories (1, 2): “Opus adgredior opimum casibus, atrox proeliiis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace saevum”. Does the similarity between the letter from 1661 and the preface published in 1672 prove that Widekindi was working on Historia as early as in 1661? Not necessarily: he could have coined the line earlier and liked his invention so much that he put it in on every fitting occasion. But fortunately we know that it was not Widekindi who coined it. The words are taken from a draft to a historical sketch on Swedish-Polish relations written by Axel Oxenstierna in 1620s and partially extant to our days (Oxenstierna 1888, 239–246). It was extensively used by Widekindi in the first book of Historia and actually forms a basis for it.33 In this case the original (Oxenstierna’s) text goes: “Opus adgredior causa grave, consiliis multiplex, difficile effectu atque eventu varium, neque hactenus a quoquam tentatum”.

The fact of using the draft of Oxenstierna draws our attention to another piece of information given by Widekindi in the first letter: from the middle of the 1650s he took care of Axel Oxenstierna’s library.34 We know35 that the main part of this book collection

32 Helander 2001, 42.
33 See Oxenstierna 1888, 244 n. and Almquist 1907, XVI.
34 In the title of his poem on the death of Johan Oxenstierna Widekindi calls himself “Eloq. et Hist. P.et Biblioth. Oxenst.” — thus he still was librarian in 1659, when the poem was published. There is also evidence that he had access to the book collection as late as in 1666, see Oxenstierna 1888, XI n.
35 Carlander 1904, 56–58; Oxenstierna 1888, XI.
was until the 1670's held in the castle of Tidö, not far from Västerås; in 1732, a catalogue presumably describing the collection was published under the title *Catalogus librorum, qui in bibliothecis illustrium qorundam virorum, hoc tempore reperiuntur, et Holmiae vel simul, tota bibliotheca, vel separatim per partes, indigenis et exoticis, jam nunc usque ad finem mensis junii anni subsequentis: venduntur.*

Indeed, it turns out that this catalogue contains quite a few of the printed sources used by Widekindi in *Historia*, namely:

- *Descriptio Sarmatiae Europeae* by A. Guagnini (1581) — p. 45, N 379 in the catalogue
- *Theatrum vitae humanae* by Th. Zwinger (1604) — p. 67, N 568
- *Europa* by E. S. Piccolomini in his *Opera omnia* (1571) — p. 91, N 735
- *Preussische Chronica* by C. Schütz (1599) — p. 103, N 826
- *Commentariorum Chotinensis belli libri III* by J. Sobieski (1646) — p. 147, N 212
- *De optimo statu libertatis libri II* by Ch. Warsevicius (1598) — p. 165, N 379
- *Mußkowitzische Chronica* by P. Petrejus (1620) — p. 197, N 612
- *De bello Moscovitico Stephani Regis Poloniae commentariorum libri VI* by R. Heidenstein (1588) — p. 233, N 874
- *Exotericarum exercitationum libri XV* by J. C. Scaliger (1576) — p. 373, N 600
- *Meditamenta pro foederibus* by E. von Weyhe aka W. de Ehrenberg (1641–42) — p. 401, N 877

Especially important is the presence of Warsevicius (apparently quite a rare book) and of the German version of Petrejus, while the catalogue does not contain the Swedish one (published in 1615) — and it is just the German version Widekindi refers to (on p. [448] of his Latin text).

One of the main sources of *Historia* (especially for books 3 and 4) is missing in this list, namely S. Kobierzycki’s *Historia Vladislai Poloniae et Sueciae Principis* — but the reason is quite obvious: Axel Oxenstierna died 1654, a year before the publication of Kobierzycki’s work. Probably Widekindi studied it later, in the 1660s. An important point is, however, that Widekindi had accomplished a great deal of work already in the middle or in the second half of the 1650s.

To sum up, the letters of Widekindi provide us with priceless information on the origins of *Historia* and allow us to draw an outline of what further research on this impressive piece of Swedish Neo-Latin literature should look like. First of all, the Latin text, a slight revision of the original draft, should be the primary object of the studies in stylistic, rhetorical and literary aspects of the work. Such studies are, though, less relevant (or even irrelevant, in certain cases) when it comes to passages loaned directly from other sources — thus the starting point is to look for these sources. The catalogue of Oxenstierna’s library, containing a lot of both Rossica and Polonica, may provide us with some new discoveries in this respect. Secondly, the Swedish text (apart from books 9 and 10) is mostly interesting from the linguistic point of view, i. e. as a translation. It may be analyzed and compared with other Swedish translations from the 17th century, e. g. in terms of the

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36 I’m going to treat this subject elsewhere, as the problem of Widekindi’s printed sources seems to have never been systematically studied.

recently released TRIX-method. An especially tempting question to embark on is, of course, whether it is possible to tell parts of text translated by different persons apart from one another. Finally, substantial differences between the two versions should be treated more thoroughly. We know from Widekindi’s letter that at least one of them was due to De la Gardie’s opinion which he expressed after having read the Swedish edition — could this be not the only case of the patron’s influence on the Latin edition?

The research goes on. Historia itself is not less fruitful in confronting a scholar with interesting philological problems than these few letters that shed light on the history of its creation.

Appendix

Illustrissime Celsissimeque Domine, Regni Sv. Cancellarie, Patrone Summe.

Ignosee, obsecro, Gratiosissime Domine, quod coram Celsissam Excel<en>t<ia>m tuam non adeam, cum hisce diebus ex lege mortalitatis fraternis exeqvijs valde occupatus sim. Interim contestari iussit obseqvij debitum, me Literis Illustr. Excellentiae Tuae decenti veneratione acceptis, me Literis Illust. Excellentiae Tuae decenti veneratione acceptis, illico paruisse, et ex opere Moschoviticato atque adeo omni memoria erasisse Appendicem illum genealogicam. Certum quidem est, Theodorum Michaelovizium tunc temporis nulla mentione consangvineitatis vel affinitatis cum magna Basilidum familia, sed fortuita electionis sorte primum a Cosacis proclamatum, et deinde quod in Adolescente mitis et Pacifici animi, in matre Prudentiae et magnanimitatis, in Patre (qui Patriarcha tunc captivus apud Polonos detinebatur) acris in gentem Polonam odij signa comparerent, a Bajoris in Magnum Ducem confirmatum fuisse: Certum quoque est, in Stolboensi tractatu, solenni cessione Livoniea, Careliae, et Ingriae, non usurpasse titulum illum, Plurium versus occidentem ditionum Dominum, sed posteriori tempore, quam commemorationem cum tempora non ferant, nec me in his nimis curiosum esse deceat, lubenter sapientissimo judicio tuo acquiesco, volens veritatem ae terna potius oblivione obrutam, quam cum periculo fato luctari.

In reliquis, quod stylum et materiam attinet, fateor Romana lingua me primum historiam consignasse, vnde partim mea, partim (propter festinationem et impedimenta) aliorum cura in Svecicum idioma translatœ est, quod etiam, non diffiteor, melius expoliri et potuisse et debuisse, sed rerum documentis conquirendis magis intentus, nihil cultui et nitori dans, malebam stylum populari et quo vulgus hominum loquitur modo fluere, quam alicuius verborum flosculis ambituque dare, putans omnem simplicis et ingenuae veritatis gratiam a Svecico sermone perire, si multum ornamentis litaretur. quae minus concinne, clare aut apte posita possunt secunda editione emendari, et interim lumen a Latino textu, qui fulgidior, habere.

Quod res et materiam attinet, optassem, pleniori momentorum explicatione deduci potuisse. Sed, sub Regibus CAROLO GUSTAVOque arduis negocijs occupatissimis, cum nulla diaria, nulla ferme protocolla, aut Senatus consulta rite descripta extarent, paucæ relations integrae, acta comitoriœ et deliberationum multa ex parte mutilata, ducum et militum literœ variae, omnes qui interfuerœ mortui, oportuit me, illis quæ haberi potuere, monumentis contentum fuisse. excussis omnibus loculis, perlectis innumeris literis, qvas

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38 See Wollin 2014.
39 The characteristic of these differences given in Kovalenko et al. 2000, 559–560 is somewhat superficial.
satagebam, circumstantias plures clarioresque reperire non poteram. In judicijs ferendis volebam quidem parcus cautusque esse, quam profluens et largus, sed interim ea par
rhesia uti, quae historicum deceat, quam et ratio tunc temporis ac status dictabat, et qua maximos viros, incomparabilem Parentem Tuum, aliosque duces et legatos usos fuisse video, extra quorum sensa nunquam, raro verba vagatus sum. Si in aliquibus, hoc primo specimen, aberravi, humilime rogo, ut Illust. Excellentia Tua pro singulari sua humani
tate benignissime interpret<et>ur…

Denique devotissime veneror illa favoris tui ac patrocinii benignissima promissa, quae nisi diu mihi affulsissent, iam dudum difficiles hos labores deprecatus essem, qui utcunque tractentur, semper obnoxij: Nihilque maiori contentione rogo, ut si continu-
andi sunt, cum vita brevis ac memoria rerum fugax sit, quam ut adminicula absolvendis suppedentur. Nam et scribam quem superiori anno mihi adiunxi, nunc amisi, nec ty-
pographi proprijs sumptibus additamenta Gustavi li Historiae, aut hoc quinquennium primum Gustavi Adolphi excudere volunt, nec ipse, non rite soluto salario, sustineo. Itaque humilime et obnixe rogo, ut illustri. Excell. Tua, quam honos et sera annalium gloria per literas in orbe nostro amplificatas manet, dignetur obstaculis remotis, taedi-
jsque hisce laborum sublatis, destinata ad optatos successus promovere. Nam ut cito per-
ficere, ita cito defungi cupio.

Celsissimae Excellentiae Tuae
humilimus observantissimusque cliens
Johan. Widekindi
Holm. 15. Mart. 72.

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НА ДВУХ ЯЗЫКАХ О ДВУЯЗЫЧНОМ ТЕКСТЕ:
ПИСЬМА ЮХАНА ВИДЕКИНДА МАГНУСУ ГАБРИЭЛЮ ДЕЛАГАРДИ

Арсений Анатольевич Ветушко-Калевич

Собрание писем Юхана Видекинда Магнусу Габриэлю Делагарди, хранящееся в Государственном архиве Швеции, до сих пор оставалось без должного внимания в исследованиях, относящихся к истории создания «Истории десятилетней шведско-московитской войны», главного труда Видекинда, в котором описываются события Смутного времени и Ингерманландской войны. Особенно важно в этом отношении последнее из 11 писем, датированное 15 марта 1672 года и посвященное почти исключительно «Истории». Из него следует, что первоначально текст книги был написан по-латыни (хотя шведская версия была опубликована первой). Шведское издание 1671 года — перевод, поспешно выполненный Видекиндом и несколькими его помощниками, а латинское издание 1672 года — отредактированный и неполный текст оригинала. Из другого письма известно, что Видекинд начал работу над книгой еще до 1661 года. Его основной целью, ясно обозначенной в письмах, было прославление Якоба Делагарди, отца его покровителя. Но М. Г. Делагарди, которому долгое время было известно о проекте историографа, стал оказывать ему помощь в публикации «Истории» только в 1666 году (или позднее), — вероятно, потому, что она стала вписываться в его внешне политическую программу. То обстоятельство — также известное из писем, — что в середине 1650-х гг. (или начиная с этого времени) Видекинд имел доступ к библиотеке канцлера Акселя Оксеншерна, а также использование им черновиков Оксеншерна при написании первой книги «Истории» позволяют думать, что со многими своими источниками Видекинд познакомился именно там. Каталог книжного собрания Оксеншерны подтверждает такое предположение.

Ключевые слова: Смутное время, Ингерманландская война, шведская новолатинская литература, историография XVII в., Россия, Юхан Видекинд, Магнус Габриэль Делагарди.

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A number of researchers have shown that Shakespeare's works bear the marks of the dramatist's knowledge of Plato. Elizabethans could have an access to Plato's heritage due to various editions of his dialogues, both in the original and also in Latin, Italian and French translations, but there is no way to establish whether the Bard borrowed directly from Plato or whether he learned about Plato's teachings from some other sources. J. Vivian, H. R. Rickman, D. Quincy demonstrated convincingly Shakespeare's indebtedness to Plato. They found that debt in such dramatic works as "A Midsummer Night's Dream" and "Henry V". Meanwhile Shakespearean scholars have ignored a possibility of interpreting Shakespeare's last will and testament as a text that could be properly understood due to allusions to Plato's works incorporated in it. The embarrassingly unpolished style of the document and its having nothing in common with Shakespeare's poetic diction, have both been explained by the testator's poor physical condition. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a new reading of the most notorious phrase in the will, the one about the second best bed bequeathed to Shakespeare's prospective widow. The phrase can be regarded as an allusion to two dialogues by Plato, the "Republic" and the "Laws", and this reading might change some of the existing beliefs in Shakespearean studies.

Keywords: Plato in Renaissance England, William Shakespeare, Shakespeare's Greek, William Shakespeare's last will, the second best bed, the "Republic", the "Laws."

It has become an adage that the Platonic school of thought influenced most English writers of the Elizabethan age, including William Shakespeare. These 16th-century English intellectuals shared Plato's notion of love as a series of elevations providing human beings with the opportunity to ward off base lust binding them to the animal kingdom and aspire after the only proper form of love, the so-called heavenly one, born in pursuit of the Ideal beauty and devoid of sensual attraction. Renaissance thinkers’ adherence to the aristocratic theory of subordination in government as the means of preservation of the natural order of things and their general disapproval of democracy stemmed mostly from the "Politics" and "Republic". It was Plato who supplied the Renaissance thought with the unanimously adopted concept of the human soul as consisting of three parts denoted as
the Appetite, the Rational, and the Spiritual ones. These were a few of Plato’s insights, and only a few, which became an integral part of Renaissance culture.

It is true that no English translations of Plato were published before or during Shakespeare’s lifetime (Palmer 1911), but the philosopher was highly praised by humanists and introduced into the Universities (Conley 1927, 57). Elizabethan humanists could read Plato in the original as both the first Greek edition of the Platonic corpus published by Aldus Manutius in 1513 (Hattaway 2003, 49) and the second one by Johannes Oporinus and Simon Grynaeus (Oporinus et al. 1534) were brought to England from the Continent. Alas, not so many Elizabethans could read Greek. Knowledge of Latin was much more common, so most of them were introduced to Plato through Marcilio Ficino’s classic Latin translation of Omnia Opera published in 1484, the edition retaining its popularity over subsequent two centuries. A fine Jean de Serres’ edition of Plato’s complete works dedicated to Queen Elizabeth, in which every Latin translation was set alongside the original Greek text (de Serres 1578), was also available for the English readers. Those who could not read Plato in any of the classical languages could satisfy their curiosity with French or Italian translations, eg., the one by Louis Le Roy who most probably was the first among his compatriots to translate Plato directly from the original texts as no traces of literal borrowings from Ficino’s translations were found in his works (Gundersheimer 1966, 32). These were the editions of Plato prevalent in the Elizabethan England.

There is no proof, however, that Shakespeare read any works by Plato. Conversely, nobody has proved he did not. From Ben Jonson’s famous commendatory poem published in the First Folio (1623), we may assume Shakespeare’s “small Latin and lesse Greeke” were not enough for his reading difficult philosophical texts in either of classical languages. Still a possibility exists he could study Plato in French: by Elizabethan and Jacobean standards, the Bard might not have got a top-notch learning but his command of French was so strongly pronounced in “Henry V” that it gave grounds to regard the author as the only English dramatist of his time to write at length in French (Watson 1990, 614).

Not having a decisive evidence of Shakespeare’s direct knowledge of Plato, some scholars still maintain the great playwright was much influenced by the Greek philosopher and provide compelling examples from Shakespeare’s plays to prove their standpoint. For one, in his laconic one-page report Hans P. Rickman pointed out at the coincidence of Shakespeare’s account of the death of Falstaff in “Henry V” (Act ii, Scene 3) with the description of the death of Socrates in the “Phaedo” (117e–118a), insisting Shakespeare quoted Plato verbatim (Rickman 1996, 378). John Vivian carried out a convincing analysis of “A Midsummer Night’s Dream” as a parable based on Platonist ideas (Vivyan 1961, 8). In a more recent paper, Bérnard Quincy drew an impressive parallel between “A Midsummer Night’s Dream” and the “Phaedrus”. Starting with the discussion of the striking similitude of the place of action in both works, the scholar found a much more important semblance between the texts, pointing out that Shakespeare employed erotic tension “to contrast sober reason with impassioned madness” in just the same way as it had been done in the “Phaedrus,” (Quincy 2009, 105) thus establishing Plato’s dialogue as a source of inspiration for the Renaissance playwright.

The problem of Shakespeare’s indebtedness to Plato might be approached not only by scrutinizing the texts of plays and poems by the Bard. Our aim in this paper is to draw attention of specialists to a possible reading of the seemingly ridiculous interlineal insertion on the third leaf of Shakespeare’s last will and testament about the bed he left to his wife:
“Item I give unto my wife my second best bed with the furniture”, which might shed a new light on the document as a whole.

Since the day it was found, Shakespeare’s will has ever been puzzling and embarrassing researchers by a striking disconnect between its unbookish style and supreme poetic diction characteristic of Shakespeare’s works. It launched an endless debate over the so-called Shakespeare authorship question, Anti-Stratfordians refusing to take it for granted that the text of the last will was dictated by the superb master of the English language. The phrase about the bed in particular has been unanimously and severely ridiculed as the one that by no means could be coined by the Bard. Still there were many who, feeling uneasy about the clumsy phrase, tried to ignore its ambiguity. In the third variorum Shakespeare edition (1821) James Boswell put forward the assumption that “the second best bed” was the usual occurrence in the age of Shakespeare (Shakespeare, 1821, vol. 2, 609). To prove his point, he cited the last will of Sir Thomas Lucy who in 1600 left his second son a second-best horse. Boswell’s interpretation still seems feasible for some modern scholars, opposing opinion prevailing. The truth must be somewhere in between.

In his fifth book on Elizabethan life Frederick George Emmison offers an extensive analysis of wills of Essex gentry and yeomen, showing Elizabethan testators often used “best” to define items they bequeathed. Moreover, there are wills in which “best beds” are mentioned. For instance, a widower left his “best bed” to his daughter, another person, a yeoman, intended his “best bed” to his wife (Emmison 1980, 104; 126). Such phrasing must have been a commonplace, but there are no other documents in which a bequeathed “next to the best” item is mentioned without a preceding reference to “the best” one. Also Shakespeare’s instruction about the “second best bed” stands out by the absence of any hints how the will executors were to distinguish it from the best one as well as by an uncommonly gelid mentioning of Mrs. Shakespeare who, unlike all the other heirs, was not even called by name. In this particular case, however, scholars and fiction writers tend to prefer extremities.

Most authors agree that Shakespeare’s wife was mentioned only in the afterthought insertion into the text, as if the dying man had completely forgotten about his prospective widow distributing his property between relatives and friends. The testator did not entrust his surviving spouse to anyone or call her well-beloved (Miller Cutting 2011, 85). The scantiness of the gift proved to be enough to hypothesize Shakespeare’s marriage was an unhappy one. Thus the second best bed bequest became a window into the Bard’s family life and a sandy foundation for nearly everything that has been written about his wife, both by critics and fiction writers. As Katherine Scheil wittily remarked, our idea of Anne Shakespeare would be very different if she had been given the “broad silver gilt bowl” instead of the “second best bed” (Scheil 2009, 69).

Though it is impossible to arrive at the truth about Shakespeare’s feelings for his wife, there is little doubt, whether it was meant as a snub or a token of affection and care, it was the latest amendment introduced into the text of the will. This old belief was firmly buttressed by a recent paper and ink analysis of the will carried out by conservators at The National Archives. An infrared ray scanning of the manuscript showed it had not been drafted in one setting, page two having been written earlier than the first and last ones. As to the “second best bed,” Dr. Amanda Bevan, Legal Records Specialist at The National Archives, believes it was added in March 1616 (What Will’s Will tells us about Shakespeare, 2016).
The important results obtained do not help to settle another problem: the will contains neither instructions where to look for “the second best bed,” nor any hints at how to distinguish it from the best bed that was to exist in the household (Garber et al. 2008, 92–94). Hence there have been a lot of suppositions made, researches competing with fiction writers in their bold assumptions and fantasies. For one, the late Robert Nye believed “the second best bed” was a marital bed in New Place (Nye 2000), “the best bed” being the one in London, on which Shakespeare made love with Southampton. According to Audrey Peterson, both beds, the best and the one next to it, were in Stratford, the best item having been mindfully given by the Shakespeares to Will’s elderly parents (Peterson 2005, 90). Peter Ackroyd is almost of the same opinion except he believes the best bed in the household was reserved for guests (Ackroyd 2005, 484). Cognate (Holden 1999, 322) and even more elaborate suggestions can be easily found in scholarly papers. For instance, Dieter Fuchs locates the second best bed in Stratford suggesting to look for the best bed, the symbol of marital fidelity, in Ancient Greece lore: the researcher regards the inserted phrase in Shakespeare’s will as a hint at Anne’s infidelity, her contrariety to Penelope, the best bed being the one made by Odysseus of a living olive tree (Fuchs 2015, 30–33).

The late 20th-century pseudo-biographical fiction about Shakespeare seems to have grown fascinated with the motif of “the second best bed” as a hiding-place for something so precious it could not be directly mentioned in the last will. In Tim Kelly’s comedy “The Second Best Bed” the fabled piece of furniture becomes a hider for Shakespeare’s loving letter to his spouse and jewels he left her to ensure her well-being in the years to come after his death (Kelly 1970). Adhering authors like Connie Willis (Willis 1994) and Avril Rowlands (Rowlands 2005) made a step further, inferring that Shakespeare’s manuscripts were hidden in the bed and Shakespeare wished this invaluable heritage would fall to Anne. Pseudo-biographical writings associating the “second best bed” either with material or spiritual values are mere fantasies. That said, the trend requires an explanation.

What could compel Shakespeare to make such a ridiculous addition to his will? If he had meant to insult his wife, it would have been enough for him not to mention her in the will. If he had been worrying about her future, he would have named somebody to take care of her. One way or another, there must have been some solid reason to prevent him from taking the final decision about the second best bed up to the eleventh hour. His being slow might be attested to his not willing to let his decision known in advance, which could be quite understandable if the bed contained something really precious. It is also possible to surmise the clumsy phrase jumping out of the page may have more than one meaning, the hidden one being clear to those who were let into the secret.

If our guess is correct, it is important to consider allusions “the second best bed” triggers. In Shakespeare’s works, beds are often mentioned in connection with love-making, death and rest. For instance, the word occurs 27 times in “Romeo and Juliet” and 21 times in “Othello.” But it was just once that the Bard addressed to the bed of his own: “Weary with toil, I haste me to my bed…” (Sonnet 27, line 1), associating it with creativity, as physical rest encourages fantasy, wakes up poetic fancies and invites the poet to start on an imaginary journey towards the ideal image of his love. It should be specified that in all the pre-Shakespearean literary tradition the direct link between a bed and creative work had been firmly established only in Plato’s the “Republic,” Book X, in which the philosopher discourses upon the existence of three kinds of beds, τρισὶν εἴδεσι κλινῶν (Pl. Resp. 597b12).
The primary bed exists as the idea of a bed created by god, that is further incarnated in an ordinary piece of furniture by an artisan (τέκτων, carpenter, or κλινοποιός, a maker of beds), while the third kind of a bed is its painted image, an imitation of a real bed produced by an artist (Plato’s term ζωγράφος stands here for an imitator of nature, the one who draws from nature).

In Shakespeare’s aesthetics, to create a work of art was to mirror real life, so the playwright could also be called a sort of Plato’s ζωγράφος, while his work could be likened to the third type of a bed mentioned by Plato. Moreover, a little further on in the “Republic” the philosopher directly compared an artist to an author of tragedies:

tούτ’ ἄρα ἐσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδοποιός, εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστι, τρίτος τις τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας περιφέρεσις, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μμηταί. (Pl. Resp. 597e6–7)

‘This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators.’ (Shorey, 1969)

In another dialogue, the “Laws,” we can find an equivalent for the English “second best”: πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον (Pl. Leg. 739a4), i. e., next to the best. Thus, the attribute for the bed Shakespeare used in his last will also sounds quite Platonic. For our purposes it is also worth mentioning that in the same book of the “Laws” Plato touched upon the issues of inherited wealth:

μὴ δή τις φιλοχρημονεῖ παῖδων γ’ ἑνεκα, ἵνα πλουσιοτέρους καταλιπῃ (Pl. Laws. 729a2–3)

‘And let no man love riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as wealthy as possible...’ (Bury 1967–1968);

παισίν δὲ αἰδῶ χρή πολλῆς, οὐ χρυσον καταλείπειν. (Pl. Laws. 729b1)

‘To his children it behoves a man to bequeath modesty, not money, in abundance.’ (Bury, 1967–1968).

If we were to choose key words for sections of Plato’s dialogues containing “second best” and “bed”, we might pitch upon “tragedy” and “succession to an estate” establishing additional links between them and Shakespeare’s testament. That said, we might attempt to look at the notorious phrase from a different angle. In Shakespeare’s plays, double entendres are common. Oftentimes they have a sexual connotation as it is with the famous Thisbe’s kissing “the wall’s hole” (“A Midsummer Night’s Dream,” V, 1; Shakespeare 1994, 299) or Maria’s sly remark about Sir Andrew Aguecheek’s dry hands (“Twelfth Night,” I, 3; Shakespeare 1994, 643). One can also find not a few examples of phrases with double meaning in tragedies and chronicles, suffice it to mention “Macbeth” with its prophecy concerning Great Birnam wood. Such devices being characteristic of Shakespeare’s style, it is possible to interpret the phrase about the second best bed as the one with an equivocal meaning, the hidden one being an allusion to Plato.

There is a certain problem to be resolved in our further speculations: Plato wrote about three kinds of beds while in case of Shakespeare’s last will we can consider only two beds: the bed mentioned directly presupposes there existed the best one, in other words, Shakespeare departed from Plato as to the number of beds. Quality can be attributed only to material objects; this said, the bed made by a carpenter appears to be the best and the one created by an artist becomes the next in quality to it.
If we agree the phrase about the second best bed may contain allusions to Plato, we get a possible key to its hidden meaning: the second best bed might be a circumlocution standing for Shakespeare's manuscripts (τοῦτ' ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδοποιός, εἴπερ μυθήτης ἐστι, Pl. Resp. 597ε6). The fact that the First Folio was published in the year of Anne Shakespeare's death is also suggestive to the hypothesis she had been appointed the custodian of the Bard's archive.

Our speculations over “the second best bed” brought us to the following conclusions:

- Shakespeare did not suffer from mental debility in the closing stage of his life;
- his manuscripts were brought from London to Stratford and were kept in his house;
- Shakespeare cared for his wife’s future;
- he trusted her enough to give her the power with his most precious possession;
- his last will and testament may have been read in a wrong way;
- other phrases in the document considered may also have a double meaning and be allusive.

All of them require a further fine-grained examination. We have just suggested an unconventional approach to Shakespeare's last will and testament interpretation hoping to draw attention of classical scholars to the document traditionally treated by British studies specialists only.

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В ряде научных работ было продемонстрировано, что сочинения Шекспира свидетельствуют о знании драматургом трудов Платона. Несмотря на очевидность того, что елизаветинцы могли знакомиться с наследием Платона по различным изданиям его диалогов, как на языке оригинала, так и в переводах на латынь, итальянский и французский языки, нет никакой возможности установить, обращался ли Бард непосредственно к текстам Платона или знал об его учении из каких-то иных источников. Дж. Вивиан, Г. Рикман, Д. Куинси выявили убедительные примеры влияния Платона на Шекспира, обнаружив их в таких пьесах, как «Сон в летнюю ночь» и «Генрих V».

В то же время шекспирологи игнорируют возможность интерпретации завещания Шекспира как текста, который может быть должным образом осмыслен благодаря содержащимся в нем аллюзиям на сочинения Платона. Вызывающий недоумение убогий стиль документа, не имеющий ничего общего с языком поэзии Шекспира, объясняется плохим физическим состоянием завещателя. Цель данной работы заключается в том, чтобы предложить новый вариант прочтения наиболее печально знаменитой фразы из завещания, в которой упоминается о наследовании будущей вдове Шекспира второй по качеству кровати. Рассмотрение этой фразы как содержащей аллюзию на два диалога Платона, «Государство» и «Законы», могло бы изменить некоторые устоявшиеся представления шекспирологов.

Ключевые слова: Платон в ренессансной Англии, Уильям Шекспир, греческий язык Шекспира, завещание Шекспира, вторая по качеству кровать, «Государство», «Законы».
А. И. ЗАЙЦЕВ О НАУКЕ И УЧЕНЫХ* 1

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Автор настоящего доксографического и психологического очерка был тесно связан с А. И. Зайцевым с 1961–1962 гг. до конца жизни (2000) как ученик, ценитель и, со временем, коллега. Задача настоящего материала — привести в более или менее связном перечислении яркие высказывания Зайцева, цель которых была точная и емкая формулировка проверенного на собственной жизни опыта — своего или чужого. Все, что он говорил, имело это свойство, и затрагивало все, что представлялось важным в жизни — именно это было прямо необходимо в обстановке сильно приторного самостоятельного мышления в пору сталинизма. В настоящем очерке автор старается привести и обсудить ряд высказываний и обывковений Зайцева, касающихся прежде всего академической жизни: вопрос о способности отдельных людей к гуманитарному знанию; эпистемологические особенности филологии и истории; когнитивное состояние этих наук в старой Европе, в СССР и в современном мире. Тем более Зайцев высказывался по широкому набору вопросов, касающихся дидактических приемов, педагогических целей и научных достижений.

При разнообразии и разнородности приводимых высказываний выяснилось, что трудность не столько в том, чтобы придать связность такому собранию изречений; серьезнее оказалось то, что надо было позаботиться о том, чтобы апофегмы были даны в подходящем свете — иначе была бы очевидна опасность неправильно понять их неправильным контекстом. Наконец, понятно и то, что отдельно взятые суждения и оценки составляют некое целое, и уяснение на основании и главные пружины подхода дают возможность понять более глубокую связь идей и лежащих в основе сторон деятельности. Именно в этом случае перед нами будут ipsissima verba, ради чего, в частности, представлялось правильным излагать специфический российский опыт на русском языке. Что касается источников знания Зайцева, то они необыкновенно широки, а особенно сильное влияние на него оказывали Платон и Аристотель, немецкая филология лучшего времени в целом, Жюльен Бенда в пору созревания его подхода к долгу ученых и интеллектуалов, и, наконец, старинные традиции католической мысли.

Ключевые слова: ученость, знание, наука, учитель, ученики, мудрость, семинары, доклады, апофегмы, афоризмы, серьезность, ирония, истина.

Роль Александра Иосифовича Зайцева (1926–2000) в Университете была осознана своевременно, ибо была востребована сразу: наиболее авторитетные наставники в начале 1960-х врастали уже в пенсионный возраст. Сам он, хотя лишь по

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случае и недолго возглавлял кафедру, но с годами несомненно стал ведущей научной силой на ней. После 2000 г. энергичная работа по первому приведению в порядок наследия А. И. Зайцева (далее А. И.) была проведена стараниями большой группы его учеников. Собрание его сочинений, отражающее и часть разработанных им курсов, заслуживало особого внимания, ибо имело не только историко-научную ценность, но и прямую — служить основой в преподавании специальных учебных дисциплин. Четвертый том СС А. И. Зайцева, пока оказавшийся последним (план был несколько шире), был издан уже в 2006 г., что совпало с 80-летием со дня рождения А. И. Четырехтомник содержит немало ценных, в частности, подсобных материалов. Вообще, следует признать, что ученики А. И., имена которых появляются во всех томах Собрания его сочинений, показали этим изданием, что серьезно относятся к творчеству учителя, к Университетской традиции и к себе самим.

Обширный архив А. И. как ученого был разительно скоро — при его объеме и трудно обозримой многосложности — приведен в порядок, что было бы невозможно без всеременной помощи О. И. Зайцевой. Чуть позже, опять же при ее участии, был составлен Хронологическая канва жизни и научной деятельности А. И. То, что работу делали те, у кого на глазах протекали труды и дни ученого, не всегда делало задачу легкой — некоторые, особенно внешние, события нуждаются для датировки в прямых документах. События внутренние, о которых окружающим приходится скорее догадываться — идеи, планы, ход той или иной работы, преобразование мыслей — установить еще труднее; даже сам человек, в котором происходят сложные творческие процессы, то и дело теряет «нить» в напряженном потоке мыслей и устремлений. Помню, как-то А. И. с иронией отметил, что темы, над которыми ученик работает (речь зашла о нем самом) внешнему наблюдателю представляются бессвязными, а на деле «все они об одном и том же».

Любопытно, что довольно рано некоторые коллеги начали писать свои воспоминания об А. И., а другим, в особенности Г. Г. Анпетковой-Шаровой, старому товарищу А. И., захотелось увековечить нечто сиюминутное и гениальное, прямо из его уст. Для автора настоящего материала общение с А. И. было одним из определяющих, хотя я старался получать впечатления от многих старших — то было поколение дедов, с которым у меня легко установилась связь, потому что в семье воспитывал меня дед — человек того же поколения, что и старшие на факультете (отец пропал без вести в 1941 г. добровольцем). А. И. был старше меня на 16 лет, но поскольку на эти годы приходились очень серьезные исторические события и не все равно, встретить войну младенцем или пережить ее в пору становления личности, он относился скорее к очень редкому у моих сверстников поколению отцов. Мое ученичество, а затем наше коллегиальное общение продолжалось 40 лет (1960–2000), а пик моего общения с А. И. приходился именно на 1963–1978 гг., которые и были для меня решающими. Количество его мнений, которые были услышаны, обдуманы, приняты или как-то переработаны, настолько велико, что их трудно уложить в нечто единое несмотря на их яркость. Их интересно было усваивать, интересно передавать друзьям, что я и делал постоянно как студент и аспирант, а потом внушал те же принципы моим первым слушателям как молодой преподаватель.

Правил, идей, мыслей А. И. множество — даже тех, которые удается выхватить из ставшего как будто своим и привычным опыта. С другой стороны, когда я надумал
пересказывать разрозненные сентенции А. И., отражающие различные принципы, стала намечаться пестрая картина, так что в пору было думать о чем-нибудь в стиле Scriptores Historiae Augustae или Диогена Лазртского с его простодушно нанизанными вереницами чьих-нибудь мудрых мыслей. Но тут же пришлось осознать, впервые, что высказываний вспоминается много, а во-вторых, что они нуждаются в комментарии исторического рода, а еще что значительность их без ситуации не обязательно будет понята так, как следует. Поэтому я ограничил на этот раз памятное мне суждение А. И. (конечно, лишь часть его placita) сферой знания и науки, ученых и ученых. Ниже я постараюсь припоминать суждения и афоризмы А. И., когда их помню в оригинальной форме, и присовокуплять комментарий к их содержанию. Поскольку мы часто беседовали на обратном пути из БАН между 11 (когда закрывалась библиотека) и 12 часами ночи — А. И. надо было в самом начале Загородного, а мне — к Московскому вокзалу, да и вообще мы часто беседовали в пути, признавая, что я нередко помню то самое место в городе, где А. И. произносит ту или иную фразу, или вернее, мысль. Это, между прочим, косвенно доказывает, что слово А. И. бывало для меня (как и для других, со временем — многих) прямым жизненным событием. Любопытно: сам он вполне отчетливо понимал, что такое общение со старшим существеннейшим образом важно для младших, и связывал почти каждодневное, сплетенное с событиями жизни общение с высшей формой связи учителя и ученика, когда они живут рядом и думают часто об одном. Несомненно, что такой формат отношений имеет колокообразующее значение; и жаль, что объем таких влияний суживается по мере того как учеников становится больше, а временной ресурс старшего сокращается.

Заметим, что в этом «цеховом» контексте примечательность основана не только на оригинальности и индивидуальном характере идей, но и просто на том, что личность, в которую вглядывается младший, собирает именно такую, а не другую житейско-афористическую икебану. Для А. И. характерно, что он, будучи в высшей степени оригинальным, не слишком дорожил как раз своей оригинальностью, причем это распространялось (редкость для ученого) даже на сферу сугубо научных положений. Мысль была ему интереснее, чем ее авторство (чаще всего трудно установимое). Ему интересней было составить общую большую картину, придать мыслям связность и полноту, владеть собой при любых обстоятельствах. Оценивая себя (такое случалось редко — когда был особый повод для этого, и особенно в пору, когда его «Культурному перевороту» не давали родиться как книге), он, уверенный в том, что дал верное объяснение «греческому чуду», говорил, что в его случае можно говорить «о предрасположенности к науке». У него, кажется, само получалось подобное тому, чего Станиславский требовал от актера: не он царит в научном знании, а научное знание пользуется им как инструментом для познания некого положения вещей. Он видел в себе лишь рупор науки. Она говорила через него благодаря его готовности ей служить. В этом были его Олимпийские игры и олимпийское же спокойствие.

С А. И. — и это было характерно — говорили обо всем, что угодно. Во-первых, просто нужен был совет. Во-вторых, любопытно было увидеть новые доказательства его мудрости. Помню несколько случаев, когда в его осведомленности слышалось некое tremendum. Однажды подошел я в БАН к А. И., стоявшему в кулуаре
с несколькими его слушателями разных лет. Когда меня спросили, чем я озабочен, я рассказал, что надлежало что-то вносить или выносить из квартиры, а в это самое время дом начали ремонтировать и поставили леса… «Леса по ГОСТу должны отстоять от двери на …», и А. И. назвал точное расстояние. Группа собеседников была поражена. Один из стоявших рядом, не веря, спросил А. И., откуда он такое знает. «А я прочел когда-то у Пушкина, что мы ленивы и не любопытны, и решил противиться этому». У меня, помнится, было ясное сознание, что меня на такое заведомо не хватит, так что и желания подражать А. И. у меня в этом случае не возникло, но когнитивную ситуацию с притязанием на тотальную осведомленность я почувствовал.

Другой эпизод, когда А. И. поразил, приводя ex tempore весьма экзотические сведения, были цитаты из старинного прусского законодательства (Das allgemeine Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten, знаменитое PrALR, изданное в 1794 г.) — этим он поразил голландского историка из начавших заглядывать к нам в 1980-е годы гесперических ученых: Даниэл ван ден Хенгст таких экскурсов с цитатами на память от “советского ученого” не ожидал. Между тем для А. И. закон qua закон был свят; он испытывал постоянную двойственность, видя сдавленное буйство большинства отечественных интеллектуалов и колеблясь между Зевсом и Тифоном в себе самом… Отсюда его пожизненное внимание к «Законам» Платона и дальнейшее его чтение Платона и Аристотеля, его отнюдь неформальное участие в работе народных заседателей еще в СССР. Признаюсь, что в свое время я видел в этом трамву после заключения (А. И. был реабилитирован только в 1991 г.); однако теперь я думаю, что важнее для А. И. была система представлений о космическом и государственном порядке. Прав был наш общий знакомый, рано умерший факультетский германист В. Михайлов, который обсуждая со мной мнения и мысли А. И. как-то сказал, что вещи, удивляющие нас в нем, суть следствия необыкновенной цельности его натуры.

Гурман знаний хочет иметь сведения, которые — по той или иной причине — для него лакомы. Приходится признать, однако, что такая установка легко переходит в умственную лень, а иной раз — увы, невзначай и легко! — в обскурантизм. А. И. все это знал. Один из его принципов (который я наблюдал на деле, а некоторые слышали в виде правила) гласил поэтому: «Не надо беречь интеллектуальных усилий». Я по-прежнему полагаю, что нельзя всего запомнить, как нельзя, пожалуй, все что угодно одинаково хорошо понимать, но я не раз видел, как А. И., когда его были любым обстоятельствам и в любой обстановке — спросит о каком-нибудь затрудняющем тексте или обстоятельстве, тут же напрягался почти физически подобно штангисту, который принуждает себя брать очередной вес. Введение его «сред» по вечерам, когда к нему мог прийти каждый со своим вопросом, заходя по очереди, было некоторой полумерой, им самим принятой для того, чтобы избежать трудности вдруг сосредоточиться на любом из заданных вопросов. Он ждал; если посетителей не было, он все равно оставался в кафедральном помещении. На фоне этого положения обсуждалось все что угодно, будь то происхождение и бессмертие души и всяческая антропология с теологией пополам, или то, что касается жизни государств — об этом, в чем нам отказано было участвовать, разговоры были особенно неотступны. Высказывался А. И. обо всем — о людях, о стране, о человеке вообще, об альтруизме у животных, о старых и новых книгах, о текущих обстоятельствах любого рода и проч. Ограничений типа «я не специалист»
или «об этом мне не приходилось или не хочется думать» — А.И. не признавал совершенно. Кому нужно это алиби от подозрения в наличии ума? Поэтому при необходимости выбирать и толковать возьмем здесь то, что он говорил по вопросам историко-филологической науки и научной жизни, когда это не было высказывание по частному научному поводу. Ведь не исчислить, сколько отзывов он написал или произнес, он, считавший своим долгом идти на каждое заседание! Ниже мы будем иметь в виду именно разрозненные обобщающие и, главное, устные афоризмы Зайцева на тему учености и знания, какие удалось мне припомнить. При этом из неписаного учения Зайцева, его аграфа догматы — приходится опять же выбирать какую-то часть, тем более, что мне показалось не просто полезным, а даже необходимым, давать пояснение о внутренней связи между этими placita. И хотя зайцевские афоризмы призваны были объяснять или пояснять, однако сообщая их без контекста и без собственных пояснений, мы породили бы иной раз ложные представления.

Это не ново: каждый филолог знает, что комментарии нуждаются в комментариях, и если перпетуум мобиль где-нибудь существует, так именно здесь. К тому же нередко в живом общении можно было натолкнуться на парадоксы: иногда в А.И. заметно вступал рационализм того рода, который не боится упрощения и как будто даже банаальности, а с другой стороны в нем же наблюдалась склонность к чему-то причудливому — к будто бы разделяемым суевериям, не говоря о гротескно неожиданной форме, которая тоже может сбивать с толку. На это положение вещей можно опять-таки припомнить его постулат о «противоречиях, присущих живой мысли». Инчае говоря, противоречия у А.И. разрешались, было бы только умно и занимательно. Иногда (правда, лишь изредка) можно было наблюдать и то, как об одном и том же ученом персонаже давались различные отзывы: помню случай, когда прежний «глубокий ум» некое время спустя превратился в «великого путаника».

При неуклонной и неустанной систематической работе у А.И. вырабатывались весьма определенные и связные мнения не только внутри специальности, но и вне ее; не столь же последовательные, это были системно значимые мнения. Задавшись целью изложить какую-то их часть, я начинаю осознавать, что это весьма любопытная область интеллектуального опыта ученого: то, о чем ученый обычно не пишет, хотя именно этого питает как мыслителя и писателя. Это формально не систематизированный методологический опыт ученого, некие приемы, сохраняющиеся в его памяти под именами мыслителей и направлений — то, о чем на лекциях, а тем более в статьях он почти не говорит в частностях и подробно. Это своего рода ученое подсознание. Такие сгустки мыслей и опыта доказывать строго было бы слишком трудно, избыточно. Зато приятно, чтобы иррациональная подкладка немного согревала скудные ткани разума. Эти подвалы интеллекта в чем-то содержательнее частных научных вопросов.

Зачем вообще надо изучать древность?

Выбора, предполагаемого «спором древних и новых», А.И. решительно не признавал. И уже это было важной чертой его подхода к рассмотрению мировой культуры. Ведь всякий выбор лишен нас чего-то существенного, более того, — необходимого. Если мы понимаем, что одно выступает рельефнее только на фоне другого,
то Древность и Новейшее время (в котором он, несмотря на успехи технической цивилизации, опасался узнавать недвусмысленные признаки упадка) взаимно необходи́мы. Продолжение этого тандема в будущем ничуть не гарантировано. Признаки этого он обнаруживал даже в науке: «Может прийти время, когда переста́нут понимать то, что написали прежние ученые» — я до сих пор помню, как стало страшно, когда он вскользь обозначил эту перспективу, а пугать он умел, невзначай и вскользь, с бодрым выражением лица, чтобы это не выглядело как тусклое по-рождение унылого темпера́мента.

Зайцев говорил об античности: «Там еще что-то можно понять». Он имел в виду, что современный мир настолько перенасыщен, что действительность за-путана почти безнадежно. — Я бы к этому добавил, что современной истории не только слишком много, но она при этом еще и не завершена. Мудрое respicere finem применимо только к прошлому, а у вглядывающихся в него все время новы́й историче́ский опыт и новы́е мысли. Направляя свой взгляд на древность, мы благодарны глубине и силе вековых традиций антиковедения соедини́ем древне́й с новейше́й.

«Самые трудные языки, даже из древних — классические». Так считал А. И., при этом в приемлемой степени ориентируясь в древнееврейском, в санскрите, в анатолийских языках (hetтском особенны). Почему? Казалось бы, естественна некото́рая опаска́ перед восточны́ми языками, с которыми даже при наличии некоторых связей все-таки меньше связан наш язык. Однако А. И., пожалуй, был прав: и количество греческих и латинских текстов, и их изученность, которые вме-сте позволяют тонкое знание обоих этих языков, ставят перед изучающими весьма разнообразные и высокие требования. Взять хотя бы частицы, на которые сы́рался А. И. — изобилие в греческих текстах знаков логических отношений, а зна́чит, целый фено-менологи краси и чувства в их тонкостях и оттенках. Остаётся добавить обстоятельство уже упомянутое: традиция изучения классического мира всю Европой, а там почти всем миром, которые столько многое из древних вычита́ли, а кое-что умное, пожалуй, в рассмотрение их памятников привнесли от себя. Стоит сравнить библейское «вав» с добрýм десятком греческих союзов и союznых выра́жений, заглянув в известный труд Деннистона, который является триумфом не только греческой, но и англійской культу́ры. Тому, кто прочтет, чем отличаются какие-нибудь καὶ γὰρ οὖν и τοιγαροῦν, все тут же станет ясно. Другое дело, легче ли, читая текст, расслышать все эти оттенки и оценки или же угадать все, что следует, из одного и того же союзного слова?

Кстати, чтению классических тексътов (вместе с необходимым для их осмы́с-ления усилием) А. И. приписывал нравственно-терапевтическое значение. «Если человек разобрал 300 стихов Гомера или Энеида, он уже не способен на пре-ступление». Это, помнится, А. И. сказал на борту грузовика, когда перевозили вещи Я. М. Боровского из просторной «кельи» Смолного монастыря в квартиру на улице Достоевского, а среди помогавших был кто-то, учи́вший юристов древним языкам — последние не были в тот момент признаны лиши́ми для выносилых служителей российской Феми́ды.
Зайцев и доклады

У А. И. после его возращения в университетскую жизнь скоро установились неукоснительные правила своего участия в научной жизни сперва на факультете, а затем и во всем городе; после перестройки он охотно ездил всюду, куда его звали (например, в Квебек), не говоря о праотческой Литве или, тем более, о заметившей его как наставника Москве. Одним из главных правил стало прагматичное и неукоснительно соблюдение своих обязанностей. Значительность каждого эпизода научной жизни, а не только таких, которые заранее имели ореол значительности. Также и мнениями он дорожил — не только авторитетов, но всякой, кто чем-либо занимается. В этом соединились его природная любознательность и чувство долга перед научной мыслью. Наверное, в этой непреклонной обязательности сказалось и семь лет, проведенных в Казани, которые вскормили его голод по нормальной академической и вообще культурной жизни. Это, среди прочего, подталкивало А. И. к универсализму знаний; со временем А. И., прослушав доклад, научился в уравновешенной и обобщенной форме выявить содержание и смысл любого сообщения, а нередко — объяснить выступавшему, в чем, собственно говоря, состоят следствия и польза разобраных им фактов и сделанных наблюдений. Он не только искал смысла, но и давал его. Я наблюдал это не одну сотню раз, иногда на своих собственных докладах и могу засвидетельствовать, что А. И. часто видел предмет обсуждения точнее и как правило дальше того, кто выступал. А. И. никогда не расхваливал докладчика, не говорил чего-то в духе, который мы впоследствии часто находили в собственности на другом континенте, вроде: „Thank you so much for your splendid / brilliant / marvelous etc. lecture…“, но с неким удовлетворением и в деловом тоне обсуждал содержание услышанного, будто подтверждая старинное французское правило: les gens savants n’admirent pas, ils approuvent. При этом в его высказываниях во время дискуссии, иногда восполняющих еще и заключительным подведением итога, не было и тени «остентации» — того самого поведения, которое он характеризовал этим словом и сдерживало не одобрал (а ведь как трудно этого избежать, когда вдруг что-нибудь знаешь…). Вместе с докладчиком он хотел быть свидетелем и участником научных поисков; к любознательности здесь примешивалось любопытство, к выступлению — приятное сочетание серьезности с вежливостью. Не зря места, где занимаются наукой (университетские аудитории, библиотеки и тд.), он называл святынами, а действия, предпринимаемые в таком окружении — священнодействием. Смолоду А. И. выражал это в кулуарах еще и словами священнослужитель, или еще: священная сила такого-то (скажем, Якова Марковича Боровского). Потом такое произносилось реже, но все уже знали этот фон и понимали, что он мыслит об этом по существу.

Более того, со временем стало понятно: А. И. интересно, что делает любой, выступая с тем или иным научным сообщением, если в подготовке и установках выступающего есть хоть какое-то благомыслье. Он чтел Разум, Логос вообще. Усердный читатель, не говоря о неуклонном чтении в библиотеках, он читал и перед сном и легко засыпал, накрыв лицо книгой — я однажды видел такую сценку в Софии в пору Эпиграфического конгресса. Разумеется, он отлично понимал, что энцикло—
педические знания лучше питать через чтение, когда можно подобрать источник лучше, выбрать подходящее (тебе, а не другому) время и возвращаться — когда нужно — к прочитанному. Однако читать — это не то, что наблюдать энергичную фазу занятий любимым предметом, когда это делает другой человек. Тут появляется возможность не просто усваивать новое, а пережить увлечение, увидеть изобретательность и приемы, ознакомиться с трудностями подхода к материалу. Хорошо, конечно, узнавать то, что мы давно хотим узнать. Но иной раз еще существеннее узнать то, о чем мы даже не догадываемся. Чужой доклад ценен не столько знанием, сколько открывающейся внимательному наблюдателю картиной общей научной жизни. И неудивительно, что в самом сердце зайцевской концепции «культурного переворота» в Греции, а вместе и формулы культурных прорывов или взлетов вообще, немалую роль играют формы гражданской солидарности, взаимодействия одаренных людей и умов при единстве места и времени. Надо сказать, что у представителей старшего поколения получалась иная картина: для А. И. Доватура с братьями Круазе, с Э. Ренаном и Г. Буссе высокая европейская культура в целом торжественно завершалась; лишь кое-где оставались отдельные интеллигентные личности, которые способны худо-бедно понимать носителей подлинной, т. е. старой, культуры и пускать в ход их достижения, не надеясь на движение знаний вперед и на свое участие в этом процессе. Жители это было по-своему здраво, но зайцевская вера в познавательный пыл человечества имела в себе что-то смелое и в этом смысле святое.

Зайцев и другие ученые

Старшие отечественные ученые были еще вполне ощутимы в его пору. К ним он относился с почтением как к носителям нормальности. «Он же еще получил образование в нормальных условиях», говорил в таких случаях А. И., имея в виду прежнюю сносную житейскую обстановку, высокообразованных учителей и ученые в раннем возрасте, притом без уродливой и уродующей почти тотальной индоктринации советских времен. Действительно, стирать следы агрессивной идеологии не хватит иной жизни; то же и с прочным усвоением основ историко-филологического знания или азов культурного обихода. Дело было не в подходе в духе adoratio temporis acti, даже если иногда А. И. гиперболизированно выражал совершенный восторг перед некоторыми чертами старорежимности, вроде дневного рациона мяса в старых казачьих войсках или в употреблении архаических мер и весов.

Когда я рассказал ему, что прослушал — кажется, это было в 1961 г. или 1963 г. — немецкую лекцию о фольклоре когда-то учившегося в Тарту Исидора Левина, А. И. остановился как вкопанный (дело было в коридоре исторического факта) и воскликнул: «Так это ж, наверно, ученик великого Вальтера Андерсона!». Мне это тогда мало что говорило, но познакомившись с Исидором Геймовичем, я мог убедиться, что А. И. как в воду глядел — так оно и было.

Сверхников, тем более примечательных, у него было мало — а жаль. А. И. умел ценить тех немногих, которые сохранились в его последовательно децимированном поколении. У людей, которые воспитывались в ранней советской семье и школе, случались прорехи в образовании и воспитании, но была и сила — понимание часто чудовищной реальности XX в. и способность как-то с нею справ-
ляться. Кроме того, советская средняя школа, в которой работали учителя, воспитанные еще в начале того столетия, являла ряд великолепных достоинств. Это был ответ старого режима в его лучших чертах, связанных с благороднейшими тенденциями старого русского общества. Между прочим, это можно было наблюдать в солидных школьных библиотеках, которые сохранялись в старых школах. Во время эвакуации Уфимская библиотека дала А.И. возможность проходить большую часть предметов по гимназическим учебникам — это был его собственный выбор, но ведь была еще возможность осуществить его! И тут я должен сообщить одну мысль А.И., которая, казалось бы, очевидна, но доходит не до всех и не всегда: подлинная цена режимов проверяется не в тот момент, когда новые силы решительно завладели ситуацией, а когда в жизни разворачиваются воспитанные новым режимом поколения. Сколько мы слышали (в том числе и от иностранных наблюдателей) о весьма примечательной советской системе образования! Между тем, вполне очевидно, что в 1920–50-е годы действовала или сильно сказывалась еще старая система, а когда учителей и во- обще людей, воспитанных в старой России с ее замечательными педагогическими устремлениями и институтами, почти уже не осталось.

Об отечественной интеллигенции. А.И. однажды (мы переходили трамвайные пути на Лиговке у дома Перцова) процитировал какого-то побывавшего в старой России англичанина, который в качестве отличительной черты русского интеллигента называл ‘total commitment’ — полную самоотдачу. Чувствовалось, что сам он разделял такую предельную установку. Помню и еще одно высказывание А.И., которое должно было бы понравиться нашим “пatriотам”. По случаю оказался у нас перед глазами портрет кого-то из знаменитых испанских интеллектуалов (не помню, был ли это Менендес Пидаль, Ортега-и-Гассет или Унамуно). Я не удер- жался от прекраснодушного умиления: “Какие лица у них!” А.И. взглянул искоса на прославленного испанца и с деланным равнодушием бросил: “А по мне — про- сто шпана.” Это безусловно была шутка, основанная на обыгрывании немецкого испанцы-Spanier. Но я со своей провоцирующей хвалой напрасно позабыл, что не зря же А.И. всегда с чувством говорил об отечественных интеллигентах, име- ющих облик А.П. Чехова, К.С. Станиславского, Николая Петровича Лихачева или Питирима Сорокина, которым он заслуженно восхищался еще тогда, когда об этом выходило из зырянских лесов немногие у нас слышали.

О гелертерстве. А.И. постоянно анализировал жизнь, действия и характеры людей, а не только литературу, уверенный, что для понимания литературы это будет не только полезно, но и необходимо. Такова одна из установок, противоречащих сладостной болезни гелертерства — понимать научные занятия как уволь- нительную от всего, что болезненно в человеческой жизни. Когда мы впадаем в гелертерское настроение ученость начинает казаться нам шире и глубже (пошлой!) действительности. Вот эпизод, показывающий насмешливость А.И. к гелертерству.

Однажды он слышал разговор лингвистов о том, что топонимику переделять — дело житейское, лексику вообще — любо-дорого, а вот можно ли поменять фонематический состав языка? Порассуждав, ученые мужи склонились к выводу, что фонемы в отличие от лексем — нет, нельзя. Слушая эту дискуссию, А.И. (как сам признался) посмеялся про себя: “А это смотря какие средства пустить в ход...”. Другой рассказ А.И. касался до провозвестника социолингвистики

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В. М. Жирмунского, которого А. И. мог однажды наблюдать в магазине писчих принадлежностей. У продавщиц советского канцелярского магазина академик, прибегая к своему знаменитому, с рыдающей интонацией, «романо-жирмунскому» произношению, про бумагу для набросков спрашивал так: «Есть у Вас брульоны?» (brouillons). «Отец социальной диалектологии не понимает — размышлял А. И., что продавщица относится к тому слою и поколению, которые про брульоны не слыхивали».

Научная жизнь. Помню еще молодого А. И., когда он вдруг в присутствии старших коллег объявил, что отныне не пропустит ни одной негодной диссертации по классической филологии. Началось с диссертации, защищавшейся в Институте языкоznания. Статистика латинской речи у лингвистки проводилась по надгробным надписям — на это последовало методологическое замечание А. И.: при грамматическом однообразии кратких надписей одного жанра статистические данные нерепрезентативны; лингвистика бессильна без филологии. И. М. Тронский был сильно раздражен и вел себя обидным для А. И. образом, между тем как Жирмунский был осторожнее. Диссертация была защищена. И все-таки А. И., требовавший от себя не только не мстить, но и не бранить своих обидчиков, заметил лестный для И. М. парадокс в его ученой практике: «Даже безнадежно запутанное Иосиф Моисеевич изложит ясно — иначе не умеет».

Непокорная истина

Полемики. На лекциях по мифологии А. И. часто касался идей А. Ф. Лосева, О. М. Фрейденберг, новейших структуралистов, которые в эту пору стали выступать заходно с семиотикой; подробно разобрали в семинаре и статью С. С. Аверинцева об Эдипе. Марксистское засилье (А. И. лишь изредка допускал, что у номинальных марксистов случаются «питекантропские — но свои — мысли») грозило перемениться на «инонауку», где вместо идейного железобетона должно было воцариться нечто противопоставленное иной официальной идеологии, но не продолжающей старую, отодвинутую в сторону научную традицию. Под определяющим влиянием А. И. и учеников Доватура и Боровского развернулась критика слушавшей его молодежи в адрес новых течений; главная цель была сформировать свое мнение, показать его тем, кто выбирает свою дорогу рядом с нами, чтобы заниматься впрямь не чуждой нам, а собственной повесткой. А. И. при этом не был зачинщиком событий, скорее ему приходилось сдерживать своих слушателей, которые, как водится, соединяли концепцию, шедшую от учителя, с задором молодости. Задача как самого А. И., так и антиковедческой молодежи, ополчившейся на «новизну», была оградить изучение античности в рамках необъятной klassische Altertumswissenschaft от легковесного новаторства; новыми, по нашему мнению, должны быть итоги рассмотрения, а не способы и приемы мысли. Для школы (или некого ее подобия) такие операции полезны — иначе она не кристаллизуется и не мобилизуется.

Как и наши учителя на обеих университетских кафедрах (Классической филологии и Истории древнего мира), мы понимали, что оздоровление дисциплин, изучающих античность, может прийти только из традиции. Это обстоятельство однажды отчетливо выразил А. И. при обсуждении творчества О. М. Фрейденберг: каково бы оно ни было само по себе, на него просто нет времени у университет-
ской науки — q.e.d. Разумеется, ценность в науке может иметь не только то, что твердо доказано, но преподавать в Университете следует только то, что имеет многовековой запас прочности. Примечательно, что со временем, с начала 80-х, когда и в Москве появилась академическая молодежь, пожелавшая учиться у А. И., он живо откликнулся, и это не прошло бесследно для ряда тамошних классиков.

Одной из характерных черт обстановки, когда начало отступать идеологическое засилье, стал релятивизм, когда получалось, что любая интерпретация сгодится — все толкования хороши и все они не только существуют в научной литературе, но и, некоторым образом, предсуществуют в произведениях. Этому обратному имманентному характеру релятивизма противостояла зайцевская принципиальная оценка лучших ученых, о которых он говорил с пietetом: «Это (был) один из тех, кто еще верит (или: верил) в научную истину».

Речь тут шла не о том, что человек готов в крик возглашать свое мнение, от которого ни за что на свете не способен уже отказаться. Верить в (объективную) истину для А. И. означало скорее обратное: быть готовым отказываться и от своего мнения, если взыскательное исследование этого потребует.

Кумиры А. И. были: Платон и Аристотель, А. Шопенгауэр, Ф. Ф. Зелинский, М. Вебер, Жюльен Бенда, А. Шопенгауэр, Ф. Ф. Зелинский, М. Вебер, Жюльен Бенда, А. Тойнби, К. Поппер. В 1960-е годы, если не ранее, А. И. особенно ценил “Trahison des clercs” Ж. Бенда (значение культурологической концепции последнего было замечено у нас позже). Это сочинение (как и “Wissenschaft als Beruf” М. Вебера) формировали свое зерно взглядов А. И. на место и роль ученого в обществе, хотя и понятно, что по мере всестороннего углубления в научную жизнь, ответы на затронутые французским интеллектуалом животрепещущие вопросы получали у А. И. собственную окраску. По Ж. Бенда и А. И. Зайцеву, в научной среде речь должна идти не о классах, партиях или идеологиях, а о служении каждого, кто объявляет себя причастным к ученому (при)званию, вечным общечеловеческим ценностям, как это делали лучшие умы всех эпох и народов; нравственный долг ученого не подменять этой задачи. Именно отсюда я — увы, лишь несколько десятилетий спустя — постигаю замечание А. И. по поводу отказа одного ученого принять участие в каком-то научном мероприятии: «Не спросил он: “Зачем мне это нужно?”». Это замечание, выраженное даже с нажимом, не было мне вполне понятно, хотя в нем сразу почувствовалось что-то тревожное, потому что я по самому себе начал замечать, что вдруг стал иной раз задавать себе вопросы в этом духе. Инче говоря, А. И. был давно и на практике, и теоретически готов к тому, чтобы оценить новую обстановку: мы получили ряд свобод, зато невзначай усилилось вторжение утилитаризма в сферу ценностей, когда «приходится» (а по существу уже и хочется) не хранить и приумножать вечные ценности, а пускаться во все тяжкие, чтобы добыть себе какие получится. Эпоха героического сопротивления стала уходить в прошлое и время от времени начало проявляться то, что я с некоторых пор начал называть “когнитивным бизнесом”.

Педагогика и дидактика

Единство научных занятий и педагогической деятельности было у А. И. поразительным по масштабу, последовательности и длительности. Это была полнейшая Einheit der Forschung und Lehre, по В. Гумбольдту. Часто вспоминаю о приведенных
выше словах о роли total commitment у старой русской интеллигенции, упомяну здесь и еще один ориентир, который, может быть, имел место. А. И. будучи и католиком, и педагогом, был мне кажется, под сильным впечатлением от Игнация Лойолы — личности безусловно выдающейся и обжигающей острой.Дело не в основании одного из примечательнейших орденов, но в том педагогическом направлении, какое основатель ему так основательно придал, и в той не только внешней, но и внутренней дисциплине, к которой он был страстно устремлен. Разумеется, это могло быть и не так — тогда пусть это будет часть того, что формировал в А. И. французский католический консерватизм, который был ему близок несомненно.

Однажды обсуждали вопрос, каково предельное количество учащихся в аудитории для успешного преподавания древних языков. А. И. сказал: «Готов преподавать древний язык в Актовом зале (на Филфаке он довольно просторный). При одном условии: в одной руке у меня будет бич, в другой — пистолет». Однако, поскольку, как и всем другим, ему не давали таких педагогических аксессуаров, приходилось ему, как и всем, прибегать к менее романтической педагогике, когда неизвестно, кому хуже: страдающему за предмет наставнику или жизнерадостному слушателю. И тут он давал младшим педагогам дорогой совет: «Говорите слова», не расходуя себя на самоистязание в педагогическом процессе, было у него и примечательное умение проговаривать то, что он думал о своем визави при неправильном поведении последнего, в тот самый момент, но в общем виде, так что получалось нечто вроде разговора с совестью младшего.

Разрозненное об учителях и учениках

Про научные школы А. И. говорил, что «ученики это те, кто повторяет и ошибки учителя». Думается, что это положение весьма полезно при вдумчивом выделении и эпistemологической оценке научных школ.

«Воля берет свое» — о деловитости, ослабляющей характерный для юности созерцательный интерес к общим вопросам познания, к энциклопедии наук и т. п.: четкие жизненные задачи сужают круг внимания к явлениям мира.

Почему старшие бывают иногда придирчивы к младшим? На мой вопрос А. И. ответил цитатой: Simia quam similis, turpissima bestia, nobis (тоже ученый и тоже самостоятельный — как это стерпеть?).

«Простых текстов нет» (говорено около Биржи Томона) — совершенно простая, но для дидактики, как и для герменевтики, важная мысль. — Да, если учитывать разнообразие отношений любого текста к действительности, с одной стороны, и к мысли, ее «фигурам», истокам и предпосылкам — с другой, то это не только просто звучит, но и подЂтоживает большое научное содержание.

Преподавал он много и до конца не истощился — последние ученики оказались едва ли не самыми профессионально удачными. Он выдержал — и составил школу. Оставил еще и след в Москве. Наконец, принял весомое участие в основании и во внутренней программе возрожденной гимназии (школа №610), которой вполне пристало бы носить его имя. Школа способствует развитию гуманитарного знания в различных областях. И как раз это затевал Зайцев, помогая Л. Я. Лурье и Л. Я. Жмудю составить программу классической гимназии, которая была бы достойна этого имени и противоположна «обезьяннику».
Во-первых, уже рассказывалось о ценности выводов, которые, как умело выявить А. И., сами собой следовали из того, что было сказано в прослушанном им докладе. Но примечательно было и другое, что часто радовало в его собственных докладах или лекциях. Дело было в ограничении выводов, т. е. в отказе от части вопросов, которые не являются необходимыми для изображенного рассмотрения. Отметив, что ответа на некий попутно возникший вопрос мы пока не знаем, или что доказательства него более широкого утверждения он не знает, он вдруг восклицал, ликуя: «Но это и не нужно для вопроса, который мы себе поставили». Иначе говоря, он предупреждал неискушенного исследователя от наивности браться доказывать все, что угодно, радостно взваливая на себя onus probandi. (Бельгийский историк Анри Пирон в немецком плену, наблюдавшая русских военнопленных, заметил как раз избыточное трудолюбие русских, за которым верный глаз разглядит более изысканную форму той же лени.) Получается, что А. И. пояснял: нужен не труд сам по себе, а привычка и умение трудиться с толком, чтобы дойти до конца, т. е. до успеха.

Выбор жизненных принципов

Мы говорили, что А. И. больше занимался правотой или правильностью представлений, чем оригинальностью и поиски превосходства. Поэтому он мог легко брать чужие принципы — лишь бы подходили. Иногда это были прописные истины, которым однако трудно следовать. «Ненавидеть порок, а не человека». Сюда же относится разительное в жизни прощение тех, кто бывал нехорош с ним. Разделяя скорее этику Феогнида, я недоумевал в тех случаях, когда за него же был обижен. Оригинальнее казалось наблюдение: «Христианство делает хороших лучше, а дурных хуже» (мне неизвестно происхождения этой любопытной идеи).

Сюда же отнесем любимую поговорку А. И.: «Лучшее враг хорошего». Мудрость известная, но может казаться индюгендшей халтурщика. То, что ей следовал А. И., сразу показывает: это не так. Не враждую с перфекционизмом, А. И. обращал внимание на то, что оборотной стороной его является малодушное, стремление отказывать, забывание исходной цели и в итоге — торжество небытия. Сюда же относилась у А. И. формула «Дело рук человеческих», т. е. старательно не помни, что несовершенства неизбежны (ср. «изделие рук человеческих» в 2 Reg., 19, 18, применительно к идолам). Для младших он использовал такое ободрение: «Не боги горшки обжигают», что слышал от него юный тогда Д. Кейер, в котором А. И. не боялся укрепить сомнение в авторитетах. Кстати, хотя я не помню, чтобы он брал какие-нибудь свои слова назад, всегда чувствовалось, что непогрешимым он себя не считает, особенно в том, что для него было всего важнее — в научном рассуждении. Авторитет имел у него не когнитивную, а скорее эвристическую ценность.

Знание будущего

Из того, что греки столь же наивно, сколь и громоздко гадали о будущем, А. И. не вывел суетности самого интереса к такому приложению знания. Рассуждая о неоднолинейной эволюции, он в начале 1970-х пророчил возвращение суеверий. В конце 80-х это стало стремительное происходить; более того, после засилья самого плоского рационализма суеверие вернулось в весьма примитивных формах.
Тут можно говорить о прямом пророчестве А. И., который и вообще считал, что разумное знание приложимо к будущему, хотя оно молчит в аксиологии.

Он не только знал иногда, что будет, но мог говорить и о том, чего не будет. Не будет, например, Пушкина. «Сто генералов с саблями наголо должны скакать во весь опор ради того, чтоб был один Пушкин.» Иначе говоря, без великолепного окруже-
ния и роскошного антуража в духе Галереи 1812 г., без иерархии и славы, без чести и благородства, без борьбы многих со многими (но не всех со всеми — это уже, опять по Зайцеву — «банка пауков», которая, возможно, ожидает нас) существование людей вселенски гениального духа немыслимо; без отважных не будет и совершенных.

Тройственная формула будущего по Зайцеву: человеческое понимание, человеческое существование людей вселенски гениального духа немыслимо; без отважных не будет и совершенных.

Примечательность тут уже в том, что будущее мыслилось не как предмет досужего гадания, но как объект расчета. Футурология хоть и не обязательно научна, но способна такою быть и должна такою стать. А еще то, что в первую очередь триады входят, как видим, гуманитарные науки и не в последнюю очередь филология в качестве не единственной, но наиболее разработанной области герменевтики, которой, таким образом, уготовано достойнейшее место в человеческой истории. Дело в том, что при восхищении перед достижениями естественных наук восторженного отношения к уровню современного филологического знания у А. И. не могло быть. Однако то, что не наблюдается в настоящем, может еще сложиться в будущем. Он считал, что гуманитарное, в частности, филологическое знание, будет серьезно востребовано впоследствии, а для примера приводил криминалистику. Успех политологии, сказывающеся в успехах иностранных и иногда политтехнологий, обеспечивают значительное влияние этого знания (будь то в хорошем или дурном смысле). По-моему очевидно, что в руках национальной филологии (любой народности) находится хранение национальных святых и через это — национальный язык и гуманистическую литературу — воспитание патриотизма, притом настоящего, а не того, который кому-то удобен. Продолжая эту мысль: антропологическая составляющая филологии пока еще не стала очевидной, но легко ожидать, что она прояснится.

Отсюда, в частности, само собой следует великое значение (и уж наверное — на значение) гуманитарных наук. Наступление века информации (культурный взрыв на нашей памяти!) и роль процессов управления в постиндустриальном обществе, где процессы управления будут становиться важнее, чем производство, готовит нас к более изысканным формам человеческого существования. Что касается человечества, то он понимал, что предстоит социальное использование наследственности. Прочтение генома А. И. совершенно не удивило бы — он ждал именно такого рода открытий, не говоря о развитии медицины. Не без ужаса задумывался он о евгенике и о социальных экспериментах, но ему было ясно, что это неминуемо и что образ человека, создаваемый словесностью, будет играть роль во всем этом.

Эстетика и стиль афоризмов

А. И. смолоду изредка, но хаживал в музыкальный концерт или на вернисаж. Чувствовал он, конечно, и художественную красоту текстов. Однако обычно он не говорил об этом, хотя определенно чувствовал, испытывая не столько восторг, сколько некое благоговение перед близостью красоты. Об этом же свидетельствует и усердное
чтение новинок художественной — своей или иностранной — литературы. Тут была, как я догадываюсь, вдумываясь в него теперь, скромность, притом скромность подлинная. Хотя всякое художество онтологически (и платоновски) стояло для него ниже истинного знания, персоналистики он, видно, ставил искусство выше науки, у которой есть по крайней мере какие-то правила, между тем как нельзя вообще предугадать, как быть и что делать художнику. Понимая, что нельзя притязать на все разом, А.И. просто принял, что артистическое это, как бы, не его ума дело.

В его научных трудах преобладает деловитость и авторитетная сдержанность. Его язык не цитет ничего кроме мысли — здравой, твердой, уверенной в своей мощи. Но при столь яркой натуре и уме не обошлось без того, чтоб в сфере учительства и убедительной дидактики наметилась (скорее бессознательно) собственная афроистическая дикция. Стиль сложился здесь супер-твердый: краткость, гипербола, гротеск. Зерно в сказывания укладывается обычно в десяток слогов с 2–3 тоническими акцентами. Задание было следующее: выражая мрачные мысли, говорить веселые слова, потому что ум по природе есть нечто сильное и радостное, а уныние уместно там, где ум на ущербе. Кроме того, дидактически правильно довести до знания некое наставительное содержание, не надоедая нотациями. Как ни странно, пускалась в ход при этом и гистрионика: чаще всего это была имитация блаженства с гротескной гиперболизацией его. Помню, к примеру, его восторженно-блаженное стональное при фамилии Урядникова: «Кака-я фа-ми-лия!»

Умоприятелен был литературно-монархический сон о явлении некоего великого князя в беспорядочно-шумном собрании людей — это можно даже не воспроизводить здесь: там были собраны все архетипические черты, включая звук волочившейся по полу сабли главного, хоть и немого, персонажа. Далее — немая сцена. Соединять страхи с некой веселостью, наверное, хорошо, тогда не так страшно. Об этом упоминали историю от Г. В. Пионтека (другой товарищ и близкий современник А.И.), который не мог не повести Ганну Галустовну и любознательного товарища на болота близ старинной системы каналов под Петергофом, начатых строительством в 1715 г. Вовремя покинуть замечательные места не успели — пришлось заночевать на болоте. Под утро вдали раздался странный крик, и Зайцев, стоявший несколько часов прислонившийся к дереву, произнес только: «Он это любит».

Обсуждали, кто употребляет просто некоторые идеи о роли структуры, а кто-таки завзятый структуралист. «А Вы попробуйте пририсовать... хвост. Получится — значит структуралист». — «Ну, например, NN? (робко спросил я, назвав очень почтенного ученого, которого, я уверен, уважал и А.И.). Неужели получится?» На это А.И. (опять с окрушением и опять безнадежно мотая головой): «Получится!» (Напоминаю, что речь не о старинных структуралистиах, а семиотического извода; и не в традиционных для них областях, а при покущении на сугубо филологическую территорию.) Помню состязание в остроумных репликах по поводу благочестия с другом Античного кабинета богословом Мартином Хенгелем из Тюбингена, посетившим нас в 90-е годы. О православном батюшке, который воз гостя к Зайцевым на своей машине, Хенгель сказал: «Молодец! Но как водитель... слишком верит в Бога». Ну а А.И. дал конфессиональный отзыв о нашем протестантском друге: «Хорош Хенгель, да только — на этом месте А.И. сокрушенно помогал головой и с осуждением вздохнул — в Чёрта не верит».
Подведем итог

Мы думали вспомнить какую-то часть зайцевских апофтехов — Lagidae placita! — надеясь, что кому-нибудь вспомнится что-нибудь близкое к этому, а то и многое другое. Однако по ходу изложения дело стало представляться несколько иначе. Оказалось, что взятые по отдельности высказывания А. И. нуждаются в пояснениях, додумывании не только житейского контекста, но и своего системного значения. Осмысление их требует мобилизации знаний о нем, посильного учета его (труднообозримого) горизонта. ἄγραφα δόγμαта крупного ученого и самобытного мыслителя не только представляют собой нечто уходящее корнями в глубины жизни и личности, но и нечто необходимое для научного творчества — они дают ту почву, на которой последнее произрастает. Это — принципы, основы, предпосылки отношения к своему предмету, о которых ученые отдельно не разговаривают, хотя ищут себе подпорок этого рода и затем исходят из них в существенные моменты своей исследовательской жизни. Что ж! Подводить итоги о Зайцеве можно не спеша.
ЧИТАЯ ЗАЙЦЕВА*

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Статья представляет собой размышление о личности и разностороннем научном и педагогическом наследии филолога-классика, профессора Ленинградского университета Александра Иосифовича Зайцева, принадлежащем его ученику, коллеге и редактору серии его трудов. Даётся обзор серии «Из наследия А. И. Зайцева», охарактеризованы прижизненное и посмертное публикации его работ, анализируются их восприятие в разных сферах — в университете и широко за его пределами. Автор ставит вопрос: почему учёный такого масштаба известен и почитаем непропорционально его исследовательскому, педагогическому и человеческому таланту? Портрет неизменно чуткого к своим ученикам учителя, который определил творческий путь, жизненные принципы и представления об этике научной деятельности нескольких поколений ленинградских / петербургских классиков, неотделим в статье от методологии гуманитарных исследований.

Ключевые слова: И. Зайцев, научное наследие, история классической филологии, культурный релятивизм.

За последние годы, готовя к изданню труды А. И. Зайцева, я читал их более систематически, чем это было при его жизни. Хотя при таком прочтении что-то неизбежно становится привычным и ускользает от внимания, другие вещи, на которые я раньше особого внимания не обращал, наоборот, приобретают более ясные очертания. Сегодня я хотел бы поделиться с вами не только своими наблюдениями редактора, но и размышлениями о том, как письменное наследие А. И., его завершенные и незавершенные работы соотносятся с памятью о его личности.

Сначала немного слов о серии «Из наследия А. И. Зайцева». Её первый том содержал исправленное и дополненное издание его книги о культурном перевороте в Греции, статьи на эту тему, а также неизданные доклады, с которыми он выступал в ходе памятных многим обсуждений книги в Ленинградском университете в 1980 и 1981 гг., а затем и в Константинском университете, уже после выхода немецкого перевода книги. В том «Избранных статей» вошли 72 работы, т. е. все имевшие более или менее законченный характер статьи и доклады. Третий том представляет собою лекции А. И. по истории греческой религии и мифологии, которые, помимо нашей серии, вышли еще раз в московском издательстве Academia в виде учебника, на плохой бумаге, но зато большим тиражом. Четвертый том состоит из трех больших работ А. И. — его дипломного сочинения о сатирической драме Эсхила «Прометей — возжигатель огня», кандидатской диссертации о гимне Диоскурам Алкмана

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1 Zaicev, 2000.
2 Zaicev, 2002.
4 Zaicev, 2005.
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и второго издания его книги о происхождении греческого гекзаметра.5 Пользуюсь случаем выразить свою искреннюю признательность всем участвовавшим в издании серии, в первую очередь Н. А. Алмазовой, соредактору второго тома, А. Л. Верлинскому, написавшему предисловие к этому тому, В. В. Зельченко, соредактору четвертого тома, а также всем, кто работал с архивом А. И., набирал, сканировал, правил, проверял и помогал советом — без их деятельного и бескорыстного участия осуществить это предприятие было бы невозможно.

В оставшийся, пятый том серии (если он выйдет) должно войти всё остальное, пригодное для публикации, например, читавшиеся в Москве лекции о Пиндаре, тексты курсов по истории греческой литературы и греческого государства, доклады о культе Эдипа, часть спецкурса по Эдипу, несколько небольших статей и ряд других работ. Поскольку эти труды не готовились А. И. к печати, работы здесь особенно много, кроме того, не хочется упустить ничего из достойного для публикации, а значит, нужно еще раз просмотреть его архив. Здесь очень важно, как мне кажется, соблюсти меру и издать действительно то, что сам А. И. счел бы в принципе стоящим внимания читателей. Его критерии были достаточно жесткими: узнав, например, о задуманном нами издании его статей, он его быстро пресек, сказав, что многие из них ему не нравятся, и предложил заняться этим после его смерти. Сейчас приходится выбирать исходя уже из собственных представлений, и выбор этот, если речь идет о неопубликованных вещах, не всегда очевиден. Есть, например, положительная рецензия на книгу академика В. Н. Топорова об Энее, положительная в том смысле, что А. И. одобряет ее, так сказать, духовное содержание, а не научные построения. Есть публицистическая статья о дате основания СПб университета, здесь А. И. солидаризировался с точкой зрения родного ему учреждения, а вот мое учреждение (ИИЕТ РАН) ее всячески оспаривало. Впрочем, сейчас этот спор, кажется, потерял свою актуальность.

Я говорил о пятом, последнем томе серии, но за ее пределами остается несколько важных трудов. Вышел учебный курс А. И. по греческой метрике под редакцией его ученицы В. П. Смышляевой.6 Аналогичный, но гораздо более обширный курс А. И. по исторической грамматике греческого языка уже более 15 лет готовится к изданию Т. Б. Путиловой. Уверенности в том, что эта работа будет когда-либо закончена и опубликована, у меня нет, хотя надежда на это еще не умерла. Еще более смутными выглядят перспективы издания комментария А. И. к платоновским «Законам». Собственно говоря, комментария как такового нет, есть записи того, что говорил А. И. на занятиях, сделанные самим стойким участником семинара В. А. Гуторовым. Можно ли будет когда-нибудь превратить их в комментарий, кто мог бы этим заняться, в каком виде их издавать — на эти вопросы пока у меня ответа нет.

Глядя на труды А. И. с редакторской, т. е. заведомо узкой точки зрения, следует сказать, что педантом он не был. Такие вещи, как унификация имен, единообразие сокращений и прочие маленькие радости редактора его не очень волновали, имя Мильмена Пэри, например, он писал четырьмя разными способами. В книгах он честно пытался справиться с огромным фактическим и библиографическим материалом, но это не всегда удавалось. Что касается стиля, то сам А. И. не

5 Zaicev, 2006.
раз признавался, что научить русской стилистике, в отличие от латинской, он не смог бы. Здесь, впрочем, можно выделить несколько этапов эволюции его стиля. Ранние работы, включая аккуратно написанный диплом, безысксcury, суховаты, но точны. В кандидатской диссертации мысль как бы опережает слово, стремление к стилистической завершенности слабее, так что править этот текст пришлось не один раз. Многие поздние работы, особенно статьи, написаны просто блестящие, некоторые не лишенны и риторических приемов, например, начало его статьи о мифе: «До каких пор мы будем рассуждать о мифе, не согласившись прежде, какое содержание вкладываем мы в это понятие?» (Зайцев, 2002, 446). Впрочем, к славе Цицерона А. И. всерьез никогда не стремился, рукописные тексты его курсов, например по греческой мифологии, содержат очень немногие следы правки и никаких следов мучительной борьбы со словом. Курс писался практически бело, с экономией не только собственного времени, но и бумаги (вообще, многие работы написаны на оборотках деловых бумаг или чужих трудов). Статьи, написанные по-немецки, в этом плане от русских ничем не отличаются, во французской статье следов правки гораздо больше.7 Судя по всему, годам к 45—50 А. И. достиг известной гармонии между тем, что и как он хотел сказать, сохранив ее до конца жизни.

Проблема «что сказать» перед ним к этому времени уже давно не стояла. Присутствующий на научном заседании с участием Зайцева, можно было быть уверенным: на какую бы тему ни был доклад, он умеет сказать по его поводу нечто существенное, не всегда обязательно оригинальное, но почти всегда общедоступное. О широте его интересов и энциклопедичности познаний говорили и писали не раз. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть другое. Талантливый человек обычно говорит о своем, особой чуткости к интеллектуальным проблемам других ожидать от него не приходится, если только они не созвучны его собственным. В А. И. меня всегда поражала уникальность его таланта, позволявшего ему держать в поле зрения и внимания всё то, чем занимались или в принципе могли бы заняться его коллеги и ученики. Раньше мне казалось, что одних таланта и энциклопедичности познаний говорили и писали не раз. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть другое. Талантливый человек обычно говорит о своем, особой чуткости к интеллектуальным проблемам других ожидать от него не приходится, если только они не созвучны его собственным. В А. И. меня всегда поражала уникальность его таланта, позволявшего ему держать в поле зрения и внимания всё то, чем занимались или в принципе могли бы заняться его коллеги и ученики. Раньше мне казалось, что одних таланта и энциклопедичности познаний говорили и писали не раз. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть другое. Талантливый человек обычно говорит о своем, особой чуткости к интеллектуальным проблемам других ожидать от него не приходится, если только они не созвучны его собственным. В А. И. меня всегда поражала уникальность его таланта, позволявшего ему держать в поле зрения и внимания всё то, чем занимались или в принципе могли бы заняться его коллеги и ученики. Раньше мне казалось, что одних таланта и энциклопедичности познаний говорили и писали не раз. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть другое. Талантливый человек обычно говорит о своем, особой чуткости к интеллектуальным проблемам других ожидать от него не приходится, если только они не созвучны его собственным. В А. И. меня всегда поражала уникальность его таланта, позволяющего ему держать в поле зрения и внимания всё то, чем занимались или в принципе могли бы заняться его коллеги и ученики. Раньше мне казалось, что одних таланта и энциклопедичности познаний говорили и писали не раз. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть другое. Талантливый человек обычно говорит о своем, особой чуткости к интеллектуальным проблемам других ожидать от него не приходится, если только они не созвучны его собственным. В А. И. меня всегда поражала уникальность его таланта, позволяющего ему держать в поле зрения и внимания всё то, чем занимались или в принципе могли бы заняться его коллеги и ученики. Раньше мне казалось, что одних таланта и энциклопедичности познаний говорили и писали не раз. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть другое. Талантливый человек обычно говорит о своем, особой чуткости к интеллектуальным проблемам других ожидать от него не приходится, если только они не созвучны его собственным. В А. И. меня всегда поражала уникальность его таланта, позволяющего ему держать в поле зрения и внимания всё то, чем занимались или в принципе могли бы заняться его коллеги и ученики. Раньше мне казалось, что одних таланта и энциклопедичности познаний говорили и писали не раз. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть другое. Талантливый человек обычно говорит о своем, особой чуткости к интеллектуальным проблемам других ожидать от него не приходится, если только они не созвучны его собственным. В А. И. меня всегда поражала уникальность его таланта, позволяющего ему держать в поле зрения и внимания всё то, чем занимались или в принципе могли бы заняться его коллеги и ученики. Раньше мне казалось, что одних таланта и энциклопедичности познан

показаться, что не будь всех нас, вместе взятых, не будь у него многочисленных и добровольно возложенных на себя обязательств, Зайцев написал бы гораздо больше. Теоретически это так, а практически дома он занимался еще полудюжиной восточных языков, от иврита до санскрита, которым, насколько я знаю, он никого не учил, но которые считал нужными для своей научной работы. Так что и здесь, как мне кажется, он сумел достичь некой гармонии между своими научными интересами и своей миссией учителя. Сколько ни разнообразны были темы его курсов, большинство из них так или иначе связаны с его самостоятельными изысканиями.

Вот что пишет В. П. Смышляева в предисловии к зайцевской «Метрике»: «Осенью 1979 г. Александр Иосифович сообщил мне, что впервые приступает к чтению лекций по стихосложению, чтобы облегчить мучительную для студентов интерпретацию греческих мелических размеров».9 Эту «Метрику» я читал раз десять, но и сейчас такая фраза как «Фалекиев одиннадцатисложник состоит из гликонея и ямбической каталектической сизигии, имеющей форму бакхии» остается для меня столь же темной, как и в первый раз. У А. И. занятия метрикой нашли прямое отражение в его замечательной книге о происхождении гексаметра. В свою очередь, я помню, как осенью того же 1979 г., будучи на 3-м курсе, я осваивал книгу Буркerta о пифагорееизме10 и жаловался А. И., что Буркерт буквально подавляет своих знаниями и интеллектом. Сам А. И. писал тогда свой «Культурный переворот», в котором нашлось место и для полемики с Буркертом, мне же он сказал следующее: «Леонид Яковлевич, Буркерт — дурак», а в ответ на мое недоумение разъяснил: «Да, он действительно знает и учитывает все, но когда дело доходит до решающего выбора, он оказывается неверным». Я думаю, что А. И. прекрасно понимал, что Буркерт не дурак, а один из самых выдающихся немецких классиков, достойный всяческого уважения, но тогда слова А. И. помогли мне сопротивляться гипнотизму аргументов БуркERTA, против которых не устояло множество исследователей, до сих пор считающих, что тему науки и философии в раннем пифагорееизме он закрыл навеки.11

Читая Зайцева, интересно наблюдать, как его казалось бы далекие от классики занятия находят неожиданный выход в его трудах. Вот, например, фраза из книги о гексаметре, на которую уже обращал внимание А. Л. Верлинский: «Более того, homo sapiens вообще возник в одном центре и распространялся повсеместно, вытесняя и истребляя неандертальцев; это была заря верхнего палеолита» (Зайцев, 2006, 60). Это сказано при обсуждении миграций праиндоевропейцев и сказано очень уместно, пусть и звучит неожиданно для индоевропеистов. В «Культурном перевороте», признавая внутреннее родство между вавилонскими решениями квадратных уравнений и греческими задачами на приложение площадей, он задает вопрос, а «мог ли кто-либо до Декарта уловить это родство и тем более — осуществить еще в V в. до н. э. сознательный перевод с алгебраического языка на геометрический?» (Зайцев, 2000, 215). Этот бесспорный аргумент в пользу независимого развития обеих традиций подразумевает не просто знание созданной Декартом аналитической геометрии, но и исторический подход к ней, столь редкий

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9 Smyshl’eaeva, 2010, 3.
10 Burkert, 1972.
для математиков. Вообще, к проблеме типологического сходства и генетического родства, проблеам кардинальной для любого сравнительного исследования, он обрачался постоянно, и на занятиях, и в своих трудах. Вот одно из его характерных замечаний: «Поразительно, что ни в одной из всех своих работ, посвященных славянскому народному стиху, Якобсон ни разу даже не взвешивает вопрос о том, не является ли то или иное сходство типологическому» (Зайцев, 2002, 140, примеч. 31). Действительно, обыденному сознанию естественно принимать похожих людей за родственников, но почему так поступал лингвист Якобсон? Ведь и там, где мы не можем прямо спросить «Простите, Вы не брат Ивана Ивановича?», нужно, по крайней мере, ставить этот вопрос перед собой, а потом уже строить какие-то выводы.

Читая Зайцева, можно кое-что лучше понять и в нем самом. А. И. очень интересовался таким феноменом, как игра, ее психологическими и социальными аспектами. С игровым началом он связывал такие важнейшие проявления человеческого духа как творчество и агональную установку. О «родственном игре духе чистого соревнования» есть немало упоминаний в «Культурном перевороте», но сейчас я хотел бы обратить внимание на то, как игровое начало проявлялось у самого Зайцева. Известно, что многие талантливые и поглощенные своим делом люди любили иногда дурачиться, обычно в юности, но нередко и позже. Студент Лобачевский на спор перепрыгивал через идущего по лестнице преподавателя. Подпоручик Тухачевский, сидя в 1914 году в окопах, смастерил лук и послал немцам записки оскорбительного содержания. Фотография седого Эйнштейна с выставленным языком всем хорошо известна. Жизнь А. И. поначалу складывалась так, что места для игр в ней, пожалуй, было еще меньше, чем для творчества. Арест и расстрел отца, лагерный срок матери, очень рано пришедшее понимание преступности режима, болезнь, эвакуация, собственный арест, годы психиатрической тюрьмы — всё это могло сломать и высушить и очень сильного человека. А. И. не сломался и, оставаясь внутренне человеком необыкновенно сосредоточенным, нередко удивлял окружающих неординарным поведением. Вот эпизод из недавних воспоминаний Ольги Ивановны об их лесных походах, в которых А. И. иногда оставлял жену и детей на вырубке, а сам шел дальше: «Однажды, возвращаясь ко мне, он радостно залаял. Этот лай был такой естественный, что ввел меня в заблуждение и очень напугал, так что вместо того, чтобы идти навстречу лаю, я затаилась на месте». Я убежден, что многие из более известных нам эпизодов — его знаки с котом, клыты Зевсом и прочие невинные шалости — были не проявлением эксцентричности, побуждающей, например, знаменитого классика Джонатаана Барнса появляться на конференциях одетым в костюм XVIII в., и не старческими причудами, а проявлением родственного его творческой натуре игрового начала, находившего выход даже в самых странных условиях. Ярким свидетельством этому служит рассказанныя им своему казанскому сокамернику фантастическая автобиография: родился в эмиграции в семье князя Зайцева, окончил Гарвард, сражался с немцами во Франции, по заданию американской разведки был заброшен в Москву, захвачен на конspirативной квартире и так далее (Жмудь, 2000, 7).

Читая Зайцева, можно узнать много интересного, и сомнений в необходимости издать все его труды у меня никогда не возникало. Но вот сомнения в том, что их читают, появлялись не раз. Возникали они и у самого А. И. Я не видел рецензии
ни на один из уже вышедших томов серии, и событием в научной жизни они, по- моему, не стали. Сейчас, положим, научная книга едва ли может стать событием в России, и всё же расходятся и воспринимаются такие книги по-разному. В обна- руженном мною в интернете опросе о наиболее значительных книгах последних лет только один участник назвал Зайцева, это был В. В. Зельченко; имя Гаспарова встречалось в ответах гораздо чаще. Вообще, я давно заметил, что труды Зайцева гораздо лучше воспринимаются людьми, зналвшими его лично, но ведь с годами их становится всё меньше. Особенно обидно за «Культурный переворот», немецкий перевод которого остался практически незамеченным. Даже в томе специальной международной конференции, посвященной этой теме, имя Зайцева фигурирует лишь в одной обзорной статье. В чем здесь дело? Сам А. И. полагал, что в его книге есть какие-то невидимые ему изъяны. Мне они, честно говоря, так же невидимы, как и ему. Да и на «Гексаметр» была только одна рецензия, написанная Ю. В. Откупщиковым. Может быть, русского и немецкого уже недостаточно, чтобы книга жила? Может быть, нужно переводить на английский? Но вот мне пишет коллега из Принстона, что собирается издавать неопубликованную немецкую версию «Диониса и прядионисиствва» Вячеслава Иванова: «Как образец более широкой европейской классической филологии она бесценна». Оказывается, что Иванов со своим дионисиством, вполне созвучным началу XX в., вписывается и в XXI, даже и по-немецки. Зайцев же выбивался из своего времени, но и нынешнее, похоже, не спешишь признать его своим.

Проблема, видимо, состоит в том, что перспектива, с которой написан, например, «Культурный переворот», противоположна многим современным тенденциям в антиковедении, да и в гуманитарных науках в целом. А. И. пытался объяснить то, как в VIII–V вв. до н. э. возникли вещи, определяющие нашу культуру сегодня: авторская литература, философия, наука, рациональная медицина. Сейчас такой взгляд на проблему многим кажется архаичным. Суммируя изменения, произошедшие за последние 30 лет, Филип ван дер Эйк, автор ряда солидных трудов по истории греческой медицины, пишет: вплоть до 70-х годов прошлого века было принято ссылаться на греческую медицину как на часть греческого чуда, наряду с литературой, философией, искусством и демократией. История медицины была историяй успехов, ее использовали для того, чтобы показать, что уже греки стояли на победном пути, по которому идет современная медицина. С тех пор, продолжает автор, во многих областях классических исследований вера в греческое чудо выветрилась, если не окончательно исчезла. Благодаря постмодернизму, плюрализму, культурному релятивизму и компаративизму здесь произошли здоровые изменения, и старый, «узурпирующий» подход сменился новым, «отчуждающим». Различие между наукой и псевдо-наукой было отброшено как исторически неплодотворное. Традиционный, содержательный подход уступает место подходу контекстуальному, который ван дер Эйку кажется гораздо более интересным. В част-

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15 Otkupshchikov, 1997.
16 Iwanow, 2012.
ности, такой подход позволяет заметить «соревновательный характер греческой науки». Итак, то, о чем 30 лет назад писал Зайцев, ссылаясь на Буркхардта и Ницше, выделяется за открытие эпохи отчуждения и постмодерна. Но даже и соревновательность ван дер Эйк трактует в риторическом духе, не как борьбу аргументов, а как стремление поразить публику и увеличить число поклонников.

А. И. не только не скрывал своего отношения к культурному релятивизму и всем его союзникам, но и ставил своей целью борьбу со складывающейся парадигмой отказа от причинно-следственных объяснений (Зайцев, 2002, 461). Ожидать от его противников столь же благожелательного интереса к его трудам, как и к прадионисийству Иванова, не приходится. К счастью, подобный подход еще далек от всеобъемлющей эпохи отчуждения и постмодерна. Но даже и соревновательность ван дер Эйк трактует в риторическом духе, не как борьбу аргументов, а как стремление поразить публику и увеличить число поклонников.

Что можно сделать в этой ситуации? Пытаясь следовать изречению «мыслить глобально, действовать локально», я давно уже завел правило ссыльаться на труды Зайцева во всех своих статьях и книгах, если это позволяет материал. Не знаю, как это действует на расстоянии, но в двух недавних статьях моих зарубежных коллег, которым я рассказал об этом правиле, я с большим удовлетворением встретил ссылки на «Культурный переворот». Замечу в завершение: очень важно при этом постараться избежать упреков в том, что мы чтим Зайцева в первую очередь потому, что он — российский, петербургский, университетский. Следует признать, что критический подход к наследию Зайцева с трудом дается тем, кто учился у него. А. И. с его склонностью к научным дефинициям называл это эмоционально-диффузным восприятием: любя кого-нибудь, мы с гораздо большей готовностью воспринимаем его слова. Справиться с этим полностью трудно, но можно как-то контролировать. В одном из наших последних разговоров Зайцев в ответ на мои слова: «А. И., но Вас же все так почитают» — сказал: «Лучше бы читали». Он не сказал «критически», но это и так следует из всего, чему и как он учил.

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READING ZAICEV

Leonid J. Zhmud

This paper presents a reflection on the personality and diverse scholarly and pedagogical heritage of a classical scholar, professor of Leningrad/St. Petersburg University Alexander Zaicev, written by his former student, colleague and the editor of his works. The author provides an overview of the series "From the Heritage of A. I. Zaitsev", characterizes lifetime and posthumous publication of his works, analyzes their perception in various circles, both university and beyond. Portrait of a teacher always responsive to his students, who determined scholarly paths, life principles and views on the ethics of professional work of several generations of Leningrad/St Petersburg classicists is inseparable in this paper from the methodology of scholarly research.

Keywords: Alexander Zaicev, scholarly heritage, history of classical philology, cultural relativism.

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WHEN IS IT REASONABLE TO PRAY TO THE GODS (EUR. ALCESTIS 218)?

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This brief note defends the manuscript reading δῆλα against δεινά conjectured by J. Diggle in Eur. Alcestis 218. Deeming the transmitted δῆλα “inconsequential”, he confidently prints the rather ubiquitous δεινά in its place. Although the corruption proposed by Diggle is palaeographically easy, it does not contribute to the better sense of the whole passage.

Keywords: Euripides, Alcestis, J. Diggle, conjectural criticism.

Eur. Alcestis 218:

— ἔξεισι τις ἢ τέμω τρίχα
cαι μέλανα στολμόν πέπλων
ἀμφιβαλώμεθ' ἡδή;
— δεινὰ μὲν, φίλοι, δεινὰ γ', ἀλλ' ὅμως
θεοίσιν εὐξόμεσθα· θεών
γάρ δύναμις μεγίστα.

218 δεινὰ…δεινά Diggle: δῆλα…δῆλά codd.¹

“— Will someone come out, or shall I now crop my hair in mourning and put on my black garments? — It is terrible, my friends, it is terrible, but still we shall pray to the gods, for the gods’ power is supreme.”

Post-Digglean Euripides is universally acclaimed as being in superior shape — elegant, lean, logical and never really saying anything “inconsequential”. At certain times when the Euripides of our tradition did fall slightly short of this exacting standard, he has been helped along — through a well-grounded choice of readings, conjecture, excision or obelus — by the masterly hand of his OCT editor, J. Diggle, a subtle and sound critic of all things Euripidean. It is one of these conjectural helpings along that I will venture to discuss in this brief note.

¹ Diggle 1984, 46 is the source of the new text. The tradition is confined to his apparatus.

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The Chorus of the elderly men of Pherae arrive at the doors of the palace to enquire about Alcestis, for her last day has come (77–130). They are trying to judge in a down-to-earth, practical way by certain external signs whether she is yet alive, or they can put on mourning. The house is silent (77, 86–8) and there is nobody around to announce the news (89), but Admetus could not have buried her yet, for the best of women cannot have deserved such an inconspicuous burial (93, 96–7); moreover, there is no lustral basin on the porch which the tradition demands (98–100), no lock of hair, shorn in mourning for the newly dead (101–2). There are no manifest signs of mourning; still, it is the very day (105) and the Chorus plunge into hopelessness (112–30). Prayer is in vain (119–20), the only saviour is himself dead (121–9) and “to what hope of life may I now cling?” (130) is the question that will touch to the quick even the least responsive in the audience. At this point, a Handmaid comes out and tells in admirable detail how Alcestis is spending her last hours (157–196). When she leaves to announce their friendly presence to her masters, the Chorus, overpowered by emotion, begin a brief prayer (more like an outcry) for deliverance, since now they know that Alcestis is still alive (212–4). They probably split into two semi-choruses representing individual speakers and sing alternatively (at least the change of speaker is evident at 218), expressing first hope of someone coming out of the palace in a short while and bringing them the latest news (the daggered ἔξεισις τις makes acceptable sense, but is unmetrical, hence the wish of Wilamowitz to get rid of ἔξεισις and have ἄδηλα· ἔστιν τις; meaning “will someone come?” which, however, adds a hope of some deliverer coming from other, probably heavenly quarters)2 or else they are already thinking of putting on mourning (216–7). And here comes the verse in question. The other semi-chorus (or the Leader, thus Murray in his translation3) begins with δῆλα μέν, φίλοι, δῆλα γ', ἀλλ' ὁμώς which Diggle found “inconsequential”4 and authored a conjecture δεινά… δεινά which he adopted straight into his text.5 But it seems at best flat. The corruption of ΔΕΙΝΑ to ΔΗΛΑ (as well as the reverse) is in itself welcome palaeographically and it is surprising that so few cases of it have been registered so far. Diggle at least gives only one example, S. Phil. 502,6 where πάντα ἄδηλα was conjectured by Wakefield instead of πάντα δεινά of the manuscripts.7 Here δεινά is a pedestrian slip, and ἄδηλα improves the sense of the whole passage, easing the near-repetitive “fearful and dangerous” (εἰσορῶν ὡς πάντα δεινά κἀπικινδύνως βροτοῖς) while both making room for the positive outcome παθεῖν μὲν εὖ (503), and cohering better with “dangerous” that anticipates troubles to come. But we may doubt whether this example supports the conjecture proposed in the Alcestis. The

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2 See Bierl, Calder, Fowler 1991, 39 with n. 148; for the observation, see Seeck 2008, 87. Parker cites the suggestion of Ch. Collard to understand ἐστιν τις (ἀκόμης); “Will some rescue come?”, or else (her own idea?) ἔστιν ἔτι; “Is she yet alive?”, see Parker 2007, 99 ad loc.
3 Murray 1915, 14.
5 He is alone in accepting it, so it seems. The recent editors either oppose it (Conacher, Seeck, Parker), or do not admit it into their edition (Kovacs). Some scholars find the number of unnecessary conjectures in his text alarming. See, for instance Kamerbeek 1986, 92–101.
6 He also refers to an article by Dawe, 1968, 16, who conjectured δηλόν for δεινόν in S. Phil. 755, but gave no further examples either.
7 It is not universally accepted. In fact, recent editors of Sophocles (Webster 1970, Kamerbeek 1980, Schein 2013) do not even mention it; in the new Loeb Lloyd-Jones prints πάντα· ἄδηλα, but translates the vulgata “seeing that for mortals all things are full of fear and of the danger”. Jebb does mention it, but does not discuss it, see Jebb 1898 ad loc.
Chorus do know that Alcestis is still alive, but have also learned from the Handmaid that she is wasting away rapidly (203–6), so these cryptic “it is clear, my friends, it is clear indeed”, in the situation when nobody (or nothing) comes out all the way up to 233, may suggest that they are almost losing hope (she might have died in the interim and the audience is being held on tenterhooks), but bracing themselves to prayer and rekindling slight hope in the audience. To pray and have hope in the face of a clear-as-day outcome is more trying than to pray because “it is terrible”, but there is nothing “inconsequential” about it.

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КОГДА МОЛИТЬСЯ БОГАМ РАЗУМНО? (EUR. ALCESTIS 218)

Татьяна Владимировна Костылева

В настоящей заметке рассматривается конъюктура Дж. Диггль к ст. 218 «Алкестиды» Еврипиды. Вместо рукописного δῆλα, которое издатель считает «неуместным» и «нелогичным», он предлагает читать δεινά, которое, по его мнению, удачно характеризует ситуацию. Несмотря на то что предполагаемая порча δεινά в δῆλα возможна палеографически, δεινά в контексте драмы Еврипид — очевидная банализация.

Ключевые слова: Еврипид, Алкестида, Дж. Диггль, критика текста.

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8 Hayley fared ill in Diggle’s discussion (n. 4), since he dared suggest in his fine and well-balanced commentary ad loc. that “[it is clear that] Alcestis is dead and the mourning should be put on”. But only as an alternative meaning, his other suggestion being “or we may understand ὅτι οὐκ ἂν γενοίτο κακῶν …It is hard to tell whether 218–19 is an answer to 215–17, or a continuation of 213–14 without regard to the intervening words of the other semi-chorus” which is a reasonable view. See Hayley 1898, 93 ad v. 218. Cf. Dale 1954, 69, ad loc.

9 From the point of view of grammar “it is clear, but we shall still pray” needs the adversative much more than “it is terrible, but we shall still pray”. See Seeck (n. 2) ad loc.